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The following Lectures were delivered by Lord Acton as Regius Profes-
sor of Modern History at Cambridge in the academical years 1895–96,
1896–97, 1897–98, 1898–99. The French Revolution, 1789–95, was in
those years one of the special subjects set for the Historical Tripos, and
this determined the scope of the course. In addition some discussion of
the literature of the Revolution generally took place either in a conver-
sation class or as an additional lecture. Such connected fragments of
these as remain have been printed as an appendix. For the titles of the
Lectures the editors are responsible.
J.N.F.
R.V.L
August 10, 1910I: THE HERALDS OF THE REVOLUTION
The revenue of France was near twenty millions when Lewis XVI, find-
ing it inadequate, called upon the nation for supply. In a single lifetime
it rose to far more than one hundred millions, while the national income
grew still more rapidly; and this increase was wrought by a class to
whom the ancient monarchy denied its best rewards, and whom it de-
prived of power in the country they enriched. As their industry effected
change in the distribution of property, and wealth ceased to be the pre-
rogative of a few, the excluded majority perceived that their disabilities
rested on no foundation of right and justice, and were unsupported by
reasons of State. They proposed that the prizes in the Government, the
Army, and the Church should be given to merit among the active and
necessary portion of the people, and that no privilege injurious to them
should be reserved for the unprofitable minority. Being nearly an hun-
dred to one, they deemed that they were virtually the substance of the
nation, and they claimed to govern themselves with a power propor-
tioned to their numbers. They demanded that the State should be re-
formed, that the ruler should be their agent, not their master.
That is the French Revolution. To see that it is not a meteor from the
unknown, but the product of historic influences which, by their union
were efficient to destroy, and by their division powerless to construct,
we must follow for a moment the procession of ideas that went before,
and bind it to the law of continuity and the operation of constant forces.
If France failed where other nations have succeeded, and if the pas-
sage from the feudal and aristocratic forms of society to the industrial
and democratic was attended by convulsions, the cause was not in the
men of that day, but in the ground on which they stood. As long as the
despotic kings were victorious abroad, they were accepted at home. The
first signals of revolutionary thinking lurk dimly among the oppressed
minorities during intervals of disaster. The Jansenists were loyal and
patient; but their famous jurist Domat was a philosopher, and is remem-
bered as the writer who restored the supremacy of reason in the chaotic
jurisprudence of the time. He had learnt from St. Thomas, a great name
in the school he belonged to, that legislation ought to be for the people
and by the people, that the cashiering of bad kings may be not only a
right but a duty. He insisted that law shall proceed from common sense,
not from custom, and shall draw its precepts from an eternal code. The
principle of the higher law signifies Revolution. No government foundedLectures on the French Revolution/7
on positive enactments only can stand before it, and it points the way to
that system of primitive, universal, and indefeasible rights which the
lawyers of the Assembly, descending from Domat, prefixed to their con-
stitution.
Under the edict of Nantes the Protestants were decided royalists; so
that, even after the Revocation, Bayle, the apostle of Toleration, re-
tained his loyalty in exile at Rotterdam. His enemy, Jurieu, though intol-
erant as a divine, was liberal in his politics, and contracted in the
neighbourhood of William of Orange the temper of a continental Whig.
He taught that sovereignty comes from the people and reverts to the
people. The Crown forfeits powers it has made ill use of. The rights of
the nation cannot be forfeited. The people alone possess an authority
which is legitimate without conditions, and their acts are valid even
when they are wrong. The most telling of Jurieu’s seditious proposi-
tions, preserved in the transparent amber of Bossuet’s reply, shared the
immortality of a classic, and in time contributed to the doctrine that the
democracy is irresponsible and must have its way.
Maultrot, the best ecclesiastical lawyer of the day. published three
volumes in 1790 on the power of the people over kings, in which, with
accurate research among sources very familiar to him and to nobody
else, he explained how the Canon Law approves the principles of 1688
and rejects the modern invention of divine right. His book explains still
better the attitude of the clergy in the Revolution, and their brief season
of popularity.
The true originator of the opposition in literature was Fénelon. He
was neither an innovating reformer nor a discoverer of new truth; but as
a singularly independent and most intelligent witness, he was the first
who saw through the majestic hypocrisy of the court, and knew that
France was on the road to ruin. The revolt of conscience began with him
before the glory of the monarchy was clouded over. His views grew
from an extraordinary perspicacity and refinement in the estimate of
men. He learnt to refer the problem of government, like the conduct of
private life, to the mere standard of morals, and extended further than
any one the plain but hazardous practice of deciding all things by the
exclusive precepts of enlightened virtue. If he did not know all about
policy and international science, he could always tell what would be
expected of a hypothetically perfect man. Fénelon feels like a citizen of
Christian Europe, but he pursues his thoughts apart from his country or
his church, and his deepest utterances are in the mouth of pagans. He8/John Acton
desired to be alike true to his own beliefs, and gracious towards those
who dispute them. He approved neither the deposing power nor the pun-
ishment of error, and declared that the highest need of the Church was
not victory but liberty. Through his friends, Fleury and Chevreuse, he
favoured the recall of the Protestants, and he advised a general tolera-
tion. He would have the secular power kept aloof from ecclesiastical
concerns, because protection leads to religious servitude and persecu-
tion to religious hypocrisy. There were moments when his steps seemed
to approach the border of the undiscovered land where Church and State
are parted.
He has written that a historian ought to be neutral between other
countries and his own, and he expected the same discipline in politi-
cians, as patriotism cannot absolve a man from his duty to mankind.
Therefore no war can be just, unless a war to which we are compelled in
the sole cause of freedom. Fénelon wished that France should surrender
the ill-gotten conquests of which she was so proud, and especially that
she should withdraw from Spain. He declared that the Spaniards were
degenerate and imbecile, but that nothing could make that right which
was contrary to the balance of power and the security of nations. Hol-
land seemed to him the hope of Europe, and he thought the allies justi-
fied in excluding the French dynasty from Spain for the same reason
that no claim of law could have made it right that Philip II should oc-
cupy England. He hoped that his country would be thoroughly humbled,
for he dreaded the effects of success on the temperament of the victori-
ous French. He deemed it only fair that Lewis should be compelled to
dethrone his grandson with his own guilty hand.
In the judgment of Fénelon, power is poison; and as kings are nearly
always bad, they ought not to govern, but only to execute the law. For it
is the mark of barbarians to obey precedent and custom. Civilised soci-
ety must be regulated by a solid code. Nothing but a constitution can
avert arbitrary power. The despotism of Lewis XIV renders him odious
and contemptible, and is the cause of all the evils which the country
suffers. If the governing power which rightfully belonged to the nation
was restored, it would save itself by its own exertion; but absolute au-
thority irreparably saps its foundations, and is bringing on a revolution
by which it will not be moderated, but utterly destroyed. Although Fénelon
has no wish to sacrifice either the monarchy or the aristocracy, he be-
trays sympathy with several tendencies of the movement which he fore-
saw with so much alarm. He admits the state of nature, and thinks civilLectures on the French Revolution/9
society not the primitive condition of man, but a result of the passage
from savage life to husbandry. He would transfer the duties of govern-
ment to local and central assemblies; and he demands entire freedom of
trade, and education provided by law, because children belong to the
State first and to the family afterwards. He does not resign the hope of
making men good by act of parliament, and his belief in public institu-
tions as a means of moulding individual character brings him nearly
into touch with a distant future.
He is the Platonic founder of revolutionary thinking. Whilst his real
views were little known, he became a popular memory; but some com-
plained that his force was centrifugal, and that a church can no more be
preserved by suavity and distinction than a state by liberty and justice.
Lewis XVI, we are often told, perished in expiation of the sins of his
forefathers. He perished, not because the power he inherited from them
had been carried to excess, but because it had been discredited and un-
dermined. One author of this discredit was Fénelon. Until he came, the
ablest men, Bossuet and even Bayle, revered the monarchy. Fénelon
struck it at the zenith, and treated Lewis XIV in all his grandeur more
severely than the disciples of Voltaire treated Lewis XV. in all his degra-
dation. The season of scorn and shame begins with him. The best of his
later contemporaries followed his example, and laid the basis of oppos-
ing criticism on motives of religion. They were the men whom Cardinal
Dubois describes as dreamers of the same dreams as the chimerical
archbishop of Cambray. Their influence fades away before the great
change that came over France about the middle of the century.
From that time unbelief so far prevailed that even men who were
not professed assailants, as Montesquieu, Condillac, Turgot, were es-
tranged from Christianity. Politically, the consequence was this: men
who did not attribute any deep significance to church questions never
acquired definite notions on Church and State, never seriously exam-
ined under what conditions religion may be established or disestablished,
endowed or disendowed, never even knew whether there exists any gen-
eral solution, or any principle by which problems of that kind are de-
cided. This defect of knowledge became a fact of importance at a turn-
ing-point in the Revolution. The theory of the relations between states
and churches is bound up with the theory of Toleration, and on that
subject the eighteenth century scarcely rose above an intermittent, em-
barrassed, and unscientific view. For religious liberty is composed of
the properties both of religion and of liberty, and one of its factors never10/John Acton
became an object of disinterested observation among actual leaders of
opinion. They preferred the argument of doubt to the argument of certi-
tude, and sought to defeat intolerance by casting out revelation as they
had defeated the persecution of witches by casting out the devil. There
remained a flaw in their liberalism, for liberty apart from belief is lib-
erty with a good deal of the substance taken out of it. The problem is
less complicated and the solution less radical and less profound. Al-
ready, then, there were writers who held somewhat superficially the con-
viction, which Tocqueville made a corner-stone, that nations that have
not the self-governing force of religion within them are unprepared for
freedom.
The early notions of reform moved on French lines, striving to utilise
the existing form of society, to employ the parliamentary aristocracy, to
revive the States-General and the provincial assemblies. But the scheme
of standing on the ancient ways, and raising a new France on the sub-
structure of the old, brought out the fact that whatever growth of insti-
tutions there once had been had been stunted and stood still. If the medi-
aeval polity had been fitted to prosper, its fruit must be gathered from
other countries, where the early notions had been pursued far ahead.
The first thing to do was to cultivate the foreign example; and with that
what we call the eighteenth century began. The English superiority, pro-
claimed first by Voltaire, was further demonstrated by Montesquieu.
For England had recently created a government which was stronger than
the institutions that had stood on antiquity. Founded upon fraud and
treason, it had yet established the security of law more firmly than it had
ever existed under the system of legitimacy, of prolonged inheritance,
and of religious sanction. It flourished on the unaccustomed belief that
theological dissensions need not detract from the power of the State,
while political dissensions are the very secret of its prosperity. The men
of questionable character who accomplished the change and had gov-
erned for the better part of sixty years, had successfully maintained
public order, in spite of conspiracy and rebellion; they had built up an
enormous system of national credit, and had been victorious in conti-
nental war. The Jacobite doctrine, which was the basis of European
monarchy, had been backed by the arms of France, and had failed to
shake the newly planted throne. A great experiment had been crowned
by a great discovery. A novelty that defied the wisdom of centuries had
made good its footing, and revolution had become a principle of stabil-
ity more sure than tradition.Lectures on the French Revolution/11
Montesquieu undertook to make the disturbing fact avail in politi-
cal science. He valued it because it reconciled him with monarchy. He
had started with the belief that kings are an evil, and not a necessary
evil, and that their time was running short. His visit to Walpolean En-
gland taught him a plan by which they might be reprieved. He still con-
fessed that a republic is the reign of virtue; and by virtue he meant love
of equality and renunciation of self. But he had seen a monarchy that
throve by corruption. He said that the distinctive principle of monarchy
is not virtue but honour, which he once described as a contrivance to
enable men of the world to commit almost every offence with impunity.
The praise of England was made less injurious to French patriotism by
the famous theory that explains institutions and character by the barom-
eter and the latitude. Montesquieu looked about him, and abroad, but
not far ahead His admirable skill in supplying reason for every positive
fact sometimes confounds the cause which produces with the argument
that defends. He knows so many pleas for privilege that he almost over-
looks the class that has none: and having no friendship for the clergy, he
approves their immunities. He thinks that aristocracy alone can pre-
serve monarchies, and makes England more free than any common-
wealth. He lays down the great conservative maxim, that success gener-
ally depends on knowing the time it will take; and the most purely Whig
maxim in his works, that the duty of a citizen is a crime when it ob-
scures the duty of man, is Fénelon’s. His liberty is of a Gothic type, and
not insatiable. But the motto of his work, Prolem sine matre creatam,
was intended to signify that the one thing wanting was liberty; and he
had views on taxation, equality, and the division of powers that gave
him a momentary influence in 1789. His warning that a legislature may
be more dangerous than the executive remained unheard. The Esprit
des lois had lost ground in 1767, during the ascendancy of Rousseau.
The mind of the author moved within the conditions of society familiar
to him, and he did not heed the coming democracy. He assured Hume
that there would be no revolution, because the nobles were without civic
courage.
There was more divination in d’Argenson, who was Minister of
Foreign Affairs in 1745, and knew politics from the inside. Less acqui-
escent than his brilliant contemporary, he was perpetually contriving
schemes of fundamental change, and is the earliest writer from whom
we can extract the system of 1789. Others before him had perceived the
impending revolution; but d’Argenson foretold that it would open with12/John Acton
the slaughter of priests in the streets of Paris. Thirty-eight years later
these words came true at the gate of St. Germain’s Abbey As the sup-
porter of the Pretender he was quite uninfluenced by admiration for
England, and imputed, not to the English Deists and Whigs but to the
Church and her divisions and intolerance, the unbelieving spirit that
threatened both Church and State. It was conventionally understood on
the Continent that 1688 had been an uprising of Nonconformists, and a
Whig was assumed to be a Presbyterian down to the death of Anne. It
was easy to infer that a more violent theological conflict would lead to a
more violent convulsion. As early as 1743 his terrible foresight discerns
that the State is going to pieces, and its doom was so certain that he
began to think of a refuge under other masters. He would have deposed
the noble, the priest, and the lawyer, and given their power to the masses.
Although the science of politics was in its infancy, he relied on the dawn-
ing enlightenment to establish rational liberty, and the equality between
classes and religions which is the perfection of politics. The world ought
to be governed not by parchment and vested rights, but by plain reason,
which proceeds from the complex to the simple, and will sweep away all
that interposes between the State and the democracy, giving to each part
of the nation the management of its own affairs. He is eager to change
everything, except the monarchy which alone can change all else. A
deliberative assembly does not rise above the level of its average mem-
bers. It is neither very foolish nor very wise. All might be well if the king
made himself the irresistible instrument of philosophy and justice, and
wrought the reform. But his king was Lewis XV. D’Argenson saw so
little that was worthy to be preserved that he did not shrink from sweep-
ing judgments and abstract propositions. By his rationalism, and his
indifference to the prejudice of custom and the claim of possession; by
his maxim that every man may be presumed to understand the things in
which his own interest and responsibility are involved; by his zeal for
democracy, equality, and simplicity, and his dislike of intermediate au-
thorities, he belongs to a generation later than his own. He heralded
events without preparing them, for the best of all he wrote only became
known in our time.
Whilst Montesquieu, at the height of his fame as the foremost of
living writers, was content to contemplate the past, there was a student
in the Paris seminary who taught men to fix hope and endeavour on the
future, and led the world at twenty-three. Turgot, when he proclaimed
that upward growth and progress is the law of human life, was studyingLectures on the French Revolution/13
to become a priest. To us, in an age of science, it has become difficult to
imagine Christianity without the attribute of development and the fac-
ulty of improving society as well as souls. But the idea was acquired
slowly. Under the burden of sin, men accustomed themselves to the con-
sciousness of degeneracy; each generation confessed that they were un-
worthy children of their parents, and awaited with impatience the ap-
proaching end. From Lucretius and Seneca to Pascal and Leibniz we
encounter a few dispersed and unsupported passages, suggesting ad-
vance towards perfection, and the flame that brightens as it moves from
hand to hand; but they were without mastery or radiance. Turgot at once
made the idea habitual and familiar, and it became a pervading force in
thoughtful minds, whilst the new sciences arose to confirm it. He im-
parted a deeper significance to history, giving it unity of tendency and
direction, constancy where there had been motion, and development in-
stead of change. The progress he meant was moral as much as intellec-
tual; and as he professed to think that the rogues of his day would have
seemed sanctified models to an earlier century, he made his calculations
without counting the wickedness of men. His analysis left unfathomed
depths for future explorers, for Lessing and still more for Hegel; but he
taught mankind to expect that the future would be unlike the past, that it
would be better, and that the experience of ages may instruct and warn,
but cannot guide or control. He is eminently a benefactor to historical
study; but he forged a weapon charged with power to abolish the prod-
uct of history and the existing order. By the hypothesis of progress, the
new is always gaining on the old; history is the embodiment of imper-
fection, and escape from history became the watchword of the coming
day. Condorcet, the master’s pupil, thought that the world might be
emancipated by burning its records.
Turgot was too discreet for such an excess, and he looked to history
for the demonstration of his law. He had come upon it in his theological
studies. He renounced them soon after, saying that he could not wear a
mask. When Guizot called Lamennais a malefactor, because he threw
off his cassock and became a freethinker, Scherer, whose course had
been some way parallel, observed: “He little knows how much it costs.”
The abrupt transition seems to have been accomplished by Turgot with-
out a struggle. The Encyclopaedia, which was the largest undertaking
since the invention of printing, came out at that time, and Turgot wrote
for it. But he broke off, refusing to be connected with a party professedly
hostile to revealed religion; and he rejected the declamatory paradoxes14/John Acton
of Diderot and Raynal. He found his home among the Physiocrats, of all
the groups the one that possessed the most compact body of consistent
views, and who already knew most of the accepted doctrines of political
economy, although they ended by making way for Adam Smith. They
are of supreme importance to us, because they founded political science
on the economic science which was coming into existence. Harrington,
a century before, had seen that the art of government can be reduced to
system; but the French economists precede all men in this, that holding
a vast collection of combined and verified truths on matters contiguous
to politics and belonging to their domain, they extended it to the whole,
and governed the constitution by the same fixed principles that gov-
erned the purse. They said: A man’s most sacred property is his labour.
It is anterior even to the right of property, for it is the possession of
.those who own nothing else. Therefore he must be free to make the best
use of it he can. The interference of one man with another, of society
with its members, of the state with the subject, must be brought down to
the lowest dimension. Power intervenes only to restrict intervention, to
guard the individual from oppression, that is from regulation in an inter-
est not his own. Free labour and its derivative free trade are the first
conditions of legitimate government Let things fall into their natural
order, let society govern itself, and the sovereign function of the State
will be to protect nature in the execution of her own law. Government
must not be arbitrary, but it must be powerful enough to repress arbi-
trary action in others. If the supreme power is needlessly limited, the
secondary powers will run riot and oppress. Its supremacy will bear no
check. The problem is to enlighten the ruler, not to restrain him; and one
man is more easily enlightened than many. Government by opposition,
by balance and control, is contrary to principle; whereas absolutism
might be requisite to the attainment of their higher purpose. Nothing
less than concentrated power could overcome the obstacles to such be-
neficent reforms as they meditated. Men who sought only the general
good must wound every distinct and separate interest of class, and would
be mad to break up the only force that they could count upon, and thus
to throw away the means of preventing the evils that must follow if
things were left to the working of opinion and the feeling of masses.
They had no love for absolute power in itself, but they computed that, if
they had the use of it for five years, France would be free. They distin-
guished an arbitrary monarch and the irresistible but impersonal state.
It was the era of repentant monarchy. Kings had become the first ofLectures on the French Revolution/15
public servants, executing, for the good of the people, what the people
were unable to do for themselves; and there was a reforming movement
on foot which led to many instances of prosperous and intelligent ad-
ministration. To men who knew what unutterable suffering and wrong
was inflicted by bad laws, and who lived in terror of the uneducated and
inorganic masses, the idea of reform from above seemed preferable to
parliamentary government managed by Newcastle and North, in the in-
terest of the British landlord. The economists are outwardly and avow-
edly less liberal than Montesquieu, because they are incomparably more
impressed by the evils of the time, and the need of immense and funda-
mental changes. They prepared to undo the work of absolutism by the
hand of absolutism. They were not its opponents, but its advisers, and
hoped to convert it by their advice. The indispensable liberties are those
which constitute the wealth of nations; the rest will follow. The disease
had lasted too long for the sufferer to heal himself: the relief must come
from the author of his sufferings. The power that had done the wrong
was still efficient to undo the wrong. Transformation, infinitely more
difficult in itself than preservation, was not more formidable to the econo-
mists because it consisted mainly in revoking the godless work of a
darker age. They deemed it their mission not to devise new laws, for that
is a task which God has not committed to man, but only to declare the
inherent laws of the existence of society and enable them to prevail.
The defects of the social and political organisation were as dis-
tinctly pointed out by the economists as by the electors of the National
Assembly, twenty years later, and in nearly all things they proposed the
remedy. But they were persuaded that the only thing to regenerate France
was a convulsion which the national character would make a dreadful
one. They desired a large scheme of popular education, because com-
mands take no root in soil that is not prepared. Political truths can be
made so evident that the opinion of an instructed public will be invin-
cible, and will banish the abuse of power. To resist oppression is to
make a league with heaven, and all things are oppressive that resist the
natural order of freedom. For society secures rights; it neither bestows
nor restricts them. They are the direct consequence of duties. As truth
can only convince by the exposure of errors and the defeat of objections,
liberty is the essential guard of truth. Society is founded, not on the will
of man, but on the nature of man and the will of God; and conformity to
the divinely appointed order is Followed by inevitable reward. Relief of
those who suffer is the duty of all men, and the affair of all.16/John Acton
Such was the spirit of that remarkable group of men, especially of
Mercier de la Rivière, of whom Diderot said that he alone possessed the
true and everlasting secret of the security and the happiness of empires.
Turgot indeed had failed in office; but his reputation was not dimin-
ished, and the power of his name exceeded all others at the outbreak of
the Revolution. His policy of employing the Crown to reform the State
was at once rejected in favour of other counsels; but his influence may
be traced in many acts of the Assembly, and on two very memorable
occasions it was not auspicious. It was a central dogma of the party that
land is the true source of wealth, or, as Asgill said, that man deals in
nothing but earth. When a great part of France became national prop-
erty, men were the more easily persuaded that land can serve as the
basis of public credit and of unlimited assignats. According to a weighty
opinion which we shall have to consider before long, the parting of the
ways in the Revolution was on the day when, rejecting the example both
of England and America, the French resolved to institute a single undi-
vided legislature. It was the Pennsylvanian model; and Voltaire had pro-
nounced Pennsylvania the best government in the world. Franklin gave
the sanction of an oracle to the constitution of his state, and Turgot was
its vehement protagonist in Europe.
A king ruling over a level democracy, and a democracy ruling itself
through the agency of a king, were long contending notions in the first
Assembly. One was monarchy according to Turgot, the other was mon-
archy adapted to Rousseau; and the latter, for a time, prevailed. Rousseau
was the citizen of a small republic, consisting of a single town, and he
professed to have applied its example to the government of the world. It
was Geneva, not as he saw it, but as he extracted its essential principle,
and as it has since become, Geneva illustrated by the Forest Cantons
and the Landesgemeinde more than by its own charters. The idea was
that the grown men met in the market-place, like the peasants of Glarus
under their trees, to manage their affairs, making and unmaking offi-
cials, conferring and revoking powers. They were equal, because every
man had exactly the same right to defend his interest by the guarantee of
his vote. The welfare of all was safe in the hands of all, for they had not
the separate interests that are bred by the egotism of wealth, nor the
exclusive views that come from a distorted education. All being equal in
power and similar in purpose, there can be no just cause why some
should move apart and break into minorities. There is an implied con-
tract that no part shall ever be preferred to the whole, and minoritiesLectures on the French Revolution/17
shall always obey. Clever men are not wanted for the making of laws,
because clever men and their laws are at the root of all mischief. Nature
is a better guide than civilisation, because nature comes from God, and
His works are good; culture from man, whose works are bad in propor-
tion as he is remoter from natural innocence, as his desires increase
upon him, as he seeks more refined pleasures, and stores up more super-
fluity. It promotes inequality, selfishness, and the ruin of public spirit.
By plausible and easy stages the social ideas latent in parts of Swit-
zerland produced the theory that men come innocent from the hands of
the Creator, that they are originally equal, that progress from equality to
civilisation is the passage from virtue to vice and from freedom to tyr-
anny, that the people are sovereign, and govern by powers given and
taken away; that an individual or a class may be mistaken and may
desert the common cause and the general interest, but the people, neces-
sarily sincere, and true, and incorrupt, cannot go wrong; that there is a
right of resistance to all governments that are fallible, because they are
partial, but none against government of the people by the people, be-
cause it has no master and no judge, and decides in the last instance and
alone ; that insurrection is the law of all unpopular societies founded on
a false principle and a broken contract, and submission that of the only
legitimate societies, based on the popular will; that there is no privilege
against the law of nature, and no right against the power of all. By this
chain of reasoning, with little infusion of other ingredients, Rousseau
applied the sequence of the ideas of pure democracy to the government
of nations.
Now the most glaring and familiar fact in history shows that the
direct self-government of a town cannot be extended over an empire. It
is a plan that scarcely reaches beyond the next parish. Either one district
will be governed by another, or both by somebody else chosen for the
purpose. Either plan contradicts first principles. Subjection is the direct
negation of democracy; representation is the indirect. So that an En-
glishman underwent bondage to parliament as much as Lausanne to
Berne or as America to England if it had submitted to taxation, and by
law recovered his liberty but once in seven years. Consequently Rousseau,
still faithful to Swiss precedent as well as to the logic of his own theory,
was a federalist. In Switzerland, when one half of a canton disagrees
with the other, or the country with the town, it is deemed natural that
they should break into two, that the general will may not oppress mi-
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ted by Rousseau as a preservative of unanimity on one hand, and of
liberty on the other. Helvétius came to his support with the idea that men
are not only equal by nature but alike, and that society is the cause of
variation ; from which it would follow that everything may be done by
laws and by education.
Rousseau is the author of the strongest political theory that had
appeared amongst men. We cannot say that he reasons well, but he
knew how to make his argument seem convincing, satisfying, inevi-
table, and he wrote with an eloquence and a fervour that had never been
seen in prose, even in Bolingbroke or Milton. His books gave the first
signal of a universal subversion, and were as fatal to the Republic as to
the Monarchy. Although he lives by the social contract and the law of
resistance, and owes his influence to what was extreme and systematic,
his later writings are loaded with sound political wisdom. He owes nothing
to the novelty or the originality of his thoughts. Taken jointly or sever-
ally, they are old friends, and you will find them in the school of Wolf
that just preceded, in the dogmatists of the Great Rebellion and the Je-
suit casuists who were dear to Algernon Sidney, in their Protestant op-
ponents, Duplessis Mornay, and the Scots who had heard the last of our
schoolmen, Major of St. Andrews, renew the speculations of the time of
schism, which decomposed and dissected the Church and rebuilt it on a
model very propitious to political revolution, and even in the early inter-
preters of the Aristotelian Politics which appeared just at the era of the
first parliament.
Rousseau’s most advanced point was the doctrine that the people
are infallible. Jurieu had taught that they can do no wrong: Rousseau
added that they are positively in the right The idea, like most others, was
not new, and goes back to the Middle Ages. When the question arose
what security there is for the preservation of traditional truth if the epis-
copate was divided and the papacy vacant, it was answered that the
faith would be safely retained by the masses. The maxim that the voice
of the people is the voice of God is as old as Alcuin; it was renewed by
some of the greatest writers anterior to democracy, by Hooker and
Bossuet, and it was employed in our day by Newman to prop his theory
of development. Rousseau applied it to the State.
The sovereignty of public opinion was just then coming in through
the rise of national debts and the increasing importance of the public
creditor. It meant more than the noble savage and the blameless South
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men from the calculating wisdom of the few. It was destined to prove the
most serious of all obstacles to representative government. Equality of
power readily suggests equality of property; but the movement of So-
cialism began earlier, and was not assisted by Rousseau. There were
solemn theorists, such as Mably and Morelly, who were sometimes quoted
in the Revolution, but the change in the distribution of property was
independent of them.
A more effective influence was imported from Italy; for the Italians,
through Vico, Giannone, Genovesi, had an eighteenth century of their
own. Sardinia preceded France in solving the problem of feudalism.
Arthur Young affirms that the measures of the Grand Duke Leopold
had, in ten years, doubled the produce of Tuscany; at Milan, Count
Firmian was accounted one of the best administrators in Europe. It was
a Milanese, Beccaria, who, by his reform of criminal law, became a
leader of French opinion. Continental jurisprudence had long been over-
shadowed by two ideas: that torture is the surest method of discovering
truth, and that punishment deters not by its justice, its celerity, or its
certainty, but in proportion to its severity. Even in the eighteenth cen-
tury the penal system of Maria Theresa and Joseph II was barbarous.
Therefore no attack was more surely aimed at the heart of established
usage than that which dealt with courts of justice. It forced men to con-
clude that authority was odiously stupid and still more odiously fero-
cious, that existing governments were accursed, that the guardians and
ministers of law, divine and human, were more guilty than their culprits.
The past was branded as the reign of infernal powers, and charged with
long arrears of unpunished wrong. As there was no sanctity left in law,
there was no mercy for its merciless defenders; and if they fell into
avenging hands, their doom would not exceed their desert. Men after-
wards conspicuous by their violence Brissot and Marat, were engaged
in this campaign of humanity, which raised a demand for authorities
that were not vitiated by the accumulation of infamy, for new laws, new
powers, a new dynasty.
As religion was associated with cruelty, it is at this point that the
movement of new ideas became a crusade against Christianity. A book
by the Curé Meslier, partially known at that time, but first printed by
Strauss in 1864, is the clarion of vindictive unbelief; and another abbé,
Raynal, hoped that the clergy would be crushed beneath the ruins of
their altars.
Thus the movement which began, in Fénelon’s time, with warnings20/John Acton
and remonstrance and the zealous endeavour to preserve, which pro-
duced one great scheme of change by the Crown and another at the
expense of the Crown, ended in the wild cry for vengeance and a pas-
sionate appeal to fire and sword. So many lines of thought converging
on destruction explain the agreement that existed when the States-Gen-
eral began, and the explosion that followed the reforms of ‘89 and the
ruins of ‘93. No conflict can be more irreconcilable than that between a
constitution and an enlightened absolutism, between abrogation of old
laws and multiplication of new, between representation and direct de-
mocracy, the people controlling and the people governing, kings by con-
tract and kings by mandate.
Yet all these fractions of opinion were called Liberal: Montesquieu,
because he was an intelligent Tory; Voltaire, because he attacked the
clergy; Turgot, as a reformer; Rousseau, as a democrat; Diderot, as a
freethinker. The one thing common to them all is the disregard for lib-
erty.II: THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICA
The several structures of political thought that arose in France, and
clashed in the process of revolution, were not directly responsible for
the outbreak. The doctrines hung like a cloud upon the heights, and at
critical moments in the reign of Lewis XV men felt that a catastrophe
was impending. It befell when there was less provocation, under his
successor; and the spark that changed thought into action was supplied
by the Declaration of American Independence. It was the system of an
international extra-territorial universal Whig, far transcending the En-
glish model by its simplicity and rigour. It surpassed in force all the
speculation of Paris and Geneva, for it had undergone the test of experi-
ment, and its triumph was the most memorable thing that had been seen
by men.
The expectation that the American colonies would separate was an
old one. A century before, Harrington had written: “They are yet babes,
that cannot live without sucking the breasts of their mother-cities; but
such as I mistake if, when they come of age, they do not wean them-
selves; which causes me to wonder at princes that like to be exhausted in
that way.” When, in 1759 the elder Mirabeau announced it, he meant
that the conquest of Canada involved the loss of America, as the colo-
nists would cling to England as long as the French were behind them,
and no longer. He came very near to the truth, for the war in Canada
gave the signal. The English colonies had meditated the annexation of
the French, and they resented that the king’s government undertook the
expedition, to deprive them of the opportunity for united action. Fifty
years later President Adams said that the treatment of American offic-
ers by the British made his blood boil.
The agitation began in 1761, and by the innovating ideas which it
flung abroad it is as important as the Declaration itself; or the great
constitutional debate. The colonies were more advanced than Great Brit-
ain in the way of free institutions, and existed only that they might es-
cape the vices of the mother country. They had no remnants of feudal-
ism to cherish or resist They possessed written constitutions, some of
them remarkably original, fit roots of an immense development George
III. thought it strange that he should be the sovereign of a democracy
like Rhode Island, where all power reverted annually to the people, and
the authorities had to be elected anew. Connecticut received from the
Stuarts so liberal a charter, and worked out so finished a scheme of22/John Acton
local self-government, that it served as a basis for the federal constitu-
tion. The Quakers had a plan founded on equality of power, without
oppression, or privilege, or intolerance, or slavery. They declared that
their holy experiment would not have been worth attempting if it did not
offer some very real advantage over England. It was to enjoy freedom,
liberty of conscience, and the right to tax themselves, that they went into
the desert. There were points on which these men anticipated the doc-
trines of a more unrestrained democracy, for they established their gov-
ernment not on conventions, but on divine right, and they claimed to be
infallible. A Connecticut preacher said in 1638: “The choice of public
magistrates belongs unto the people, by God’s own allowance. They
who have the power to appoint officers and magistrates, it is in their
power, also, to set the bounds and limitations of the power and place
unto which they call them.” The following words, written in 1736, ap-
pear in the works of Franklin: “The judgment of a whole people, espe-
cially of a free people, is looked upon to be infallible. And this is univer-
sally true, while they remain in their proper sphere, unbiassed by fac-
tion, undeluded by the tricks of designing men. A body of people thus
circumstanced cannot be supposed to judge amiss on any essential points;
for if they decide in favour of themselves, which is extremely natural,
their decision is just, inasmuch as whatever contributes to their benefit
is a general benefit, and advances the real public good.” A commentator
adds that this notion of the infallible perception by the people of their
true interest, and their unerring pursuit of it, was very prevalent in the
provinces, and for a time in the States after the establishment of Ameri-
can independence.
In spite of their democratic spirit, these communities consented to
have their trade regulated and restricted, to their own detriment and the
advantage of English merchants. They had protested, but they had ended
by yielding. Now Adam Smith says that to prohibit a great people from
making all they can of every part of their own produce, or from employ-
ing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advanta-
geous for themselves, is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of
mankind. There was a latent sense of injury which broke out when, in
addition to interference with the freedom of trade, England exercised the
right of taxation. An American lately wrote: “The real foundation of the
discontent which led to the Revolution was the effort of Great Britain,
beginning in 1750, to prevent diversity of occupation, to attack the growth
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attempt to tax without representation was the effort to enforce the navi-
gation laws.” When England argued that the hardship of regulation might
be greater than the hardship of taxation, and that those who submitted
to the one submitted, in principle, to the other, Franklin replied that the
Americans had not taken that view, but that, when it was put before
them, they would be willing to reject both one and the other. He knew,
however, that the ground taken up by his countrymen was too narrow.
He wrote to the French economist, Morellet: “Nothing can be better
expressed than your sentiments are on this point, where you prefer lib-
erty of trading, cultivating, manufacturing, etc., even to civil liberty,
this being affected but rarely, the other every hour.”
These early authors of American independence were generally en-
thusiasts for the British Constitution, and preceded Burke in the ten-
dency to canonise it, and to magnify it as an ideal exemplar for nations.
John Adams said, in 1766: “Here lies the difference between the British
Constitution and other forms of government, namely, that liberty is its
end, its use, its designation, drift and scope, as much as grinding corn is
the use of a mill.” Another celebrated Bostonian identified the Constitu-
tion with the law of Nature, as Montesquieu called the Civil Law, writ-
ten Reason. He said: “It is the glory of the British prince and the happi-
ness of all his subjects, that their constitution bath its foundation in the
immutable laws of Nature; and as the supreme legislative, as well as the
supreme executive, derives its authority from that constitution, it should
seem that no laws can be made or executed that are repugnant to any
essential law in Nature.” The writer of these words, James Otis, is the
founder of the revolutionary doctrine. Describing one of his pamphlets,
the second President says: “Look over the declaration of rights and
wrongs issued by Congress in 1774; look into the declaration of inde-
pendence in 1776; look into the writings of Dr. Price and Dr. Priestley;
look into all the French constitutions of government; and, to cap the
climax, look into Mr. Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, Crisis, and Rights
of Man. What can you find that is not to be found in solid substance in
this ‘Vindication of the House of Representatives’?” When these men
found that the appeal to the law and to the constitution did not avail
them, that the king, by bribing the people’s representatives with the
people’s money, was able to enforce his will, they sought a higher tribu-
nal, and turned from the law of England to the law of Nature, and from
the king of England to the King of kings. Otis, in 1762, 1764 and 1765,
says: “Most governments are, in fact, arbitrary, and consequently the24/John Acton
curse and scandal of human nature; yet none are of right arbitrary. By
the laws of God and nature, government must not raise taxes on the
property of the people without the consent of the people or their depu-
ties. There can be no prescription old enough to supersede the law of
Nature and the grant of God Almighty, who has given all men a right to
be free. If a man has but little property to protect and defend, yet his life
and liberty are things of some importance.” About the same time Gadsden
wrote: “A confirmation of our essential and common rights as English-
men may be pleaded from charters clearly enough; but any further de-
pendence on them may be fatal. We should stand upon the broad com-
mon ground of those natural rights that we all feel and know as men and
as descendants of Englishmen.”
The primitive fathers of the United States began by preferring ab-
stract moral principle to the letter of the law and the spirit of the Consti-
tution. But they went farther. Not only was their grievance difficult to
substantiate at law, but it was trivial in extent The claim of England was
not evidently disproved, and even if it was unjust, the injustice practi-
cally was not hard to bear. The suffering that would be caused by sub-
mission was immeasurably less than the suffering that must follow re-
sistance, and it was more uncertain and remote. The utilitarian argu-
ment was loud in favour of obedience and loyalty. But if interest was on
one side, there was a manifest principle on the other a principle so sa-
cred and so clear as imperatively to demand the sacrifice of men’s lives,
of their families and their fortune. They resolved to give up everything,
not to escape from actual oppression, but to honour a precept of unwrit-
ten law. That was the transatlantic discovery in the theory of political
duty, the light that came over the ocean. It represented liberty not as a
comparative release from tyranny, but as a thing so divine that the exist-
ence of society must be staked to prevent even the least constructive
infraction of its sovereign right “A free people,” said Dickinson, “can
never be too quick in observing nor too firm in opposing the beginnings
of alteration either in form or reality, respecting institutions formed for
their security. The first kind of alteration leads to the last. As violations
of the rights of the governed are commonly not only specious, but small
at the beginning, they spread over the multitude in such a manner as to
touch individuals but slightly. Every free state should incessantly watch,
and instantly take alarm at any addition being made to the power exer-
cised over them.” Who are a free people? Not those over whom govern-
ment is reasonably and equitably exercised; but those who live under aLectures on the French Revolution/25
government so constitutionally checked and controlled that proper pro-
vision is made against its being otherwise exercised. The contest was
plainly a contest of principle, and was conducted entirely on principle
by both parties. “The amount of taxes proposed to be raised,” said
Marshall, the greatest of constitutional lawyers, “was too inconsider-
able to interest the people of either country.” I will add the words of
Daniel Webster, the great expounder of the Constitution, who is the
most eloquent of the Americans, and stands, in politics, next to Burke:
“The Parliament of Great Britain asserted a right to tax the Colonies in
all cases whatsoever; and it was precisely on this question that they
made the Revolution turn. The amount of taxation was trifling, but the
claim itself was inconsistent with liberty, and that was in their eyes
enough. It was against the recital of an act of Parliament, rather than
against any suffering under its enactment, that they took up arms. They
went to war against a preamble. They fought seven years against a dec-
laration. They saw in the claim of the British Parliament a seminal prin-
ciple of mischief, the germ of unjust power.”
The object of these men was liberty, not independence. Their feeling
was expressed by Jay in his address to the people of Great Britain:
“Permit us to be as free as yourselves, and we shall ever esteem a union
with you to be our greatest glory and our greatest happiness.” Before
1775 there was no question of separation. During all the Revolution
Adams declared that he would have given everything to restore things as
before with security; and both Jefferson and Madison admitted in the
presence of the English minister that a few seats in both Houses would
have set at rest the whole question.
In their appeal to the higher law the Americans professed the purest
Whiggism, and they claimed that their resistance to the House of Com-
mons and the jurisprudence of Westminster only carried forward the
eternal conflict between Whig and Tory. By their closer analysis, and
their fearlessness of logical consequences, they transformed the doc-
trine and modified the party. The uprooted Whig, detached from his
parchments and precedents, his leading families and historic conditions,
exhibited new qualities; and the era of compromise made way for an era
of principle. Whilst French diplomacy traced the long hand of the En-
glish opposition in the tea riots at Boston, Chatham and Camden were
feeling the influence of Dickinson and Otis, without recognising the dif-
ference. It appears in a passage of one of Chatham’s speeches, in 1775
: “This universal opposition to your arbitrary system of taxation might26/John Acton
have been foreseen. It was obvious from the nature of things, and from
the nature of man, and, above all, from the confirmed habits of thinking,
from the spirit of Whiggism flourishing in America. The spirit which
now pervades America is the same which formerly opposed loans, be-
nevolences, and ship-money in this country, is the same spirit which
roused all England to action at the Revolution, and which established at
a remote era your liberties, on the basis of that grand fundamental maxim
of the Constitution, that no subject of England shall be taxed but by his
own consent. To maintain this principle is the common cause of the
Whigs on the other side of the Atlantic, and on this. It is the alliance of
God and Nature, immutable, eternal, fixed as the firmament of heaven.
Resistance to your acts was necessary as it was just; and your vain
declarations of the omnipotence of parliament, and your imperious doc-
trines of the necessity of submission will be found equally impotent to
convince or enslave your fellow-subjects in America.”
The most significant instance of the action of America on Europe is
Edmund Burke. We think of him as a man who, in early life, rejected all
generalities and abstract propositions, and who became the most strenu-
ous and violent of conservatives. But there is an interval when, as the
quarrel with the Colonies went on, Burke was as revolutionary as Wash-
ington. The inconsistency is not as flagrant as it seems. He had been
brought forward by the party of measured propriety and imperative
moderation, of compromise and unfinished thought, who claimed the
right of taxing, but refused to employ it. When he urged the differences
in every situation and every problem, and shrank from the common
denominator and the underlying principle, he fell into step with his friends.
As an Irishman, who had married into an Irish Catholic family, it was
desirable that he should adopt no theories in America which would un-
settle Ireland. He had learnt to teach government by party as an almost
sacred dogma, and party forbids revolt as a breach of the laws of the
game. His scruples and his protests, and his defiance of theory, were the
policy and the precaution of a man conscious of restraints, and not en-
tirely free in the exertion of powers that lifted him far above his tamer
surroundings. As the strife sharpened and the Americans made way,
Burke was carried along, and developed views which he never utterly
abandoned, but which are difficult to reconcile with much that he wrote
when the Revolution had spread to France.
In his address to the Colonists he says: “We do not know how to
qualify millions of our countrymen, contending with one heart for anLectures on the French Revolution/27
admission to privileges which we have ever thought our own happiness
and honour, by odious and unworthy names. On the contrary, we highly
revere the principles on which you act We had much rather see you
totally independent of this crown and kingdom, than joined to it by so
unnatural a conjunction as that of freedom and servitude. We view the
establishment of the English Colonies on principles of liberty, as that
which is to render this kingdom venerable to future ages. In comparison
of this, we regard all the victories and conquests of our warlike ances-
tors, or of our own times, as barbarous, vulgar distinctions, in which
many nations, whom we look upon with little respect or value, have
equalled, if not far exceeded us. Those who have and who hold to that
foundation of common liberty, whether on this or on your side of the
ocean, we consider as the true and the only true Englishmen. Those who
depart from it, whether there or here, are attainted, corrupted in blood,
and wholly fallen from their original rank and value. They are the real
rebels to the fair constitution and just supremacy of England. A long
course of war with the administration of this country may be but a pre-
lude to a series of wars and contentions among yourselves, to end at
length (as such scenes have too often ended) in a species of humiliating
repose, which nothing but the preceding calamities would reconcile to
the dispirited few who survived them. We allow that even this evil is
worth the risk to men of honour when rational liberty is at stake, as in
the present case we confess and lament that it is.”
At other times he spoke as follows: ”Nothing less than a convulsion
that will shake the globe to its centre can ever restore the European
nations to that liberty by which they were once so much distinguished.
The Western world was the seat of freedom until another, more West-
ern, was discovered; and that other will probably be its asylum when it
is hunted down in every other part Happy it is that the worst of times
may have one refuge still left for humanity. If the Irish resisted King
William, they resisted him on the very same principle that the English
and Scotch resisted King James. The Irish Catholics must have been the
very worst and the most truly unnatural of rebels, if they had not sup-
ported a prince whom they had seen attacked, not for any designs against
their religion or their liberties, but for an extreme partiality for their
sect. Princes otherwise meritorious have violated the liberties of the
people, and have been lawfully deposed for such violation. I know no
human being exempt from the law. I consider Parliament as the proper
judge of kings, and it is necessary that they should be amenable to it.28/John Acton
There is no such thing as governing the whole body of the people con-
trary to their inclination. Whenever they have a feeling they commonly
are in the right Christ appeared in sympathy with the lowest of the people,
and thereby made it a firm and ruling principle that their welfare was
the object of all government.
“In all forms of government the people is the true legislator. The
remote and efficient cause is the consent of the people, either actual or
implied, and such consent is absolutely essential to its validity. Whiggism
did not consist in the support of the power of Parliament or of any other
power, but of the rights of the people. If Parliament should become an
instrument in invading them, it was no better in any respect, and much
worse in some, than any other instrument of arbitrary power. They who
call upon you to belong wholly to the people are those who wish you to
belong to your proper home, to the sphere of your duty, to the post of
your honour. Let the Commons in Parliament assembled be one and the
same thing with the Commons at large. I see no other way for the pres-
ervation of a decent attention to public interest in the representatives,
but the interposition of the body of the people itself; whenever, it shall
appear by some flagrant and notorious act, by some capital innovation,
that those representatives are going to overleap the fences of the law and
to introduce an arbitrary power. This interposition is a most unpleasant
remedy; but if it be a legal remedy, it is intended on some occasion to be
used to be used then only when it is evident that nothing else can hold
the Constitution to its true principles. It is not in Parliament alone that
the remedy for parliamentary disorders can be completed; hardly, in-
deed, can it begin there. A popular origin cannot therefore be the char-
acteristic distinction of a popular representative. This belongs equally
to all parts of government, and in all forms. The virtue, spirit, and es-
sence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express image of
the feelings of the nation. It was not instituted to be a control upon the
people. It was designed as a control for the people. Privilege of the
crown and privilege of Parliament are only privilege so long as they are
exercised for the benefit of the people. The voice of the people is a voice
that is to be heard, and not the votes and resolutions of the House of
Commons. He would preserve thoroughly every privilege of the people,
because it is a privilege known and written in the law of the land; and he
would support it, not against the crown or the aristocratic party only,
but against the representatives of the people themselves. This was not a
government of balances. It would be a strange thing if two hundredLectures on the French Revolution/29
peers should have it in their power to defeat by their negative what had
been done by the people of England. I have taken my part in political
connections and political quarrels for the purpose of advancing justice
and the dominion of reason, and I hope I shall never prefer the means, or
any feelings growing out of the use of those means, to the great and
substantial end itself. Legislators can do what lawyers can not, for they
have no other rules to bind them but the great principles of reason and
equity and the general sense of mankind. All human laws are, properly
speaking, only declaratory; they may alter the mode and application,
but have no power over the substance, of original justice. A conserva-
tion and secure enjoyment of our natural rights is the great and ultimate
purpose of civil society.
“The great inlet by which a colour for oppression has entered into
the world is by one man’s pretending to determine concerning the happi-
ness of another. I would give a full civil protection, in which I include an
immunity from all disturbance of their public religious worship, and a
power of teaching in schools as well as temples, to Jews, Mahometans,
and even Pagans. The Christian religion itself arose without establish-
ment, it arose even without toleration, and whilst its own principles
were not tolerated, it conquered all the powers of darkness, it conquered
all the powers of the world. The moment it began to depart from these
principles, it converted the establishment into tyranny, it subverted its
foundation from that very hour. It is the power of government to prevent
much evil; it can do very little positive good in this, or perhaps in any-
thing else. It is not only so of the State and statesman, but of all the
classes and descriptions of the rich: they are the pensioners of the poor,
and are maintained by their superfluity. They are under an absolute,
hereditary, and indefeasible dependence on those who labour and are
miscalled the poor. That class of dependent pensioners called the rich is
so extremely small, that if all their throats were cut, and a distribution
made of all they consume in a year, it would not give a bit of bread and
cheese for one night’s supper to those who labour, and who in reality
feed both the pensioners and themselves. It is not in breaking the laws of
commerce, which are the laws of nature and consequently the laws of
God, that we are to place our hope of softening the divine displeasure. It
is the law of nature, which is the law of God.”
I cannot resist the inference from these passages that Burke, after
1770, underwent other influences than those of his reputed masters, the
Whigs of 1688. And if we find that strain of unwonted thought in a man30/John Acton
who afterwards gilded the old order of things and wavered as to tolera-
tion and the slave trade, we may expect that the same causes would
operate in France.
When the Letters of a Pennsylvanian Farmer became known in
Europe, Diderot said that it was madness to allow Frenchmen to read
such things, as they could not do it without becoming intoxicated and
changed into different men. But France was impressed by the event more
than by the literature that accompanied it. America had made herself
independent under less provocation than had ever been a motive of re-
volt, and the French Government had acknowledged that her cause was
righteous and had gone to war for it. If the king was right in America, he
was utterly wrong at home, and if the Americans acted rightly, the argu-
ment was stronger, the cause was a hundredfold better, in France itself.
All that justified their independence condemned the Government of their
French allies. By the principle that taxation without representation is
robbery, there was no authority so illegitimate as that of Lewis XVI.
The force of that demonstration was irresistible, and it produced its
effect where the example of England failed. The English doctrine was
repelled at the very earliest stage of the Revolution, and the American
was adopted. What the French took from the Americans was their theory
of revolution, not their theory of government their cutting, not their sew-
ing. Many French nobles served in the war, and came home republicans
and even democrats by conviction. It was America that converted the
aristocracy to the reforming policy, and gave leaders to the Revolution.
“The American Revolution,” says Washington, “or the peculiar light of
the age, seems to have opened the eyes of almost every nation in Europe,
and a spirit of equal liberty appears fast to be gaining ground every-
where.” When the French officers were leaving, Cooper, of Boston, ad-
dressed them in the language of warning: “Do not let your hopes be
inflamed by our triumphs on this virgin soil. You will carry our senti-
ments with you, but if you try to plant them in a country that has been
corrupt for centuries, you will encounter obstacles more formidable than
ours. Our liberty has been won with blood; you will have to shed it in
torrents before liberty can take root in the old world.” Adams, after he
had been President of the United States, bitterly regretted the Revolu-
tion which made them independent, because it had given the example to
the French; although he also believed that they had not a single principle
in common.
Nothing, on the contrary, is more certain than that American prin-Lectures on the French Revolution/31
ciples profoundly influenced France, and determined the course of the
Revolution. It is from America that Lafayette derived the saying that
created a commotion at the time, that resistance is the most sacred of
duties. There also was the theory that political power comes from those
over whom it is exercised, and depends upon their will; that every au-
thority not so constituted is illegitimate and precarious; that the past is
more a warning than an example; that the earth belongs to those who are
upon it, not to those who are underneath. These are characteristics com-
mon to both Revolutions.
At one time also the French adopted and acclaimed the American
notion that the end of government is liberty, not happiness, or prosper-
ity, or power, or the preservation of an historic inheritance, or the adap-
tation of national law to national character, or the progress of enlighten-
ment and the promotion of virtue; that the private individual should not
feel the pressure of public authority, and should direct his life by the
influences that are within him, not around him.
And there was another political doctrine which the Americans trans-
mitted to the French. In old colonial days the executive and the judicial
powers were derived from a foreign source, and the common purpose
was to diminish them. The assemblies were popular in origin and char-
acter, and everything that added to their power seemed to add security to
rights. James Wilson, one of the authors and commentators of the con-
stitution, informs us that “at the Revolution the same fond predilection,
and the same jealous dislike, existed and prevailed. The executive, and
the judicial as well as the legislative authority, was now the child of the
people, but to the two former the people behaved like stepmothers. The
legislature was still discriminated by excessive partiality.” This prefer-
ence, historic but irrational, led up naturally to a single chamber. The
people of America and their delegates in Congress were of opinion that
a single Assembly was every way adequate to the management of their
federal concerns, and when the Senate was invented, Franklin strongly
objected. “As to the two chambers,” he wrote, “I am of your Opinion
that one alone would be better; but, my dear friend, nothing in human
affairs and schemes is perfect, and perhaps this is the case of our opin-
ions.”
Alexander Hamilton was the ablest as well as the most conservative
of the American statesmen. He longed for monarchy, and he desired to
establish a national government and to annihilate state rights. The Ameri-
can spirit, as it penetrated France, cannot well be described better than32/John Acton
it was by him: “I consider civil liberty, in a genuine, unadulterated sense,
as the greatest of terrestrial blessings. I am convinced that the whole
human race is entitled to it, and that it can be wrested from no part of
them without the blackest and most aggravated guilt. The sacred rights
of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty
records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of
human nature, by the hand of the Divinity itself; and can never be erased
or obscured by mortal power.”
But when we speak in the gross of the American Revolution we
combine different and discordant things. From the first agitation in 1761
to the Declaration of Independence, and then to the end of the war in
1782, the Americans were aggressive, violent in their language, fond of
abstractions, prolific of doctrines universally applicable and universally
destructive. It is the ideas of those earlier days that roused the attention
of France, and were imported by Lafayette, Noailles, Lameth, and the
leaders of the future revolution who had beheld the lowering of the Brit-
ish flag at Yorktown. The America of their experience was the America
of James Otis, of Jefferson, of The Rights of Man.
A change followed in 1787, when the Convention drew up the Con-
stitution. It was a period of construction, and every effort was made,
every scheme was invented, to curb the inevitable democracy. The mem-
bers of that assembly were, on the whole, eminently cautious and sen-
sible men. They were not men of extraordinary parts, and the genius of
Hamilton failed absolutely to impress them. Some of their most memo-
rable contrivances proceeded from no design, but were merely half mea-
sures and mutual concessions. Seward has pointed out this distinction
between the revolutionary epoch and the constituent epoch that suc-
ceeded: “The rights asserted by our forefathers were not peculiar to
themselves. They were the common rights of mankind. The basis of the
Constitution was laid broader by far than the superstructure which the
conflicting interests and prejudices of the day suffered to be erected.
The Constitution and laws of the Federal Government did not practi-
cally extend those principles throughout the new system of government;
but they were plainly promulgated in the Declaration of Independence.”
Now, although France was deeply touched by the American Revo-
lution, it was not affected by the American Constitution. It underwent
the disturbing influence, not the conservative.
The Constitution, framed in the summer of 1787, came into opera-
tion in March 1789, and nobody knew how it worked, when the crisisLectures on the French Revolution/33
came in France. The debates, which explain every intention and combi-
nation, remained long hidden from the world. Moreover, the Constitu-
tion has become something more than the original printed paper. Be-
sides amendments, it has been interpreted by the courts, modified by
opinion, developed in some directions, and tacitly altered in others. Some
of its most valued provisions have been acquired in this way, and were
not yet visible when the French so greatly needed the guiding lessons of
other men’s experience. Some of the restrictions on the governing power
were not fully established at first.
The most important of these is the action of the Supreme Court in
annulling unconstitutional laws. The Duke of Wellington said to Bun-
sen that by this institution alone the United States made up for all the
defects of their government. Since Chief Justice Marshall, the judiciary
undoubtedly obtained immense authority, which Jefferson, and others
besides, believed to be unconstitutional; for the Constitution itself gives
no such power. The idea had grown up in the States, chiefly, I think, in
Virginia. At Richmond, in 1782, Judge Wythe said: “Tyranny has been
sapped, the departments kept within their own spheres, the citizens pro-
tected, and general liberty promoted. But this beneficial result attains to
higher perfection when, those who hold the purse and the sword differ-
ing as to the powers which each may exercise, the tribunals, who hold
neither, are called upon to declare the law impartially between them. If
the whole legislature an event to be deprecated should attempt to over-
leap the boundaries prescribed to them by the people, I, in administering
the justice of the country, will meet the united powers at my seat in this
tribunal, and, pointing to the Constitution, will say to them: ‘Here is the
limit of your authority; hither shall you go, but no further.”’ The Virgin-
ian legislature gave way, and repealed the act.
After the Federal Constitution was drawn up, Hamilton, in the sev-
enty-eighth number of the Federalist, argued that the power belonged to
the judiciary; but it was not constitutionally recognised until 1801. “This,”
said Madison, “makes the judiciary department paramount, in fact, to
the legislature, which was never intended, and can never be proper. In a
government whose vital principle is responsibility, it never will be al-
lowed that the legislative and executive departments should be com-
pletely subjected to the judiciary, in which that characteristic feature is
so faintly seen.” Wilson, on the other hand, justified the practice on the
principle of the higher law: “Parliament may, unquestionably, be con-
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not this superior authority binding upon the courts of justice? When the
courts of justice obey the superior authority, it cannot be said with pro-
priety that they control the inferior one; they only declare, as it is their
duty to declare, that this inferior one is controlled by the other, which is
superior. They do not repeal an act of Parliament; they pronounce it
void, because contrary to an overruling law.” Thus the function of the
judiciary to be a barrier against democracy, which, according to
Tocqueville, it is destined to be, was not apparent. In the same manner
religious liberty, which has become so much identified with the United
States, is a thing which grew by degrees, and was not to be found im-
posed by the letter of the law.
The true natural check on absolute democracy is the federal system,
which limits the central government by the powers reserved, and the
state governments by the powers they have ceded. It is the one immortal
tribute of America to political science, for state rights are at the same
time the consummation and the guard of democracy. So much so that an
officer wrote, a few months before Bull Run: “The people in the south
are evidently unanimous in the opinion that slavery is endangered by the
current of events, and it is useless to attempt to alter that opinion. As
our government is founded on the will of the people, when that will is
fixed our government is powerless.” Those are the words of Sherman,
the man who, by his march through Georgia, cut the Confederacy into
two. Lincoln himself wrote, at the same time: “I declare that the mainte-
nance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of
each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according
to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of powers
on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend.”
Such was the force with which state rights held the minds of abolition-
ists on the eve of the war that bore them down.
At the Revolution there were many Frenchmen who saw in federal-
ism the only way to reconcile liberty and democracy, to establish gov-
ernment on contract, and to rescue the country from the crushing pre-
ponderance of Paris and the Parisian populace. I do not mean the
Girondins, but men of opinions different from theirs, and, above all,
Mirabeau. He planned to save the throne by detaching the provinces
from the frenzy of the capital, and he declared that the federal system is
alone capable of Preserving freedom in any great empire. The idea did
not grow up under American influence; for no man was more opposed
to it than Lafayette; and the American witness of the Revolution, Mor-Lectures on the French Revolution/35
ris, denounced federalism as a danger to France.
Apart from the Constitution, the political thought of America influ-
enced the French next to their own. And it was not all speculation, but a
system for which men died, which had proved entirely practical, and
strong enough to conquer all resistance, with the sanction and encour-
agement of Europe. It displayed to France a finished model of revolu-
tion, both in thought and action, and showed that what seemed extreme
and subversive in the old world, was compatible with good and wise
government, with respect for social order, and the preservation of na-
tional character and custom. The ideas which captured and convulsed
the French people were mostly ready-made for them, and much that is
familiar to you now, much of that which I have put before you from
other than French sources, will meet us again next week with the old
faces, when we come to the States-General.III: THE SUMMONS OF THE STATES-GENERAL
The condition of France alone did not bring about the overthrow of the
monarchy and the convulsion that ensued. For the sufferings of the people
were not greater than they had been before; the misgovernment and op-
pression were less, and a successful war with England had largely wiped
out the humiliations inflicted by Chatham.
But the confluence of French theory with American example caused
the Revolution to break out, not in an excess of irritation and despair,
but in a moment of better feeling between the nation and the king. The
French were not mere reckless innovators; they were confiding follow-
ers, and many of the ideas with which they made their venture were
those in which Burke agreed with Hamilton, and with his own illustri-
ous countrymen, Adam Smith and Sir William Jones. When he said
that, compared to England, the government of France was slavery, and
that nothing but a revolution could restore European liberty, French-
men, saying the same thing, and acting upon it, were unconscious of
extravagance, and might well believe that they were obeying precepts
stored in the past by high and venerable authority. Beyond that common
ground, they fell back on native opinion in which there was wide diver-
gence, and an irrepressible conflict arose. We have to deal with no un-
likely motives, with no unheard of theories, and, on the whole, with
convinced and average men.
The States-General were convoked because there was no other way
of obtaining money for the public need. The deficit was a record of bad
government, and the first practical object was the readjustment of taxes.
From the king’s accession, the revival of the old and neglected institu-
tion had been kept before the country as a remedy, not for financial
straits only, but for all the ills of France.
The imposing corporation of the judiciary had constantly opposed
the Crown, and claimed to subject its acts to the judgment of the law.
The higher clergy had raised objections to Turgot, to Necker, to the
emancipation of Protestants; and the nobles became the most active of
all the parties of reform. But the great body of the people had borne
their trouble in patience. They possessed no recognised means of ex-
pressing sentiments. There was no right of public meeting, no liberty for
the periodical press; and the privileged newspapers were so tightly
swaddled in their official character that they had nothing to say even of
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multitude did not appear, unless they appeared in the shape of disorder.
Without it France remained an unknown quantity. The king felt the re-
sistance of the privileged and interested classes which was the source of
his necessity, but he was not apprehensive of a national opposition. He
was prepared to rely on the Third Estate with hopefulness, if not with
confidence, and to pay a very high price for their support. In a certain
measure their interest was the same. The penury of the State came from
the fact that more than half the property of France was not taxed in its
proportion, and it was essential for the government to abolish the excep-
tion, and to bring nobles and clergy to surrender their privilege, and pay
like the rest. To that extent the object of the king was to do away with
privilege and to introduce equality before the law. So far the Commons
went along with him. They would be relieved of a heavy burden if they
ceased to pay the share of those who were exempt, and rejected the time-
honoured custom that the poor should bear taxation for the rich. An
alliance, therefore, was indicated and natural. But the extinction of privi-
lege, which for monarchy and democracy alike meant fiscal equality,
meant for the democracy a great deal more. Besides the money which
they were required to pay in behalf of the upper class and for their
benefit and solace, money had to be paid to them. Apart from rent for
house or land, there were payments due to them proceeding from the
time, the obscure and distant time, when power went with land, and the
local landholder was the local government, the ruler and protector of the
people, and was paid accordingly. And there was another category of
claims, proceeding indirectly from the same historic source, consisting
of commutation and compensation for ancient rights, and having there-
fore a legal character, founded upon contract, not upon force.
Every thinking politician knew that the first of these categories, the
beneficial rights that were superfluous and oppressive, could not be
maintained, and that the nobles would be made to give up not only that
form of privilege which consisted in exemption from particular taxes,
but that composed of superannuated demands in return for work no
longer done, or value given. Those, on the other hand, which were not
simply mediaeval, but based upon contract, would be treated as lawful
property, and would have to be redeemed. Privilege, in the eyes of the
state, was the right of evading taxes. To the politician it meant, further-
more, the right of imposing taxes. For the rural democracy it had a
wider significance. To them, all these privileges were products of the
same principle, ruins of the same fabric. They were relics and remnants38/John Acton
of feudalism, and feudalism meant power given to land and denied to
capital and industry. It meant class government, the negation of the very
idea of the state and of the nation; it meant conquest and subjugation by
a foreign invader. None denied that many great families had won their
spurs in the service of their country; everybody indeed knew that the
noblest of all, Montmorency, bore the arms of France because, at the
victory of Bouvines, where their ancestor was desperately wounded, the
king laid his finger on the wound and drew with his blood the lilies upon
his shield. When we come, presently, to the Abbé Sieyès, we shall see
how firmly men believed that the nobles were, in the mass, Franks,
Teutonic tyrants, and spoilers of the Celtic native. They intended that
feudalism should not be trimmed but uprooted, as the cause of much
that was infinitely odious, and as a thing absolutely incompatible with
public policy, social interests, and right reason. That men should be
made to bear suffering for the sake of what could only be explained by
very early history and very yellow parchments was simply irrational to
a generation which received its notion of life from Turgot, Adam Smith,
or Franklin.
Although there were three interpretations of feudal privilege, and
consequently a dangerous problem in the near future, the first step was
an easy one, and consisted in the appeal by the Crown to the Commons
for aid in regenerating the State. Like other princes of his time, Lewis
XVI was a reforming monarch. At his accession, his first choice of a
minister was Machault, known to have entertained a vast scheme of
change, to be attempted whenever the throne should be occupied by a
serious prince. Later, he appointed Turgot, the most profound and thor-
ough reformer of the century. He appointed Malesherbes, one of the
weakest but one of the most enlightened of public men; and after hav-
ing, at the Coronation, taken an oath to persecute, he gave office to
Necker, a Protestant, an alien, and a republican. When he had begun,
through Malesherbes, to remove religious disabilities, he said to him,
“Now you have been a Protestant, and I declare you a Jew”; and began
to prepare a measure for the relief of Jews, who, wherever they went,
were forced to pay the same toll as a pig. He carried out a large and
complicated scheme of law reform; and he achieved the independence of
revolted America. In later days the Elector of Cologne complained to an
émigré that his king’s policy had been deplorable, and that, having pro-
moted resistance to authority in the Colonies, in Holland, and in Brabant,
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But the impulse in the direction of liberal improvement was inter-
mittent, and was checked by a natural diffidence and infirmity of pur-
pose. The messenger who was to summon Machault was recalled as he
mounted his horse. Turgot was sacrificed to gratify the queen. Necker’s
second administration would have begun a year and a half earlier, but,
at the last moment, his enemies intervened. The war minister, Saint
Germain, was agreeable to the king, and he wished to keep him. “But
what can I do?” he wrote; “his enemies are bent on his dismissal, and I
must yield to the majority.” Maurepas, at his death, left a paper on
which were the names of four men whom he entreated his master not to
employ. Lewis bestowed the highest offices upon them all. He regarded
England with the aversion with which Chatham, and at that time even
Fox, looked upon France, and he went to war in the just hope of aveng-
ing the disgrace of the Seven Years’ War, but from no sympathy with
the American cause. When he was required to retrench his personal
expenditure, he objected, and insisted that much of the loss should be
made to fall on his pensioners. The liberal concessions which he al-
lowed were in many cases made at the expense, not of the Crown, but of
powers that were obstructing the Crown. By the abolition of torture he
incurred no loss, but curbed the resources of opposing magistrates. When
he emancipated the Protestants and made a Swiss Calvinist his princi-
pal adviser, he displeased the clergy; but he cared little for clerical dis-
pleasure. The bishops, finding that he took no notice of them, disap-
peared from his levée. He objected to the appointment of French cardi-
nals. English travellers at Versailles, Romilly and Valpy, observed that
he was inattentive at mass, and talked and laughed before all the court.
At the Council he would fall asleep, and when the discussion was dis-
tasteful, he used to snore louder than when he slept. He said to Necker
that he desired the States-General because he wanted a guide. When, in
1788, after skirmishing with magistrates and prelates, he took the memo-
rable resolution to call in the outer people, to compel a compromise with
the class that filled his court, that constituted society, that ruled opinion,
it was the act of a man destitute of energy, and gifted with an uncertain
and indistinct enlightenment. And Necker said, “You may lend a man
your ideas, you cannot lend him your strength of will.”
The enterprise was far beyond the power and quality of his mind,
but the lesson of his time was not lost upon him, and he had learnt
something since the days when he spoke the unchanging language of
absolutism. He showed another spirit when he emancipated the serfs of40/John Acton
the Crown, when he introduced provincial and village councils, when he
pronounced that to confine local government to land-owners was to of-
fend a still larger class, when he invited assistance in reforming the
criminal code in order that the result might be the work, not of experts
only, but of the public. All this was genuine conviction. He was deter-
mined that the upper class should lose its fiscal privileges with as little
further detriment as possible. And, to accomplish this necessary and
deliberate purpose, he offered terms to the Commons of France such as
no monarch ever proposed to his subjects. He declared in later days, and
had a right to declare, that it was he who had taken the first step to
concert with the French people a permanent constitution, the abolition
of arbitrary power, of pecuniary privilege, of promotion apart from merit,
of taxation without consent. When he heard that the Notables had given
only one vote in favour of increased representation of the Third Estate,
he said, “You can add mine.” Malouet, the most high-minded and saga-
cious statesman of the Revolution, testifies to his sincerity, and declares
that the king fully shared his opinions.
The tributary elements of a free constitution which were granted by
Lewis XVI, not in consultation with deputies, not even always with
public support, included religious toleration, Habeas Corpus, equal in-
cidence of taxes, abolition of torture, decentralisation and local self-
government, freedom of the press, universal suffrage, election without
official candidates or influence, periodical convocation of parliament,
right of voting supplies, of initiating legislation, of revising the constitu-
tion, responsibility of ministers, double representation of the Commons
at the States-General. All these concessions were acts of the Crown,
yielding to dictates of policy more than to popular demand. It is said
that power is an object of such ardent desire to man, that the voluntary
surrender of it is absurd in psychology and unknown in history. Lewis
XVI no doubt calculated the probabilities of loss and gain, and per-
suaded himself that his action was politic even more than generous. The
Prussian envoy rightly described him in a despatch of July 31, 1789. He
says that the king was willing to weaken the executive at home, in order
to strengthen it abroad; if the ministers lost by a better regulated admin-
istration, the nation would gain by it in resource, and a limited authority
in a more powerful state seemed preferable to absolute authority which
was helpless from its unpopularity and the irreparable disorder of fi-
nance. He was resolved to submit the arbitrary government of his an-
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far on the way to established freedom that it was exhausted, and the rest
was left to the nation. As the elections were not influenced, as the in-
structions were not inspired, the deliberations were not guided or con-
trolled. The king abdicated before the States-General. He assigned so
much authority to the new legislature that none remained with the Crown,
and its powers, thus practically suspended, were never recovered. The
rival classes, that only the king could have reconciled and restrained,
were abandoned to the fatal issue of a trial of strength.
In 1786 the annual deficit amounted to between four and five mil-
lions, and the season for heroic remedies had evidently come. The artful
and evasive confusion of accounts that shrouded the secret could not be
maintained, and the minister of finance, Calonne, convoked the No-
tables for February 1787. The Notables were a selection of important
personages, chiefly of the upper order, without legal powers or initia-
tive. It was hoped that they would strengthen the hands of the govern-
ment, and that what they agreed to would be accepted by the class to
which they belonged. It was an experiment to avert the evil day of the
States-General. For the States-General, which had not been seen for one
hundred and seventy-five years, were the features of a bygone stage of
political life, and could neither be revived as they once had been, nor
adapted to modern society. If they imposed taxes, they would impose
conditions, and they were an auxiliary who might become a master. The
Notables were soon found inadequate to the purpose, and the minister,
having failed to control them, was dismissed. Necker, his rival and ob-
vious successor, was sent out of the way, and the Archbishop of Toulouse,
afterwards of Sens, who was appointed in his place, got rid of the As-
sembly. There was nothing left to fall back upon but the dreaded States-
General. Lafayette had demanded them at the meeting of the Notables,
and the demand was now repeated far and wide.
On August 8, 1788, the king summoned the States-General for the
following year, to the end, as he proclaimed, that the nation might settle
its own government in perpetuity. The words signified that the absolute
monarchy of 1788 would make way for a representative monarchy in
1789. In what way this was to be done, and how the States would be
constituted, was unknown. The public were invited to offer suggestions,
and the press was practically made free for publications that were not
periodical. Necker, the inevitable minister of the new order of things,
was immediately nominated to succeed the Archbishop, and the funds
rose 30 per cent in one day. He was a foreigner, independent of French42/John Acton
tradition and ways of thought, who not only stood aloof from the Catho-
lics, as a Genevese, but also from the prevailing freethinkers, for Priestley
describes him as nearly the only believer in religion whom he found in
intellectual society at Paris. He was the earliest foreign statesman who
studied and understood the modern force of opinion; and he identified
public opinion with credit, as we should say, with the city. He took the
views of capitalists as the most sensitive record of public confidence;
and as Paris was the headquarters of business, he contributed, in spite
of his declared federalism, to that predominance of the centre which
became fatal to liberty and order.
Necker was familiar with the working of republican institutions,
and he was an admirer of the British model; but the king would not hear
of going to school to the people whom he had so recently defeated, and
who owed their disgrace as much to political as to military incapacity.
Consequently Necker repressed his zeal in politics, and was not eager
for the States-General. They would never have been wanted, he said, if
he had been called to succeed Calonne, and had had the managing of the
Notables. He was glad now that they should serve to bring the entire
property of the country, on equal terms, under the tax-gatherer, and if
that could have been effected at once, by an overwhelming pressure of
public feeling, his practical spirit would not have hungered for further
changes.
The Third Estate was invoked for a great fiscal operation. If it
brought the upper class to the necessary sense of their own obligations
and the national claims, that was enough for the keeper of the purse, and
he would have deprecated the intrusion of other formidable and absorb-
ing objects, detrimental to his own. Beyond that was danger, but the
course was clear towards obtaining from the greater assembly what he
would have extracted from the less if he had held office in 1787. That is
the secret of Necker’s unforeseen weakness in the midst of so much
power, and of his sterility when the crisis broke and it was discovered
that the force which had been calculated equal to the carrying of a mod-
est and obvious reform was as the rush of Niagara, and that France was
in the resistless rapids.
Everything depended on the manner in which the government de-
cided that the States should be composed, elected, and conducted. To
pronounce on this, Necker caused the Notables to be convoked again,
exposed the problem, and desired their opinion. The nobles had been
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their reply might relieve him of a dreaded responsibility and prevent a
conflict. The Notables gave their advice. They resolved that the Com-
mons should be elected, virtually, by universal suffrage without condi-
tions of eligibility; that the parish priests should be electors and eligible;
that the lesser class of nobles should be represented like the greater.
They extended the franchise to the unlettered multitude, because the
danger which they apprehended came from the middle class, not from
the lower. But they voted, by three to one, that each order should be
equal in numbers. The Count of Provence, the king’s next brother, went
with the minority, and voted that the deputies of the Commons should be
as numerous as those of the two other orders together. This became the
burning question. If the Commons did not predominate, there was no
security that the other orders would give way. On the other hand, by the
important innovation of admitting the parish clergy, and those whom we
should call provincial gentry, a great concession was made to the popu-
lar element. The antagonism between the two branches of the clergy,
and between the two branches of the noblesse, was greater than that
between the inferior portion of each and the Third Estate, and promised
a contingent to the liberal cause. It turned out, at the proper time, that
the two strongest leaders of the democracy were, one, an ancient noble;
the other, a canon of the cathedral of Chartres. The Notables concluded
their acceptable labours on December 12. On the 5th the magistrates
who formed the parliament of Paris, after solemnly enumerating the
great constitutional principles, entreated the king to establish them as
the basis of all future legislation. The position of the government was
immensely simplified. The walls of the city had fallen, and it was doubt-
ful where any serious resistance would come from.
Meantime, the agitation in the provinces, and the explosion of pent-
up feeling that followed the unlicensed printing of political tracts, showed
that public opinion moved faster than that of the two great conservative
bodies. It became urgent that the Government should come to an early
and resolute decision, and should occupy ground that might be held
against the surging democracy. Necker judged that the position would
be impregnable if he stood upon the lines drawn by the Notables, and he
decided that the Commons should be equal to either order singly, and
not jointly to the two. In consultation with a statesmanlike prelate, the
Archbishop of Bordeaux, he drew up and printed a report, refusing the
desired increase. But as he sat anxiously watching the winds and the
tide, he began to doubt; and when letters came, warning him that the44/John Acton
nobles would be butchered if the decision went in their favour, he took
alarm. He said to his friends, “If we do not multiply the Commons by
two, they will multiply themselves by ten.” When the Archbishop saw
him again at Christmas, Necker assured him that the Government was
no longer strong enough to resist the popular demand. But he was also
determined that the three houses should vote separately, that the Com-
mons should enjoy no advantage from their numbers in any discussion
where privilege was at stake, or the interest of classes was not identical.
He hoped that the nobles would submit to equal taxation of their own
accord, and that he would stand between them and any exorbitant claim
of equal political power.
On December 27 Necker’s scheme was adopted by the Council.
There was some division of opinion; but the king overruled it, and the
queen, who was present, showed, without speaking, that she was there
to support the measure. By this momentous act Lewis XVI., without
being conscious of its significance, went over to the democracy. He
said, in plain terms, to the French people: “Afford me the aid I require,
so far as we have a common interest, and for that definite and appropri-
ated assistance you shall have a princely reward. For you shall at once
have a constitution of your own making, which shall limit the power of
the Crown, leaving untouched the power and the dignity and the prop-
erty of the upper classes, beyond what is involved in an equal share of
taxation.” But in effect he said: “Let us combine to deprive the aristoc-
racy of those privileges which are injurious to the Crown, whilst we
retain those which are offensive only to the people.” It was a tacit com-
pact, of which the terms and limits were not defined; and where one
thought of immunities, the other was thinking of oppression. The
organisation of society required to be altered and remodelled from end
to end to sustain a constitution founded on the principle of liberty. It was
no arduous problem to adjust relations between the people and the king.
The deeper question was between the people and the aristocracy. Be-
hind a political reform there was a social revolution, for the only liberty
that could avail was liberty founded on equality. Malouet, who was at
this moment Necker’s best adviser, said to him: “You have made the
Commons equal in influence to the other orders. Another revolution has
to follow, and it is for you to accomplish it the levelling of onerous
privilege.” Necker had no ambition of the kind, and he distinctly guarded
privilege in all matters but taxation.
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plause; and the public believed that everything they had demanded was
now obtained, or was at least within reach. The doubling of the Com-
mons was illusory if they were to have no opportunity of making their
numbers tell. The Count of Provence, afterwards Lewis XVIII, had ex-
pressly argued that the old States-General were useless because the Third
Estate was not suffered to prevail in them. Therefore he urged that the
three orders should deliberate and vote as one, and that the Commons
should possess the majority. It was universally felt that this was the real
meaning of the double representation, and that there was a logic in it
which could not be resisted. The actual power vested in the Commons
by the great concession exceeded their literal and legal power, and it
was accepted and employed accordingly.
The mode of election was regulated on January 24. There were to
be three hundred deputies for the clergy, three hundred for the nobles,
six hundred for the Commons. There were to be no restrictions and no
exclusions; but whereas the greater personages voted directly, the vote
of the lower classes was indirect; and the rule for the Commons was that
one hundred primary voters chose an elector. Besides the deputy, there
was the deputy’s deputy, held in reserve, ready in case of vacancy to
take his place. It was on this peculiar device of eventual representatives
that the Commons relied, if their numbers had not been doubled. They
would have called up their substitutes. The rights and charters of the
several provinces were superseded, and all were placed on the same
level.
A more sincere and genuine election has never been held. And on
the whole it was orderly. The clergy were uneasy, and the nobles more
openly alarmed. But the country in general had confidence in what was
coming; and some of the most liberal and advanced and outspoken mani-
festations proceeded from aristocratic and ecclesiastical constituencies.
On February 9 the Venetian envoy reports that the clergy and nobles are
ready to accept the principle of equality in taxation. The elections were
going on for more than two months, from February to the beginning of
May.
In accordance with ancient custom, when a deputy was a plenipo-
tentiary more than a representative, it was ordained that the preliminary
of every election was the drawing up of instructions. Every corner of
France was swept and searched for its ideas. The village gave them to
its elector, and they were compared and consolidated by the electors in
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istic bequest to its successors of a society at the point of death, were
often the work of conspicuous public men, such as Malouet, Lanjuinais,
Dupont, the friend of Turgot and originator of the commercial treaty of
1786; and one paper, drawn up by Sieyès, was circulated all over France
by the duke of Orleans.
In this way, by the lead which was taken by eminent and experi-
enced men, there is an appearance of unanimity. All France desired the
essential institutions of limited monarchy, in the shape of representation
and the division of power, and foreshadowed the charter of 1814. There
is scarcely a trace of the spirit of departing absolutism; there is not a
sign of the coming republic. It is agreed that precedent is dead, and the
world just going  begin. There are no clear views on certain grave mat-
ters of detail, on an Upper House, Church and State, and primary edu-
cation. Free schools, progressive taxation, the extinction of slavery, of
poverty, of ignorance, are among the things advised. The privileged or-
ders are prepared for a vast surrender in regard to taxes, and nobody
seems to associate the right of being represented in future parliaments
with the possession of property. On nine-tenths of all that is material to
a constitution there is a general agreement. The one broad division is
that the Commons wish that the States-General shall form a single united
Assembly, and the other orders wish for three. But on this supreme issue
the Commons are all agreed, and the others are not. An ominous rift
appears, and we already perceive the minority of nobles and priests,
who, in the hour of conflict, were to rule the fate of European society.
From all these papers, the mandate of united France, it was the function
of true statesmanship to distill the essence of a sufficient freedom.
These instructions were intended to be imperative. Nine years be-
fore, Burke, when he retired from the contest at Bristol, had defined the
constitutional doctrine on constituency and member; and Charles Sumner
said that he legislated when he made that speech. But the ancient view,
on which instructions are founded, made the deputy the agent of the
deputing power, and much French history turns on it. At first the danger
was unfelt; for the instructions were often compiled by the deputy him-
self, who was to execute them. They were a pledge even more than an
order.
The nation had responded to the royal appeal, and there was agree-
ment between the offer and the demand. The upper classes had opposed
and resisted the Crown; the people were eager to support it, and it was
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moderation and serenity of the Instructions disguised the unappeasable
conflict of opinion and the furious passion that raged below.
The very cream of the upper and middle class were elected; and the
Court, in its prosperous complacency, abandoned to their wisdom the
task of creating the new institutions and permanently settling the finan-
cial trouble. It persisted in non-interference, and had no policy but ex-
pectation. The initiative passed to every private member. The members
consisted of new men, without connection or party organisation. They
wanted time to feel their way, and missed a moderator and a guide. The
governing power ceased, for the moment, to serve the supreme purpose
of government; and monarchy transformed itself into anarchy to see
what would come of it, and to avoid committing itself on either side
against the class by which it was always surrounded or the class which
seemed ready with its alliance.
The Government renounced the advantage which the elections and
the temperate instructions gave them; and in the hope that the elect would
be at least as reasonable as the electors, they threw away their greatest
opportunity. There was a disposition to underrate dangers that were not
on the surface. Even Mirabeau, who, if not a deep thinker, was a keen
observer, imagined that the entire mission of the States-General might
have been accomplished in a week. Few men saw the ambiguity hidden
in the term Privilege, and the immense difference that divided fiscal
change from social change. In attacking feudalism, which was the sur-
vival of barbarism, the middle class designed to overthrow the condition
of society which gave power as well as property to a favoured minority.
The assault on the restricted distribution of power involved an assault
on the concentration of wealth. The connection of the two ideas is the
secret motive of the Revolution. At that time the law by which power
follows property, which has been called the most important discovery
made by man since the invention of printing. was not clearly known.
But the underground forces at work were recognised by the intelligent
conservatives, and they were assuming the defensive, in preparation for
the hour when they would be deserted by the king. It was therefore
impossible that the object for which the States-General were summoned
should be attained while they were divided into three. Either they must
be dissolved, or the thing which the middle-class deputies could not
accomplish by use of forms would be attempted by the lower class, their
masters and employers, by use of force.
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weighty counsel. He said: “You now know the wishes of France; you
know the instructions, you do not know the deputies. Do not leave all
things to the arbitrament of the unknown. Convert at once the demands
of the people into a constitution, and give them force of law. Act while
you have unfettered power of action. Act while your action will be hailed
as the most magnificent concession ever granted by a monarch to a loyal
and expectant nation. To-day you are supreme and safe. It may be too
late to-morrow.”
In particular, Malouet advised that the Government should regulate
the verification of powers, leaving only contested returns to the judg-
ment of the representatives. Necker abided by his meditated neutrality,
and preferred that the problem should work itself out with entire free-
dom. He would not take sides lest he should offend one party without
being sure of the other, and forfeit his chance of becoming the accepted
arbitrator. Whilst, by deciding nothing, he kept the enemy at bay, the
upper classes might yet reach the wise conclusion that, in the midst of so
much peril to royalty and to themselves, it was time to place the interest
of the state before their own, and to accept the duties and the burdens of
undistinguished men.
Neither party could yield. The Commons could not Fail to see that
time was on their side, and that, by compelling the other orders to merge
with them, they secured he downfall of privilege and played the game of
the court. The two other orders were, by the imperative mandate of
many constituencies, prohibited from voting in common. Their resis-
tance was legitimate, and could only be overcome by the intervention
either of the Crown or the people. Their policy might have been justified
if they had at once made their surrender, and had accomplished with
deliberation in May what had to be done with tumult in August. With
these problems and these perils before them, the States-General met on
that memorable 5th of May. Necker, preferring the abode of financiers,
wished them to meet at Paris; and four or five other places were pro-
posed. At last the king, breaking silence, said that it could be only at
Versailles, on account of his hunting. At the time he saw no cause for
alarm in the proximity of the capital. Since then, the disturbances in one
or two places, and the open language of some of the electors, had begun
to make him swerve.
On the opening day the queen was received with offensive silence;
but she acknowledged a belated cheer with such evident gladness and
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of deputies were cheered as they passed all but the Commons of Provence,
for they had Mirabeau among them. He alone was hissed. Two ladies
who watched the procession from the same window were the daughters
of Necker and the wife of the Foreign Minister, Montmorin. One thought
with admiration that she was a witness of the greatest scene in modern
history; and the other was sad with evil forebodings. Both were right;
but the feeling of confidence and enthusiasm pervaded the crowd. Near
relations of my own were at Rome in 1846, during the excitement at the
reforms of the new Pope, who, at that moment, was the most popular
sovereign in Europe. They asked an Italian lady who was with them
why all the demonstrations only made her more melancholy. She an-
swered: “Because I was at Versailles in 1789.”
Barentin, the minister who had opposed Necker’s plans and viewed
the States-General with apprehension and disgust, spoke after the king.
He was a French judge, with no heart for any form of government but
the ancient one enjoyed by France. Nevertheless he admitted that joint
deliberation was the reasonable solution. He added that it could only be
adopted by common consent; and he urged the two orders to sacrifice
their right of exemption. Necker perplexed his hearers by receding from
the ground which the Chancellor had taken. He assured the two orders
that they need not apprehend absorption in the third if, while voting
separately, they executed the promised surrender. He spoke as their pro-
tector, on the condition that they submitted to the common law, and paid
their taxes in arithmetical proportion. He implied, but did not say, that
what they refused to the Crown would be taken by the people. In his
financial statement he under-estimated the deficit, and he said nothing
of the Constitution. The great day ended badly. The deputies were di-
rected to hand in their returns to the Master of Ceremonies, an official
of whom we shall soon see more. But the Master of Ceremonies was not
acceptable to the Commons, because he had compelled them to with-
draw, the day before, from their places in the nave of the church. There-
fore the injunction was disregarded ; and the verification of powers,
which the Government might have regulated, was left to the deputies
themselves, and became the lever by which the more numerous order
overthrew the monarchy, and carried to an end, in seven weeks, the
greatest constitutional struggle that has ever been fought out in the world
by speech alone.IV: THE MEETING OF THE STATES-GENERAL
The argument of the drama which opened on May 6, 1789, and closed
on June 27, is this: The French people had been called to the enjoyment
of freedom by every voice they heard by the king; by the notables, who
proposed unrestricted suffrage; by the supreme judiciary, who proclaimed
the future Constitution; by the clergy and the aristocracy, in the most
solemn pledges of the electoral period; by the British example, celebrated
by Montesquieu and Voltaire; by the more cogent example of America;
by the national classics, who declared, with a hundred tongues, that all
authority must be controlled, that the masses must be rescued from deg-
radation, and the individual from constraint.
When the Commons appeared at Versailles, they were there to claim
an inheritance of which, by universal consent, they had been wrongfully
deprived. They were not arrayed against the king, who had been already
brought to submission by blows not dealt by them. They desired to make
terms with those to whom he was ostensibly opposed. There could be no
real freedom for them until they were as free on the side of the nobles as
on that of the Crown. The modern absolutism of the monarch had sur-
rendered; but the ancient owners of the soil remained, with their exclu-
sive position in the State, and a complicated system of honours and
exactions which humiliated the middle class and pauperised the lower.
The educated democracy, acting for themselves, might have been con-
tent with the retrenchment of those privileges which put them at a disad-
vantage. But the rural population were concerned with every fragment
of obsolete feudalism that added to the burden of their lives.
The two classes were undivided. Together they had elected their
deputies, and the cleavage between the political and the social demo-
crat, which has become so great a fact in modern society, was scarcely
perceived. The same common principle, the same comprehensive term,
composed the policy of both. They demanded liberty, both in the State
and in society, and required that oppression should cease, whether exer-
cised in the name of the king or in the name of the aristocracy. In a word,
they required equality as well as liberty, and sought deliverance from
feudalism and from absolutism at the same time. And equality was the
most urgent and prominent claim of the two, because the king, virtually,
had given way, but the nobles had not.
The battle that remained to be fought, and at once commenced, was
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to poverty by the operation of law, and people who were prosperous at
their expense. And as there were men who would perish from want while
the laws remained unchanged, and others who would be ruined by their
repeal, the strife was deadly.
The real object of assault was not the living landlord, but the unbur-
ied past. It had little to do with socialism, or with high rents, bad times,
and rapacious proprietors. Apart from all this was the hope of release
from irrational and indefensible laws, such as that by which a patrician’s
land paid three francs where the plebeian’s paid fourteen, because one
was noble and the other was not, and it was an elementary deduction
from the motives of liberal desire.
The elections had made it unexpectedly evident that when one part
of territorial wealth had been taken by the State, another would be taken
by the people; and that a free community, making its own laws, would
not submit to exactions imposed of old by the governing class on a
defenceless population. When the notables advised that every man should
have a vote, this consequence was not clear to them. It was perceived as
things went on, and no provision for aristocratic interests was included
in the popular demands.
In the presence of imminent peril, the privileged classes closed their
ranks, and pressed the king to resist changes sure to be injurious to
them. They became a Conservative party. The court was on their side,
with the Count d’Artois at its head, and the queen and her immediate
circle.
The king remained firm in the belief that popularity is the best form
of authority, and he relied on the wholesome dread of democracy to
make the rich aristocrats yield to his wishes. As long as the Commons
exerted the inert pressure of delay, he watched the course of events.
When at the end of five tedious and unprofitable weeks they began their
attack, he was driven slowly, and without either confidence or sympa-
thy, to take his stand with the nobles, and to shrink from the indefinite
change that was impending.
When the Commons met to deliberate on the morning of the 6th of
May, the deputies were unknown to each other. It was necessary to pro-
ceed with caution, and to occupy ground on which they could not be
divided. Their unanimity was out of danger so long as nothing more
complex was discussed than the verification of powers. The other or-
ders resolved at once that each should examine its own returns. But this
vote, which the nobles carried by a majority of 141, obtained in the52/John Acton
clergy a majority of only 19. It was evident at once that the party of
privilege was going asunder, and that the priests were nearly as well
inclined to the Commons as to the noblesse. It became advisable to give
them time, to discard violence until the arts of conciliation were ex-
hausted and the cause of united action had been pleaded in vain. The
policy of moderation was advocated by Malouet, a man of practical
insight and experience, who had grown grey in the service of the State.
It was said that he defended the slave trade; he attempted to exclude the
public from the debates; he even offered, in unauthorised terms, to se-
cure the claims, both real and formal, of the upper classes. He soon lost
the ear of the House. But he was a man of great good sense, as free from
ancient prejudice as from modern theory, and he never lost sight of the
public interest in favour of a class. The most generous proposals on
behalf of the poor afterwards emanated from him, and parliamentary
life in France began with his motion for negotiation with the other or-
ders.
He was supported by Mounier, one of the deepest minds of that day,
and the most popular of the deputies. He was a magistrate of Grenoble,
and had conducted the Estates of Dauphiné with such consummate art
and wisdom that all ranks and all parties had worked in harmony. They
had demanded equal representation and the vote in common; they gave
to their deputies full powers instead of written instructions, only requir-
ing that they should obtain a free government to the best of their ability;
they resolved that the chartered rights of their province should not be
put in competition with the new and theoretic rights of the nation. Under
Mounier’s controlling hand the prelate and the noble united to declare
that the essential liberties of men are ensured to them by nature, and not
by perishable title-deeds. Travellers had initiated him in the working of
English institutions, and he represented the school of Montesquieu; but
he was an emancipated disciple and a discriminate admirer. He held
Montesquieu to be radically illiberal, and believed the famous theory
which divides powers without isolating them to be an old and a common
discovery. He thought that nations differ less in their character than in
their stage of progress, and that a Constitution like the English applies
not to a region, but to a time. He belonged to that type of statesmanship
which Washington had shown to be so powerful revolutionary doctrine
in a conservative temper. In the centre of affairs the powerful provincial
betrayed a lack of sympathy and attraction. He refused to meet Sieyès,
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esteem came to him at once, and in the great constructive party he was
a natural leader, and predominated for time. But at the encounter of
defeat, his austere and rigid character turned it into disaster; and as he
possessed but one line of defence, the failure of his tactics was the ruin
of his cause. Although he despaired prematurely, and was vociferously
repentant of his part in the great days of June, parading his sackcloth
before Europe, he never faltered in the conviction that the interests of no
class, of no family, of no man, can be preferred to those of the nation.
Napoleon once said with a sneer: “You are still the man of 1789.” Mounier
replied : “Yes, sir. Principles are not subject to the law of change.”
He desired to adopt the English model, which meant: representation
of property; an upper house founded upon merit, not upon descent; royal
veto and right of dissolution. This could only be secured by active coop-
eration on the part of all the conservative elements. To obtain his major-
ity he required that the other orders should come over, not vanquished
and reluctant, but under the influence of persuasion. Mirabeau and his
friends only wished to put the nobles in the wrong, to expose their obsti-
nacy and arrogance, and then to proceed without them. The plan of
Mounier depended on a real conciliation.
The clergy were ready for a conference; and by their intervention
the nobles were induced to take part in it. There, on May 23, the Arch-
bishop of Vienne, who was in the confidence of Mounier, declared that
the clergy recognised the duty of sharing taxes in equal proportion. The
Duke of Luxemburg, speaking for the nobles, made the same declara-
tion. The intention, he said, was irrevocable; but he added that it would
not be executed until the problem of the Constitution was solved. The
nobles declined to abandon the mode of separate verification which had
been practised formerly. And when the Commons objected that what
was good in times of civil dissension was inapplicable to the Arcadian
tranquillity of 1789, the others were not to blame if they treated the
argument with contempt.
The failure of the conference was followed by an event which con-
firmed Necker in the belief that he was not waiting in vain. He received
overtures from Mirabeau. Until that time Mirabeau had been notorious
for the obtrusive scandal of his life, and the books he had written under
pressure of need did not restore his good name. People avoided him, not
because he was brutal and vicious like other men of his rank, but be-
cause he was reputed a liar and a thief During one of his imprisonments
he had obtained from Dupont de Nemours communication of an impor-54/John Acton
tant memoir embodying Turgot’s ideas on local government. He copied
the manuscript, presented it to the minister as his own work, and sold
another copy to the booksellers as the work of Turgot. Afterwards he
offered to suppress his letters from Prussia if the Government would
buy them at the price he could obtain by publishing them. Montmorin
paid what he asked for, on condition that he renounced his candidature
in Provence. Mirabeau agreed, spent the money on his canvass, and
made more by printing what he had sold to the king. During the contest,
by his coolness, audacity, and resource, he soon acquired ascendency.
The nobles who rejected him were made to feel his power. When tu-
mults broke out, he appeased them by his presence, and he moved from
Marseilles to Aix escorted by a retinue of 200 carriages. Elected in both
places by the Third Estate, he came to Versailles hoping to repair his
fortune. There it was soon apparent that he possessed powers of mind
equal to the baseness of his conduct. He is described by Malouet as the
only man who perceived from the first where the Revolution was tend-
ing; and his enemy Mounier avows that he never met a more intelligent
politician. He was always ready to speak, and always vigorous and
adroit. His renowned orations were often borrowed, for he surrounded
himself with able men, mostly Genevese, versed in civil strife, who sup-
plied him with facts, mediated with the public, and helped him in the
press. Rivarol said that his head was a gigantic sponge, swelled out with
other men’s ideas. As extempore speaking was a new art, and the ablest
men read their speeches, Mirabeau was at once an effective debater
probably the best debater, though not the most perfect orator, that has
appeared in the splendid record of parliamentary life in France. His
father was one of the most conspicuous economists, and he inherited
their belief in a popular and active monarchy, and their preference for a
single chamber.
In 1784 he visited London, frequented the Whigs, and supplied Burke
with a quotation. He did not love England, but he thought it a convinc-
ing proof of the efficacy of paper Constitutions, that a few laws for the
protection of personal liberty should be sufficient to make a corrupt and
ignorant people prosper.
His keynote was to abandon privilege and to retain the prerogative;
for he aspired to sway the monarchy, and would not destroy the power
he was to wield. The king, he said, is the State, and can do no wrong.
Therefore he was at times the most violent and indiscreet of men, and at
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fully prepared. As he had a fixed purpose before him, but neither prin-
ciple nor scruple, no emergency found him at a loss, or embarrassed by
a cargo of consistent maxims. Incalculable, and unfit to trust in daily
life, at a crisis he was the surest and most available force. From the first
moment he came to the front. On the opening day he was ready with a
plan for a consultation in common, before deciding whether they should
act jointly or separately. The next day he started a newspaper, in the
shape of a report to his constituents, and when the Government attempted
to suppress it, he succeeded, May 19, in establishing the liberty of the
press.
The first political club, afterwards that of the Jacobins, was founded,
at his instigation, by men who did not know the meaning of a club. For,
he said to them, ten men acting together can make a hundred thousand
tremble apart from each other. Mirabeau began with caution, for his
materials were new and he had no friends. He believed that the king was
really identified with the magnates, and that the Commons were totally
unprepared to confront either the court or the approaching Revolution.
He thought it hopeless to negotiate with his own doomed order, and
meant to detach the king from them. When the scheme of conciliation
failed, his opportunity came. He requested Malouet to bring him into
communication with ministers. He told him that he was seriously alarmed,
that the nobles meant to push resistance to extremity, and that his reli-
ance was on the Crown. He promised, if the Government would admit
him to their confidence, to support their policy with all his might.
Montmorin refused to see him, Necker reluctantly consented. He had a
way of pointing his nose at the ceiling, which was not conciliatory, and
he received the hated visitor with a request to know what proposals he
had to make. Mirabeau, purple with rage at this frigid treatment by the
man he had come to save, replied that he proposed to wish him good
morning. To Malouet he said, “Your friend is a fool, and he will soon
have news of me.” Necker lived to regret that he had thrown such a
chance away. At the time, the interview only helped to persuade him
that the Commons knew their weakness, and felt the need of his succour.
Just then the expected appeal reached him from the ecclesiastical
quarter. When it was seen that the nobles could not be constrained by
fair words, the Commons made one more experiment with the clergy.
On May 27 they sent a numerous and weighty deputation to adjure
them, in the name of the God of peace and of the national welfare, not to
abandon the cause of united action. The clergy this time invoked the56/John Acton
interposition of Government.
On the 30th conferences were once more opened, and the ministers
were present. The discussion was as inconclusive as before, and, on
June 4, Necker produced a plan of his own. He proposed, in substance,
separate verification, the crown to decide in last instance. It was a solu-
tion favourable to the privileged orders, one of which had appealed to
him. He wanted their money, not their power. The clergy agreed. The
Commons were embarrassed what to do, but were quickly relieved; for
the nobles replied that they had already decided simply to try their own
cases. By this act, on June 9, negotiations were broken off.
The decision had been taken in the apartments of the Duchess of
Polignac, the queen’s familiar friend, and it made a breach between the
court and the minister at the first step he had taken since the Assembly
met. Up to this point the aristocracy were intelligible and consistent.
They would make no beginning of surrender until they knew how far it
would lead them, or put themselves at the mercy of a hostile majority
without any assurance for private rights. Malouet offered them a guar-
antee, but he was disavowed by his colleagues in a way that warned the
nobles not to be too trusting.
Nobody could say how far the edifice of privilege was condemned
to crumble, or what nucleus of feudal property, however secured by
contract and prescription, would be suffered to remain. The nobles felt
justified in defending things which were their own by law, by centuries
of unquestioned possession, by purchase and inheritance, by sanction of
government, by the express will of their constituents. In upholding the
interest, and the very existence, of the class they represented, they might
well believe that they acted in the spirit of true liberty, which depends on
the multiplicity of checking forces, and that they were saving the throne.
From the engagement to renounce fiscal exemption, and submit to the
equal burden of taxation, they did not recede, and they claimed the sup-
port of the king. Montlosier, who belonged to their order, pronounced
that their case was good and their argument bad. Twice they gave the
enemy an advantage. When they saw the clergy waver, they resolved, by
their usual majority of 197 to 44, that each order possessed the right of
nullification; so that they would no more yield to the separate vote of the
three Estates than to their united vote. Evidently the country would sup-
port those who denied the veto and were ready to overrule it, against
those who gave no hope that anything would be done. Again, when they
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came an obstruction. They had lost the clergy. They now repulsed the
minister. Nothing was left them except their hopes of the king. They
ruined him as well as themselves. It did not follow that, because they
supported the monarchy, they were sure of the monarch. And it was a
graver miscalculation to think that a regular army is stronger than an
undisciplined mob, and that the turbulent Parisians, eight miles off, could
not protect the deputies against regiments of horse and foot, commanded
by the gallant gentlemen of France, accustomed for centuries to pay the
tax of blood, and fighting now in their own cause.
There was nothing more to be done. The arts of peace were ex-
hausted. A deliberate breach with legality could alone fulfil the national
decree. The country had grown tired of dilatory tactics and prolonged
inaction. Conciliation, tried by the Commons, by the clergy, and by the
Government, had been vain. The point was reached where it was neces-
sary to choose between compulsion and surrender, and the Commons
must either employ the means at their command to overcome resistance,
or go away confessing that the great movement had broken down in
their hands, and that the people had elected the wrong men. Inaction and
delay had not been a policy, but the preliminary of a policy. It was
reasonable to say that they would try every possible effort before resort-
ing to aggression; but it would have been unmeaning to say that they
would begin by doing nothing, and that afterwards they would continue
to do nothing, Their enemy had been beforehand with them in making
mistakes. They might hazard something with less danger now.
Victory indeed was assured by the defection among the nobles and
the clergy. Near fifty of the one, and certainly more than one hundred of
the others, were ready to come over. Instead of being equal, the parties
were now two to one. Six hundred Commons could not control the same
number of the deputies of privilege. But eight hundred deputies were
more than a match for four hundred Therefore, on June 10, the Com-
mons opened the attack and summoned the garrison. Mirabeau gave
notice that one of the Paris deputies had an important motion to submit.
The mover was more important than the motion, for this was the appa-
rition of Sieyès, the most original of the revolutionary statesmen, who,
within a fortnight of this, his maiden speech, laid low the ancient mon-
archy of France. He was a new member, for the Paris elections had been
delayed, the forty deputies took their seats three weeks after the open-
ing, and Sieyès was the last deputy chosen. He objected to the existing
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the duty to France. He proposed that the other orders be formally in-
vited to join, and that the House should proceed to constitute itself, and
to act with them if they came, without them if they stayed away. The
returns were accordingly verified, and Sieyès then moved that they should
declare themselves the National Assembly, the proper name for that
which they claimed to be.
In spite of Malouet, and even of Mirabeau, on June 17 this motion
was carried by 491 to 90. All taxes became dependent on the Assembly.
The broad principle on which Sieyès acted was that the Commons were
really the nation. The upper classes were not an essential part of it.
They were not even a natural and normal growth, but an offending
excrescence, a negative quantity, to be subtracted, not to be added up.
That which ought not to exist ought not to be represented. The deputies
of the Third Estate appeared for the whole. Alone they were sufficient to
govern it, for alone they were identified with the common interest.
Sieyès was not solicitous that his invitation should be obeyed, for
the accession of the other orders might displace the majority. Those who
possessed the plenitude of power were bound to employ it. By axiom-
atic simplicity more than by sustained argument Sieyès mastered his
hearers.V: THE TENNIS-COURT OATH
We saw last week that much time was spent in fruitless negotiation
which ended in a deadlock—the Commons refusing to act except in
conjunction with the other orders, and the others insisting on the sepa-
rate action which had been prescribed by their instructions and by the
king.
The Commons altered their policy under the influence of Sieyès,
who advised that they should not wait for the others, but should proceed
in their absence. In his famous pamphlet he had argued that they were
really the nation, and had the right on their side. And his theory was
converted into practice, because it now appeared that they had not only
the right, but the power. They knew it, because the clergy were waver-
ing. Thursday, June 18, the day after the proclamation of the National
Assembly, was a festival. On Friday the clergy divided on the question
of joining. The proposal was negatived, but twelve of its opponents
stated that they would be on the other side if the vote in common ex-
tended only to the verification of returns. The minority at once accepted
the condition, and so became the majority. Others thereupon acceded,
and by six o’clock in the evening 149 ecclesiastics recorded their votes
for the Commons. That 19th of June is a decisive date, for then the
priests went over to the Revolution. The Commons, by a questionable
and audacious act, had put themselves wrong with everybody when the
inferior clergy abandoned the cause of privilege and came to their res-
cue.
The dauphin had lately died, and the royal family were living in
retirement at Marly. At ten o’clock in the evening of the vote, the Arch-
bishops of Paris and Rouen arrived there, described the event to the
king, and comforted him by saying that the prelates, all but four, had
remained true to their order. They were followed by a very different
visitor, whom it behoved the king to hear, for he was a man destined to
hold the highest offices of State under many governments, to be the
fore- most minister of the republic, the empire, and the monarchy, to
predominate over European sovereigns at Vienna, over European states-
men in London, and to be universally feared, and hated, and admired, as
the most sagacious politician in the world.
Talleyrand came to Marly at dead of night, and begged a secret
audience of the king. He was not a favourite at court. He had obtained
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and when the pope selected him for a cardinal’s hat, Lewis prevented his
nomination. He now refused to see him, and sent him to his brother. The
Count d’Artois was in bed, but the bishop was his friend, and was ad-
mitted. He said it was necessary that the Government should act with
vigour. The conduct of the Assembly was illegal and foolish, and would
ruin the monarchy unless the States-General were dissolved. Talleyrand
would undertake, with his friends, some of whom came with him and
were waiting below, to form a new administration. The Assembly, com-
promised and discredited by the recent outbreak, would be dismissed, a
new one would be elected on an altered franchise, and a sufficient dis-
play of force would prevent resistance. Talleyrand proposed to reverse
the policy of Necker, which he thought feeble and vacillating, and which
had thrown France into the hands of Sieyès. With a stronger grasp he
meant to restore the royal initiative, in order to carry out the constitu-
tional changes which the nation expected.
The count put on his clothes, and carried the matter to the king. He
detested Necker with his concessions, and welcomed the prospect of
getting rid of him for a minister of his own making taken from his own
circle. He came back with a positive refusal. Then Talleyrand, con-
vinced that it was henceforth vain to serve the king, gave notice that
every man must be allowed to shift for himself; and the count admitted
that he was right. They remembered that interview after twenty-five
years of separation, when one of the two held in his hands the crown of
France, which the other, in the name of Lewis XVIII, came to receive
from him.
The king repulsed Talleyrand because he had just taken a momen-
tous resolution. The time had arrived which Necker had waited for, the
time to interpose with a Constitution so largely conceived, so exactly
defined, so faithfully adapted to the deliberate wishes of the people, as
to supersede and overshadow the Assembly, with its perilous tumult and
its prolonged sterility. He had proposed some such measure early in
May, when it was rejected, and he did not insist. But now the policy
unwisely postponed was clearly opportune. Secret advice came from
liberal public men, urging the danger of the crisis, and the certainty that
the Assembly would soon hurry to extremes. Mirabeau himself deplored
its action, and Malouet had reason to expect a stouter resistance to the
revolutionary argument and the sudden ascendency of Sieyès. The queen
in person, and influential men at court, entreated Necker to modify his
constitutional scheme; but he was unshaken, and the king stood by him.Lectures on the French Revolution/61
It was decided that the comprehensive measure intended to distance and
annul the Assembly should be proclaimed from the throne on the fol-
lowing Monday.
This was the rock that wrecked the Talleyrand ministry, and it de-
stroyed more solid structures than that unsubstantial phantom. The plan
was statesmanlike, and it marks the summit of Necker’s career. But he
neglected to communicate with men whom he might well have trusted,
and the secret was fatal, for it was kept twelve hours too long. As the
princes had refused the use of their riding-school, there were only three
buildings dedicated to the States-General, instead of four, and the Com-
mons, by reason of their numbers, occupied the great hall where the
opening ceremony was held, and which had now to be made ready for
the royal sitting.
Very early in the morning of Saturday, June 20, the president of the
Assembly, the astronomer Bailly, received notice from the master of
ceremonies that the hall was wanted, in order to be prepared for Mon-
day, and that the meetings of the Commons were meanwhile suspended
for that day. Bailly was not taken by surprise, for a friend, who went
about with his eyes open, had warned him of what was going on. But the
Assembly had formally adjourned to that day, the members were ex-
pecting the appointed meeting, and the message came too late. Bailly
deemed that it was a studied insult, the angry retort of Government, and
the penalty of the recent vote, and he inferred, most erroneously as we
know, that the coming speech from the throne would be hostile. There-
fore he gave all the solemnity he could to the famous scene that ensued.
Appearing at the head of the indignant deputies, he was denied admis-
sion. The door was only opened that he might fetch his papers, and the
National Assembly that represented France found itself, by royal com-
mand, standing outside on the pavement, at the hour fixed for its delib-
erations.
At that instant the doubts and divisions provoked by the overriding
logic of Sieyès disappeared. Moderate and Revolutionist felt the same
resentment, and had the same sense of being opposed by a power that
was insane. There were some, and Sieyès among them, who proposed
that they should adjourn to Paris. But a home was found in the empty
Tennis Court hard by. There, with a view to baffle dangerous designs,
and also to retrieve his own waning influence, Mounier assumed the
lead. He moved that they should bind themselves by oath never to sepa-
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immediately swore it, save one, who added “Dissentient” to his name,
and who was hustled out by a backdoor, to save him from the fury of his
colleagues. This dramatic action added little to that which had been
done three days earlier. The deputies understood that a Constituent As-
sembly must be single, that the legislative power had, for the purpose,
been transferred to them, and could not be restrained or recalled. Their
authority was not to be limited by an upper house, for both upper houses
were absorbed; nor by the king, for they regarded neither his sanction
nor his veto; nor by the nation itself, for they refused, by their oath, to
be dissolved.
The real event of the Tennis Court was to unite all parties against
the crown, and to make them adopt the new policy of radical and indefi-
nite change, outdoing what Sieyès himself had done. The mismanage-
ment of the court drove its friends into the van of the movement. The
last Royalist defender of safe measures had vanished through the
backdoor.
Malouet had tendered a clause saving the royal power; but it was
decided not to put it, lest it should be refused. Mirabeau, in whose eyes
the decree of the 17th portended civil war, now voted, reluctantly, with
the rest.
Whilst the Assembly held its improvised and informal meeting at
Versailles, the king sat in council at Marly on Necker’s magnanimous
proposal. After a struggle, and with some damaging concessions, the
minister carried his main points. They were gathering their papers, and
making ready to disperse, when a private message was brought to the
king. He went out, desiring them to wait his return. Montmorin turned
to Necker and said, “It is the queen, and all is over.” The king came
back, and adjourned the council to Monday at Versailles. And it was in
this way that the report of what had happened that morning told upon
the Government, and the enthusiasm of the Tennis Court frustrated the
pondered measures of the most liberal minister in Europe. For it was, in
truth, the queen, and in that brief interval it was decreed that France, so
near the goal in that month of June, should wade to it through streams of
blood during the twenty- five most terrible years in the history of Chris-
tian nations.
The council of ministers, which was adjourned in consequence of
the meeting in the Tennis Court, went over to the noblesse, and restored
in their interest the principles of the old régime. It resolved that the king
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late the division of orders, allowing the option of debate in common
only in cases where neither privilege nor the Constitution were affected;
that he should confirm feudal rights and even fiscal immunities, unless
voluntarily abandoned, and should deny admission to public employ-
ment irrespective of class. Necker’s adversaries prevailed, and the an-
cient bulwarks were set up again, in favour of the aristocracy.
Still, a portion of the great scheme was preserved, and the conces-
sions on the part of the crown were such that some weeks earlier they
would have been hailed with enthusiasm, and the consistent logic of free
institutions exercises a coercive virtue that made many think that the
King’s Speech of June 23 ought to have been accepted as the greater
charter of France. That was the opinion of Arthur Young; of Gouverneur
Morris, who had given the final touches to the American Constitution;
of Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence; and after-
wards even of Sieyès himself.
On this account, Necker wavered to the last moment, and on the
Tuesday morning prepared to attend the king. His friends, his family,
his daughter, the wonder of the age, made him understand that he could
not sanction by his presence, at a solemn crisis, an act which reversed
one essential half of his policy. He dismissed his carriage, took off his
court suit, and left the vacant place to proclaim his fall. That evening he
sent in his resignation. His significant absence; the peremptory language
of the king; the abrogation of their decrees, which was effectual and
immediate, while the compensating promises were eventual, and not yet
equivalent to laws; the avowed resolve to identify the Crown with the
nobles, struck the Assembly with consternation. The removal of the
constitutional question to the list of matters to be debated separately
was, in the existing conditions of antagonism, the end of free govern-
ment. And indeed the position occupied by the king was untenable, be-
cause the division of orders into three Houses had already come to an
end. For on Monday the 22nd, in the Church of St Lewis, 149 ecclesias-
tical deputies, the Archbishops of Bordeaux and Vienne at their head,
had joined the Commons. It was a step which they were legally authorised
and competent to take, and the Revolution now had a majority not only
of individual votes, but of orders. It was a forlorn hope, therefore, to
separate them by compulsion.
Lewis XVI. ended by declaring that he was determined to accom-
plish the happiness of his people, and that if the deputies refused to co-
operate he would accomplish it alone; and he charged them to withdraw.64/John Acton
The Commons were in their own House, and, with the majority of the
clergy, they resumed their seats, uncertain of the future. Their uncer-
tainty was all at once auspiciously relieved. Dreux Brézé, the master of
ceremonies, reappeared, and as he brought a message from the king he
wore his plumed hat upon his head. With clamorous outcries he was
told to uncover, and he uttered a reply so insolent that his son, describ-
ing the scene in public after many years, declined to repeat his words.
There- fore, when he asked whether they had heard the king’s order to
depart, he received a memorable lesson. Mirabeau exclaimed, “Yes, but
if we are to be expelled, we shall yield only to force.” Brézé answered,
correctly, that he did not recognise Mirabeau as the organ of the Assem-
bly, and he turned to the president. But Bailly rose above Mirabeau, and
said, “The nation is assembled here, and receives no orders.” At these
words the master of ceremonies, as if suddenly aware of the presence of
majesty, retired, walking backwards to the door. It was at that moment
that the old order changed and made place for the new. For Sieyès, who
possessed the good gift of putting a keen edge to his thoughts, who had
begun his career in Parliament ten days before by saying, “It is time to
cut the cables,” now spoke, and with superb simplicity thus defined the
position: “What you were yesterday you are now. Let us pass to the
order of the day.” In this way the monarchy, as a force distinct from a
form, was not assailed, or abolished, or condemned, but passed over.
Assault, abolition, condemnation were to follow, and already there were
penetrating eyes that caught, in the distance, the first gleam of the axe.
“The king,” said Mirabeau, “has taken the road to the scaffold.”
The abdication of prerogative, which the king offered on June 23,
went far; but the people demanded surrender in regard to privilege. The
Assembly, submitting to the geometrical reasoning of Sieyès and to the
surprise of the Tennis Court, had frightened him into an alliance with
the nobles, and he linked his cause to theirs. He elected to stand or fall
with interests not his own, with an order which was powerless to help
him, which could make no return for his sacrifice in their behalf, which
was unable for one hour to defend itself, and was about to perish by its
own hand. The failure of June 23 was immediately apparent. The As-
sembly, having dismissed Dreux Brézé, was not molested further. Necker
consented to resume office, with greatly increased popularity. Under the
influence of the royal declaration forty-seven nobles, being a portion
only of the Liberal minority, went over to the Commons, and Talleyrand
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instructed the resisting magnates to join the National Assembly. In very
sincere and solemn terms they warned him that by such a surrender he
was putting off his crown. The Count d’Artois rejoined that the king’s
life would be in danger if they persisted. There was one young noble-
man rising rapidly to fame as a gracious and impressive speaker, whom
even this appeal to loyal hearts failed to move. “Perish the monarch,”
cried Cazalès, “but not the monarchy!”
Lewis underwent the humiliation of revoking, on June 27, what he
had ceremoniously promulgated on the 23rd, because there was a fatal
secret. Paris was agitated, and the people promised the deputies to stand
by them at their need. But what could they effect at Versailles against
the master of so many legions? Just then a mutiny broke out in the
French guards, the most disciplined body of troops in the capital, and
betrayed the key to the hollow and unstable counsels of the Govern-
ment. The army could not be trusted. Necker suspected it as early as
February. In the last week of June, the English, Prussian, and Venetian
envoys report that the crown was disabled because it was disarmed. The
regiments at hand would not serve against the national representatives.
It was resolved to collect faithful bands of Swiss, Alsatians, and
Walloons. Ten foreign regiments, near 30,000 men in all, were hurried
to the scene. They were the last hope of royalism. Trusty friends were
informed that the surrender was only to last until the frontier garrisons
could be brought to Versailles. D’Artois confided to one of them that
many heads must fall. And he uttered the sinister proverb which became
historic in another tragedy: If you want an omelette you must not be
afraid of breaking eggs.VI: THE FALL OF THE BASTILLE
After the dramatic intervention of the Marquis de Brézé, the king’s speech
of June 23 was never seriously considered by the Assembly. Yet the
concessions, which it made to the spirit of political progress, satisfied
philosophic observers, and there had been no time in English history
where changes so extensive, proceeding from the Crown, would have
failed to conciliate the people. It was a common belief in those days,
expressly sanctioned by the Economists, that secondary liberties, car-
ried far enough, are worth more than formal securities for the principle
of self-government. One is of daily use and practical advantage; the
other is of the domain of theory, dubiously beneficial, and without as-
surance of enlightenment and justice. A wise, honest, and intelligent
administration gives more to men than the established reign of uncertain
opinion. These arguments had more weight with philosophers than with
the deputies, for it was already decided that they must make the Consti-
tution. All the king offered, and a great deal more, they intended to take.
Much that he insisted on preserving they were resolved to destroy. The
offer, at its best, was vitiated by the alloy; for the most offensive privi-
leges, immunities, and emoluments of rank were to be perpetuated, and
it was against these that the fiercest force of the revolutionary move-
ment was beating. In order that they might be abolished, the nation ten-
dered its indefeasible support, its unconquerable power, to its represen-
tatives.
If the Assembly, content with the advantage gained over the king,
had surrendered unconditionally to the nobles, and assented, for a few
political reforms, to the social degradation of the democracy, they would
have betrayed their constituents. On that consideration they were com-
pelled to act. They acted also on the principle, which was not new, which
came down indeed from mediaeval divines, but which was newly in-
vested with universal authority, that the law is not the will of the sover-
eign that commands, but of the nation that obeys. It was the very mar-
row of the doctrine that obstruction of liberty is crime, that absolute
authority is not a thing to be consulted, but a thing to be removed, and
that resistance to it is no affair of interest or convenience, but of sacred
obligation. Every drop of blood shed in the American conflict was shed
in a cause immeasurably inferior to theirs, against a system more legiti-
mate by far than that of June 23. Unless Washington was an assassin, it
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the mongrel measure of concession and obstinacy which the Court had
carried against the proposals of Necker. That victory was reversed, and
the success of the Commons was complete. They had brought the three
orders into one; they had compelled the king to retract his declaration
and to restore his disgraced minister; they had exposed the weakness of
their oppressors, and they had the nation at their back.
On June 27, in the united Assembly, Mirabeau delivered an address
of mingled triumph and conciliation, which was his first act of states-
manship. He said that the speech from the throne contained large and
generous views that proved the genuine liberality of the king. He desired
to receive them gratefully without the drawbacks imposed by unthink-
ing advisers, and to respect the just rights of the noblesse. He took the
good without the evil, extricating Lewis from his entanglement, and
tracing the line by which he might have advanced to great results. “The
past,” he said, “has been the history of wild beasts. We are inaugurating
the history of men; for we have no weapon but discussion, and no adver-
sary but prejudice.”
Their victory brought loss as well as gain to the Commons, and
there was reason to think that the counsel of Sieyès, to let the other
orders take their own separate course, was founded on wisdom. Their
opponents, joining under compulsion, had the means as well as the will
of doing them injury.
For the clergy there was a brief season of popular favour. The coun-
try priests, sprung from the peasantry, and poorly off, shared many of
their feelings. The patronage of the State went to men of birth; and one
of these, the Archbishop of Aix, had proclaimed his belief that, if any-
body was to be exempt from taxation, it ought to be the impoverished
layman, not the wealthy ecclesiastic. When it chanced that the Commit-
tee of Constitution was elected without any member of the clergy upon
it, the Commons raised a cry that they should be introduced in their
proportion. They, in a fraternal spirit, refused. And the second Commit-
tee, the one that actually drew up the scheme, was composed of three
churchmen to five laymen. The nobles were not reconciled, and refused
to unite with men of English views in a Tory party. To them, the separa-
tion of orders was a fundamental maxim of security, which they had
inherited, which they were bound to hand down. They looked on debate
in common as provisional, as an exception, to be rectified as soon as
might be. They kept up the practice of also meeting separately. On July
3 there were one hundred and thirty-eight present; and on the 11th there68/John Acton
still were eighty. They refused to vote in the divisions of the joint As-
sembly, because their instructions forbade. The scruple was sincere,
and was shared by Lafayette; but others meant it as a protest that the
Assembly was not lawfully constituted. Therefore, July 7, Talleyrand
moved to annul the instructions. They could not be allowed to control
the Assembly; they ought not to influence individuals. The constituen-
cies contribute to a decision; they cannot resist it. Whatever the original
wish of the electors, the final act belonged to the legislature. The king
himself, on June 27, had declared the imperative mandates unconstitu-
tional. But the deputies, in declaring themselves permanent, had cut
themselves adrift from their constituents. The instructions had become
the sole security that the Constitution would remain within the limits
laid down by the nation, the sole assurance against indefinite change.
They alone determined the line of advance, and gave protection to mon-
archy, property, religion, against the headlong rush of opinion, and the
exigencies of popular feeling.
Sieyès, who expected no good from the co-operation of the orders
which he condemned, and who thought a nobleman or prelate who did
not vote better than one who voted wrong, urged that the question did
not affect the Assembly, but the constituencies, and might be left to
them. He carried his amendment by seven hundred to twenty-eight.
Meantime the party that had prevailed on June 23 and had suc-
cumbed on the 27th was at work to recover the lost position. Lewis had
retained the services of Necker, without dismissing the colleagues who
baffled him. He told him that he would not accept his resignation ,now,
but would choose the time for it. Necker had not the acuteness to under-
stand that he would be dismissed as soon as his enemies felt strong
enough to do without him. A king who deserted his friends and reversed
his accepted policy because there was no force he could depend on, was
a king with a short shrift before him. He became the tool of men who did
not love him, and who now despised him.
The resources wanting at the critical moment were, however, within
reach, and the scheme proposed to the Count d’Artois by the wily bishop
a few nights before was revived by less accomplished plotters. On July
1 it became known that a camp of 25,000 men was to be formed near
Versailles under Marshal de Broglie, a veteran who gathered his laurels
in the Seven Years’ War, and soon the Terrace was crowded with offic-
ers from the north and east, who boasted that they had sharpened their
sabres, and meant to make short work of the ambitious lawyers, theLectures on the French Revolution/69
profligate noblemen, and unfrocked priests who were ruining the coun-
try.
In adopting these measures the king did not regard himself as the
originator of violence. There had been disturbances in Paris, and at
Versailles the archbishop of Paris had been assaulted, and compelled to
promise that he would go over to the Assembly. The leader on the other
side, Champion de Cicé, archbishop of Bordeaux, came to him, and
entreated him not to yield to faction, not to keep a promise extorted by
threats. He replied that he had given his word and meant to keep it.
Forty years later Charles X. declared that his brother had mounted
the scaffold because, at this juncture, he would not mount his horse. In
truth Lewis believed that the deputies, cut off from Paris by visible
battalions, would be overawed, that the army of waverers would be
accessible to influence, to promises, remonstrances, and rewards, that it
would be safer to coerce the Assembly by intimidation than to dissolve
it. He had refused to listen to Talleyrand; he still rejected the stronger
part of his scheme. By judicious management he hoped that the Assem-
bly might be brought to undo its own usurping and unwarranted work,
and that he would be able to recover the position he had taken up on
June 23, the last day on which his policy had been that of a free agent.
Necker knew no more than everybody else of the warlike array. On
July 7 thirty regiments were concentrated; more were within a few days’
march, and the marshal, surrounded by an eager and hurried staff sur-
veyed his maps of suburban Paris at his headquarters at Versailles.
The peril grew day by day, and it was time for the Assembly to act.
They were defenceless, but they relied on the people of Paris and on the
demoralisation of the army. Their friends had the command of money,
and large sums were spent in preparing the citizens for an armed con-
flict For the capitalists were on their side, looking to them to prevent the
national bankruptcy Which the Court and the nobles were bringing on.
And the Palais Royal, the residence of the Duke of Orleans, was the
centre of an active organisation. Since the king had proved himself in-
competent, helpless, and insincere, men had looked to the Duke as a
popular prince of the Blood, who was also wealthy and ambitious, and
might avail to save the principle of monarchy, which Lewis had discred-
ited. His friends clung to the idea, and continued to conspire in his inter-
est after the rest of the world had been repelled by the defects of his
character. For a moment they thought of his son, who was gifted for that
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be in a later generation.
The leading men in the Assembly knew their position with accu-
racy, and did not exaggerate the danger they were in. On July 10 their
shrewd American adviser, Morris, wrote: “I think the crisis is past with-
out having been perceived; and now a free Constitution will be the cer-
tain result.” And yet there were 30,000 men, commanded by a marshal
of France, ready for action; and several regiments of Swiss, famed for
fidelity and valour, and destined, in the same cause, to become still more
famous, were massed in Paris itself under Besenval, the trusted soldier
of the Court.
On July 8, breaking through the order of debate, Mirabeau rose and
the action began the action which changed the face of the world, and the
imperishable effects of which will be felt by every one of us, to the last
day of his life. He moved an address to the king, warning him that, if he
did not withdraw his troops, the streets of Paris would run blood ; and
proposing that the preservation of order should be committed to a civic
guard. On the following day the Assembly voted the address, and on the
10th the Count de Clermont Tonnerre, at the head of a deputation, read
it to the king. On the morning of Saturday, 11th, his reply was com-
muni- cated to the Assembly. He had had three days to hasten his mili-
tary preparations. At Paris, the agitators and organisers employed the
time in arranging their counter measures.
The king refused to send away troops which there had been good
reason to collect, but he was ready to move, with the Assembly, to some
town at a distance from the turbid capital. The royal message was tipped
with irony, and the deputies, in spite of Mirabeau, resolved not to dis-
cuss it. After this first thrust Lewis flung away the scabbard. That day,
at council, it was noticed that he was nervous and uneasy, and disguised
his restlessness by feigning sleep. At the end, taking one of the ministers
aside, he gave him a letter for Necker, who was absent. The letter con-
tained his dismissal, with an order for banishment.
Necker, who for some days had known that it must come, was at
dinner. He said nothing to his company, and went out, as usual, for a
drive. Then he made for the frontier, and never stopped till he reached
Brussels. Two horsemen who had followed, keeping out of sight, had
orders to arrest him if he changed his course. He travelled up the Rhine
to his own country, on the way to his home by the lake of Geneva. At the
first Swiss hotel he found the Duchess de Polignac. He had left her at
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him; and she was now ruined and an exile, and the forerunner of the
emigration. From her, and from the letters that quickly followed, for-
warded by the Assembly, he learned the events that had happened since
his fall, learned that he was, for one delirious moment, master of the
king, of his enemies, and of the country.
The astounding news that Necker heard at “The Three Kings” at
Bale was this. His friends had been disgraced with him, and the chief of
the new ministry was Breteuil, who had been the colleague of Calonne
and Vergennes, and had managed the affair of the Diamond Necklace.
He had directed the policy of those who opposed the National Assem-
bly, holding himself in the twilight, until strong measures and a strong
man were called for. He now came forward, and proposed that the nobles
should depart in a body, protesting against the methods by which the
States-General had been sunk in the National Assembly. In one day he
brought round twenty-six of the minority to his views. A few remained,
who would make a light day’s work for a man of conviction and re-
source. But resolute as Breteuil was, the Parisian democracy acted with
still greater quickness and decision, and with a not less certain aim. On
the i 2th it became known that Necker had been sent out of the country,
and that the armaments were in the hands of men who meant to employ
them against the people. Paris was in disorder, but the middle class
provided a civic guard for its protection. There were encounters with
the troops, and some blood was shed.
New men began to appear who represented the rising classes: Camille
Desmoulins, a rhetorical journalist, with literary but not political talent,
harangued the people in the garden of the Palais Royal; and one of the
strong men of history, Danton, showed that he knew how to manage and
to direct the masses.
The 13th was a day wasted by Government, spent by Paris in busy
preparation. Men talked wildly of destroying the Bastille, as a sign that
would be understood. Early on July 14 a body of men made their way to
the Invalides, and seized 28,000 stand of arms and some cannon. At the
other extremity of Paris the ancient fortress of the Bastille towered over
the workmen’s quarter and commanded the city. Whenever the guns
thundered from its lofty battlements, resistance would be over, and the
conquered arms would be unavailing.
The Bastille not only overshadowed the capital, but it darkened the
hearts of men, for it had been notorious for centuries as the instrument
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uninteresting; but the wide world knew the horror of its history, the
blighted lives, the ruined families, the three thousand dishonoured graves
within the precincts, and the common voice called for its destruction as
the sign of deliverance. At the elections both nobles and commons de-
manded that it should be levelled with the ground.
As early as the 4th of July Besenval received notice that it would be
attacked. He sent a detachment of Swiss, that raised the garrison to one
hundred and thirty-eight, and he did no more. During the morning hours,
while the invaders of the Invalides were distributing the plundered arms
and ammunition, emissaries penetrated into the Bastille, under various
pretexts, to observe the defences. One fair-spoken visitor was taken to
the top of the dreaded towers, where he saw that the guns with which the
embrasures had bristled, which were beyond the range of marksmen,
and had Paris at their mercy, were dismantled and could not be fired.
About the middle of the day, when this was known, the attack be-
gan. It was directed by the Gardes Françaises, who had been the first to
mutiny, and had been disbanded, and were now the backbone of the
people’s army. The siege consisted in efforts to lower the drawbridge.
After several hours the massive walls were unshaken, and the place was
as safe as before the first discharge. But the defenders knew that they
were lost. Besenval was not the man to rescue them by fighting his way
through several miles of streets. They were not provisioned, and the
men urged the governor to make terms before he was compelled. They
had brought down above a hundred of their assailants, without losing a
man. But it was plain that the loss neither of a hundred nor of a thou-
sand would affect the stern determination of the crowd, whilst it might
increase their fury. Delauney, in his despair, seized a match, and wanted
to fire the magazine. His men remonstrated and spoke of the dreadful
devastation that must follow the explosion. The man who stayed the
hand of the despairing commander, and whose name was Bécard, de-
served a better fate than he met that day, for he was one of the four or
five that were butchered. The men beat a parley, hoisted the white flag,
and obtained, on the honour of a French officer, a verbal promise of
safety.
Then the victors came pouring over the bridge, triumphant over a
handful of Swiss and invalids  triumphant too over thirteen centuries of
monarchy and the longest line of kings. Those who had served in the
regular army took charge of as many prisoners as they could rescue,
carried them to their quarters, and gave them their own beds to sleep in.Lectures on the French Revolution/73
The officers who had conducted the unreal attack, and received the pit-
eous surrender, brought the governor to the Hôtel de Ville, fighting their
way through a murderous crowd. For it was long believed that Delauney
had admitted the people into the first court, and then had perfidiously
shot them down. In his struggles he hurt a bystander, who chanced to be
a cook. The man, prompted, it seems, less by animosity than by the
pride of professional skill, drew a knife and cut off his head. Flesselles,
the chief of the old municipality, appointed by the Crown, was shot soon
after, under suspicion of having encouraged Delauney to resist.
Dr. Rigby, an Englishman who was at the Palais Royal, has de-
scribed what he saw. First came an enormous multitude bearing aloft
the keys of the conquered citadel, with the inscription, “The Bastille is
taken.” The joy was indescribable, and strangers shook his hand, say-
ing, “We too are free men, and there will never more be war between our
countries.” Then came another procession, also shouting and rejoicing;
but the bystanders looked on with horror, for the trophies carried by
were the heads of murdered men. For the nation had become sovereign,
and the soldiers who fired upon it were reckoned rebels and traitors. The
foreign envoys were all impressed with the idea that the vengeance
wrought was out of all proportion with the immensity of the thing
achieved. At nightfall the marshal gave orders to evacuate Paris. Besenval
was already in full retreat, and the capital was no longer in the posses-
sion of the king of France.
Meanwhile the National Assembly, aware of the strength of popu-
lar feeling around them, were calm in the midst of danger. Theirs was a
diminished part, while, almost within sight and hearing, history was
being unmade and made by a power superior to their own. On the morn-
ing of the 14th they elected the Committee of Eight who were to draw up
the Constitution. Mounier and the friends of the English model still pre-
vailed. By evening their chance had vanished, for the English model
includes a king.
Late in the day Noailles brought authentic news of what he had
witnessed; and the Assembly learned, in agitated silence, that the head
of the governor of the impregnable Bastille had been displayed on a pike
about the streets of Paris. Lafayette took the chair, while the President
hurried with Noailles to the palace. They made no impression there.
Lewis informed them that he had recalled his troops, and then he went to
bed, tranquil, and persistently ignoring what it was that had been done,
and what it was that had passed away.74/John Acton
But in the morning, when the Assembly met in disorder, and were
about to send one more deputation, it was found that a change had taken
place in the brief hours of that memorable night. At two o’clock the king
was roused from sleep by one of the great officers of the household. The
intruder, La Rochefoucauld, Duke de Liancourt, was not a man of tal-
ent, but he was universally known as the most benevolent and the most
beneficent of the titled nobles of the realm. He made his master under-
stand the truth and its significance, and how, in the capital that day, in
every province on the morrow, the authority of government was at an
end. And when Lewis, gradually awaking, exclaimed, “But this is a
great revolt!” Liancourt replied, “No, sir, it is a great Revolution!” With
those historic words the faithful courtier detached the monarch from his
ministers, and obtained control over him in the deciding days that were
to follow. Guided by the duke, and attended by his brothers, but without
the ceremonious glories of regality, Lewis XVI went down to the As-
sembly and made his submission. In the pathetic solemnity of the scene,
the deputies forgot for a moment their righteous anger and their more
righteous scorn, and the king returned to the palace on foot, in a sudden
procession of triumph, amnestied and escorted by the entire body.
The struggle was over, and the spell was broken; and the Assembly
had to govern France. To establish order a vast deputation repaired to
the Hôtel de Ville, where Lally Tollendal delivered an oration thrilling
with brother- hood and gladness, and appeared, crowned with flowers,
before the people.
To cement the compact between Paris and Versailles, Bailly, the
first president, was placed at the head of the new elective municipality,
and the vice-president, Lafayette, became commander of the National
Guard. This was the first step towards that Commune which was to
exercise so vast an influence over the fortunes of France. It came into
existence of necessity, when the action of Government was paralysed,
and the space which it occupied was untenanted.
The National Guard was an invention of great import, for it was the
army of society distinct from the army of the state, opinion in arms
apart from authority. It was the middle class organised as a force, against
the force above and the force below; and it protected liberty against the
Crown, and property against the poor. It has been ever since the defence
of order and the ruin of governments; for, as it was the nation itself,
nobody was bold enough to fight it. Before the altar of Notre Dame
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never displayed real capacity for peace or war; but in the changes of a
long life he was true to the early convictions imbibed in Washington’s
camp.
On their return from Paris the great deputation reported that the
people demanded the recall of Necker. At last the king dismissed Breteuil,
and charged the Assembly to take charge of a letter to the banished
statesman. His banishment had lasted five days; it was now the turn of
his enemies. On the same night, July 16, the baffled intriguers went into
exile. Lewis himself sent his brother away, for the safety of himself and
of the dynasty. The others followed. The queen was compelled to dis-
miss Madame de Polignac, whom she had too confidently trusted, and
she was left alone amongst her enemies. This was the first emigration.
The remaining nobles announced that they abandoned resistance, and
the Assembly was at last united. The fight was lost and won, and the
victor claimed the spoils.
But the Assembly was not the victor, and had contributed little to
the portentous change between the dismissal of Necker and the despatch
of the fleet messenger with his recall. Whilst the deputies served the
national cause by talking, there were plainer men at Paris who had died
for it. The force that risked life and conquered was not at Versailles. It
was Paris that held the fallen power, the power of governing itself the
Assembly, and France. The predominance of the capital was the new
feature that enabled the monarchy to pass into a Republic.
The king had become a servant of two masters. Having recanted
before his master at Versailles, it became necessary that he should sub-
mit himself to the new and mysterious authority at the Hôtel de Ville. He
had yielded to representative democracy. He had to pay the same recog-
nition to direct democracy. It was not safe to leave the Orleans strong-
hold entirely in their hands. Between the ministry that was gone and the
ministry to come, Lewis acted by the advice of Liancourt.
Early on July 17 he made his will, heard mass, received commun-
ion, and set out to visit his good city. The queen remained behind, with
all her carriages ready, in order that, at the first signal, she might fly for
her life. At the barrier the king’s eye fell, for the first time, on innumer-
able armed men, who lined the streets for miles, and wore strange colours,
and did not own him as their chief. Neither the National Guard, nor the
dense crowd behind them, uttered a sound of welcome. Not a voice was
raised, except for the nation and its deputies.
The peace made between the king and the Assembly did not count76/John Acton
here. All men had to know that there was a distinct authority, to which a
further homage was due, even from the sovereign. At the Hôtel de Ville
the homage was paid. There the king confirmed the new mayor, and
approved what had been done, and he showed himself to the people with
the new cockade, devised by Lafayette, to proclaim that the royal power
which had ruled France since the conversion of Clovis ruled France no
more. He made his way home amid acclamations, regulated by the com-
mander of the National Guard, like the gloomy and menacing silence in
which he had been received.
A new reign commenced. The head of the great house of Bourbon,
the heir of so much power and glory, on whom rested the tradition of
Lewis XIV, was unfit to exert, under jealous control, the narrow mea-
sure of authority that remained. For the moment there was none. Anar-
chy in the capital gave the signal for anarchy in the provinces, and anar-
chy at that moment had a terrible meaning.
The deputies who came to Paris, to share the enthusiasm of the
moment, failed to notice the fact that the victorious army which gave
liberty to France and power to the Assembly was largely composed of
assassins. Their crimes disappeared in the blaze of their achievements.
Their support was still needed. It seemed too soon to insult the patriot
and the hero by telling him that he was also a ruffian. The mixed multi-
tude was thereby encouraged to believe that the slaughter of the obnox-
ious was a necessity of critical times. The Russian envoy wrote on the
19th that the French people displayed the same ferocity as two centuries
before.
On the 22nd, Foulon, one of the colleagues of Breteuil, and his son-
in-law Berthier, also a high official, were massacred by premeditation
in the streets. Neither Bailly, nor Lafayette with all his cohorts, could
protect the life of a doomed man; but a dragoon who had paraded with
the heart of Berthier was challenged, when he came home to barracks,
and cut down by a comrade.
Lally Tollendal brought the matter before the Assembly. His father
inherited the feelings of an exiled Jacobite against Hanoverian England.
He was at Falkirk with Charles Edward, and charged with the Irish
Brigade that broke the English column at Fontenoy. During the Seven
Years’ War he commanded in India, and held Pondicherry for ten months
against Coote. Brought home a prisoner, he was released on parole, that
he might stand his trial. He was condemned to death; and his son, who
did not know who he was, was brought to the place of execution, thatthey might meet once on earth. But Lally stabbed himself, and lest jus-
tice should be defrauded, he was brought out to die, with a gag in his.
mouth to silence protest, some hours before the time.
The death of Lally is part of the long indictment against the French
judiciary, and his son strove for years to have the sentence reversed. He
came over to England, and understood our system better than any of his
countrymen. Therefore, when Mounier, who was no orator, brought for-
ward his Constitution, it was Lally who expounded it By his emotional
and emphatic eloquence he earned a brief celebrity; and in the Waterloo
year he was a Minister of State, in partibus, at Ghent. He became a peer
of France, and when he died, in 1830, the name disappeared. Not many
years ago a miserable man, whom nobody knew and who asked help
from nobody, died of want in a London cellar. He was the son of Lally
Tollendal.
It is said that when, on July 22, he denounced the atrocities in Paris,
he overdid the occasion, speaking of himself, of his father, of his feel-
ings. Barnave, who was a man of honour, and already conspicuous, was
irritated to such a pitch that he exclaimed: “Was this blood, that they
have shed, so pure?”
Long before Barnave expiated his sin upon the scaffold he felt and
acknowledged its enormity. But it is by him and men like him, and not
by the scourings of the galleys, that we can get to understand the spirit
of the time. Two men, more eminent than Barnave, show it still more
clearly. The great chemist Lavoisier wrote to Priestley that if there had
been some excesses, they were committed for the love of liberty, phi-
losophy, and toleration, and that there was no danger of such things
being done in France for an inferior motive. And this is the view of
Jefferson on the massacres of September: “Many guilty persons fell
without the forms of trial, and with them some innocent. These I deplore
as much as anybody. But it was necessary to use the arm of the people,
a machine not quite so blind as balls and bombs, but blind to a certain
degree was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood?” There
is a work in twelve stout volumes, written to prove that it was all the
outcome of the Classics, and due to Harmodius, and Brutus, and
Timoleon.
But you will find that murder, approved and acknowledged, is not
an epidemic peculiar to any time, or any country, or any opinion. We
need not include hot-blooded nations of the South in order to define it as
one characteristic of modern Monarchy. You may trace it in the Kings78/John Acton
of France, Francis I, Charles IX, Henry III, Lewis XIII, Lewis XIV, in
the Emperors Ferdinand I and II, in Elizabeth Tudor and Mary Stuart,
in James and William. Still more if you consider a class of men, not
much worse, according to general estimate, than their neighbours, that
is, the historians. They have praise and hero-worship for nearly every
one of these anointed culprits. The strong man with the dagger is fol-
lowed by the weaker man with the sponge. First, the criminal who slays;
then the sophist who defends the slayer.
The royalists pursued the same tradition through the revolutionary
times. Cérutti advised that Mirabeau and Target should be removed by
poison; Chateaubriand wished to poniard Condorcet, and Malesherbes
admired him for it; the name of Georges Cadoudal was held in honour,
because his intended victim was Napoleon; La Rochejaquelein enter-
tained the same scheme, and made no secret of it to the general, Ségur.
Adair found them indignant at Vienna because Fox had refused to have
the Emperor murdered, and warned him of the plot.
Those who judge morality by the intention have been less shocked
at the crimes of power, where the temptation is so strong and the danger
so slight, than at those committed by men resisting oppression. Assur-
edly, the best things that are loved and sought by man are religion and
liberty—they, I mean, and not pleasure or prosperity, not knowledge or
power. Yet the paths of both are stained with infinite blood; both have
been often a plea for assassination, and the worst of men have been
among those who claimed to promote each sacred cause.
Do not open your minds to the filtering of the fallacious doctrine
that it is less infamous to murder men for their politics than for their
religion or their money, or that the courage to execute the deed is worse
than the cowardice to excuse it. Let us not flinch from condemning
without respite or remission, not only Marat and Carrier, but also
Barnave. Because there may be hanging matter in the lives of illustrious
men, of William the Silent and Farnese, of Cromwell and Napoleon, we
are not to be turned from justice towards the actions, and still more the
thoughts, of those whom we are about to study.
Having said this, I shall endeavour, in that which is before us, to
spare you the spectacles that degrade, and the plaintive severity that
agitates and wearies. The judgment I call for is in the conscience, not
upon the lips, for ourselves, and not for display. “Man,” says Taine, “is
a wild beast, carnivorous by nature, and delighting in blood.” That cruel
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it has ever been in royal or Christian history.
The Revolution will never be intelligibly known to us until we dis-
cover its conformity to the common law, and recognise that it is not
utterly singular and exceptional, that other scenes have been as horrible
as these, and many men as bad.VII: THE FOURTH OF AUGUST
We come to-day to the most decisive date in the Revolution, the fall of
the social system of historic France, and the substitution of the Rights
of Man.
When the Assembly was fully constituted, it had to regulate its pro-
cedure. Sir Samuel Romilly, a friend of Dumont, and occasionally of
Mirabeau, sent over an account of the practice of the British Parlia-
ment, with the cumbrous forms, the obstacles to prompt action, the con-
trivances to favour a minority, and to make opposition nearly equal to
government. The French required more expeditious methods. They had
a single Assembly with a known and well-defined commission, and the
gravest danger of the hour was obstruction and delay. Every member
obtained the right of initiative, and could submit a motion in writing.
The Assembly might, after debate, refuse to consider it; but if not ar-
rested on the threshold, it might be discussed and voted and passed in
twenty-four hours. The security for deliberation was in the Bureaux.
The Assembly was divided into thirty groups or committees, of nearly
forty members each, who met separately, the Assembly in the morning,
the Bureaux in the evening. This plan ensured thorough and sincere
discussion, for men spoke their genuine thoughts, where there was no
formality, no reporter, no stranger in the gallery. The Bureaux were
disliked and suspected by the excluded public. The electorate, experi-
encing for the first time the sensation of having deputies at work to do
their will, desired to watch them, and insisted on the master’s right to
look after his man. Representation was new; and to every reader of
Rousseau, of Turgot, or of Mably, it was an object of profound distrust.
The desire to uphold the supremacy of the deputing power over the
deputed, of the constituent over his member, was distinctly part of the
great literary inheritance common to them all. As the mandate was origi-
nally imperative, the giver of the mandate claimed the right of seeing to
its execution. The exercise of powers that were defined and limited, that
were temporary and revocable, called for scrutiny and direct control.
The Bureaux did not last, and their disappearance was a disaster.
Party, as the term is used in the constitutional vocabulary, was not yet
developed; and no organisation possessed the alternate power of pre-
senting ministers to the Crown. The main lines that divided opinion
came to light in the debates of September, arid, the Assembly fell into
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a fortnight, and each new election indicated the movement of opinion,
the position of parties, the rise of reputations. The united Assembly did
honour to the acceding orders. The first presidents were prelates and
men of rank. Out of six elections only one fell to a commoner, until the
end of September, when the leader of the Liberal Conservatives, Mounier,
was chosen, at what proved a moment of danger. In the same way, the
thirty chairmen of the Bureaux were, with scarcely an exception, al-
ways taken from the clergy or the nobles.
As Mounier, with his friends, had dominated in the constitutional
committee of thirty, and was now paramount in the new committee of
eight, there was some prospect of a coalition, by which, in return for
their aid in carrying the English model, the nobles would obtain easy
terms in the liquidation of privilege. That is the parliamentary situation.
That is the starting-point of the transactions that we have now to follow.
During the days spent in making terms between the king, the As-
sembly, and the capital, the provinces were depending on Paris for news,
for opinions, and direction. They were informed that the Parisians had
made them- selves masters of the royal fortress, and had expelled the
royal authority; that the king and the Assembly had accepted and ap-
proved the action; that there was no executive ministry, either old or
new; and that the capital was providing for its own security and admin-
istration. The towns soon had imitations of the disorders that had been
so successful, and quickly repressed them; for the towns were the seat
of the middle class, the natural protectors of acquired property, and
defenders of order and safety. in country districts the process of disinte-
gration was immediate, the spontaneous recovery was slow. For the
country was divided between the nobles who were rich, and their depen-
dents who were poor. And the poverty of one class was ultimately due to
innumerable devices for increasing the wealth of the other. And now
there was nobody in authority over them, nobody to keep peace between
them.
The first effect of the taking of the Bastille, the effacement of roy-
alty, the suspension of the ministerial office, was the rising of the cot-
tage against the castle, of the injured peasant against the privileged land-
lord, who, apart from any fault of his own, by immemorial process of
history and by the actual letter of the law, was his perpetual and inevi-
table enemy. The events of the week between July 11 and 18 proclaimed
that the authorised way to obtain what you wanted was to employ the
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no present resistance, and no subsequent complaint. And if there was
some excess in the way of cruelty and retribution, it was sure of am-
nesty on the ground of intolerable provocation and of suffering endured
too long. The king had accepted his own humiliation as if it had been as
good as due to him. He could not do more for others than for himself.
His brief alliance with the aristocracy was dissolved. He was powerless
for their defence, as they were for their own. By their formal act of
submission to the Assembly on July 16, they acknowledged that their
cause was lost with the Bastille. They neglected to make terms with the
enemy at their homes.
The appalling thing in the French Revolution is not the tumult but
the design. Through all the fire and smoke we perceive the evidence of
calculating organisation. The managers remain studiously concealed and
masked; but there is no doubt about their presence from the first They
had been active in the riots of Paris, and they were again active in the
provincial rising. The remnant of the upper classes formed a powerful
minority at Versailles; and if they acted as powerful minorities do, if
they entered into compacts and combinations, they could compound for
the loss of fiscal immunity by the salvation of social privilege. The people
would continue to have masters masters, that is, not of their own mak-
ing. They would be subject to powers instituted formerly, whilst the
Government itself obtained its credentials for the day, and there would
still be an intermediate body between the nation and the sovereign. Wealth
artificially constituted, by means of laws favouring its accumulation in
a class, and discouraging its dispersion among all, would continue to
predominate.
France might be transformed after the likeness of England; but the
very essence of the English system was liberty founded on inequality.
The essence of the French ideal was democracy, that is, as in America,
liberty founded on equality. Therefore it was the interest of the demo-
cratic or revolutionary party that the next step should be taken after the
manner of the last, that compulsion, which had answered so well with
the king, should be tried on the nobles, that the methods applied at Paris
should be extended to the Provinces, for there the nobles predominated.
A well-directed blow struck at that favoured and excepted moment, when
the country was ungoverned, might alter for ever, and from its founda-
tion, the entire structure of society. Liberty had been secured ; equality
was within reach. The political revolution ensured the prompt success
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ise, and sweeping the historical ruin away, had never been known in
Europe.
While the local powers were painfully constituting themselves, there
was a priceless interval for action. The king had given way to the middle
class; the nobles would succumb to the lower, and the rural democracy
would be emancipated like the urban. This is the second phase of that
reign of terror which, as Malouet says, began with the Bastille. Experi-
ence had shown the efficacy of attacking castles instead of persons, and
the strongholds of feudalism were assailed when the stronghold of abso-
lutism had fallen.
It is said that one deputy, Duport, a magistrate of the parliament of
Paris, had 400,000 francs to spend in raising the country against the
nobles at the precise moment of their weakness. The money was scarcely
needed, for the rioters were made to believe that they were acting in
obedience to the law. One of their victims wrote, August 3, to Clermont
Tonnerre that they were really sorry to behave in that way against good
masters, but they were compelled by imperative commands from the
king. He adds that seven or eight castles in his neighbourhood were
attacked by their vassals, all believing that the king desired. it. The
charters and muniments were the main object of pillage and destruction,
for it was believed that claims which could not be authenticated could
not be enforced. Often the castle itself was burnt with the parchments it
contained, and some of the owners perished.
The disorders raged in many parts of France. A district east and
south-east of the centre suffered most Those provinces had continued
long to be parts of the Empire; and we shall see hereafter what that
implies. The peasants of Eastern France rose up in arms to overthrow
the ancient institutions of society, which the peasants of the West gave
their lives to restore.
Rumours of all this desolation soon penetrated to the Assembly, and
on August 3 it was officially reported that property was at the mercy of
gangs of brigands, that no castle, no convent, no farm-house was safe.
A committee moved to declare that no pretext could justify the refusal to
pay the same feudal dues as before. Duport proposed that the motion be
sent back to the Bureaux. The Assembly came to no conclusion. In
truth, the thing proposed was impossible. The Commons, who now pre-
vailed, could not, after sitting three months, re-impose, even provision-
ally, burdens which were odious, which their Instructions condemned,
and which they all knew to be incapable of defence. There had been time84/John Acton
to provide: the crisis now found them unprepared. The Court advised
the nobles that nothing could save them but a speedy surrender. They
also were informed, by Barère, that some of his friends intended to move
the abolition of fiscal and feudal privilege. They replied that they would
do it themselves. Virieu, who afterwards disappeared in a sortie, during
the siege of Lyons, said to a friend: “There are only two means of calm-
ing an excited populace, kind- ness and force. We have no force; we
hope to succeed by kindness.” They knew that precious time had been
lost, and they resolved that the surrender should be so ample as to be
meritorious. It was to be not the redress of practical grievances, but the
complete establishment of the new principle, equality.
At a conference held on the evening of August 3 it was agreed that
the self-sacrifice of the ancient aris- tocracy of France, and the institu-
tion in its place of a society absolutely democratic, should be made by
the Duke d’Aiguillon, the owner of vast domains, who was about to
forfeit several thousands a year. But on August 4 the first to speak was
Noailles; then d’Aiguillon, followed by a deputy from Brittany. You
cannot repress violence, said the Breton, unless you remove the injus-
tice which is the cause of it. If you mean to proclaim the Rights of Man,
begin with those which are most flagrantly violated. They proposed that
rights abandoned to the State should be ceded unconditionally, and that
rights abandoned to the people should be given up in return for compen-
sation. They imagined that the distinction was founded on principle; but
nobody ever ascertained the dividing line between that which was prop-
erty and that which was abuse. The want of definiteness enabled the
landlords afterwards to attempt the recovery of much debatable ground,
and involved, after long contention, the ultimate loss of all.
The programme was excessively complicated, and required years to
be carried out. The nobles won the day with their demand to be compen-
sated; but Duport already spoke the menacing words: “Injustice has no
right to subsist, and the price of injustice has no right to subsist.” The
immensity of the revolution, which these changes implied, was at once
apparent. For it signified that liberty, which had been known only in the
form of privilege, was henceforward identified with equality. The nobles
lost their jurisdiction; the corporation of judges lost their right of hold-
ing office by purchase. All classes alike were admitted to all employ-
ments. When privilege fell, provinces lost it as well as orders. One after
the other, Dauphiné, Provence, Brittany, Languedoc, declared that they
renounced their historic rights, and shared none but those which wereLectures on the French Revolution/85
common to all Frenchmen. Servitude was abolished; and on the same
principle, that all might stand on the same level before the law, justice
was declared gratuitous.
Lubersac, bishop of Chartres, the friend and patron of Sieyès, moved
the abolition of the game laws, which meant the right of preserving on
another man’s land. It was a right which necessarily followed the move-
ment of that night; but it led men to say that the clergy gave away gen-
erously what belonged to somebody else. It was then proposed that the
tithe should be commuted; and the clergy showed themselves as zealous
as the laity to carry out to their own detriment the doctrine that imposed
so many sacrifices.
The France of history vanished on August 4, and the France of the
new democracy took its place. The transfer of property from the upper
class to the lower was considerable. The peasants’ income was increased
by about 60 per cent. Nobody objected to the tremendous loss, or ar-
gued to diminish it. Each class, recognising what was inevitable, and
reconciled to it, desired that it should be seen how willingly and how
sincerely it yielded. None wished to give time for others to remind them
of incon- sistency, or reserve, or omission, in the clean sweep they had
undertaken to make. In their competition there was hurry and disorder.
One characteristic of the time was to be unintelligent in matters relating
to the Church, and they did not know how far the clergy was affected by
the levelling principle, or that in touching tithe they were setting an
avalanche in motion. At one moment, Lally, much alarmed, had passed
a note to the President begging him to adjourn, as the deputies were
losing their heads. The danger arose, as was afterwards seen, when the
Duke du Chatelet proposed the redemption of tithe.
The nobles awoke next day with some misgiving that they had gone
too far, and with some jealousy of the clergy, who had lost less, and who
had contributed to their losses. On August 7 Necker appeared before the
Assembly and exposed the want of money, and the need of a loan, for
the redistribution of property on August 4 did nothing to the immediate
profit of the Exchequer. But the clergy, vying with their rivals in gener-
osity, had admitted the right of the nation to apply Church property to
State uses.
On the following day the Marquis de Lacoste proposed that the new
debt should be paid out of the funds of the clergy, and that tithe should
be simply abolished. He expressed a wish that no ecclesiastic should be
a loser, and that the parish clergy should receive an accession of in-86/John Acton
come. The clergy offered no resistance, and made it impossible for oth-
ers to resist. They offered to raise a loan in behalf of the State; but it was
considered that this would give them a position of undue influence, and
it would not have satisfied the nobles, who saw the way to recover from
the clergy the loss they had sustained. In this debate the Abbé Sieyès
delivered his most famous speech. He had no fellow-feeling with his
brethren, but he intended that the tithe should enrich the State. Instead
of that it was about to be given back to the land, and the landowners
would receive a sum of nearly three millions a year, divided in such a
way that the richest would receive in proportion to his wealth. It would
indemnify the laity. Not they, but the clergy, were now to bear the charge
of August 4. There was one deputy who would be richer by 30,000
francs a year upon the whole transaction. The landlords who had bought
their estates subject to the tithe had no claim to receive it. As all this
argument was heard with impatience, Sieyès uttered words that have
added no little to his moral stature: “They fancy that they can be free
and yet not be just!” He had been, for three months, the foremost per-
sonage in the nation. He was destined in after years, and under condi-
tions strangely altered, to be once more the dictator of France. More
than once, without public favour, but by mere power of political think-
ing, he governed the fortunes of the State. He never again possessed the
heart of the people.
The Assembly deemed it a good bargain to restore the tithe to the
land; and the clergy knew so well that they had no friends that, on Au-
gust 11, they solemnly renounced their claim. In this way the Assembly
began the disendowment of the Church, which was the primitive cause
of the Reign of Terror and the Civil War.
All these things are an episode. The business of the Assembly, from
the end of July, was the Constitution. The first step towards it was to
define the rights for which it exists. Such a declaration, suggested by
America, had been demanded by the electors in several of the instruc-
tions, and had been faithfully reproduced by Mounier, July 9. It ap-
peared, on the following day, that Lafayette had already got the required
document in his pocket. Another text was produced, ten days later, by
Sieyès, and another by Mounier, which was a revision of Lafayette’s.
Several more came out soon after.
On July 27 the archbishop of Bordeaux, in laying down the outline
of the new institutions, observed that it was necessary to found them on
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forward his analysis of the available ideas contained in the instructions.
He went at once to the heart of the matter. Some instructions, he said,
contemplated no more than the reform of existing institutions, with the
maintenance of controlling tradition and the historic chain. Others con-
ceived an entirely new system of laws and government. The distinction
between the two was this, that some required a code of principles which
must be the guide in preparing the Constitution; the others wished for no
such assistance, but thought it possible to bind past and future together.
The main conflict was between the authority of history and the Rights
of Man. The Declaration was the signal of those who meant to rescue
France from the ancestors who had given it tyranny and slavery as an
inheritance. Its opponents were men who would be satisfied with good
government, in the spirit of Turgot and the enlightened reformers of his
time, who could be happy if they were prosperous, and would never risk
prosperity and peace in the pursuit of freedom.
Those who imagined that France possessed a submerged Constitu-
tion that might be extracted from her annals had a difficult task.
Lanjuinais desired to sail by a beacon and to direct the politics of 1789
by a charter of 864. There was a special reason, less grotesque than the
archaeology of Lanjuinais, which made men averse to the Declaration.
Liberty, it was said, consists in the reign of the national will, and the
national will is known by national custom. Law ought to spring from
custom, and to be governed by it, not by independent, individual theory
that defies custom. You have to declare the law, not to make it, and you
can only declare what experience gives you. The best government de-
vised by reason is less free than a worse government bequeathed by
time. Very dimly, ideas which rose to power in other days and evolved
the great force of nationality, were at work against a system which was
to be new and universal, renouncing the influence both of time and place.
The battle was fought against the men of the past, against a history
which was an unbroken record of the defeat and frustration of freedom.
But the declaration of rights was more needful still against dangers on
the opposite side, those that were coming more than those that were
going out. People were quite resolved to be oppressed no more by mon-
archy or aristocracy, but they had no experience or warning of oppres-
sion by democracy. The classes were to be harmless; but there was the
new enemy, the State.
No European knew what security could be needed or provided for
the individual from the collected will of the people. They were protected88/John Acton
from government by authority or by minority; but they made the major-
ity irresistible, and the plébiscite a tyranny.
The Americans were aware that democracy might be weak and un-
intelligent, but also that it might be despotic and oppressive. And they
found out the way to limit it, by the federal system, which suffers it to
exist nowhere in its plenitude. They deprived their state governments of
the powers that were enumerated, and the central government of the
powers that were reserved. As the Romans knew how monarchy would
become innocuous, by being divided, the Americans solved the more
artful problem of dividing democracy into two.
Many Frenchmen were convinced that Federalism would be the re-
ally liberal policy for them. But the notion was at once pushed aside by
Mounier, and obtained no hearing. And the division of powers, which
he substituted, was rejected in its turn. They would not admit that one
force should be checked and balanced by another. They had no resource
but general principles, to abolish the Past and secure the Future. By
declaring them, they raised up an ideal authority over the government
and the nation, and established a security against the defects of the Con-
stitution and the power of future rulers. The opponents of the Declara-
tion fought it on the proposal to add a declaration of duties. The idea
was put forward by the most learned of the deputies, the Jansenist Camus,
and the clergy supported him with energy. The Assembly decided that a
system of rights belonged to politics, and a system of duties to ethics,
and rejected the motion, on the morning of the 4th of August, by 570 to
433.
This was the deciding division on the question of the Rights of Man.
After some days, absorbed by the crisis of aristocracy, the distracted
and wearied Assembly turned again from the excitement of facts and
interests to the discussion of theory. A new committee of five was ap-
pointed to revise the work of the committee of eight, which dealt with
the entire Constitution.
On August 17 Mirabeau reported their scheme. His heart was not in
it; and he resented the intrusion of hampering generalities and moralities
into the difficult experimental science of government. He advised that
the Constitution should be settled first, that the guide should follow
instead of preceding. The Assembly rejected the proposals of its com-
mittees, and all the plans which were submitted by the celebrities. The
most remarkable of these was by Sieyès, and it met with favour; but the
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author’s name. The selected text was less philosophical and profound,
and it roused less distant echoes than its rival; but it was shorter, and
more tame, and it was thought to involve fewer doubtful postulates, and
fewer formidable consequences. Between the 20th and 26th of August it
was still further abridged, and reduced from twenty-four propositions
to the moderate dimension of seventeen. These omissions from a docu-
ment which had been preferred to very remarkable competitors are the
key to the intentions of the National Assembly, and our basis of inter-
pretation.
The original scheme included a State Church. This was not adopted.
It distinguished the inequality of men from the equality of rights. This
was deemed self-evident and superfluous. It derived the mutual rights of
men from their mutual duties; and this terrestrial definition also disap-
peared, leaving the way open to a higher cause. The adopted code was
meagre and ill-composed, and Bentham found a malignant pleasure in
tearing it to pieces. It is, on the whole, more spiritual than the one on
which it was founded, and which it generally follows; and it insists with
greater energy on primitive rights, anterior to the State and aloof from
it, which no human authority can either confer or refuse. It is the trium-
phant proclamation of the doctrine that human obligations are not all
assignable to contract, or to interest, or to force.
The Declaration of the Rights of Man begins with an appeal to
heaven, and defines them in the presence, and under the auspices, of
Almighty God. The Preamble implies that our duties towards Him con-
stitute our rights towards mankind, and indicates the divine origin of
Law, without affirming it. The Declaration enumerates those rights which
are universal, which come from nature, not from men. They are four:
Liberty, Property, Security, and Self-defence. Authorities are consti-
tuted, and laws are made, in order that these original, essential, and
supreme possessions of all mankind may be preserved.
The system of guarantees is as sacred as the rights which they pro-
tect. Such are the right of contributing by representatives to legislation
and taxation, religious toleration, the liberty of the press. As the rights
are equal, the power of ensuring them must be equal. All men alike have
a share in representation, all alike are admissible to office, all must be
taxed in the same proportion. The law is the same for all. The principle
of equality is the idea on which the Declaration most earnestly insists.
Privilege had just been overthrown, and the duty of providing against
indirect means for its recovery was the occupation of the hour. That this90/John Acton
may be secured, all. powers must be granted by the people, and none
must be exercised by the people. They act only through their agents.
The agent who exercises power is responsible, and is controlled by the
sovereign authority that delegates it. Certain corollaries seem to follow:
restricted suffrage, progressive taxation, an established church, are dif-
ficult to reconcile with equality so profoundly conceived. But this is not
explicit. Questions regarding education, poverty, revision, are not ad-
mitted among the fundamentals and are left to future legislation. The
most singular passage is that which ordains, that no man may be mo-
lested for his opinions, even religious. It would appear that Toleration
was that part of the liberal dogma for which the deputies were least
prepared.
The Declaration passed, by August 26, after a hurried debate, and
with no further resistance. The Assembly, which had abolished the past
at the beginning of the month, attempted, at the end, to institute and
regulate the future. These are its abiding works, and the perpetual heri-
tage of the Revolution. With them a new era dawned upon mankind.
And yet this single page of print, which outweighs libraries, and is
stronger than all the armies of Napoleon, is not the work of superior
minds, and bears no mark of the lion’s claw. The stamp of Cartesian
clearness is upon it, but without the logic, the precision, the thorough-
ness of French thought. There is no indication in it that Liberty is the
goal, and not the starting-point, that it is a faculty to be acquired, not a
capital to invest, or that it depends on the union of innumerable condi-
tions, which embrace the entire life of man. Therefore it is justly ar-
raigned by those who say that it is defective, and that its defects have
been a peril and a snare.
It was right that the attempt should be made; for the extinction of
privilege involved a declaration of rights. When those that were exclu-
sive and unequal were abandoned, it was necessary to define and to
insist on those that were equal and the property of all. After destroying,
the French had to rebuild, and to base their new structure upon prin-
ciples unknown to the law, unfamiliar to the people, absolutely opposed
to the lesson of their history and to all the experience of the ages in
which France had been so great. It could not rest on traditions, or inter-
ests, or any persistent force of gravitation. Unless the idea that was to
govern the future was impressed with an extreme distinctness upon the
minds of all, they would not understand the consequences of so much
ruin, and such irrevocable change, and would drift without a compass.Lectures on the French Revolution/91
The country that had been so proud of its kings, of its nobles, and of its
chains, could not learn without teaching that popular power may be
tainted with the same poison as personal power.VIII: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES
When the Assembly passed the Rights of Man, they acted in harmony
for the last time. Agreement on first principles did not involve agree-
ment in policy, and in applying them to the Constitution, a week later,
the division of parties appeared.
From the tennis court to the great constitutional debate, the Moder-
ates, who may be called the Liberals, were predominant Mounier was
their tactician, Clermont Tonnerre and Lally Tollendal were their ora-
tors, Malouet was their discreet adviser. They hoped, by the division of
powers and the multiplication of checks, to make their country as free
as England or America. They desired to control the Representatives in
three ways: by a Second Chamber, the royal veto, and the right of disso-
lution. Their success depended on the support of Ministers and of rec-
onciled Conservatives. Whilst the Constitution for them was a means of
regulating and restraining the national will, it was an instrument for
accomplishing the popular will for their rivals rising to power on the
crest of the wave.
The Democrats refused to resist the people, legitimately governing
itself, either by the English or the American division of power. There
was little concentration yet of the working class in towns, for the indus-
trial age had hardly dawned, and it was hard to understand that the
Third Estate contained divergent interests and the material of a coming
conflict. The managers of the democratic party were Duport, Lameth,
and Barnave, aided sometimes by Sieyés, sometimes by Talleyrand, and
by their sworn enemy Mirabeau.
The nobles, weak in statesmanship, possessed two powerful debat-
ers: Cazalès, who reminded men of Fox, but who, when not on his legs,
had little in him; and Maury, afterwards Cardinal and Archbishop of
Paris, a man whose character was below his talents. Numbering nearly
a third of the Assembly, and holding the balance, it was in their power to
make a Constitution like that of 1814.
How these three parties acted in that eventful September, and what
in consequence befell, we have now to consider.
The five weeks from August 27 to October 1 were occupied with
the constitutional debates. They were kept within narrow limits by the
Rights of Man, which declared that the nation transmits all powers and
exercises none. On both sides there were men who were impatient of
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wished for security that the national will should always prevail, through
its agents; the others, that they should be able to obstruct it. They
struggled for an enlarged construction, and strove to break the barrier,
in the republican or the royalist direction.
The discussion opened by a skirmish with the clergy. They observed
the significant omission of a State church in the Declaration of Rights,
and feared that they would be despoiled and the Church disestablished.
The enthusiasm of the first hour had cooled. One after another, ecclesi-
astics attempted to obtain the recognition of Catholicism. Each time the
attempt was repulsed. The clergy drifted fast into the temper which was
confessed by Maury when he said, “The proposed measure would en-
able the Constitution to live: we vote against it.”
The scheme of the Committee was produced on August 31, and was
explained by Lally in a speech which is among the finest compositions
of the time. He insisted on the division of the legislative, and the unity of
the executive, as the essentials of a free government. On the following
day Mirabeau spoke on the same side. He said that the danger was not
from the Crown, but from the representatives; for they may exclude
strangers and debate in secret, as the English law allows, and these may
declare themselves permanent, and escape all control. Through the king,
the public possesses the means of holding them in check. He is their
natural ally against usurping deputies, and the possible formation of a
new aristocracy. The legislature enjoys a temporary mandate only. The
perpetual representative of the people is the king. It is wrong to deny
him powers necessary for the public interest. It is the partial appearance
of a view that was expanded by Napoleon.
Mounier defended his plan on September 4. On several points there
was no large variety of opinion. It was practically admitted that there
could be no governing without Parliament, that it must meet annually,
that its acts require the royal assent, that it shall be elected indirectly, by
equal districts, and a moderate property franchise. Mounier further con-
ceded that the Constitution was not subject to the royal veto, that Min-
isters should not be members of the Assembly, that the Assembly, and
not the king, should have the initiative of proposing laws, and that it
should have the right of refusing supplies. The real question at issue
was whether the representatives of the people should be checked by an
Upper House, by the king’s power of dissolution, and by an absolute or
a temporary veto.
Mounier had private friends among his opponents, and they opened94/John Acton
a negotiation with him. They were prepared to accept his two Houses
and his absolute veto. They demanded in return that the Senate should
have only a suspensive veto on the acts of the representatives, that there
should be no right of Dissolution, that Conventions should be held peri-
odically, to revise the Constitution. These offers were a sign of weak-
ness. The Constitutional party was still in the ascendant, and on August
31 the Bishop of Langres, the chief advocate of a House of Lords, was
chosen President by 499 to 328. If the division of the legislature into
two was sure of a majority, then the proposed bargain was one-sided,
and the Democrats would have taken much more than they gave. Mounier,
counting on the, support of those whose interest was that he should
succeed, rejected the offer. He had already been forced, by the defection
of friends, to abandon much that he would have wished to keep; and the
plan which he brought forward closely resembled that under which France
afterwards prospered.
Nevertheless, the failure of that negotiation is a fatal date in consti-
tutional history. With more address, and a better knowledge of the situ-
ation, Mounier might have saved half of the securities he depended on.
He lost the whole. The things he refused to surrender at the con- ference
were rejected by the Assembly; and the offers he had rejected were not
made again. When the legis- lature was limited to two years, the right of
dissolution lost its value. The right of revision would have caused no
more rapid changes than actually ensued; for there were fourteen Con-
stitutions in eighty-six years, or a funda- mental revision every six or
seven years. Lastly, the veto of the Senate had no basis of argument,
until it was decided how the Senate should be composed.
The disastrous ruin of the cause was brought’ on by want of man-
agement, and not by excess of conservatism. Mounier inclined to an
hereditary House of Peers; and that, after August 4, was not to be thought
of. But he knew the difficulty, and, however reluctantly, gave way. And
he attached undue importance to the absolute veto; but that was not the
point on which the conference broke up. He was supported by Lafayette,
who dreaded as much as he did the extinction of the royal power; at
times by Mirabeau, whom he detested. Even Sieyès was willing to have
two Houses, and even three, provided they were, in reality, one House,
deliberating in three divisions, but counting all the votes in common. He
also proposed that there should be a renewal of one-third at a time; so
that there would be three degrees of the popular infusion and of proxim-
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Mounier, with some of his friends, deserves to be remembered among
the men, not so common as they say, who loved liberty sincerely; I mean,
who desired it, not for any good it might do them, but for itself, however
arduous, or costly, or perilous its approach might be. They subordi-
nated the means to the end, and never regarded conditional forms as an
emanation of eternal principles. Having secured the Rights of Man, they
looked with alarm at future legislation, that could not improve, and might
endanger them. They wished the Constituent Assembly to bind and bar
its successors as far as possible; for none would ever speak with so
much authority as the genuine voice of the entire people.
By an extraordinary fortune, the nation, this time, had responded
wisely. It was certain that it would not always do so well. It had pas-
sions; it had prejudices; it was grossly ignorant; it was not disinterested;
and it was demoralized by an evil tradition. The French were accus-
tomed to irresponsible power. They were not likely to consent that the
power in their hands should be inferior to that which had been exercised
over them, or to admit that an entire people is not above the law which
it obeys. It was to be expected that they would endeavour by legislation
to diminish those securities for the minority and the weaker cause which
were appointed by the Rights of Man. Opinion was changing rapidly,
and had become more favourable to violence, more indulgent to crime.
A draft project of the Rights of Man had appeared, in which the writer
avowed that, by the law of nature, a man may do what he likes in the
pursuit of happiness, and, to elude oppression, may oppress, imprison,
and destroy.
The man who wrote thus quickly acquired a dread ascendancy over
the people, and was able to defy police and governments and assem-
blies, for it was the beginning of Marat. Lists of proscription were cir-
culated; threatening letters poured in on the deputies; and Paris, at the
end of August, was preparing to march upon Versailles, to expel obnox-
ious members, and, when they ceased to be inviolable, to put them on
their trial. These were first-fruits of liberty, and the meed and reward of
Liberals. No man can tell in what country such things would remain
without effect. In France it was believed that civic courage was often
wanting. De Serre, the great orator of the Restoration, once affirmed,
from the tribune, that the bulk of the representatives had always been
sound. He was interrupted by a furious outcry, and challenged by his
legitimist audience to say whether he included the Convention, which,
by a majority, condemned the king to death. His answer, very famous in96/John Acton
parliamentary history, was, “Yes, even the Convention. And if it had not
deliberated under poniards, we should have been spared the most ter-
rible of crimes.”
The opposition presented a united front, but was rent by many stages
of gravitation towards Democracy. They also were generally anxious to
establish political freedom, even by the greatest sacrifices. By freedom
they meant, first, deliverance from known and habitual causes of op-
pression. True, there might be others; but they were less clear and less
certain. All European experience proclaimed that the executive con-
stantly masters the legislative, even in England. It was absurd to sup-
pose that every force that, for centuries, had helped to build up absolut-
ism, had been destroyed in two months. They would rise again from the
roots, and the conflict would be constantly renewed.
The salvation seemed to lie in the principle that all power is derived
from the people, and that none can exist against the people. The popular
will may be expressed by certain forms; it cannot be arrested by ob-
stacles. Its action may be delayed; it cannot be stopped. It is the ultimate
master of all, without responsibility or exemption, and with no limit that
is not laid down in the Rights of Man. The limits there defined are
sufficient, and individual liberty needs no further protection. Distrust of
the nation was not justified by the manner in which it had chosen and
instructed its deputies.
In studying this group of public men, men to whom the future be-
longed, we are forced to admit the element of national character. No
philosophy is cheaper or more vulgar than that which traces all history
to diversities of ethnological type and blend, and is ever presenting the
venal Greek, the perfidious Sicilian, the proud and indolent Spaniard,
the economical Swiss, the vain and vivacious Frenchman. But it is cer-
tainly true that in France the liberty of the press represents a power that
is not familiar to those who know its weakness and its strength, who
have had experience of Swift and Bolingbroke and Junius. Maury once
said, “We have a free press: we have everything.” In 1812, when Napo-
leon watched the grand army crossing the Niemen to invade Russia, and
whistled the tune of Malbrook, he interrupted his tune to exclaim, “And
yet all that is not equal to the songs of Paris!,’ Chateaubriand after-
wards said that, with the liberty of the press, there was no abuse he
would not undertake to destroy. For he wrote French as it had never
been written, and the magnificent roll of his sentences caught the ear of
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from the Foreign Office, his friend, the editor of the Journal des Débats,
called on the Prime Minister Villèle and warned him, “We have over-
thrown your predecessor, and we shall be strong enough to overthrow
you.” Villèle replied, “You succeeded against him by aid of royalism:
you cannot succeed against me but by aid of revolution.” Both prophe-
cies came true. The alliance of Chateaubriand with the newspaper turned
out the Ministry in 1827, and the Monarchy in 1830.
In September 1789, the liberty of the press was only four months
old, and the reign of opinion was beginning on the Continent. They
fancied that it was an invincible force, and a complete security for hu-
man rights. It was  invaluable if it secured right without weakening
power, like the other contrivances of Liberalism. They thought that when
men were safe from the force above them, they required no saving from
the influence around them. Opinion finds its own level, and a man yields
easily and not unkindly to what surrounds him daily. Pressure from
equals is not to be confounded with persecution by superiors. It is right
that the majority, by degrees, should absorb the minority. The work of
limiting authority had been accomplished by the Rights of Man. The
work of creating authority was left to the Constitution. In this way men
of varying opinions were united in the conclusion that the powers ema-
nating from the people ought not to be needlessly divided.
Besides Sieyès, who found ideas, and Talleyrand, who found expe-
dients, several groups were, for the time, associated with the party which
was managed by Duport. There were some of the most eminent jurists,
eager to reform the many systems of law and custom that prevailed in
France, who became the lawgivers of successive Assemblies, until they
completed their code under Napoleon. Of all the enemies of the old
monarchical régime, they were the most methodical and consistent. The
leader of the Paris Bar, Target, was their most active politician. When
he heard of a plan for setting the finances in order he said, “If anybody
has such a plan, let him at once be smothered. It is the disorder of the
finances that puts the king in our power.” The Economists were as sys-
tematic and definite as the lawyers, and they too had much to destroy.
Through Dupont de Nemours their theories obtained enduring influ-
ence.
There were two or three of the future Girondins who taught that the
people may be better trusted than representatives, and who were ready
to ratify the Constitution, and even to decide upon the adoption of laws,
by the popular vote. And there were two men, not yet distinctly divided98/John Acton
from these their future victims, who went farther in opposition to the
Rights of Man, and towards the confusion of powers. In their eyes,
representation and delegation were treason to true democracy. As the
people could not directly govern itself, the principle exacted that it should
do so as nearly as possible, by means of a perpetual control over the
delegates. The parliamentary vote ought to be constantly brought into
harmony with the wish of the constituency, by the press, the galleries
and the mob. To act consciously in opposition to the delegating power
was a breach of trust. The population of Paris, being the largest col-
lected portion of sovereign power, expresses its will more surely than
deputies at second hand. Barère, who was one of these, proposed an
ingenious plan by which every law that passed re- mained suspended
until after the next elections, when the country pronounced upon it by
imperative mandate. Thus he disposed of royal veto and dissolution.
Robespierre would not suspend the law, but left it to the next legis-
lature to rectify or revoke the errors of the last. He argued that powers
require to be checked in proportion to the danger they present. Now the
danger from a power not representative exceeds that from a power that
represents, and is better acquainted with the needs and wishes of the
mass. A nation governs itself, and has a single will, not two. If the
whole does not govern the part, the part will govern the whole.
Robespierre conceived that it was time to constitute powers sufficient to
conquer the outward foe, and also the inward; one for national safety,
and one for national progress, and the elevation of the poor at the ex-
pense of the minorities that have oppressed them. He stands at the end
of the scale, and the idea of liberty, as it runs through the various sets of
thought, is transformed into the idea of force. From Sieyès to Barnave,
from Barnave to Camus, from Camus to Buzot, and from Buzot the
Girondin to Robespierre the Jacobin who killed the Girondins, we traverse
the long line of possible politics; but the transitions are finely shaded,
and the logic is continuous.
In the second week of September the Constitution of Mounier was
defeated by the union of these forces. The main question, the institution
of a Senate, was not seriously debated. It was feared as the refuge of the
defeated classes, and was not defended by those classes themselves.
They were not willing that a new aristocracy should be raised upon their
ruins; and they suspected that Government would give the preference to
that minority of the nobles who went over in time, and who were ren-
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ger in resistance to the executive than two, and that the time might come
for a senate when the fallen aristocracy had ceased to struggle, and the
Crown was reconciled to its reduced condition.
On September g the President of the Assembly, La Luzerne, bishop
of Langres, was driven by insult to resign. The next day the Assembly
adopted the single Chamber by 499 to 89, the nobles abstaining.
On September 11 the decisive division took place. Mounier had
insisted on the unlimited right of veto. The debate went against him. It
was admitted on his own side that the king would, sooner or later, have
to yield. The others agreed that the king might resist until two elections
had decided in favour of the vetoed measure. He might reject the wish of
one legislature, and even of two; he would give way to the third. The
Ministers themselves were unable to insist on the absolute veto in pref-
erence to the suspensive thus defined. A letter from the king was sent to
the Assembly, to inform them that he was content with the temporary
veto. Mounier did not allow the letter to be read, that it might not influ-
ence votes. He was defeated by 673 to 325. The Conservatives had
deserted him when he defended the Upper House; and now the king
deserted him when he defended the rights of the Crown. It was a crush-
ing and final disaster. For he fell, maintaining the cause of aristocracy
against the nobles, and the cause of prerogative against the monarch.
The Democrats triumphed by 410 votes one day, and 350 the next. The
battle for the Constitution on the English model was fought and lost.
On September 12 Mounier and his friends retired from the Commit-
tee. A new one was at once elected from the victorious majority. At this
critical point a secret Council was held, at which the royalists advised
the king to take refuge in the provinces. Lewis refused to listen to them.
The majority, elated with success, now called on him to sanction the
decrees of August 4. His reply, dated September 18, is drawn up with
unusual ability. He adopted the argument of Sieyès on the suppression
of tithe. He said that a large income would be granted to the land, and
that the rich, who ought to contribute most, would, on the contrary,
receive most. Small holders would profit little, while those who pos-
sessed no land at all would now be mulcted for payment of the clergy.
Instead of relieving the nation, it would relieve one class at the expense
of another, and the rich at the expense of the poor.
The Assembly insisted that the abolition of feudalism was part of
the Constitution, and ought to receive an unconditional sanction. But
they promised to give most respectful attention to the remarks of the100/John Acton
king, whenever the decrees came to be completed by legislation. The
royal sanction was accordingly given on the following day. Thereupon
the Assembly made a considerable concession. They resolved, on Sep-
tember 21, that the suspensive veto should extend over two legislatures.
The numbers were 728 to 224.
The new Committee, appointed on the 15th, took a fort- night to
complete their scheme, on the adopted principles that there should be
one Chamber, no dissolution, and a power of retarding legislation with-
out preventing it. On the 29th it was laid before the Assembly by their
reporter, Thouret. The voice was the voice of Thouret, but the hand was
the hand of Sieyès. At that juncture he augured ill of the Revolution, and
repented of his share in it. His Declaration of Rights had been passed
over. His proposal to restore the national credit by the surrender of tithe
had been rejected. His partition of the Assembly, together with partial
renewal, which is favourable to the executive, by never allowing the
new parliament to rise, like a giant refreshed, from a general election,
had encountered no support. It remained that he should compose the
working machinery for his essential doctrine, that the law is the will of
him that obeys, not of him that commands. To do this, the Abbé Sieyès
abolished the historic Provinces, and divided France into departments.
There were to be eighty, besides Paris; and as they were designed to be
as nearly as possible equal to a square of about forty-five miles, they
differed widely in population and property. They were to have an aver-
age of nine deputies each: three for the super- ficial area, which was
invariable; three, more or less, for population; and again three, more or
less, according to the amount which the department contributed to the
national income. In this way territory, numbers and wealth were repre-
sented equally.
Deputies were to be elected in three degrees. The taxpayers, in their
primary assemblies, chose electors for the Commune, which was the
political unit, and a square of about fifteen miles; the communal elec-
tors sent their representatives to the department, and these elected the
deputy. Those who paid no taxes were not recognized as shareholders in
the national concern. Like women and minors, they enjoyed the benefit
of government; but as they were not independent, they possessed no
power as active citizens. By a parallel process, assemblies were formed
for local administration, on the principle that the right of exercising
power proceeds from below, and the actual exercise of power from above.
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and when it became law, in December, the chief part of the new Consti-
tution was completed. It had been the work of these two months, from
August 4 to September 29. The final promulgation came two years later.
No legislative instrument ever failed more help- lessly than this product
of the wisdom of France in its first parliamentary Assembly, for it lasted
only a single year.
Many things had meanwhile occurred which made the constructive
design of 1789 unfit to meet the storms of 1792. The finances of the
State were ruined; the clergy and the clerical party had been driven into
violent opposition; the army was almost dissolved, and war broke out
when there was not a disciplined force at the command of Government.
After Varennes, the king was practically useless in peace, and impos-
sible in times of danger and invasion; not only because of the degrada-
tion of his capture and of his imprisonment on the throne, but because,
at the moment of his flight, he had avowed his hostility to the institu-
tions he administered.
The central idea in the plan of September 29, the idea of small
provinces and large municipalities, was never appreciated and never
adopted. Sieyès placed the unit in the Commune, which was the name he
gave to each of the nine divisions of a department. He intended that
there should be only 720 of these self-governing districts in France.
Instead of 720, the Assembly created 44,000, making the Commune no
larger than the parish, and breaking up the administrative system into
dust. The political wisdom of the village was substituted for that of a
town or district of 35,000 inhabitants.
The explanation of the disastrous result is as much in the Court as
in the Legislature, and as much in the legislation that followed as in the
policy of the moment in which the great issues were determined, and
with which we are dealing. No monarchical constitution could succeed,
after Varennes; and the one of which we are speaking, the object of the
memorable conflict between Mounier and Sieyès, is not identical with
the one that failed. The repudiation of the English model did not cause
the quick passage from the Constitution of 1791 to the Republic. Yet the
scheme that prevailed shows defects which must bear their portion of
blame. Political science imperatively demands that powers shall be regu-
lated by multiplication and division. The Assembly preferred ideas of
unity and simplicity.
The old policy of French parliaments nearly suggested a court of
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United States, occurred to Sieyès long after. An effective Senate might
have been founded on the provincial assemblies; but the ancient prov-
inces were doomed, and the new divisions did not yet exist, or were
hidden in the maps of freemasonry.
Power was not really divided between the legislative and the execu-
tive, for the king possessed no resource against the majority of the As-
sembly. There was no Senate, no initiative, no dissolution, no effective
veto, no reliance on the judicial or the Federal element. These are not
defects of equal importance; but taken together, they subverted that prin-
ciple of division which is useful for stability, and for liberty is essential.
The reproach falls not only on those who carried the various mea-
sures, but also on the minority that opposed them. Mounier encouraged
the suspicion and jealousy of Ministers by separating them from the
Assembly, and denying to the king, that is to them, the prerogative of
proposing laws. He attributed to the absolute veto an importance which
it does not possess; and he frustrated all chance of a Second Chamber
by allowing it to be known that he would have liked to make it heredi-
tary. This was too much for men who had just rejoiced over the fall of
the aristocracy. In order to exclude the intervention of the king in favour
of a suspensive veto, he accepted the argument that the Constitution
was in the hands of the Assembly alone. When Lewis raised a just ob-
jection to the decrees of August 4, this argument was turned against
him, and the Crown suffered a serious repulse.
The intellectual error of the Democrats vanishes before the moral
error of the Conservatives. They refused a Second Chamber because
they feared that it would be used as a reward for those among them to
whose defection they partly owed their defeat. And as they did not wish
the Constitution to be firmly established, they would not vote for mea-
sures likely to save it. The revolutionists were able to count on their aid
against the Liberals.
The watchword came from the Palace, and the shame of their policy
recoils upon the king. Late in September one of his nobles told him that
he was weary of what he saw, and was going to his own country. “Yes,”
said the king, taking him aside; “things are going badly, and nothing can
improve our position but the excess of evil.” On this account Royer
Collard, the famous Doctrinaire, said, in later times, that all parties in
the Revolution were honest, except the Conservatives.
From the end of August the Paris agitators, who managed the mob
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Versailles. Thouret, one of the foremost lawyers in the Assembly, who
was elected President on August 1, refused the honour. He had been
warned of his unpopularity, and gave way to threats. Yielding to the
current which, as Mirabeau said, submerges those who resist it, he went
over to the other side, and soon became one of their leaders. The expe-
rience of this considerable man is an instance of the change that set in,
and that was frequent among men without individual conviction or the
strength of character that belongs to it.
The downward tendency was so clearly manifest, the lesson taught
by successful violence against the king and the aristocracy was so reso-
lutely applied to the Assembly, that very serious politicians sought the
means of arresting the movement. Volney, who was no orator, but who
was the most eminent of the deputies in the department of letters, made
the attempt on September 18. He proposed that there should be new
elections for a parliament that should not consist of heterogeneous in-
gredients, but in which class interests should be disregarded and un-
known. He moved that it should represent equality. They reminded him
of the oath not to separate until France was a constitutional State, and
the protest was ineffectual. But in intellectual France there was no man
more perfectly identified with the reigning philosophy than the man who
uttered this cry of alarm.
On October 2 the first chapters of the Constitution were ready for
the royal assent. They consisted of the Rights of Man, and of the funda-
mental measures adopted in the course of September. Mounier, the new
President, carried to the king the articles by which his cause had been
brought to its fall. Lewis undertook to send his reply; and from Mounier
came no urging word. They both fancied that delay was possible, and
might yet serve. The tide had flowed so slowly in May, that they could
not perceive the torrent of October. On the day of that audience of the
most liberal of all the royalists, the respite before them was measured
by hours.
All through September, at Paris, Lafayette at the head of the forces
of order, and the forces of tumult controlled by the Palais Royal had
watched each other, waiting for a deadly fight. There were frequent
threats of marching on Versailles, followed by reassuring messages from
the General that he had appeased the storm. As it grew louder, he made
himself more and more the arbiter of the State. The Government, resent-
ing this protectorate, judged that the danger of attack ought to be averted,
not by the dubious fidelity and the more dubious capacity of the com-104/John Acton
mander of the National Guard, but by the direct resources of the Crown.
They summoned the Flanders regiment, which was reputed loyal, and
on October x it marched in, a thousand strong. The officers, on their
arrival, were invited by their comrades at Versailles to a festive supper
in the theatre. The men were admitted, and made to drink the health of
the king; and in the midst of a scene of passionate enthusiasm the king
and queen appeared. The demonstration that ensued meant more than
the cold and decent respect with which men regard a functionary hold-
ing delegated and not irrevocable powers. It was easy to catch the note
of personal devotion and loyalty and the religion of the Cavalier, in the
cries of these armed and excited royalists. The managers at Paris had
their opportunity, and resolved at once to execute the plot they had long
meditated.
Whilst the Executive, which alone upheld the division of powers
and the principle of freedom, was daily losing ground at the hands of its
enemies, of its friends, and at its own, a gleam of hope visited the for-
lorn precincts of the Court. Necker had informed the Assembly that he
could not obtain a loan, and he asked for a very large increase of direct
taxation. He was heard with impatience, and Mirabeau, who spoke for
him, made no impression. On September 26 he made another effort, and
gained the supreme triumph of his career. In a speech that was evidently
unprepared, he drew an appalling picture of the coming bankruptcy;
and as he ended with the words “These dangers are before you, and you
deliberate!” the Assembly, convulsed with emotion, passed the vote unani-
mously, and Necker was saved. None knew that there could be such
power in man.
In the eighteen months of life that remained to him, Mirabeau un-
derwent many vicissitudes of influence and favour; but he was able, in
an emergency, to dominate parties. From that day the Court knew what
he was, and what he could do; and they knew how his imperious spirit
longed to serve the royal cause, and we shall presently see who it was
that attempted to flatter and to win him when it was too late, and who
had repelled him when it might yet have been time.
We have reached the point at which the first part of the Revolution
terminates, and the captivity of the monarch is about to begin. The events
of the next two days, October 5 and 6, form a complete and coherent
drama, that will not bear partition, and must occupy the whole of our
attention next week.IX: THE MARCH TO VERSAILLES
The French Revolution was approved at first by the common judgment
of mankind. Kaunitz, the most experienced statesman in Europe, de-
clared that it would last for long, and perhaps for ever. Speaking less
cautiously, Klopstock said: “I see generations crushed in the struggle; I
see perhaps centuries of war and desolation; but at last, in the remote
horizon, I see the victory of liberty.” Even at St. Petersburg the fall of
the Bastille was hailed with frantic joy. Burke began by applauding. He
would not listen to Tom Paine, who had been the inspirer of a revolution
himself; and who assured him that the States-General would lead to
another. He said, afterwards, that the Rights of Man had opened his
eyes; but at Holland House they believed that the change came a few
days earlier, when the Church was attacked. The Americans were not
far from the opinion of Burke. By the middle of the summer Jefferson
thought that all that was needful had been obtained. Franklin took alarm
at the events, of July. Washington and Hamilton became suspicious soon
after.
For the September decrees were directed not only against the En-
glish model, but still more against the American. The Convention of
1787 had constructed a system of securities that were intended to save
the Union from the power of unchecked democracy. The National As-
sembly resolutely swept every security away. Nothing but the Crown
was left that could impede the direct operation of the popular will, or
that could make the division of powers a reality. Therefore the Liberal
party looked to the king as much as the Conservative, and wished as
much as they, and even more than they, to strengthen his hands. Their
theory demanded a divided legislature. Having lost that, they fell back
on Montesquieu, and accepted the division of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers. These theoretic subtleties were unintelligible to the people
of France. Men who were as vehement for the king in October as they
had been vehement against him in June appeared to them to be traitors.
They could not conceive that the authority which had so long oppressed
them, and which it had required such an effort to vanquish, ought now
to be trusted and increased. They could not convince themselves that
their true friends were those who had suddenly gone over to the ancient
enemy and oppressor, whose own customary adherents seemed no longer
to support him.
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repression of monarchy which began on June 23. As the Crown passed
under the control of the Assembly, the Assembly became more depen-
dent on the constituencies, especially on that constituency which had the
making of French opinion, and in which the democratic spirit was con-
centrated. After the month of August the dominant fact is the growing
pressure of Paris on Versailles. In October Paris laid its hand on its
prey. For some weeks the idea of escaping had been entertained. Thirty-
two of the principal royalists in the Assembly were consulted, and ad-
vised that the king should leave Versailles and take refuge in the prov-
inces. The late minister, Breteuil, the Austrian ambassador, Mercy, were
of the same opinion, and they carried the queen with them. But Necker
was on the other side.
Instead of flight they resolved upon defence, and brought up the
Flanders regiment, whose Colonel was a deputy of the Left In the morn-
ing the Count d’Estaing, who held command at Versailles, learnt with
alarm that it had been decided to omit the health of the nation. The
Prussian envoy writes that the officers of the Guards, who had not yet
adopted the Tricolor, displayed the utmost contempt for it. It required
no exaggeration to represent the scene in a light odious to the public.
When Madame Campan came home and described with admiration what
she had just beheld, Beaumetz, a deputy, and friend of Talleyrand, be-
came very grave, and took his leave, that he might make up his mind
whether he should not emigrate at once. Hostile witnesses reported the
particulars to the press next day, and it was stated, figuratively or liter-
ally, that the Royal Guards had trampled the national colours under
foot. Marat came over to inquire, and Camille Desmoulins says that he
hurried back to Paris making as much noise as all the trumpets of the
Last Day.
The feast had been held on a Thursday. On the Sunday, October 4,
Paris was in a ferment. The insult to the nation, the summoning of troops,
the projected flight, as was now supposed, to the fortress of Metz, were
taken to mean civil war, for the restoration of despotism. At the Palais
Royal the agitators talked of going out to Versailles, to punish the inso-
lent guards. On the evening of Sunday, one district of the city, the
Cordeliers, who were governed by Danton, were ready to march. The
men of other districts were not so ready for action, or so zealous to
avenge the new cockade. To carry the entire population more was re-
quired than the vague rumour of Metz, or even than the symbolical
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There was hunger among the 800,000 inhabitants of Paris, between
last year’s corn that was exhausted, and the new harvest that was not
yet ground. Nobody, says Dumont, could wonder if so much suffering
led to tumult The suffering was due to poverty more than to scarcity;
but Lafayette asserted that above £2000 a week were paid to bakers, or
to millers, to create discontent by shortening supplies. There were people
who thought that money spent in this way would rouse indignation against
the incompetent and inactive Assembly. Upon sixteen days in the course
of September the bakers’ shops had to be guarded by troops. The re-
duced noble families were putting down their establishments; and 200,000
passports were issued to intending émigrés in the two months following
the fall of the Bastille.
The primary offender, responsible for subsistence, was the munici-
pality of the capital; and their seat of office was the first object of at-
tack. Early on the Monday morning a multitude of excited women made
their way into the Hôtel de Ville. They wanted to destroy the heaps of
papers, as all that writing did them no good. They seized a priest, and
set about hanging him. They rang the tocsin, bringing all the trained
battalions and all the ragged bands of the city to the Place de Grève.
They carried away several hundreds of muskets, and some useless can-
non; and they fetched torches, that they might burn the building to the
ground. It was the headquarters of the elected municipality; but the masses
were becoming conscious that they were not the Third Estate, that there
was a conflict of interest between property and labour, and they began
to vent their yet inarticulate rage upon the middle class above them. It
presently appeared that these revolutionary heroines, knitting compan-
ions of the future guillotine, were not all infuriated or implacable. Par-
cels of banknotes that they took away were brought back; the priest was
left unhung; the torches that were to have lighted the conflagration were
extinguished without difficulty. They were easily persuaded that their
proper sphere of action was Versailles, with its Assembly, that was able
to do everything, and did nothing for the poor. They played the genuine
part of mothers whose children were starving in their squalid homes,
and they thereby afforded to motives which they neither shared nor un-
der- stood the aid of a diamond point that nothing could withstand. It
was this first detachment of invading women that allowed Stanislas
Maillard to lead them away.
Maillard was known to all the town as a conqueror of the Bastille.
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as the calculating controller of dishevelled tumult, he left on those who
saw him an impression of unusual force. Whilst he mustered his army in
the Champs Elysées, and recruiting parties were sent through the streets,
an emissary from the Hôtel de Ville hastened to warn the Government at
Versailles. He was able to announce that the National Guard were com-
ing.
Lafayette appeared late upon the scene, and did nothing to hinder
the expedition of Maillard. He thought the danger contemptible, and
believed that there were resources at Versailles enough to stop it, al-
though there were seven or eight thousand women and some hundreds
of men among them. Both Necker and Mounier, the President of the
Assembly, confirm the fact.
When the news of what they must be prepared for reached minis-
ters, the king was out shooting, some miles away, and nothing could be
done without him. The queen was found at the Trianon, which she never
saw again. An officer who came on foot from Paris told the king of his
danger. He refused his name, but stated that there was no man in the
service who had greater reason to complain. A mounted messenger ar-
rived from the Minister of the Interior, and Lewis took horse and gal-
loped to Versailles. The streets were already crowded with disorderly
people, and shots were fired as he rode by.
The roads from Paris to Versailles cross the Seine at three points,
and the general officers who were in the ministry declared that they
might be defended with the troops that were at hand. St. Priest, the
Minister of the Interior, advised the king to meet the army of Paris at
Sèvres, and order it to retire. If they refused, he thought that they could
be beaten.
Necker was against giving battle, and two important colleagues were
with him. He was ready to take the king to Paris, seeing the objections,
as he always did to every proposal, but hoping that public opinion,
stimulated by the presence of the Court, which had not been seen there
for generations, would sustain the Crown against the Assembly. He had
held that opinion from the first, and he refused to be answerable for civil
war. Lewis, unable to decide, went to consult the queen. She would be
sent away, with her children, if there was a fight. She declared that she
would remain if the king remained, and would not allow him to incur
dangers which she did not share. This resolution made it impossible for
him to adopt a manly or spirited course. The Council broke up without
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Whilst this was going on, between three and four in the afternoon
Maillard reached Versailles with his column of women. Their quality
had deteriorated by the recruits made on the way, and there had been a
large accession of ferocity. Besides the women who followed Maillard
from the Hôtel de Ville, some of whom believed that hunger is caused by
bad government, and can be appeased by good, others displayed the
aprons in which they meant to carry the queen to Paris, bit by bit. And
there was a group, more significant than either, who were well supplied
with money, to be distributed among the soldiers of the Flemish regi-
ment, and who effectually performed their office.
Maillard, who had prevented depredation by the way, made straight
for the Assembly, and was admitted with a deputation of his followers.
They arrived at a moment of excitement. The king had accepted the
nineteen paragraphs of the Constitution, with the proviso that he re-
tained the executive power undiminished. He had put off the Rights of
Man until it should be seen how they were affected by the portions of
the constitution yet to pass. The reply was not countersigned by a min-
ister; and the deputies saw in it an attempt to claim the right of modify-
ing the fundamental laws. They brought up the imprudences of the din-
ner of welcome, and argued that there must be a plot.
Mirabeau had never stood in a more difficult position. He clung to
the monarchy, but not to the king. He was ready to serve the Count of
Provence, or even the Duke of Orleans, but not a feeble executive; and
he judged that, as things were going, there would soon be no king to
serve. Through his friend La Marck he had attempted to terrify the Court,
and to induce them to accept his services. La Marck had represented to
the queen the immense value of the aid of such a man; and the queen had
replied, decisively, that she hoped they would never fall so low as to
need help from Mirabeau.
He defended the king’s answer on the ground he had held before,
that the Declaration ought to follow the Constitution, and ought not to
precede it. Speaking of the scene at the officers’ dinner, he said that the
king was inviolable—the king, and no other person. The allusion was so
clear that the royalists were reduced to silence. The Assembly resolved
that the king should be requested to give his assent, unconditionally.
Before the deputation had left, Maillard entered the Assembly.
Mirabeau had received early notice of the intended attack by a large
body of Parisians, and had advised Mounier to adjourn in time. Mounier
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his post. When Maillard appeared with a few women, he allowed him to
speak. As the orator of the women whom he had brought from the H6tel
de Ville, Maillard asked for cheap bread, denounced the artificial fam-
ine and the Royal Guards. When rebuked by Mounier for using the term
“citizens,” he made a very effective point by saying that any man who
was not proud to be a citizen ought at once to be expelled. But he admit-
ted that he did not believe all the imputations that were made by his
followers; and he obtained a cheer for the Royal Guard by exhibiting a
regimental cocked hat with the tricolor cockade.
The Assembly gave way, and sent Mounier at the head of a deputa-
tion to invite the king’s attention to the demands of his afflicted subjects.
Whilst the deputies, with some of the women, stood in the rain, waiting
for the gates to be opened, a voice in the crowd exclaimed that there was
no want of bread in the days when they had a king, but now that they
had twelve hundred they were starving. So that there were some whose
animosity was not against the king, but against the elect of the people.
The king at once conceded all that Mounier asked for his strange
companions, and they went away contented. Then their friends outside
fell upon them, and accused them of having taken bribes; and again it
became apparent that two currents had joined, and that some had hon-
estly come for bread, and some had not Those who had obtained the
king’s order for provisioning Paris, and were satisfied, went back to
bring it to the Hôtel de Ville. They were sent home in a royal carriage.
Maillard went with them. It was fully understood that with all his vio-
lence and crudity he had played a difficult part well.
Mounier remained at the Palace. He was not eager to revisit the
scene of his humiliation, where vociferous women had occupied the
benches, asking for supper, and bent on kissing the President. He wished
the king now to accept the Rights of Man, without waiting for the ap-
pointed deputation from the Assembly. Although they were in part his
work, he was no longer wedded to them as they stood, and thought, like
Mirabeau, that they were an impediment. But a crisis had arrived, and
this point might be surrendered, to save the very existence of monarchy.
He waited during many eventful hours, and returned after ten at night to
find that the bishop of Langres, disgusted with the scene before him,
had adjourned the Assembly. Mounier instantly convoked them, by beat
of drum. He had other things to speak of besides the Rights of Man; for
he knew that an invader more formidable than Maillard with his Ama-
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For the later weeks of September Lafayette had cast his influence
on the side of those who designed to strengthen the executive. He had
restrained his men when they threatened to come to support the National
Assembly. To yield to that movement was to acknowledge defeat, and
loss of available popularity and power. When he came to the Hôtel de
Ville and found that his army was resolved to go, he opposed the project,
and for many hours held his ground. The men whom he commanded
were not interested on their own account in the daily allowance of food.
Their anger was with the Royal Guards, and their purpose was to take
their place. Then there would be less danger of resistance to the decrees,
or, of flight to the provinces.
Lafayette could not appear before the king at their head without
evident hostility and revolt; for their temper was threatening, and he
was rapidly losing control. By delay and postponement he gained some-
thing. Instead of arriving as an assailant, he came as a deliverer. When
he remonstrated, his soldiers said that they meant no injury to the king,
but that he must obey or abdicate. They would make their general Re-
gent; but if he refused to put himself at their head, they would take his
life. They told him that he had commanded long enough, and now he
must follow. He did not yield until the tumult had risen high, and the
strain on his authority was breaking.
Early in the afternoon the watchers who followed the march of the
women from the rare church towers reported that they had crossed the
Seine without opposition. It was known, therefore, that the road was
open, that the approach of the army would be under cover of the contin-
gent that had preceded, that there was no danger of collision.
About four o’clock Lafayette sent word to the Hôtel de Ville—for
his men would not allow him out of sight—that it was time to give him
his orders, as he could not prevent the departure. They were brought to
him where he sat in the saddle in the Place de Grève, and he read them
with an expression of the utmost alarm. They contained all that ambi-
tion could desire, for the four points which he was directed to insist on
made him Dictator of France. But it was added that the orders were
given because he demanded them. Lafayette never produced that docu-
ment; and he left it to the commissaries sent with him to urge the one
demand in which he was interested, the establishment of the Court at
Paris.
He started about five o’clock, with nearly 20,000 men. From the
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Government as to his intentions. It was a march of seven hours. At the
passage of the Seine, he sent on an officer with further explanations;
and he declared that he was coming under compulsion, and would have
gone back if the bridge had been held in force. Before Versailles he
halted his men, and made them take the oath of fidelity to the king and
the Assembly.
The news of his coming had been received with terror. A man, dressed
like a workman, who had been on the march with him, hurried forward
to the Palace, and was at once admitted. It was the future Duke de
Richelieu, twice, in after years, Prime Minister. What he told of the
mood of the men added to the alarm. Another Council was held, at
which the majority were in favour of flight. “Sir,” said St. Priest, “if
you go to Paris, it may cost you your crown.” “That advice,” said Necker,
“may cost you your head.” Nobody doubted that flight signified civil
war. But St. Priest carried his point, and rode off to prepare Rambouil-
let for the royal family. As he knew that the decision was the gravest
that could be taken, and that Necker’s words were probably true, he
dropped into a walk, and was overtaken by his wife. From her he learnt
that the hazardous decision had been reversed, and that the king would
remain at Versailles. His interview with the deputation of women had
had a momentary success, and provoked cries of” Vive le Roi!” There-
upon Necker recovered the lost ground, with the aid of Liancourt, who
first brought the king to Paris in the summer. The carriages, which were
ready, were countermanded. Later on, they were again sent for, but this
time they were stopped by the people.
The confusion of counsel was such that one of the ministers after-
wards declared that, if the Duke of Orleans had appeared and pressed
his demands, he would have obtained everything. It is said that the man-
agers of his party saw this, and showed him his opportunity, during the
panic that preceded Lafayette. It is even stated that they brought him to
the very door of the council chamber, and that he flinched, with the
regency within reach of his hand. When the National Guard arrived, his
chances vanished.
Lafayette never was able to prove the Duke’s complicity in the crime
of that night. When the Duke asked him what evidence he had, he re-
plied that if he had had evidence he would have sent him for trial; but
that he had enough reason for suspicion to require that he should leave
the country. Thrice the Duke, forcibly encouraged by Mirabeau, re-
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gland. Mirabeau exclaimed that he would not have him for a lackey. A
long inquiry was held, and ended in nothing. The man who knew those
times best, Roederer afterwards assured Napoleon that, if there was an
Orleanist conspiracy, Orleans himself was not in it.
The women who invaded Versailles were followed by groups of
men of the same description as those who committed the atrocities which
followed the fall of the Bastille. As night fell they became formidable,
skirmished with the guard, and tried to make their way into the Palace.
At first, when his captains asked for orders to disperse the crowd, Lewis,
against the advice of his sister, replied that he did not make war on
women. But the men were armed, and evidently dangerous. The com-
mand, at Versailles, was in the hands of d’Estaing, the admiral of the
American war, who at this critical moment showed no capacity. He re-
fused to let his men defend themselves, and ordered them to withdraw.
St. Priest grew impatient. Much depended on their having re- pressed
the riot without waiting to be rescued by the army of Paris. He sum-
moned the admiral to repel force by force. D’Estaing replied that he
waited the king’s orders. The king gave none. The minister then said:
“When the king gives no orders, a general must judge and act for him-
self.” Again the king was silent. Later, the same day, he adopted the
words of St. Priest, and made them his own. He said that the Count
d’Estaing ought to have acted on his own responsibility. No orders are
needed by a man of spirit, who understands his duty. It was the constant
wish of Lewis XVI. to be in the hands of stronger men, who would
know how to save him in spite of himself.
Mounier had obtained his unqualified assent to the Rights of Man,
and urged him to seize the moment to take refuge in some faithful prov-
ince. It was the dangerous, but the honourable course, and there was
hope that the Assembly, standing by him, would prevent an outbreak of
war. He conveyed the royal message to the Assembly, at a night sitting,
much hindered by the continued presence of the visitors from Paris. Just
then Lafayette arrived, with his overwhelming force. He assured Mounier
and his friends that the men he com- manded would now be easy to
satisfy. But he said nothing of the real purpose of his presence there.
From the Assembly he passed on to the king. Leaving his 20,000 men
behind him in the darkness, he appeared at the Palace gate, accompa-
nied only by the commissaries from the Hôtel de Ville.
The Swiss behind the bars warned him to reflect what he was about
to do. For he was entering a place crowded with men passionately ex-114/John Acton
cited against the revolutionary general, who, whether he came to save or
to destroy, was no longer a subject, but a master. The general told them
to let him in. As he passed, a voice called out, “There goes Cromwell.”
Lafayette stood still and answered, “Cromwell would not have come
alone.” Madame de Staël watched him as he entered the royal presence.
His countenance, she says, was calm. Nobody ever saw it otherwise.
Lewis received him with a sensation of relief; for he felt that he was
safe. At that moment the sovereign indeed had perished, but the man
was safe. The language of Lafayette was respectful and satisfactory. He
left to his companions the disagreeable duty of imposing terms, and they
exposed to the king the object of this strange interposition of the middle
class in arms. He replied that he had already sanctioned the Rights of
Man, that the minister would arrange with the municipality for the pro-
visioning of Paris, that he himself would trust his person to the custody
of the National Guard. The fourth, and only essential matter, the trans-
fer of the Court to Paris, was left unsettled. That was to be the work
reserved for the morrow. Word was sent to the Hôtel de Ville that all
was well.
Lafayette, holding the issue in his hands, betrayed no impatience,
and abstained from needless urging. His men undertook the outer line of
defence, but the Palace itself was left to the Royal Guards. The king did
not at once realise the position, and attempted to combine the old order
with the new. For the remainder of the night there was a divided com-
mand and an uncertain responsibility. Between Lafayette outside and
D’Estaing within, there was an unguarded door.
The general believed that he had done enough, and would easily
gather the ripe fruit in the morning. Having informed the President of
the Assembly, still ostensibly sitting, that order was restored, he went
home to bed. He had had a long and trying day. His rest was destined to
be short. Before daybreak a small band of ruffians, of the kind which
the Revolution furnished as a proper instrument for conspirators, made
their way by the garden entrance into the Palace. Those who aimed at
the life of the king came upon a guard-room full of sleeping soldiers,
and retired. The real object of popular hatred was the queen, and those
who came for her were not so easily turned from their design. Two men
on guard who fired upon them were dragged into the street and butch-
ered, and their heads were borne as trophies to the Palais Royal. Their
comrades fled for safety to the interior of the Palace. But one, who was
posted at the door of Marie Antoinette, stood his ground, and his name,Lectures on the French Revolution/115
Miomandre de Sainte Marie, lives as a household word. One of the
queen’s ladies, whose sister has left a record of the scene, was awakened
by the noise and opened the door. She saw the sentry, his face streaming
with blood, holding a crowd at bay. He called to her to save the queen
and fell, with the lock of a musket beaten into his brain. She instantly
fastened the lock, roused the queen, and hurried her, without stopping to
dress, to the king’s apartment
The National Guard from Paris, who were outside, had not pro-
tected the two first victims; but then they interfered, and the Gardes
Françaises, who had been the first mutineers, and had become the solid
nucleus of the Parisian army, poured into the Palace. As they had made
their expedition of the day before for no other purpose than to drive the
royal troops away and to take their place, none could tell what the meet-
ing of the two corps would be, and the king’s men barricaded them-
selves against the new comers. But an officer reminded the Gardes
Françaises of the day when the two regiments had withstood the En-
glish, side by side, and theirs had been rescued by the Gardes du Corps.
So they called out, “Remember Fontenoy”; and the others answered the
challenge and unbarred the door.
By the time that Lafayette appeared, roused from untimely slumber,
his men were masters of the Palace, and stood between the royal family
and the raging mob of baffled murderers. He made the captured guards-
men safe; but although he was in supreme command, he did not restore
order outside. The last of the four points he had been instructed to ob-
tain, the removal of the Court to his custody at the Tuileries and his own
permanent elevation to a position superior to the throne, was not yet
conceded. Until that was settled, the loyalty of his forces was restrained.
Nobody was arrested. Men whose hands were red with the blood of
Varicourt and Miomandre were allowed to defy justice, and a furious
crowd was left for hours without molestation under the windows of the
king. The only cry left for them to raise was “Paris,” and it was sure in
time to do its work. The king could not escape, for Lafayette held every
gate. He could not resist, for Lafayette commanded every soldier. The
general never pressed the point He was too cautious to attend the coun-
cil where the matter was considered, as if the freedom of choice was
left. This time Necker had his way, and he came forward and announced
to the assembled people that the Court was about to move to Paris.
Lewis, who had wandered, helpless and silent, between his chair and the
balcony, spoke at last, and confirmed it.116/John Acton
In that moment of triumph Lafayette showed himself a man of in-
stinct and of action. The multitude had sufficiently served his purpose;
but their own passions were not appeased, and the queen personified to
them all the antagonistic and unpopular forces. The submission of the
king was a foregone conclusion: not so the reconciliation of the queen.
He said to her, “What are your Majesty’s intentions?” She answered, “I
know my fate. I mean to die at the feet of the king.” Then Lafayette led
her forward, in the face of the storm, and, as not a word could be heard,
he respectfully kissed her hand. The populace saw and cheered. Under
his protectorate, peace was made between the Court and the democracy.
In all these transactions, which determined the future of France, the
Assembly had no share. They had had no initiative and no counsel.
Their President had not known how to prevent the irruption of the women;
he had supplied them with bread, and had been unable to turn them out
until the National Guard arrived. After two in the morning, when he
heard that all was quiet at the Palace, he adjourned the sitting. Next day
he proposed that they should attend the king in a body; but Mirabeau
would not allow it to be done. One hundred deputies gave a futile escort
to the royal family, and the Assembly followed soon after. The power
was passing from them to the disciplined people of Paris, and beyond
them and their commander to the men who managed the masses. Their
reign had lasted from July 16 to October 6.
It took seven hours to bring the royal family from Versailles to Paris,
at a foot pace, surrounded by the victorious women, who cried: “We
bring the baker, the baker’s wife, and the baker’s boy.” And they were
right. Supplies became abundant; and the sudden change encouraged
many to believe that the scarcity had not been due to economic causes.X: MIRABEAU
The transfer of the Government to Paris, which degraded and obscured
the king, at once made the queen the foremost person in the State. Those
days of October are an epoch in her character as well as in her life, and
we must turn our thoughts to her, who had so much influence and so
much sorrow, and who beyond all women in European history, except-
ing one, has charmed and saddened mankind. She had proved inferior to
her position during the years of her prosperity, and had disgraced her-
self even in her mother’s eyes, by her share in the dismissal of Turgot.
The Court was filled with stories injurious to her good name, and the
calumny of the diamond necklace showed so clearly what a Prince of
the Church thought her capable of, staking his existence on his belief,
that her own sister suspected her, and they remained long estranged.
Her frivolity was unchecked by religion; but a year or two before her
misfortunes began, she became more serious; and when they were about
to end, a priest found his way into the prison, and she was prepared to
die. At first, she was dreaded as the most illiberal influence near the
throne, and the Parliament of Paris denounced her as the occult pro-
moter of oppression. In the decisive days of June 1789 she induced
Lewis to sacrifice to the cause of aristocracy the opportune reforms that
might have retrieved his fortunes. The emigration left her to confront
alone the vengeance of the people. The terrific experience of October,
when she saw death so near, and was made to feel so keenly the hatred
she inspired, sobered in a moment the levity of her life, and brought out
higher qualities. It was on that day that she began to re- mind those
around her whose daughter she was. Ignorant as she was and passion-
ate, she could never become a safe adviser. But she acquired decision,
vigour, and self- command, and was able sometimes to strengthen the
wavering mind of her husband. Too brave to be easily frightened, she
refused at first the proffered aid of Mirabeau; and when, too late, she
bent her pride to ask for it, she acted with her eyes open, without confi-
dence or hope. For the surging forces of the day, for the idea that might
have saved her, the idea of a government uniting the best properties of a
monarchy with the best properties of a republic, she had neither sympa-
thy nor understanding. Yet she was not wedded to the maxims that had
made the greatness of her race, and the enmity of the princes and the
émigés saved her from the passions of the old régime. Condé spoke of
her as a democrat; and she would have been glad to exchange the insti-118/John Acton
tutions of 1791 for something like the British constitution as it existed in
those Tory days. She perished through her insincerity more than through
the traditional desire for power. When the king was beheaded, the Prince
Bishop of Bamberg and Wurzburg, reputed the most sagacious and en-
lightened among the prelates of the empire, was heard to say, “It ought
to have been the queen.” We who see farther may allow the retribution
that befell her follies and her errors to arrest our judgment
Marie Antoinette’s negotiation with Mirabeau, and the memorable
endeavour of Mirabeau to restore the constitutional throne, is the cen-
tral feature in the period now before us.
By the compulsory removal to Paris the democracy became prepon-
derant. They were strengthened by the support of organized anarchy
outside, and by the disappearance of their chief opponents within.
Mounier was the first to go. The outrage at Versailles had occurred
while he presided, and he resigned his seat with indignation. He at-
tempted to rouse his own province against the Assembly, which had
betrayed its mandate, and renounced its constituents; but Dauphiné, the
home and basis of his influence, rejected him, and he went into exile.
His example was followed by Lally Tollendal and a large number of
moderate men, who despaired of their country, and who, by declining
further responsibility, helped to precipitate the mischief they foresaw.
The constitutional cause, already opposed by Conservatives, was
now deserted by the Liberals. Malouet remained at his post. He had
been less prominent and less eager than Mounier, and he was not so
easily discouraged. The Left were now able to carry out in every depart-
ment of the State their interpretation of the Rights of Man. They were
governed mainly by two ideas. They dis- trusted the king as a malefac-
tor, convicted of the unpardonable sin of absolutism, whom it was im-
possible to subject to too much limitation and control; and they were
persuaded that the securities for individual freedom which are requisite
under a personal government are superfluous in a popular community
conducting its affairs by discussion and compromise and adjustment, in
which the only force is public opinion. The two views tended to the
same practical result to strengthen the legislative power, which is the
nation, and weaken the executive power, which is the king. To arrest
this tendency was the last effort that consumed the life of Mirabeau.
The danger that he dreaded was no longer the power of the king, but the
weakness of the king.
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forces were abolished. The country was about to be governed by new
principles, new forms, and new men. All the assistance that order de-
rives from habit and tradition, from local connection and personal credit,
was lost. Society had to pass through a dangerous and chaotic interval,
during which the supreme need was a vigorous administration. That is
the statesmanlike idea which held possession of Mirabeau, and guided
him consistently through the very tortuous and adventurous course of
his last days. He had no jealousy of the Executive. Ministers ought to be
chosen in the Assembly, ought to lead the Assembly, and to be con-
trolled by it; and then there would be no motive to fear them and to
restrict their action. That was an idea not to be learnt from Montesquieu,
and generally repudiated by theorists of the separation of powers. It was
familiar to Mirabeau from his experience of England, where, in 1784,
he had seen the country come to the support of the king against the
parliament. Thence he gathered the conception of a patriot king, of a
king the true delegate and mandatory of the nation, in fact of an incipi-
ent Emperor. If his schemes had come to anything, it is likely that his
democratic monarch might have become as dangerous as any arbitrary
potentate could be, and that his administration would have proved as
great an obstacle to parliamentary government as French administra-
tion has always been since Napoleon. But his purpose at the time was
sincerely politic and legitimate, and he undertook alone the defence of
constitutional principles. During the month of September Mirabeau raised
the question of a parliamentary Ministry, both in the press and in the
Assembly. He prepared a list of eminent men for the several offices,
assigning to himself a seat in the Cabinet without a portfolio. It was a
plan to make him and Talleyrand masters of the Government. The Min-
isters of the day did not trust him, and had no wish to make way for him,
and when, on November 6, he proposed that Ministers be heard in the
National Assembly, the Archbishop of Bordeaux instigated Montlosier
and Lanjuinais to oppose him. Both were men of high character, and
both had some attainments; and in their aversion for him, and for his
evident self-seeking, they carried a motion for- bidding deputies to take
office. By this vote, of November 7, which permanently excluded
Mirabeau from the councils of the king, the executive was deprived of
authority. It is one of the decisive acts of the Constituent Assembly, for
it ruined the constitutional monarchy.
Mirabeau was compelled to rely on a dissolution as the only pros-
pect of better things. He knew that the vote was due as much to his own120/John Acton
bad name as to a deliberate dislike of the English practice. The question
for him now was whether he could accomplish through the Court what
was impossible through the Assembly. He at once drew up a paper,
exhorting the king to place himself at the head of the Revolution, as its
moderator and guide. The Count of Provence refused to submit his plans
to the king, but recommended him for the part of a secret adviser. Just
then an event occurred, which is mysterious to this day, but which had
the effect of bringing Mirabeau into closer relations with the king’s
brother. At Christ- mas, the Marquis de Favras was arrested, and it was
discovered that he was a confidential agent of the Prince, who had em-
ployed him to raise a loan for a purpose that was never divulged  some
said, to carry off the king to a frontier fortress, others suspected a scheme
of counter-revolution. For the electoral law excluded the ignorant and
the indigent from the franchise, limiting the rights of active citizenship
to those who paid a very moderate sum in taxes. It was obvious that this
exclusion, by confining power to property, created the raw material for
Socialism in the future. Some day a dexterous hand might be laid on the
excluded multitude congregated at Paris, to overthrow the government
of the middle class. The Constituent Assembly was in danger of being
overtrumped, and was necessarily suspicious.
By Mirabeau’s advice, the Count of Provence at once made a pub-
lic declaration of sound revolutionary sentiments, and disavowed Favras.
His speech, delivered at the Hôtel de Ville, was well received and he
rose in popular favour. Meantime, his unhappy confederate was tried
for treason against the nation, and found guilty. Favras asked whether,
on a full and explicit confession, his life would be spared. He was told
that nothing could save him. The judge exhorted him to die in silence,
like a brave man. The priest who assisted him afterwards professed that
he had saved the life of the Count of Provence. Favras underwent his
fate with fortitude, keeping his secret to the end. The evidence which
would have compromised the prince was taken away, and no historian
has seen it. The fatal documents were restored to him when he became
king by the daughter of the man who had concealed them.
For some weeks the Count of Provence was ambitious of power,
and allowed Mirabeau to put him forward as a kind of Prime Minister,
or for a position analogous to that of the Cardinal-nephew in seven-
teenth-century Rome. He had ability, caution, and, for the moment, popu-
larity; but he was irresolute, indolent, and vain. If anything could be
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was neither loved nor trusted by the king and queen, and with such a
confederate at his elbow he might become formidable. Necker devised a
plan by which his scheming was easily frustrated. The king appeared
before the Assembly, without preliminaries, and delivered an unexpected
statement of policy, adopting the entire work of the Revolution, as far as
it had gone, and praising in particular the recent division of Provinces
into departments.
Every step, until that day, had been taken reluctantly, feebly, under
compulsion. Every concession had been a defeat and a surrender. On
February 4, under no immediate pressure, Lewis deliberately took the
lead of the movement. It was an act, not of weakness, but of policy, not
a wound received and acquiesced in, but a stroke delivered. The Assem-
bly responded by at once taking the civic oath to maintain the Constitu-
tion. As that instrument did not yet exist, none could say what the dem-
onstration would involve. It was adopted for the sake of committing the
remnant of the privileged orders who yielded under protest.
Mirabeau’s aristocratic brother threw away his sword, saying that
there was nothing else for a gentleman to do, when the king abandoned
his sceptre. Mirabeau himself was indignant with what he called a pan-
tomime; for he said that Ministers had no right to screen their own re-
sponsibility behind the inviolate throne. He saw that his patron was
ingeniously set aside and stranded, and he conceived that his own pro-
found calculations were baffled. Yet the perspicacity that he seldom
wanted failed him at that moment. For the reconciliation of the people
with the king, the executive triumphing in its popularity, guiding the
Revolution to its goal, was the exact reproduction of his proposals, and
was borrowed from his manifestoes.
The significance of this was at once felt by the foreign advisers of
the queen. Mercy Argenteau, who had been Austrian ambassador
throughout the reign, and who was a faithful and intelligent friend, sug-
gested that if they sincerely accepted the policy, they would do well to
take the politician with it, that the Count of Provence could be best
disabled by depriving him of his prompter, that the magic is not in the
wand but in the hand that waves it.
The queen hesitated, for Mirabeau had threatened her in the last
days at Versailles, and it was not yet proved that he was not concerned
in the attempt to murder her. She declared that nothing would induce her
to see him, and she wished for somebody who could undertake to man-
age him, and who would be responsible for his conduct. Mercy, regard-122/John Acton
less of her scruples, sent for La Marck, who was at his Belgian home,
opposing the Emperor, and fostering a Federal republic, and who in
consequence was not in favour with Marie Antoinette. La Marck was
intimate with Mirabeau, and kept him in pocket money. He undertook
the negotiation, with little hope of a profitable result; and at his house
Mercy and Mirabeau had a secret meeting. They parted, well pleased
with each other. Mirabeau advised that the king should leave Paris, and
the advice bore fruit. Mercy did not declare the intentions of the Court,
and Mirabeau continued to act in his own way, treating with Lafayette
for money or an embassy, and attacking the clergy, with whose cause
Lewis was more and more identified. To this interval belongs the fa-
mous scene where he exclaimed that from the place where he stood he
could see the window from which a king of France fired on his Protes-
tant subjects. Maury, not perceiving the snare, bounded from his seat,
and cried out, “Nonsense! it is not visible from here.”
When he made that speech it is clear that Mirabeau was not exert-
ing himself to secure confidence at Court; and for some weeks in spring
the negotiation hung fire. At length, La Marck convinced the queen that
his friend had been falsely accused of the crime of October, and the king
proposed that he should be asked to write down his views. He peremp-
torily rejected La Marck’s advice that the Ministers should be admitted
to the secret. He avowed to Mercy that he intended soon to change them
for men who could co-operate with Mirabeau; but he was resolved not
to place himself at once irrevocably in the power of a man in whom he
had no confidence, and who was only the subject of an experiment.
Consequently, Mirabeau’s first object of attack was the Ministry, and
the king’s forces were divided. The position was a false one from end to
end; but this hostility to Necker served to disguise the reality. On the
10th of May, 1790, he drew up a paper which La Marck carried to the
queen, and which at once had the effect of making the Court zealous to
complete the bargain. La Marck asked Mirabeau what were his condi-
tions. He replied that he would be happy on £1000 a year, if his debts
could be paid; but he feared that they were too heavy for him to expect
it. On inquiry, it turned out that they were a little over £8000. Lewis
XVI offered to clear them off, to give him £3000 a year while the As-
sembly lasted, and a million francs down whenever it came to an end.
In this way both parties were secure. Mirabeau could not play false,
without losing, not only his income, but an eventual sum of £40,000.
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paid to his creditors. The Archbishop of Toulouse undertook the deli-
cate task of dealing with them; and meeting his debtor constantly, a
strange intimacy arose between the two men.
Mirabeau, wild with the joy of his deliverance, forgot all prudence
and precaution. He took a town house and a country house; he bought
books and pictures, carriages and horses, and gave dinner-parties at
which six servants waited on his guests. After a few months he wanted
money, and .more was given without question. The Government pro-
posed at last to buy him an annuity, with one-fourth of the capital which
was to fall due at the dissolution; but the intention was not carried out.
The entire sum that Mirabeau received, up to his death, from the king
amounted to about £12,000. In return, between June 1 and February 16
he wrote fifty-one notes for the Court discussing the events of the day,
and exposing by degrees vast schemes of policy. When they came to be
known, half a century ago, they added immeasurably to his fame, and
there are people who compare his precepts and prescriptions with the
last ten years of Mazarin and the beginning of the Consulate, with the
first six years of Metternich or the first eight of Bismarck, or, on a
different plane, with the early administration of Chatham.
Mirabeau himself was proud of his new position, and relied on this
correspondence to redeem his good name. He was paid to be of his own
opinion. The king had gone over to him; he had changed nothing in his
views to meet the wishes of the king. His purpose throughout had been
the consolidation of representative monarchy on the ruins of absolut-
ism. To the king in league with privilege he was implacably opposed. To
the king divested of that complicity he was a convinced and ardent friend.
The opportunity of proving his faith was supplied by Captain Cook.
In his last voyage the navigator visited the island since named after his
lieutenant Vancouver, and sailed into Nootka Sound, to which, in his
report, he drew the attention of the Government Three or four years
before, the Spaniards had been there, and had taken formal possession;
and the Russians, spreading southward along the coast, acknowledged
their right, and withdrew. But the place was far north of the regions they
actually occupied; and English adventurers, with the sanction of the
Government, settled there, and opened a trade in peltry with China.
After a year or two, the Spaniards came in force, and carried them off,
with their ships and their cargoes; and claiming the entire Pacific sea-
board, from Cape Horn to Alaska, they called on the English Ministers
to punish their intruding countrymen. They also equipped a fleet of forty124/John Acton
sail of the line, assuring the British chargé d’affaire’s that it was only to
protect themselves against the Revolution. Pitt was not lulled by these
assurances, or by the delivery of the confiscated ships. He had authorised
the proceedings of the traders with the intention of resisting the Spanish
claim beyond the limits of effective occupation. He now demanded repa-
ration, and fitted out a fleet superior to that with which Nelson crushed
the combined navies of France and Spain. Under the treaty of 1761
Spain demanded the support of France. If the French armed, as the
Spaniards were arming, there was reason to hope that England, in so
very dubious a question, would listen to terms; and if France refused to
stand by a manifest engagement, Spain would be free to seek new friends.
The Emperor sustained the appeal. It would be well for him if England
was diverted from the concerns of Eastern Europe, and if France was
occupied in the West. The French Ministers admitted their obligation
and began to arm.
On May 14, just after the first negotiation between Mirabeau and
the Court, the matter came before the Assembly. It was a common belief
that war would strengthen the executive. The democratic leaders repu-
diated the Family Compact, and resented an alliance which was not
national but dynastic and of the essence of those things which they were
sweeping away. They sent pacific messages to the British embassy, and
claimed for the representative assembly the right of pronouncing on
peace and war.
Mirabeau, unlike many others, regarded a European war as a dan-
ger to the throne. But he was preparing for civil war, and meant to
secure the army and navy on the royal side. He demanded for the king
the exclusive right of declaring war and making peace. That is the prin-
ciple under a constitution where the deputies make the Ministecs. In
France, Ministers were excluded from parliament and the principle did
not apply. Bamave answered Mirabeau, and defeated him. On May 22,
in the most powerful constitutional argument he ever delivered, Mirabeau
insisted that, if the ultimate decision rested with the Assembly, it could
act only on the proposition of the Crown. In legislation, the king had no
initiative. Mirabeau established the royal initiative in peace and war. It
was the first-fruit of the secret compact. The new ally had proved not
only that he was capable and strong, but that he was faithful For by
asking more than he could obtain he had incurred, for the moment, a
great loss of credit. The excess of his unwonted royalism made him an
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amended version of his first speech; but others printed the two texts in
parallel columns, and exposed the fraud. He had rendered an important
service, and it was done at serious cost to himself. The event cemented
the alliance, and secured his position with the king.
The Assembly voted a solemn declaration, that France would never
make war for conquest, or against freedom. After that, Spain had little
to hope for, and Pitt became defiant. Negotiations lasted till October.
The Assembly appointed a Committee on Foreign Affairs, in which
Mirabeau predominated, casting all his influence on the side of peace,
and earning the gratitude and the gold of England. At last, the mutinous
temper of the Brest fleet settled the question.
The great Bourbon alliance was dissolved, and Pitt owed a signal
triumph to the revolutionary spirit and the moderating influence of
Mirabeau. His defence of the prerogative deserved a reward, and he
was received in a secret audience by Marie Antoinette. The interview
took place at St. Cloud, July 3. The statesman did not trust his new
friends, and he instructed the nephew who drove him, in disguise, to the
back door, to fetch the police if he did not reappear in three-quarters of
an hour. The conversation was satisfactory, and Mirabeau, as he kissed
the queen’s hand, declared with chivalrous fervour that the monarchy
was saved. He spoke sincerely. The comedian and deceiver was not the
wily and unscrupulous intriguer, but the inexperienced daughter of the
Empress-queen. She never believed in his truth. When he continued to
thunder against the Right, the king and queen shook their heads, and
repeated that he was incorrigible. The last decision they came to in his
lifetime was to reject his plans in favour of that which brought them to
Varennes. But as the year wore on, they could not help seeing that the
sophistical free-lance and giver of despised advice was the most prodi-
gious individual force in the world, and that France had never seen his
like. Everybody now perceived it, for his talent and resource increased
rapidly, -since he was steadied by a definite purpose, and a contract he
could never afford to break. The hostile press knew of his visit to St.
Cloud three days after it occurred, and pretended to know for how many
millions he had sold himself. They were too reckless to obtain belief, but
they were very near the truth; and the secret of his correspondence was
known or guessed by at least twenty persons.
With this sword hanging over him, with this rope round his neck, in
the autumn and winter of 1790, Mirabeau rose to an ascendancy in
which he outweighed all parties. He began his notes by an attempt to126/John Acton
undermine the two men who stood in his way. Lafayette was too strong
for him. On the first anniversary of the Bastille he received an ovation.
Forty thousand National Guards assembled from all parts of France for
the feast of Federation. At an altar erected in the Champ de Mars,
Talleyrand celebrated his last Mass, and France sanctioned the doings
of Paris. The king was present, but all the demonstration was for the
hero of two hemispheres, on his white charger. In November a new
Ministry took office, composed of his partisans. Mirabeau attempted a
coalition, but Lafayette did not feel the need of his friendship. He said,
“I have resisted the king of England in his power, the king of France in
his authority, the people in its rage; I am not going to yield to Mirabeau.”
Necker was less tenacious of office, and rather than consent to an
increased issue of assignats, resigned, much to his honour, and retired
obscurely. Mirabeau triumphed. He had opposed the assignats at first,
although Clavière defended them in his newspaper. He now changed his
attitude. He not only affirmed that the Church lands would be adequate
security for paper, making it equivalent to gold, but he was willing that
the purchase money should be paid in assignats, doing away with bul-
lion altogether. But the cloven hoof appeared when he assured the king
that the plan which he defended would fail, and would involve France in
ruin. He meant that it would ruin the Assembly, and would enable the
king to dissolve. The same Machiavellian purpose guided him in Church
questions. He was at heart a Liberal in matters of conscience, and thought
toleration too weak a term for the rights inseparable from religion. But
he wished the constitutional oath to be im- posed with rigour, and that
the priests should be encouraged to refuse it. He declined to give a pledge
that the Assembly would not interfere with doctrine, and he prepared to
raise the questions of celibacy and of divorce in order to aggravate the
irritation. He proposed to restore authority by civil war; and the road to
civil war was bankruptcy and persecution. Meantime, the court of in-
quiry vindicated him from aspersions connected with the attack on
Versailles ; as chairman of the Diplomatic Committee, he was the arbi-
ter of foreign policy; Necker and all his colleagues save one had gone
down before him; he was elected President of the Jacobins in November,
and when he asked for leave of absence, the Assembly, on the motion of
Barnave, requested him not to absent himself. Montmorin, the only
member of Necker’s Ministry who remained at his post, made overtures
to him, and they came to an understanding. The most remarkable of all
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agreed on a plan of united action. Mirabeau thereupon drew up the 47th
note, which is a treatise of constitutional management and intrigue, and
discloses his designs in their last phase but one, at Christmas 1790.
Mirabeau never swerved from the fundamental convictions of 1789,
and he would have become a republican if Lewis had gone over to the
reactionary émigrés. But he wished him to retire to some provincial
town, that he might not be in the power of the Assembly, and might be
able to disperse it, backed by the growing anger of the country. Mean-
time, opinion was to be worked and roused by every device. He set
himself strenuously to form a central party out of the various groups of
deputies. Montmorin was in friendly touch with some of them, and he
had the command of money. Mirabeau laboured to gain over others.
Late one night he had a long conference with Malouet, whom he dazzled,
and who influenced a certain number of votes.
On the other hand, the action of Montmorin extended to Barnave. It
seemed reasonable to suppose that a combination which reached from
Barnave on the Left to Malouet on the Right would be strong enough
either to retrieve its errors, or to break it up, in conjunction with the
Court.
At the end of January, 1791, Mirabeau became President for the
first time, and he occupied the chair with unforeseen dignity and distinc-
tion. He had attained the summit of his career. Just then, the king’s aunts
announced their departure for Rome. There was much discontent, be-
cause, if they could be detained, it would be more easy to keep the king
at Paris. Mirabeau made the Assembly feel that interference with the
princesses would be contemptible. Twice they were stopped on their
way, and twice released. Everybody saw what this implied, and Paris
was agitated. A tumult broke out in the Tuileries garden, which Mirabeau,
summoned from table, at once appeased. He was confident in his strength,
and when the Assembly discussed measures against emigration, he swore
that he would never obey a body guilty of inquisitorial dictation. He
quelled the murmurs of the Left by exclaiming, “Silence aux trente voix!”
This was the date of his breach with the Democrats. It was February 28,
and he was to dine with the Duke d’Aiguillon. When he came, the door
was shut in his face. By La Marck’s advice, he went that night to the
Jacobins, hoping to detach the club from the leaders. But he had shown
his hand, and his enemies knew how to employ their opportunity. Duport
and Lameth attacked him with extreme violence, aiming at his expul-
sion. The discussion is not reported. But three of those who were present128/John Acton
agree that Mirabeau seemed to be disconcerted and appalled by the
strength of the case against him, and sat with the perspiration streaming
down his face. His reply was, as usual, an oratorical success; but he did
not carry his audience with him, and he went home disheartened. The
Jacobin array stood unbroken.
On March 4, Lord Gower wrote that the governing power was pass-
ing to Mirabeau. But on the same day he himself avowed to La Marck
that he had miscalculated, and was losing courage. On the 25th there
was a debate on the Regency, in which he spoke with caution, and dis-
sembled. That day the ambassador again wrote that Mirabeau had shown
that he alone was fit for power. Then the end came. Tissot, meeting him
soon after the scene at the Jacobins, thought that he looked like a dying
man. He was sinking under excess of work combined with excess of
dissipation. When he remonstrated with his brother for getting drunk,
the other replied, “Why grudge me the only vice you have not appropri-
ated?” It was remembered afterwards, when suspicion arose, that he
had several attacks of illness during that month of March. On the 26th
he was brought in to Paris from his villa in an alarming condition. La
Marck’s interests were concerned in a debate on mineral property which
was fixed for the following day. Fortified with a good deal of Tokay,
Mirabeau spoke repeatedly. It was the last time. He came back to his
friend and said, “Your cause is won, but I am lost.” When his danger
became known, it seemed that nothing had occurred to diminish public
confidence, or tarnish the lustre of his fame. The crowd that gathered in
the street made it almost impossible to approach his door. He was grati-
fied to know that Barnave had called, and liked to hear how much feel-
ing was shown by the people of Paris. After a consultation, which was
held on April 1, he made up his mind to die, and signed his will. Talleyrand
paid him a long visit, and took away a discourse on the law of Inherit-
ance, which he read in the Assembly before the remains of his friend
were cold, but which did not deserve the honour, being, like about thirty
of his speeches, the work of a stranger. The presence of Talleyrand, with
whom he had quarrelled, was welcome to Mirabeau, who, though not a
believer, did not wish it to be thought that he had rejected the consola-
tions of religion. The parish priest came, but, being told of the prelate’s
presence, went away; and a report spread that the dying sinner had re-
ceived the ministrations of a more spiritual ecclesiastic than the Bishop
of Autun.
Mirabeau never knew how little the royal personages whom he servedLectures on the French Revolution/129
esteemed his counsels; and he died believing that he alone could have
saved the monarchy, and that it would perish with him. If he had lived,
he said that he would have given Pitt trouble, for there was a change in
his foreign policy. On January 28 he still spoke of the eternal fraternity
of England; but in March he was ready to call out the fleet, in the inter-
est of Russia, and was only prevented by the attack of which he died.
Whether he supported England against Spain, or Russia against En-
gland, his support was paid for in gold. To his confederates, his illness
was a season of terror. If an enemy disguised as a creditor caused seals
to be set upon his papers, a discovery must have ensued that would ruin
many reputations and imperil many lives. He clung to the secret docu-
ments on which he intended that his fame should rest. On the day of his
death, when they were deposited with La Marck, the secretary who had
transcribed them stabbed himself. On the morning of Saturday, April 2,
there was no hope, and Mirabeau asked for opium. He died before the
prescription was made up. Several doctors who made the post-mortem
examination believed that there were marks of poison; but when they
were warned that they would be torn to pieces, and the king also, they
held their peace.
Odious as he was, and foredoomed to fail, he was yet the supreme
figure of the time. Tocqueville, who wrote the best book, or one of the
two best books, on the subject, looking to the permanent result, de-
scribes the Revolution as having continued and completed the work of
the monarchy by intensifying the unity of power. It is more true to say
that the original and essential spirit of the movement was
decentralisation—to take away from the executive government, and to
give to local authorities. The executive could not govern, because it was
obliged to transmit orders to agents not its own, whom it neither ap-
pointed nor dismissed nor controlled. The king was deprived of admin-
istrative power, as he had been deprived of legislative power. That dis-
trust, reasonable in the old régime, ought to have ceased, when the Min-
isters appointed by the king were deputies presented by the Assembly.
That was the idea by which Mirabeau would have preserved the Revo-
lution from degenerating through excess of decentralisation into tyr-
anny. As a Minister, he might have saved the Constitution. It is not to
the discredit of the Assembly that the horror which his life inspired
made his genius inefficient, and that their labours failed because they
deemed him too bad for power.
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of political conduct on which men may be expected to agree, the verdict
cannot be doubtful. His ultimate policy was one vast intrigue, and he
avowedly strove to do evil that good might come. The thing is hardly
less infamous in the founder of the Left Centre than in Maury and his
unscrupulous colleagues of the Right. There was at no time a prospect
of success, for he never had the king or the queen for one moment with
him.
The answer is different if we try him by a purely political test, and
ask whether he desired power for the whole or freedom for the parts.
Mirabeau was not only a friend of freedom, which is a term to be de-
fined, but a friend of federalism, which both Montesquieu and Rousseau
regarded as the condition of freedom. When he spoke confidentially, he
said that there was no other way in which a great country like France
could be free. If in this he was sincere, and I believe that he was sincere,
he deserves the great place he holds in the memory of his countrymen.XI: SIEYÈS AND THE CONSTITUTION CIVILE
Before coming to the conflict between Church and State, with which the
legislation of 1790 closes, I must speak of a man memorable far beyond
Mirabeau in the history of political thought and political action, who is
the most perfect representative of the Revolution. I mean the Abbé Sieyès.
As a priest without a vocation, he employed himself with secular stud-
ies, and mastered and meditated the French and the English writers of
the age, politicians, economists, and philosophers. Learning from many,
he became the disciple of none, and was thoroughly independent, look-
ing beyond the horizon of his century, and farther than his own favourites,
Rousseau, Adam Smith, and Turgot. He understood politics as the sci-
ence of the State as it ought to be, and he repudiated the product of
history, which is things as they are. No American ever grasped more
firmly the principle that experience is an incompetent teacher of the
governing art. He turned resolutely from the Past, and refused to be
bound by the precepts of men who believed in slavery and sorcery, in
torture and persecution. He deemed history a misleading and useless
study, and knew little of its examples and its warnings. But he was sure
that the Future must be different, and might be better. In the same dis-
dainful spirit he rejected Religion as the accumulated legacy of child-
hood, and believed that it arrested progress by depreciating terrestrial
objects. Nevertheless he had the confidence of Lubersac, Bishop of
Tréguier, and afterwards of Chartres, who recommended him to the clergy
of Montfort as their deputy.
Sieyès preferred to stand for the Third Estate at Paris, where he was
elected last of all the candidates. One of his preliminary tracts circu-
lated in 30,000 copies, and had promptly made him famous, for it was
as rich in consequences as the ninety-five theses of Wittenberg. His phi-
losophy of history consisted in one idea. Barbarians had come down
from Germany on the people of civilised and imperial Gaul, and had
subjugated and robbed them: and the descendants of the invading race
were now the feudal nobles, who still held power and profit, and contin-
ued to oppress the natives. This identification of privileged noble with
conquering Frank was of older date; and in this century it has been
made the master-key to modern history. When Thierry discovered the
secret of our national development in the remarks of Wamba the Witless
to Gurth, under the Sherwood oaks, he applied to us a formula familiar
to his countrymen; and Guizot always defined French history as a per-132/John Acton
petual struggle between hostile nations until the eighteenth century made
good the wrong that was done in the fifth.
Right or wrong, the theory of Sieyès was adopted by his most learned
successors, and must not be imputed to ignorance. His argument is that
the real nation consisted of the mass of men enjoying no privilege, and
that they had a claim for compensation and reprisal against those who
had been privileged to oppress and to despoil them. The Third Estate
was equal to the three Estates together, for the others had no right to be
re- presented. As power exercised otherwise than by consent, power
that does not emanate from those for whose use it exists, is a usurpa-
tion, the two first orders must be regarded as wrongdoers. They ought
to be repressed, and the means of doing harm taken from them.
Although Sieyès neither wrote well nor spoke well, yet within a
fortnight of his maiden speech he had vanquished the ancient order of
things in France. The Court, the Church and the Noblesse had gone
down before the imposing coherence of his ideas. He soon lost confi-
dence in the Assembly, as it fell under the control of intruding forces,
and he drew back into an attitude of reserve and distrust. Many of his
measures were adopted, but he deemed that they were spoilt in the pro-
cess, and that men who sought popular applause were averse from in-
struction.
Sieyès was essentially a revolutionist, because he held that political
oppression can never be right, and that resistance to oppression can
never be wrong. And he was a royalist, not as believing in the propri-
etary right of dynasties, but because monarchy, justly limited and con-
trolled, is one of many forces that secure the liberty which is given by
society and not by nature. He was a Liberal, for he thought liberty the
end of government, and defined it as that which makes men most com-
pletely masters of their faculties, in the largest sphere of in- dependent
action. He was also a democrat, for he would revise the constitution
once in a generation; and he described the law as the settled will of those
who are governed, which those who govern have no share in making.
But he was less a democrat than a Liberal, and he contrived scientific
provision against the errors of the sovereign nation. He sacrificed equality
by refusing the vote to those who paid no taxes, and he preferred an
elaborate system of indirect and filtered election. He broke the direct
tide of opinion by successive renewals, avoiding dissolution. According
to his doctrine, the genuine national will proceeds from debate, not from
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coarse and obvious arithmetic. The object is to learn not what the coun-
try thinks, but what it would think if it was present at the discussion
carried on by men whom it trusted. Therefore there is no im- perative
mandate, and the deputy governs the constituent. He mitigated democ-
racy by another remarkable device. The Americans have made the guard-
ians of the law into watchers on the lawgiver, giving to the judiciary
power to preserve the Constitution against the legislature. Sieyès in-
vented a special body of men for the purpose, calling them the constitu-
tional jury, and including not judges, for he suspected those who had
administered the ancient law of France, but the élite of veteran politi-
cians.
Thus, although all power emanates from the nation alone, and very
little can be delegated to an hereditary and irresponsible monarch, he
intended to restrict its exercise at every point, and to make sure that it
would never be hasty, or violent, and that minorities should be heard. In
his sustained power of consistent thinking, Sieyès resembles Bentham
and Hegel. His flight is low, and he lacks grace and distinction. He
seems to have borrowed his departments from Harrington, the distilled
unity of power from Turgot, the rule of the mass of taxpayers over the
unproductive class above them, from the notion that labour is the only
source of wealth, which was common to Franklin and Adam Smith. But
he is profoundly original, and though many modern writers on politics
exceed him in genius and eloquence and knowledge, none equal him in
invention and resource. When he was out of public life, during the Leg-
islative Assembly, he acted as adviser to the Girondins. There- fore he
became odious to Robespierre who, after the fall of Danton, turned
against him, and required Barère to see what he could be charged with.
For, he said, Sieyès has more to answer for as an enemy to freedom than
any who have fallen beneath the law.
The Abbé’s nerves never quite recovered from the impressions of
that time. When he fell ill, forty years later, and became feverish, he sent
down to tell the porter that he was not at home, if Robespierre should
call. He offered some ideas for the Constitution of 1795, which found
no support. He patiently waited till his time came, and refused a seat on
the Directory. In 1799, when things were at the worst, he came back
from the embassy at Berlin, took the command, and rendered eminent
service. He had no desire for power. “What I want,” he said, “is a sword.”
For a moment he had thought of the Duke of Brunswick and the Arch-
duke Charles; at last he fixed on Joubert, and sent him to fight Suworow134/John Acton
in Italy. If he had come home crowned with victory, the remnant of the
National Assembly was to have been convoked, to place the daughter of
Lewis on her father’s throne.
At Novi, in the first action, Joubert fell, and Moreau commanded
the retreat. Sieyès now applied to him. Moreau was not yet the victor of
Hohenlinden. His ascendancy was doubtful, and he hesitated. They were
conferring together when news came that Bonaparte had escaped from
Egypt, and would soon be at Paris. Sieyès exclaimed, rather impudently,
“Then France is saved!” Moreau retorted, “I am not wanted. That is the
man for you.” At first Bonaparte was reserved, and took so much time
to feel his way that Sieyès, who was the head of the government, called
him an insolent fellow who deserved to be shot. Talleyrand brought
them together, and they soon came to an understanding. The conspiracy
of Brumaire would have failed at the deciding moment but for the Abbé.
For Bonaparte, when threatened with outlawry, lost his head, and Sieyès
quietly told him to drive out the hostile deputies. Thereupon the soldier,
obeying the man of peace, drew his sword and expelled them.
Everybody now turned to the great legislator of 1789 for the Con-
stitution of the hour. With incomparable opportunities for observation,
he had maturely revolved schemes for the government of France on the
lines of that which was rejected in 1795. He refused to write any- thing;
but he consented to dictate, and his words were taken down by Boulay
de la Meurthe, and were published long after, in a volume of which there
is no copy at Paris or in London.
What I have just said will give you a more favourable view of Sieyès
than you may find in books. The Abbe was not a high-minded man, and
he has no friends in his own country. Some dislike him because he was
a priest, some because he was an unfrocked priest. He is odious to roy-
alists as a revolutionist, and to republicans as a renegade. I have spoken
of him as a political thinker, not as a writer, an orator, or an administra-
tor. Mr. Wentworth Dilke and Mr. Buckle1 have pointed out something
more than specks in the character of Burke. Even if much of what they
say is true, I should not hesitate to acknowledge him as the first political
intellect of his age. Since I first spoke of Sieyès, certain papers have
come to light tending to show that he was as wicked as the rest of them.
They would not affect my judgment on his merit as a thinker.
In this oracular manner the Constitution of 1799 came into exist-
ence, and it was not his fault that it degenerated in the strong hands of
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he passed into ceremonious obscurity as president of the Senate.
When the Emperor had quarrelled with his ablest advisers he re-
gretted that he had renounced the aid of such an auxiliary. He thought
him unfit to govern, for that requires sword and spurs; but he admitted
that Sieyès often had new and luminous ideas, and might have been
useful to him beyond all the ministers of the Empire. Talleyrand, who
disliked Sieyès, and ungenerously reproached him with cupidity, spoke
of him to Lord Brougham as the one statesman of the time. The best of
the political legacy of the Revolution has been his work. Others pulled
down, but he was a builder, and he closed in 1799 the era which he had
opened ten years before. In the history of political doctrine, where al-
most every chapter has yet to be written, none will be more valuable
than the one that will show what is permanent and progressive in the
ideas that he originated.
It was the function of the constituent Assembly to recast the laws in
conformity with the Rights of Man, to abolish every survival of absolut-
ism, every heirloom of inorganic tradition, that was inconsistent with
them. In every department of State they were obliged to make ruins, to
remove them, and to raise a new structure from the foundation. The
transition from the reign of force to the reign of opinion, from custom to
principle, led to a new order through confusion, uncertainty, and sus-
pense. The efficacy of the coming system was nowhere felt at first. The
soldiers, who were so soon to form the finest army ever known, ran
away as soon as they saw a shot fired. The prosperous finances of mod-
ern France began with bankruptcy. But in one division of public life the
Revolution not only made a bad beginning, but went on, step by step, to
a bad end, until, by civil war and anarchy and tyranny, it had ruined its
cause. The majority of the clergy were true to the new ideas, and on
some decisive occasions, June 19 and August 4, promoted their victory.
Many prelates were enlightened reformers, and even Robespierre be-
lieved that the inferior clergy were, in the bulk, democratic. Neverthe-
less the Assembly, by a series of hostile measures, carefully studied,
and long pursued, turned them into implacable enemies, and thereby
made the Revolution odious to a large part of the French people.
This gradual but determined change of front, improbable at first,
and evidently impolitic, is the true cause of the disastrous conflict in
which the movement of 1789 came to ruin. Had there been no ecclesias-
tical establishment to deal with, it may be that the development of Jacobin
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was, they were secondary causes of the catastrophe that was to follow.
That there was a fund of active animosity for the church, in a generation
tutored by Voltaire, Diderot, Helvétius, Holbach, Rousseau and Raynal,
none could doubt. But in the men of more immediate influence, such as
Turgot, Mirabeau and Sieyès, contempt was more visible than resent-
ment; and it was by slow degrees that the full force of aversion predomi-
nated over liberal feeling and tolerant profession. But if the liberal ten-
dency had been stronger, and tolerant convictions more distinct, there
were many reasons which made a collision inevitable between the Church
and the prevailing ideas. The Gallican Church had been closely associ-
ated with the entire order of things which the Assembly, at all costs, was
resolved to destroy. For three centuries from the time when they became
absolute the French kings had enjoyed all the higher patronage. No such
prerogative could be left to the Crown when it became constitutional,
and it was apparent that new methods for the appointment of priest and
prelate, that a penetrating change in the system of ecclesiastical law,
would be devised.
Two things, chiefly, made the memory of monarchy odious: dynas-
tic war and religious persecution. But the wars had ended in the con-
quest of Alsace, and in the establishment of French kings in Spain and
Naples. The odium of persecution remained; and if it was not always
assignable to the influence of the clergy, it was largely due to them, and
they had attempted to renew it down to the eve of the Revolution. The
reduction of the royal power was sure to modify seriously the position
of men upon whom the royal power, in its excess, had so much relied,
and who had done so much to raise up and to sustain it. People had
come to believe that the cause of liberty demanded, not the emancipa-
tion, but the repression of the priesthood. These were underlying mo-
tives; but the signal was given by financial interests. The clergy, being a
privileged order, like the nobles, were involved in the same fate. With
the nobles, at the same night sitting of August 4, they surrendered the
right of taxing, and of not being taxed.
When the principle of exemption was rejected, the economists com-
puted that the clergy owed 100 millions of arrears. Their tithes were
abolished, with a promise of redemption. But this the landowners would
not suffer, and they gained largely by the transaction. It followed that
the clergy, instead of a powerful and wealthy order, had to become sala-
ried functionaries. Their income was made a charge on the State; and as
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priest to his parishioners were gratuitous. It was not intended that the
priests should be losers, and the bargain was a bad one for the public. It
involved an expenditure of at least two millions a year, at a time when
means were wanting to pay the national creditor. The consequences were
obvious. The State, having undertaken to remunerate the inferior clergy
out of a falling revenue, had a powerful motive to appropriate what
remained of the Church property when the tithes were lost. That re-
source was abundant for the purpose. But it was concentrated in the
hands of the higher clergy and of religious orders  both under the ban of
opinion, as nobles or as corporations. Their wealth would clear off the
debts of the clergy, would pay all their salaries and annuities, and would
strengthen the public credit After the first spoliation, in the month of
August, these consequences became clear to all, and the secularisation
of Church property was a foregone conclusion.
On October 10 Talleyrand moved that it be appropriated by the
State. He computed that after ample endowment of the clergy, there
would be a present and increasing surplus of £2,000,000 a year. It was
difficult for the clergy to resist the motion, after the agreement of Au-
gust, that the State should make provision for them. The Archbishop of
Paris had surrendered the tithe to be disposed of by the nation; and he
afterwards added the gold and silver vessels and ornaments, to the value
of several millions. Béthizy, Bishop of Usez, had declared the Church
property a gift of the nation, which the nation alone could recall. Maury,
loosely arguing, admitted that property is the product of law; from which
it followed that it was subject to modification by law. It was urged in
reply that corporate property is created by law, but not private, as the
individual has his rights from nature. The clergy complained that the
concessions of August were applied to their destruction in November,
but they suffered by their change of front. Boisgelin, Archbishop of
Aix, proposed a practical and statesmanlike arrangement. As the credit
of the Church stood better than the credit of the State, he offered to
advance £16,000,000 as a loan to the Government on the security of
Church property, which it would thus become impossible for the As-
sembly to tamper with. The State would be rescued from its present
difficulties; the Church would secure the enjoy ment of its wealth for the
future.
By restoring the finances, and the authority of government, it was
believed that this plan would ensure the success of the Revolution, and
would prevent the collapse that was already threatening. Necker, for a138/John Acton
moment, was fascinated. But his wife reminded him that this compact
would establish Catholicism for ever as the State Church. in France,
and he broke off the conference. Talleyrand’s motion was altered and
reproduced in a mitigated form; and on November 26, 1789, 568 votes
to 346 decided that the possessions of the clergy were at the disposal of
the nation. On December 1 it was resolved that the sum of 16 millions
should be raised by the sale of the new national property, to be the basis
for an issue of paper money. That was the beginning of the assignats
that rendered signal service at first, and fell rapidly after two years. It
was made apparent that more was at work below the surface than the
financial purpose. There was the desire to break up a powerful
organisation, to disarm the aristocratic episcopate, and to bind the indi-
vidual priest to the Revolution. Therefore Malouet made no impression
when he urged that they were taking on themselves the maintenance not
only of the priesthood, but of the poor; and that no surplus would be
available as long as there was a Frenchman starving.
In August, 1789, a committee on Church questions had been ap-
pointed, and in February, as it did not agree, its numbers were increased,
and the minority was swamped. Thereupon they reported against the
religious orders. Monasticism for some time had been declining, and the
monks fell, in a few years, from 26,000 to 17,000. Nine religious orders
disappeared in the course of twelve years. On February 13, 1790, the
principle that the civil law supported the rule against the monk was
abandoned. Members of monastic orders were to depart freely if they
liked, and to remain if they liked. Those who elected to leave were to
receive a pension. The position of those who remained was regulated in
a series of decrees, adverse to the system, but favourable to the inmate.
It was not until after the fall of the throne that all monastic orders were
dissolved, and all their buildings were seized.
When the property of the Church became the property of the State,
the committee drew up a scheme of distribution. They called it the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy, meaning the regulation of relations between
Church and State under the new Constitution.
The debate began on May 29, and the final vote was taken on July
12. The first object was to save money. The bishops were rich, they
were numerous, and they were not popular. Those among them who had
been chosen by the Church itself for its supreme reward, the Cardinal’s
hat—Rohan, Loménie de Brienne, Bernis, Montmorency and
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mittee proposed to economise, reducing the number by fifty, and their
income to a thousand a year. Each of the departments, just created, was
to become a diocese. There were no archbishops. This was not economy,
but theory. By putting all bishops on the same level, they lowered the
papacy. For the Jansenists influenced the Assembly, and the Jansenists
had, for a century, borne persecution, and had learnt to look with aver-
sion both on papacy and prelacy, under which they had suffered, and
they had grown less averse to presbyterianism. As they took away the
patronage from the king, and did not transfer it to the Pope who was a
more absolute sovereign than the king, and besides was a foreigner, they
met the difficulty by the principle of election, which had been upheld by
high authorities, and had played a great part in earlier times. The bishop
was to he chosen by the departmental electors, the parish priest by the
district electors; and this was to be done in the Church after Mass. It
was assumed, but not ordained, that electors of other denominations
would thereby be excluded. But at Strasburg a bishop was elected by a
Protestant majority. In conformity with the opinion of Bossuet, the right
of institution was taken away from Rome.
It was the office of the king to negotiate with the Pope, and he might
have saved the Revolution, the limited monarchy, and his own life, if he
had negotiated wisely. The new dioceses, the new revenues, were after-
wards accepted. The denial of papal institution was in the spirit of
Gallicanism; and the principle of election had a great tradition in its
favour, and needed safeguards. Several bishops favoured conciliation,
and wished the measure to be discussed in a National Council. Others
exhorted the Pope to make no concession. Lewis barely requested him
to yield something; and when it became clear that Rome wished to gain
time, on August 24 he gave his sanction. At the same time he resolved
on flight, relying on provincial discontent and clerical agitation to re-
store his throne.
On November 27 the Assembly determined to enforce acceptance
of the Civil Constitution. Every ecclesiastic holding preferment or exer-
cising public functions was required to take an oath of fidelity to the
Constitution of France, sanctioned by the king. The terms implicitly
included the measure regarding the Church, which was now part of the
Constitution, and which a large majority of the bishops had rejected, but
Rome had not. Letters had come from Rome which were suppressed;
and after the decree of November and its sanction by the king on De-
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On the 4th of January 1791 the ecclesiastical deputies were sum-
moned to take the prescribed oath. No conditions or limitations were
allowed, Mirabeau specially urging rigour, in the hope of reaction. When
the Assembly refused to make a formal declaration that it meant no
interference with the exclusive domain of religion, the great majority of
clerical deputies declined the oath. About sixty took it unconditionally,
and the proportion out of doors was nearly the same. In forty-five de-
partments we know that there were 13,426 conforming clergy. It would
follow that there were about 23,000 in the whole of France, or about
one-third of the whole, and not enough for the service of all the churches.
The question now was whether the Church of France was to be an epis-
copal or a presbyterian Church. Four bishops took the prescribed oath;
but only one of them continued to act as the bishop of one of the new
sees. Talleyrand refused his election at Paris, and laid down his mitre
and the ecclesiastical habit. Before retiring, he consecrated two consti-
tutional bishops, and instituted Gobel at Paris. He said, afterwards, that
but for him the French constitutional Church would have become
presbyterian, and consequently democratic, and hostile to the monar-
chy.
Nobody could be more violently opposed to royalism than some of
the elected prelates, such as Fauchet, Bishop of Calvados, who acted
with the Girondins and perished with them, or Grégoire, the Bishop of
Blois. Grégoire was the most conspicuous, and is still the best known of
the constitutional clergy. He was a man of serious con- victions, and as
much sincerity as is compatible with violence. With much general infor-
mation, he was an inaccurate writer, and in spite of the courage which
he manifested throughout the Reign of Terror, an unimpressive speaker.
He held fast to the doctrines of an elementary liberalism, and after the
fall of the Terrorists he was active in the restoration of religion and the
establishment of toleration. He was absent on a mission, and did not
vote for the death of the king; but he expressed his approval, and
dishonoured his later years by dissembling and denying it. Gobel, the
Bishop of Paris, Was far inferior to Grégoire. Hoping to save his life, he
renounced his office under the Convention, after having offered his re-
tractation to the Pope for £12,000. For a time it was believed that the
clergy of the two churches could co-exist amicably, and a moderate
pension was granted to the nonjurors. But there was disorder and blood-
shed at Nîmes, and in other parts of France, and it was seen that the
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the machinery for civil war. The non-juring clergy came to be regarded
as traitors and rebels, and the mob would not suffer them to celebrate
mass in the only church that remained to them at Paris. Bailly said that
when the law has spoken conscience must be silent. But Talleyrand and
Sieyès insisted on the principle of toleration, and succeeded in causing
the formula to be adopted by the Assembly. It was not observed, and
was entirely disregarded by the second legislature.
The Civil Constitution injured the Revolution not only by creating a
strong current of hostile feeling in the country, but by driving the king to
seek protection from Europe against his people. The scheme of negotia-
tion which led to the general war in 1792, having been delayed by dis-
union among the powers and the extreme caution of the Emperor Leopold,
began in the midst of the religious crisis in the autumn of 1790. The
problem for us is to discover why the National Assembly, and the com-
mittee that guided it, did not recognise that its laws were making a breach
in the established system of the Church, whether Gallican or Roman,
that they were in flagrant contradiction with the first principles of the
Revolution; and why, in that immense explosion of liberal sentiment,
there was no room for religious freedom. They believed that there was
nothing in the scheme to which the Pope would not be able to consent, to
avoid greater evils, if the diplomacy of the king was conducted wisely.
What was conceded by Pius VII to Bonaparte might have been con-
ceded by Pius VI to Lewis XVI. The judgment of Italian divines was in
many instances favourable to the decree of the National Assembly, and
the College of Cardinals was not unanimous against it. Their opinions
found their way to Paris, and were bought up by Roman agents. When
the Concordat of 1801 was concluded, Consalvi rejoiced that he had
done so well, for he was empowered, if necessary, to make still greater
concessions. The revolutionary canonists were persuaded that the Pope,
if he rejected the king’s overtures, would be acting as the instrument of
the aristocratic party, and would be governed by calculated advantage,
not by conscience. Chénier’s tragedy of Charles IX was being played,
and revived the worst scenes of fanatical intolerance. The hatred it roused
was not allayed by the language of Pius VI. in the spring of 1791, when,
too late to influence events, he condemned the Civil Constitution. For he
condemned liberty and toleration; and the revolutionists were able to
say that there could be no peace between them, and that Rome was the
irreconcilable adversary of the first principles on which they stood. The
annexation of the papal dominions in France was proposed, in May142/John Acton
1791, when the rejection of the Civil Constitution became known. It
was thrown out at first, and adopted September 14. We shall see, later
on, that the conflict thus instituted between the Revolution and the Church
hastened the fall of the throne, and persecution, and civil war.
I have repeatedly pointed to the jealousy of the executive as a source
of fatal mischief. This is the greatest instance of the harm it did. That
the patronage could not be left in the hands of the king absolutely, as it
was by the Concordat of Leo X, was obvious; but if it had been given to
the king acting through responsible ministers, then much of the diffi-
culty and the danger would have been overcome, and the arrangement
that grew out of the Concordat of Napoleon would have been antici-
pated. That idea was consistently rejected, and, stranger still, the idea of
disestablishment and separation was almost unperceived. A whole gen-
eration later, under the influence of American and Irish examples, a
school of Liberals arose among French Catholics who were as distinct
from the Gallicans as from the Ultramontanes, and possessed the solu-
tion for the perpetual rivalry of Church and State. For us, the great fact
is that the Revolution produced nothing of the sort, and went to ruin by
its failure in dealing with the problem.XII: THE FLIGHT TO VARENNES
The direct consequence of the ecclesiastical laws was the flight of the
king. From the time of his removal to Paris, in October 1789, men be-
gan to study the means by which he might be rescued, and his ministers
were ready with the necessary passports. During the summer of 1790,
which he spent at St Cloud, various plans were proposed, and con-
stantly rejected. The queen was opposed to them, for she said: “What
can the king do, away from Paris, without insight, or spirit, or ascen-
dancy? Say no more about it” But a change came over them on August
24, when the Civil Constitution was sanctioned. As soon as it was voted
in July, Mirabeau informed Lewis that he undertook to convey him,
publicly, to Rouen, or Beauvais, or Compiègne, where he would be out
of reach, and could dissolve the Assembly and proclaim a better system
of constitutional laws. Civil war would inevitably follow; but Mirabeau
believed that civil war would lead to the restoration of authority, if the
king put himself in the hands of the Marquis de Bouillé, the general
commanding at Metz. Bouillé had acquired a high reputation by his
success against the English in the West Indies, and he increased it at this
moment by the energy with which he suppressed a mutiny in the garri-
son of Nancy. For the service thereby rendered to the State and the
cause of order, he received, under pressure from Mirabeau, the thanks
of the Assembly. The king begged him to nurse his popularity as he was
reserved for greater things. This is the first intimation of the secret; and
it is confirmed by the Princess Elizabeth, within a week of the sanction
given to the Civil Constitution. But although, in that month of Septem-
ber, Lewis began to meditate departure from Paris, and accepted the
general proposed to him, he did not adopt the rest of the scheme which
would have made him dependent on Mirabeau. At that moment his stron-
gest motive was the desire to be released from the religious entangle-
ment; and he hoped to restore the Church to its lost position on condi-
tion of buying up the assignats with the property of the suppressed or-
ders. It had been computed that the Church would be able to save the
public credit by a sacrifice of forty millions, or to ruin the revolutionary
investor by refusing it. Therefore the king would not entertain the pro-
posals of Mirabeau, who was not the man to execute a policy favourable
to the influence of the priesthood. It was committed to a different politi-
cian.
Breteuil, the rival of Necker, was the man preferred to Mirabeau.144/John Acton
He was living at Soleure as the acknow- ledged head of the Royalists
who served the king, and who declined to follow the princes and the
émigrés and their chief intriguer Calonne. Breteuil was now consulted.
He advised the king to depart in secret and to take refuge in a frontier
fortress among faithful regiments, within reach of Austrian supports. In
this way Breteuil, not Mirabeau, would be master, and the restoration
would have been in favour of the old régime, not of the con- stitutional
monarchy. On one point only the two advisers agreed: Breteuil, like
Mirabeau, recommended Bouillé as the man of action. His reply was
brought by the Bishop of Pamiers, an eighteenth-century prelate of the
worldly sort, who was afterwards selected to be the minister of finance
if Brunswick had conquered. On October 23 the bishop was sent to
Metz to initiate Bouillé..
In point both of talent and renown, Bouillé was the first man in the
army as the emigration had left it. He served reluctantly under the new
order, and thought of making himself a new career in Russia. But he
was ambitious, for he had been always successful, and the emissary
from the king and from Breteuil opened a tempting future. He proposed
three alternatives. The king was to choose between Valenciennes, which
would be the safest and swiftest journey; Besançon, within reach. of the
friendly Swiss who were under agreement to supply a large force on
demand; and Montmédy, a small fortified town close to the frontier, and
not far from Luxemburg which was the strongest of the imperial for-
tresses. All this meant plainly Montmédy. Besançon was so far that
there was time to be overtaken, and Valenciennes was not in Bouillé’s
territory. Nothing could be done before the spring, for the emperor was
not yet master of his revolted provinces; and a long correspondence was
carried on between the general at Metz, and Count Fersen at Paris, who
acted for Lewis XVI and controlled the whole. At Christmas, Bouillé
sent his eldest son to Paris to arrange details with him.
During the first months of 1791, which were the last of his life, the
ascendancy of Mirabeau rose so rapidly that the king wavered between
him and Breteuil. In February, La Marck appeared at Metz, to lay
Mirabeau’s bolder plan before the soldier on whose sword its execution
was to depend. Bouillé at once preferred it to Breteuil’s, and was ready
to carry it out. But Fersen was so confident in pledging himself to con-
trive the departure from Paris at night and in secret, he was so resolute
and cool, that he dispelled all doubts, and early in March he announced
that the king had finally decided for Montmédy. His hesitation was over,Lectures on the French Revolution/145
and Mirabeau was rejected. Lewis could not have taken his advice with-
out surrendering his own main object, the restoration of the Gallican
Church. It was the essence of Mirabeau’s policy to sacrifice the priest-
hood. His last counsels were given on February 23, five weeks before he
died. He advised that the king, when driving out, should be forced by the
people to go home; or better still, that a mob should be gathered in the
court of the Tuileries to prevent him from going out. He hoped that such
an outrage would cause the Assembly to secure greater liberty of move-
ment, which would serve his purpose at the proper time.
The opportunity was found on April 18, when it became known that
the royal family were moving to St. Cloud. Easter was at hand; and at
Easter, the king of France used to receive communion in public. But
Lewis could not receive communion. He was responsible for the Civil
Constitution which he had sanctioned, and for the schism that was be-
ginning. With that on his conscience he was required to abstain, as people
would otherwise infer that neither he nor the priest who absolved him
saw anything to regret in the rising storm. There- fore to avoid scandal
it was well to be out of the way at the time. The royal family were
stopped at their very door, as Mirabeau had desired. For more than an
hour they sat in the carriage, hooted and insulted by the mob, Lafayette
vainly striving to clear the way. As they returned to the palace, the queen
indiscreetly said to those about them: “You must admit now, gentlemen,
that we are not free.” The case for flight was strengthened by the events
of that day, except in the eyes of some who, knowing the suggestion of
Mirabeau, suspected a comedy, and wondered how much the king had
paid that a howling mob might call him a fat pig to his face.
The emperor could no longer refuse aid to his sister without the
reproach of cruelty. He was now requested to move troops near enough
to the frontier to justify Bouillé in forming a camp in front of Montmédy,
and collecting supplies sufficient for the nucleus of a royal army. He
was also asked to advance a sum of money for first expenses. Leopold,
who scarcely knew Marie Antoinette, showed extreme reserve. His hands
were not free in the East. He sympathised with much of the work of the
Revolution; and he was not sorry to see France weakened, even by mea-
sures which he disapproved. His language was discouraging throughout
He would promise nothing until they succeeded in escaping; and he be-
lieved they could not escape. The queen resolved to discover whether
the gross indignity to which she had been subjected had made some
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to seek him in his Italian dominions, with ample credentials. The agent
was not wisely chosen. He found Leopold at Mantua, conferring with
the Count d’Artois, and he fell into the hands of Calonne. On his return
he produced a paper in twenty-one paragraphs, drawn up by Calonne,
with the emperor’s replies, showing that Leopold would invade France
in the summer, with 100,000 men, that the royal family were to await
his coming, and that; in effect, he had accepted the programme of the
émigrés.
The queen was persuaded that she would be murdered if she re-
mained at Paris while her .brother’s forces entered France. She believed
that the émigrés detested her; that they were prepared to sacrifice her
husband and herself to their own cause; and that if their policy triumphed,
the new masters would be worse than the old. She wrote to Mercy that it
would become an intolerable slavery. She resolved to incur the utmost
risk—rather than owe her deliverance to d’Artois and his followers.
Marie Antoinette was right in her estimate of feeling in the émigré camp.
Gustavus III spoke for many when he said, “The king and queen, per-
sonally, may be in danger; but that is nothing to a danger that threatens
all crowned heads.”
After their arrest at Varennes, Fersen was amazed at the indecent
joy of the French in Brussels, of whom many avowed their satisfaction
that the king and queen were captured. For the plan concerted with Bouillé
was to serve monarchy, not aristocracy. In her passionate resistance to
the party of d’Artois, Condé, and Calonne, the queen felt herself the
champion of popular royalism. In the language of the day, she was for a
counter-constitution, they for a counter-revolution. There was a per-
sonal question also. The queen relied on Breteuil to save her from
Calonne, whom she suspected of having tampered with the king’s con-
fessor to learn Court secrets. When she saw the answer from Mantua,
she at once knew his hand. If that was her brother’s policy, it was time
to make a rush for freedom. The Jacobin yoke could be borne, not the
yoke of the émigrés. Breteuil warned them to lose no time, if they would
escape from thraldom to their friends. When Marie Antoinette resolved
that flight with the risk of capture would be better than rescue by such
hands, she knew but half the truth. The document brought back from
Mantua by Durfort was a forgery. It governed history for 100 years;
and the genuine text was not published until 1894. And we know now
that Calonne, behind the back of the Count d’Artois, fabricated the re-
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that they were deceived. In their terror and uncertainty, they fled. The
first motive of Lewis had been the horror of injuring a religion which
was his own. When he signed the decree imposing the oath on the clergy,
which began the persecution, he said, “At least, it is not for long.”
The elections to the next Assembly were appointed for July 5. If the
first Assembly was allowed to accomplish its work, all that had been
done to discredit one party and to conciliate another, all the fruit of
Mirabeau’s expensive intrigues, would be lost. The final determination
that sent them along the road to Varennes was the treason hatched at
Mantua. They ran the gauntlet to the Argonne in the cause of limited
monarchy, to evade revolution and reaction. That was the spirit in which
Mirabeau urged departure, and in which Bouillé came to the rescue; and
it is that which made the queen odious to the expatriated nobles. But it
was not the policy of Breteuil. He refused to contemplate anything but
the restoration of the unbroken crown. The position was ambiguous.
Contrary forces were acting for the moment in combination. Between
the reactionary states- man and the constitutional general, there was no
security in the character of the king.
The calculation on which the flight to Montmédy was undertaken
was not, in itself, unreasonable. There was a strong party in the Assem-
bly with which it was possible to negotiate. In the Rhone district, along
the Loire, in parts of western and southern France, hundreds of thou-
sands of the most intrepid men on earth were ready to die for the altar
and the throne. But they were not willing to expose themselves for a
prince in whose hands the best cause was doomed to fail, and whose last
act as king was to betray his faithful defenders. Instigated by Bouillé,
the queen asked her brother to lend some regiments to act with the royal
forces as auxiliaries in case of resistance. She wished for 30,000 men.
That is the significant fact that justifies the postmaster of St. Ménehould
and the patriots of Varennes. The expedition to Montmédy was a first
step towards civil war and foreign invasion. That is what these men
vaguely understood when they stopped the fugitives.
For the management of the journey the best advice was not always
taken. Instead of two light carriages, the royal party insisted on travel-
ling in one large one, which Fersen accordingly ordered. The route by
Rheims would have been better, because Varennes was off the post road.
But Varennes was preferred on the ground that Rheims was the corona-
tion city, and the king might be recognised. The shortest way to Montmédy
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the frontier. It was urged that a military display on the road would lead
to trouble, but it was decided that it was necessary beyond Châlons.
Bouillé’s advice was not always sound, but there was one point on which
it proved fatal to reject it He wished the travellers to be accompanied by
an experienced officer, whom he knew to be masterful, energetic, and
quick in an emergency. The king thought of several, but the queen was
disinclined to have a stranger in the carriage. But she asked for three
able-bodied officers, to be employed as couriers, adding that they need
not be unusually intelligent In those words the coming story is told. The
three couriers answered too faithfully the specified qualification.
The departure had been fixed for the second week of June. Bouillé
still hoped for a movement among the imperialists, and he requested a
delay. On the 16th he was informed that the royal family would start at
midnight on the 20th. He had sent one of his colonels, the Duke de
Choiseul, to Paris for the last instructions. Choiseul’s horses were to
fetch the king at Varennes, and he was to entertain him in his house at
Montmédy. He had the command of the farthest detachment of cavalry
on the road from Montmédy to Châlons, and it was his duty to close up
behind the royal carriage, to prevent pursuit, and to gather all the de-
tachments on the road, as the king passed along. He would have arrived
at the journey’s end with at least 400 men. His last orders were to con-
vey the king across the frontier, if Bouillé should fall. The great abbey
of Orval was only a few miles away, and it was thought that, at the last
moment, it might be found safer than the hostile soil of France.
Choiseul was not equal to the difficult part he had to perform. He
set out for his post on the Monday afternoon, carrying with him a
marshal’s bâton, which had belonged to his uncle, and the queen’s hair-
dresser, Léonard. For Thursday was the solemn festival of Corpus Christi,
when a military mass would be celebrated in the camp, and, in the pres-
ence of the assembled army, Bouillé was to be made a marshal of France.
The queen could not be allowed to appear at such a function without the
artist’s help, and he was hurried away, much against his will, without a
word of explanation. The king’s sister learned the same day what was
before her. There had been an idea of sending her on with the children,
or with the Countess of Provence. The Princess, who was eminently
good, and not always gracious, did not enjoy the confidence of the queen.
She was one of those who regarded concession as surrender of prin-
ciple, and in the rift between the Princes and Marie Antoinette she was
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ers met for the last time. That night their ways parted, leading the one to
the guillotine, and the other to the throne which had been raised by
Napoleon above every throne on earth. The Count and Countess of
Provence both started at the same time as the rest, and reached Belgium
in safety.
Fersen, directing matters with skill and forethought, made one mis-
take. Two attendants on the royal children were taken, in a hired car-
riage, to Claye, the second stage on the eastern road; and it was their
driver who made known, on his return, which way the fugitives had
taken.
When everybody was in bed, and the lights were out, the royal fam-
ily went out by a door that was not in use, and got into a hackney coach.
The last to come was the queen, who had been frightened by meeting
Lafayette. Afterwards she asked him whether he had recognised her. He
replied that if he had met her not once but thrice, he could never have
recognised her, after what she had told him the day before; for she had
said that they were not going away. Bailly, who was at home, ill, had
taken alarm at the persistent rumours of departure, and urged Lafayette
to redouble his precautions. After a last inspection the general assured
the mayor that Gouvion was on guard, and not a mouse could escape.
The journalists, Marat and Fréron, had also been warned. Fréron went
to the Tuileries late at night, and satisfied himself that all was quiet
Nobody took notice of a coachman, chatting and taking snuff with a
comrade, or guessed that it was the colonel of Royal Swedes, who in
that hour built himself an everlasting name. It was twelve when the
queen arrived; and the man, who had made her heart beat in happier
years, mounted the box and drove away into the darkness. Their secret
was known, and their movements had been observed by watchful eyes.
The keeper of the wardrobe was intimate with General Gouvion. She
had warned him in good time, and had given notice to persons about the
queen that she knew what was going on. The alarm was given at two in
the morning, but that she might not be compromised it was given by
devious ways. A traveller from Marseilles was roused at his lodgings by
a friendly voice. He refused to get up, and went to sleep again. Some
hours later the visitor returned, and prevailed with the sleeper. He came
from the palace, and reported that the king was gone. They took the
news to one of the deputies, who hastened to Lafayette, while the man
from the palace disappeared. Lafayette, as soon as he was dressed, con-
ferred with the mayor and with the president of the Assembly,150/John Acton
Beauharnais, the first husband of the Empress Josephine, and they per-
suaded him that nothing could avert civil war but the capture of the
king. Thereupon Lafayette wrote an order declaring that Lewis had been
carried off, and calling on all good citizens to bring him back. He be-
lieved that too much time had been lost; but nothing less than this, which
was a warrant for arrest, would have appeased the rage of the people at
his lack of vigilance. He despatched his officers, chiefly towards Lille.
One of them, Romeuf, whom he directed to follow the road to
Valenciennes, was stopped by the mob, and brought before the Assem-
bly. There he received a new commission, with authority to make the
king a prisoner. As he rode out, after so much delay, he learned that the
fugitives had been seen on the road to Meaux, and that they had twelve
hours’ start.
There is much in these transactions that is strangely suspicious.
Lafayette did not make up his mind that there was anything to be done
until others pressed him. He sent off all his men by the wrong roads,
while Baillon, the emissary of the Commune, struck the track at once.
He told Romeuf that it was too late, so that his heavy day’s ride was
only a formality. Romeuf, who was the son of one of his tenants, got
into many difficulties, and did not give his horse the spur until the news
was four hours old. At Varennes he avowed that he had never meant to
overtake them, and the king’s officers believed him. Gouvion, second in
command of the guard, knew by which door the royal party meant to
leave, and he assured the Assembly that he had kept watch over it, with
several officers, all night. Lewis had even authorised Mine. de Tourzel
to bring Gouvion with her, if she met him on her way to the carriage.
Burke afterwards accused Lafayette of having allowed the departure,
that he might profit by the arrest Less impassioned critics have doubted
whether the companion of Washington was preparing a regency, or
deemed that the surest road to a republic is by a vacant throne.
The coach that was waiting beyond the gates had been ordered for a
Russian lady, Madame de Korff, who was Fersen’s fervent accomplice.
She supplied not only the carriage, but £12,000 in money, and a pass-
port As she required another for her own family, the Russian minister
applied to Bailly. The mayor refused, and he was obliged to ask
Montmorin, pretending that the pass- port he had just given had been
burnt by mistake. The numbers and description tallied, but the destina-
tion was Frankfort. As the travellers quitted the Frankfort road at
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der. Half an hour had been lost, but the first stage, Bondy, was reached
at half-past one. Here Fersen, who had sat by his coachman, flourishing
the whip, got down, and the family he had striven so hard to save passed
out of his protection. He wished to take them all the way, and had asked
Gustavus for leave to travel in the uniform of the Swedish Guard. But
Lewis would not allow him to remain, and underrated the value of such
an escort. Fersen took the north road, and reached Belgium without
difficulty. In the following winter he was again at the Tuileries. As a
political adviser he was unfortunate, for he was one of those concerned
in the Brunswick proclamation which cost the king his crown.
The travellers pursued their way without molestation to Châlons,
and there, as they were about to meet their faithful soldiery, they fancied
that the danger was over. In reality the mischief was already done, and
by their own fault their fate was sealed. As they were sure to be pur-
sued, safety depended on celerity. The point of peril was Varennes, for a
good horseman at full speed might ride 146 miles in less than thirteen
hours, and would arrive there about nine at night, if he started at the
first alarm. It was calculated that the royal family, at 7½ miles an hour,
would reach Varennes between 8 and 9. The margin was so narrow that
there was no time to lose. The king thought it sufficient to reach Bouillé’s
outposts before he could be overtaken, and they would be met a stage
beyond Châlons. To secure the meeting it was necessary to keep time.
The hours were exactly deter- mined; and as the agreement was not
observed, the troopers were useless. Before Châlons four hours had
been lost—not by accident, as the royalist legend tells, for Valory the
outrider testifies that it took but a few minutes to repair. Bouillé knew
the ignoble cause of his own ruin and of so much sorrow, but never
revealed it When he came to England he misled questioners, and he
exacted an oath from his son that he would keep the miserable secret for
half a century. The younger Bouillé was true to his word. In 1841 he
confided to a friend that the story whispered at the time was true, and
that the king stopped a couple of hours at Étoges, over an early dinner at
the house of Chanilly, an officer of his household, whose name appears
in his will. When people saw what came of it, there was a generous
conspiracy of concealment, which bewildered posterity, until Bouillé’s
tale was told.
At Pont de Somme-Vesle, 8 or 9 miles beyond Châlons, Choiseul
was in command. His men had been badly received at St Ménehould,
and their presence perturbed the country people. Nobody believed the152/John Acton
pretence that so many horsemen were required to protect the passage of
treasure, and they began to suspect that the treasure was the queen her-
self, flying to Austria. Choiseul took alarm; for if the king arrived in the
midst of sedition, the worst might be expected. He had been positively
instructed that the king would pass at half-past two. Fersen had said
that he might rely on it, and there was to be a courier riding an hour
ahead. When three o’clock came, without any sign of king or courier,
Choiseul resolved to move away, hoping that his departure would allay
the ferment and secure safe passage. He sent Léonard forward, with
instructions to the officers in command at St Ménehould, Clermont, and
Varennes, that all seemed to be over for the day, and that he was starting
to join Bouillé; and after some further watching, he withdrew with all
his men. For this Bouillé afterwards demanded that he should be tried
by court-martial.
It had been settled that if the king did not appear at Bondy by half-
past two in the morning, the courier who had preceded him was to push
on, and warn the officers that there was no more to be done. As no
courier made his appearance in the afternoon, it was certain that the
fugitives had got out of Paris, where the danger lay. If Choiseul found it
necessary to move his men, he was to leave a staff officer, Goguelat, to
wait the king’s coming, and to be his guide. But Choiseul took Goguelat
with him, leaving no guide; and instead of keeping on the high road, to
block it at a farther point, he went off into byways, and never reap-
peared until all was over at Varennes. His error is flagrant, but it was
due to the more tragic folly of his master. Not long after he had aban-
doned his’ post the king arrived, and passed unhindered. Again he changed
horses without resistance at the next post-town, which was St.
Ménehould, and went on to Clermont en Argonne. Some of the bystand-
ers thought they had recognised him under his disguise, and the loudest
of them was Drouet, who, as postmaster, had just had a quarrel with one
of the officers, and was in the dangerous mood of a man who has his
temper to recover. The town council assembled, and on hearing the
grounds of his suspicion, commissioned him to follow the travellers and
stop their flight They did not doubt that Lewis was about to throw him-
self into the arms of Austria. It was not his first intention, for he hoped
to make a stand at Montmédy; but the prospect of effective action on
French soil had diminished.
Bouillé’s command was narrowed. He could not trust his men; and
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within the frontier or beyond it, success implied an Austrian invasion.
Bouillé’s plan, from its inception, had no other meaning; and it was
executed under conditions which placed Lewis more completely in the
hands of the calculating emperor. It became more and more apparent
that his destination was not the camp of Montmédy, but the abbey of
Orval in Luxemburg. The men of St Ménehould who resolved to pre-
vent his escape acted on vague suspicion, but we cannot say that, as
Frenchmen, they acted wrongly. They had no certainty, and no author-
ity; but while they deliberated a pursuing horseman rode into the town,
bringing what they wanted. An officer of the National Guard, Baillon,
had got away from Paris early in the day, with orders from Bailly and
Lafayette, and took the right road. He was delayed for two hours by an
encounter with M. de Briges, one of the king’s men, whom he succeeded
in arresting. To save time he sent forward a fresh rider, on a fresh horse,
to stop the fugitives; and this messenger from Châlons brought the news
to St. Ménehould, not long after the coach had rolled away.
When Drouet started on the ride that made his fortune, he knew that
it was the king, and that Paris did not mean him to escape. An hour had
been lost, and he met his postboys returning from Clermont. From them
he learnt that the courier had given the word Varennes, and not Verdun.
By a short cut, through the woods, he arrived just in time. Meantime St
Ménehould was seething; the commanding officer was put under arrest,
and his troops were prevented from mounting. One man, Lagache, warned
by the daughter of his host that the treasure for the army chest had
evaporated and the truth was out, sprung on his horse and opened a way
through the crowd with a pistol in each hand.
Drouet told the story to the National Assembly more to his own
advantage, claiming to have recognised the queen whom he had seen at
Paris, and the king by his likeness on an assignat. On a later day he
declined all direct responsibility, and said that he followed the coach in
consequence of orders forwarded from Châlons, not on his own initia-
tive or conjecture. When he gave the second version he was a prisoner
among the Austrians, and the questioner before whom he stood was
Fersen. At such a moment even a man of Drouet’s fortitude might well
have stretched a point in the endeavour to cast off odium. Therefore the
account recorded by Fersen has not supplanted the popular tradition.
But it is confirmed by Romeuf, who says, distinctly, that the postmaster
of St Ménehould was warned by the message sent on by Baillon.
Romeuf’s testimony, contained in the protocols of the Assembly, where154/John Acton
I have seen it, was omitted in the Moniteur, in order that nothing might
deface the legend of the incautious traveller, the treacherous banknote,
and the vigilant provincial patriot, who was the idol of the hour as the
man who had preserved his country from invasion and civil war.
Clermont, like the other post towns, was agitated by the presence of
cavalry; and after the king had pursued his journey, the authorities des-
patched a messenger to rouse Varennes. Passing the royal party at full
speed, he shouted something which they did not understand, but which
made them think that they were detected. He was superseded by the
superior energy and capacity of Drouet, and plays no part in the adven-
ture. There was an officer at Clermont who knew his business; but his
men deserted him, and he reached Varennes alone. At Varennes the two
men in the secret, Bouillé’s younger son and Raigecourt, were with the
horses, at the farther end of the town, over the bridge, keeping no look-
out They relied on Goguelat, on Choiseul, on d’Andouins who com-
manded at St. Ménehould, on Damas at Clermont, and above all on the
promised courier, who was to ride an hour ahead to warn them in time.
But they expected no warning that night If there was any watchfulness
in them, it was put to sleep by Léonard, who had gone through an hour
before with Choiseul’s fatal letter. The king was arrested a few hundred
yards from their inn, and they were aware of nothing. When they heard,
they galloped away on the road to Stenay, where they knew that the
general was keeping anxious vigil. Drouet passed the carriage near the
entrance of the town, where the couriers were wrangling with the
postilions and looking about in the dark for the relays. With the help of
half a dozen men who were finishing their wine at the inn, he barricaded
the bridge.
There the king’s passport betrayed him, for it was made out for
Frankfort, and Varennes was not on the road to Frankfort. The party
were therefore detained and had to spend the night at the house of Sauce,
municipal officer and grocer, while the drums beat; the tocsin rang, the
town was roused with the cry of fire, and messengers were sent to bring
in national guards from the country round. At first Sauce beguiled the
king over a bottle of wine, and then introduced a travelled fellow-towns-
man who identified him. A scene of emotion followed, and loyal citizens
pressed their sovereign in their arms. They talked of escorting him to
Montmédy, a hundred strong, and Lewis, ready to believe them, de-
clared he would be content with fifty. As night wore on, a number of
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de Somme -Vesle; the Count de Damas from Clermont and at last Deslon,
a captain of the German horse that Bouillé chiefly trusted. Choiseul’s
men, and some of those quartered at Varennes, were faithful, and it was
thought possible to clear the street Urged by the queen, Damas wished
to attempt it, and long after he assured an English friend that he regret-
ted that he did not lead the charge, in defiance of the king’s optimism,
and of his reluctance to be saved by the sword. He said to Deslon in
German, “Mount and attack!” But Deslon saw that it was too late.
Goguelat threatened to cut his way out, and was unhorsed by a pistol
shot
Drouet was master of the situation. It was he who managed the
hesitating soldiers and the hesitating townsmen. At five in the morning
Romeuf and Baillon arrived, with Lafayette’s order, and the decree of
the sovereign Assembly. There was no more illusion then about pur-
suing the journey, and all the king’s hope was that he might gain time for
Bouillé to deliver him. Bouillé was at Stenay, twenty miles off. He spent
the night watching the road, with his arm through his horse’s bridle.
Long after every possible allowance for delay, his son came up with the
tidings of Varennes. The trumpets roused the Royal Germans, but their
colonel was hostile, and precious hours were lost Bouillé gave all his
money to his men, told them what manner of expedition they were on,
told them that their king was a prisoner, and led them to the rescue. It
was past nine when he reached the height that looks down on the valley
of the Aire. The horses were tired, the bridge was barricaded, the fords
were unknown. All was quiet at Varennes, and the king was already
miles away on the road to Clermont. It was the end of a bright dream,
and of a career which had been noted for unvarying success.
As the unhappy man, who had so narrowly missed the prize, turned
his horse’s head in the direction of exile, he said to his son, “Do you still
praise my good fortune?” That evening he rode across the frontier with
a group of officers, and his men fired on him as he passed. He issued an
angry declaration, and composed a defence of his conduct, saying that
nobody had remained at his post except himself. But he knew that king
and constitution were lost because he was not on the spot, and had posted
inexperienced men where his own presence was needed. He could not
recover his balance, and became as unwise and violent as the rest The
émigrés did not trust him, and assigned him no active part in the inva-
sion of the following year. His fame stood high among the English who
had fought him in the West Indies, and Pitt offered him the command in156/John Acton
San Domingo, which the Duke of Portland obliged him to relinquish.
Lewis XVI was brought back to Paris by an insolent and ferocious
crowd, and looked back with gratitude to the equivocal civilities of Sauce.
The journey occupied four days, during which the queen’s hair turned
grey. Three deputies, sent by the Assembly, met the dolorous procession
half way, and took charge of the royal family. The king at once assured
them that he had intended to remain at Montmédy, and there to revise
the Constitution. “With those words,” said Barnave, “we shall save the
monarchy.” Latour Maubourg refused his turn in the royal carriage, on
the plea that his legs were too long for comfort, and advised the king to
employ the time in domesticating his companions. The advice partly
succeeded, for Barnave was made a friend. Nothing could be made of
Pétion, who states in his narrative that the princess fell in love with him.
General Dumas assumed command, and, by posting cavalry on one of
the bridges, managed to bring the horses to a trot, and left the crowd
behind.
When they came to the forest of Bondy, the Hounslow Heath of
France, a band of ruffians from the capital made a determined attack,
and were with difficulty beaten off. At last, Lefebvre, the future Mar-
shal Duke of Dantzick, met them with a company of grenadiers. As
there was danger in the narrow streets of Paris, Lafayette took them
round through the Champs Elysées. Word had been passed that not a
sign of hatred or of honour should be given, and a horseman rode in
front, commanding silence. The order was sullenly obeyed. The day
before this funereal scene the Prussian envoy wrote home that the king
might be spared, from motives of policy, but that nothing could save the
queen. They had reached the terrace of the Tuileries when there was a
rush and a struggle, in which Dumas lost his hat and his belt and his
scabbard, and nearly had his clothes torn from his back. A group of
deputies came to his assistance, and no blood was shed. A carriage
came after, with Drouet conspicuous on high and triumphant. He re-
ceived a grant of £1200, and was elected to the Convention in the fol-
lowing year. Taken prisoner by the Prussians, he impressed Goethe by
his coolness in adversity. The Austrians took him at the siege of
Maubeuge, and he was exchanged for the king’s daughter. In the com-
munistic conspiracy of Babeuf he nearly lost his life, and for a time he
lived in a cavern, underground. Napoleon gave him the Legion of Honour,
made him subprefect of St. Ménehould, and was his guest when he vis-
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vanished from sight and changed his name. When he died, in 1824, his
neighbours learned with surprise that they had lived with the sinister
contriver of the tremendous tragedy.XIII: THE FEUILLANTS AND THE WAR
Tuesday, June 21, the day on which the departure of the king became
known, was the greatest day in the history of the Assembly. The depu-
ties were so quick to meet the dangers of the situation, they were so
calm, their measures were so comprehensive, that they at once restored
public confidence. By the middle of the day the tumult in the streets was
appeased, and the ambassadors were astonished at the tranquillity of
Paris. They wrote home that all parties put aside their quarrels, and
combined in a sincere endeavour to save the State. That was the appear-
ance of things on the surface and for the moment. But the Right took no
share in acts which they deemed a usurpation of powers calculated to
supersede monarchy, and to make the crisis serve as the transition to a
Republic. To the number of almost 300 they signed a protest, declaring
that they would take no further part in the deliberations. Their leader,
Cazalès, went away to Coblenz, and was coldly received as a man who
had yielded too much to parliamentary opinions, whose services had
been unavailing, and who repented too late.
The king’s flight, while it broke up the Conservative party, called
the Republican party into existence. For Lewis had left behind him a
manifesto, meditated during many months, urging the defects of the
Constitution, and denouncing all that had been effected since he had
suffered violence at Versailles. Many others besides Lewis were aware
of the defects, and desired their amendment. But the renunciation of so
much that he had sanctioned, so much that he had solemnly and repeat-
edly approved, exposed him to the reproach of duplicity and falsehood.
He not only underwent the ignominy of capture and exposure; he was
regarded henceforth as a detected perjurer. If the king could never be
trusted again, the prospects of monarchy were hopeless. The Orleans
party offered no substitute, for their candidate was discredited. Men
began to say that it was better that what was inevitable should be
recognised at once than that it should be established later on by vio-
lence, after a struggle in which more than monarchy would be imperil-
led, and which would bring to the front the most inhuman of the popu-
lace. To us, who know what the next year was to bring, the force and
genuineness of the argument is apparent; but it failed to impress the
National Assembly. Scarcely thirty members shared those opinions, and
neither Barère nor Robespierre was among them. The strong- hold of
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constitutional party remained true to the cause, and drew closer together.
Lameth and Lafayette appeared at the Jacobins arm in arm; and when
the general was attacked for negligence in guarding the Tuileries, Barnave
effectually defended him. This was the origin of the Feuillants, the last
organisation for the maintenance of monarchy. They were resolved to
save the Constitution by amending it in the direction of a strengthened
executive, and for their purpose it was necessary to restore the king. If
his flight had succeeded, it was proposed to open negotiations with him,
for he would have it in his power to plunge France into foreign and
domestic war. He was more formidable on the frontier than in the capi-
tal. Malouet, the most sensible and the most respected of the royalists,
was to have been sent to treat, in the name of the Assembly, that, by
moderating counsels, bloodshed might be averted, and the essentials of
the Revolution assured. But, on the second evening, a tired horseman
drew rein at the entrance, and the joyous uproar outside informed the
deputies before he could dismount that he came with news of the king.
He was the Varennes doctor, and he had been sent at daybreak to learn
what the town was to do with its prisoners.
The king, ceasing to be a danger, became an embarrassment. He
could not at once be replaced on the throne. Without prejudging the
future, it was resolved that he be detained at the Tuileries until the Con-
stitution, completed and revised, was submitted to him for his free as-
sent. Thus, for ten weeks, he was suspended. The Assembly governed
and legislated, without reference to his sanction; and the interregnum
was so prolonged that the monarchy could never recover. When, in Sep-
tember, Lewis resumed his royal function, he was no longer an integral
element in the State, but an innovation and an experiment. On the day
when, standing uncovered before the legislators, he promised fidelity to
their Constitution, it seemed natural to them, in the presence of tar-
nished and diminished majesty, to sit down and put their hats on. The
triumvirs, who had foiled Mirabeau, began immediately after his death
to sustain the royal cause in secret. Montmorin called on Lameth before
he was up, and began the negotiation. Barnave frequented the house of
Montmorin, but took care always to come accompanied, in order to
prevent a bribe. His two days’ journey in the royal company confirmed
him in his design. Having reduced the prerogative when it was exces-
sive, they revived it when it had become too weak, and the king could no
longer inspire alarm. They undertook to devise props for the damaged
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this king,” said Sieyès, “find us another.” This was the predominant
feeling.
When an attack was made on the king at the Jacobins, all the depu-
ties present, excepting six, seceded in a body, and founded a new club at
the Feuillants. On July 15, in a speech which was considered the finest
heard in France since Mirabeau, Barnave carried an overwhelming vote
in favour of monarchy. He said that the revolutionary movement could
go no farther without carrying away property. He dreaded the govern-
ment of the poor over the rich; for Barnave’s political philosophy con-
sisted in middle-class sovereignty government by that kind of property
which depends on constant labour, integrity, foresight, and self-denial,
excluding poverty and opulence. Defeated at the Jacobins and in the
Assembly, the republicans prepared a demonstration on the Champ de
Mars, where a petition was signed for the dethronement of the king. The
Assembly, fearing a renewal of the scenes at Versailles, commissioned
Bailly and Lafayette to disperse the meeting. On July 17 a collision
ensued, shots were fired, and several petitioners were killed. The J
acobins, for the moment, were crushed. Robespierre, Marat, even Danton,
effaced themselves, and expected that the Feuillants would follow up
their victory. It seemed impossible that men who had the resolution to
shoot down their masters, the people of Paris, and were able to give the
law, should be so weak in spirit, or so short of sight, as to throw away
their advantage, and resume a contest on equal terms with conquered
and injured adversaries.
The Feuillants were thenceforward predominant, and held their
ground until the Girondins overthrew them on March 18. It was the rule
at their club to admit none but active citizens, paying taxes and possess-
ing the franchise. The masses were thus given over to the Jacobins. By
their energy at the Champ de Mars, July 17, Lafayette and his new
friends had aroused the resentment of a vindictive party; and when they
took no advantage of the terror they inspired, the terror departed, and
the resentment remained. It was agreed that Malouet should move amend-
ments to the Constitution. The Feuillants were to oppose, and then to
play into his hands. But Malouet was deserted by his friends, the agree-
ment was not carried out, and the revision failed in the Assembly. The
Committees proposed that the famous decree of November 7, by which
no deputy could accept office, should be revoked. The exclusion was
maintained, but ministers were allowed to appear and answer for their
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ous attempt was made to adjust and harmonise the clauses voted during
two hurried years. Various reforms were vainly brought forward; and
they indicate, as well as the sudden understanding between Malouet and
Barnave, that the deputies had little faith in the work they had accom-
plished. They were tired of it. They were no longer on the crest of the
wave, and their power had passed to the clubs and to the press. They
were about to disappear. By an unholy alliance between Robespierre
and Cazalès the members of the National Assembly were ineligible to
the Legislature that was to follow. None of those who drew up the Con-
stitution were to have a share in applying it. The actual rulers of France
were condemned to political extinction. Therefore the power which the
Feuillants acquired by their very dexterous management of the situation
produced by the king’s flight could not last; their radical opponents had
time on their side, and they had logic.
Lewis, after his degradation, was an impossible king. And the re-
publicans had a future majority in reserve, whenever the excluded class
was restored to the right of voting which it had enjoyed in 1789 before
equality was a fundamental law, and which the Rights of Man enabled
them to claim. And now the incident of Varennes supplied the enemies
of the throne with a new argument. The wretched incompetence of Lewis
had become evident to all, and to the queen herself. She did not hesitate
to take his place, and when people spoke of the Court, it was the queen
they meant. The flight, and the policy that led to it, and that was re-
newed by the failure, was the policy of relying on foreign aid, especially
that of the emperor. The queen was the connecting link, and the chief
negotiator. And the object she pursued was to constrain the French people,
by means of the emperor’s influence on the Powers, either by the hu-
miliating parade of power at a congress, or by invasion. That is what
she was believed to be contriving, and the sense of national indepen-
dence was added to the motive of political liberty to make the Court
unpopular. People denounced the Austrian cabal, and the queen as its
centre. It was believed that she wished to govern not only through the
royal authority restored, but through the royal authority restored by
foreign oppressors. The Revolution was confronted with Europe. It had
begun its work by insurrection, and it had to complete its work by war.
The beginning of European complications was the flight to Varennes.
Early in September the Constitution was presented to Lewis XVI.
The gates were thrown open. The guards who were his gaolers were
withdrawn. He was ostensibly a free man. If he decided to accept, his162/John Acton
acceptance would be voluntary. The Emperor, Kaunitz, Malesherbes,
advised him to accept Malouet preferred, as usual, a judicious middle
course. Burke was for refusal. He said that assent meant destruction,
and he thought afterwards that he was right, for the king assented and
was destroyed. Burke was not listened to. He had become the adviser of
Coblenz, and great as his claims were upon the gratitude of both king
and queen, he was counted in the ranks of their enemies. Mercy, who
transmitted his letter, still extant in the archives of France, begged that
it might not influence the decision. After ten days of leisurely reflection,
but without real hesitation, for everything had been arranged with Lameth
and Barnave, the leaders of the majority, Lewis gave his sanction to the
Constitution of 1791, which was to last until 1792, and the National
Assembly was dissolved. Political delinquents, including the accom-
plices of Varennes, received an amnesty.
By right of the immense change they made in the world, by their
energy and sincerity, their fidelity to reason and their resistance to cus-
tom, their superiority to the sordid craving for increase of national power,
their idealism and their ambition to declare the eternal law, the States-
General of 1789 are the most memorable of all political assemblies.
They cleared away the history of France, and with 2500 decrees they
laid down the plan of a new world for men who were reared in the old.
Their institutions perished, but their influence has endured; and the prob-
lem of their history is to explain why so genuine a striving for the high-
est of earthly goods so deplorably failed. The errors that ruined their
enterprise may be reduced to one. Having put the nation in the place of
the Crown, they invested it with the same unlicensed power, raising no
security and no remedy against oppression from below, assuming, or
believing, that a government truly representing the people could do no
wrong. They acted as if authority, duly constituted, requires no check,
and as if no barriers are needed against the nation. The notion common
among them, that liberty consists in a good civil code, a notion shared
by so famous a Liberal as Madame de Staël, explains the facility with
which so many revolutionists went over to the Empire. But the dreadful
convulsion that ensued had a cause for which they were not responsible.
In the violent contradiction between the new order of things in France
and the in- organic world around it, conflict was irrepressible. Between
French principles and European practice there could be neither concili-
ation nor confidence. Each was a constant menace to the other, and the
explosion of enmity could only be restrained by unusual wisdom andLectures on the French Revolution/163
policy.
The dissolution of the Whig party in England indicates what might
be expected in the continental monarchies where there were no Whigs.
We shall presently see that it was upon this rock, in the nature of things,
that the Revolution went to pieces. The wisest of the statesmen who saw
the evil days, Royer Collard, affirmed long after that all parties in the
Revolution were honest, except the Royalists. He meant that the Right
alone did wrong with premeditation and design. In the surprising revul-
sion that followed the return from Varennes, and developed the Feuillants,
it was in the power of the Conservatives to give life to constitutional
monarchy. That was the moment of their defection. They would have
given much to save an absolute king: they deliberately abandoned the
constitutional king to his fate.
The 150 men who had been the first choice of France now pass out
of our sight. The 720 deputies of the Legislative Assembly were new
and generally obscure names. Nobles, clergy, conservatives did not re-
appear, and their place was taken by the Feuillants, who, in the former
Assembly, would have belonged to the Left. The centre of gravity shifted
far in the revolutionary direction. The Constitution was made. The dis-
cussion of principles was over, and the dispute was not for doctrines but
for power. The speakers have not the same originality or force; they are
not inventors in political science; they are not the pioneers of mankind.
In literary faculty, if not in political, they surpass their predecessors,
and are remembered for their eloquence if not for statecraft.
Reinhard, a German traveller who fell in with a group of the new
deputies on their way to Paris, fell under their charm, and resolved to
cast his lot with a country about to be governed by such men. Whilst he
rose to be an ambassador and minister of foreign affairs, his friends
were cut off in their prime, for they were the deputies who came from
Bordeaux, and gave the name of their depart- ment to the party of the
Gironde. By their parliamentary talents they quickly obtained the lead
of the new Assembly; and as they had few ideas and no tactics, they
allowed Sieyès to direct their course.
Robespierre, through the Jacobin Club, which now recovered much
of the ground it had lost in July, became the manager of the Extreme
Left, which gradually separated from Brissot and the Girondins. The
ministry was in the hands of the Feuillants, who were guided by Lameth,
while Barnave was the secret adviser of the queen. She followed his
counsels with aversion and distrust, looking upon him as an enemy, and164/John Acton
longing to throw off the mask, and show him how he had been deceived.
As she could not understand how the same men who had depressed
monarchy desired to sustain it, she played a double and ignoble part.
The tactics of the Feuillant advisers brought a revival of popular feeling
in favour of the Court, which seemed inconceivable at the epoch of the
arrest. King and queen were applauded in the streets, and at the theatre
the cry “Long live the king!” silenced the cry “Long live the nation!”
This was in October 1791, before the Legislative Assembly had divided
into parties, or found a policy.
When the Assembly summoned the émigrés to return by the month
of January, the king fully agreed with the policy though not with the
penalty. But when a Com- mission reported on the temper of the clergy,
and described the mischief that was brewing in the provinces between
the priests of the two sections, and severe measures of repression were
decreed against nonjurors, he interposed a veto. The First Assembly
had disendowed the clergy, leaving them a pension. The Second, regard-
ing them as agitators, resolved to proceed against them as against the
émigrés. Lewis, in resisting persecution, was supported by the Feuillants.
But the Assembly was not Feuillant, and the veto began its estrange-
ment from the king. A new minister was imposed on him. The Count
Narbonne de Lara was the most brilliant figure in the noblesse of France,
and he lived to captivate and dazzle Napoleon. Talleyrand, who thought
the situation under the Constitution desperate, put forward his friend;
and Madame de Staël, the queen of constitutional society, obtained for
him the ministry of war. The appointment of Narbonne was a blow
struck at the Feuillants, who still desired to reform the institutions, and
who were resolute in favour of peace. At the same time, Lafayette laid
down his command of the National Guard, and stood as a candidate to
succeed Bailly in the office of mayor. But Lafayette had ordered the
capture of the royal family, and could not be forgiven. The queen ob-
tained the election of Pétion instead of Lafayette; and behind Pétion was
Danton. What the Feuillants lost was added to the Girondins, not yet
distinct from the Jacobins; and as the Feuillants were for two chambers,
for peace, and for an executive independent of the single Assembly and
vetoing its decrees, the policy of its opponents was to bring the king into
subjection to the Legislature, to put down the discontented clergy, and
to make the emigration a cause for war.
The new minister, Narbonne, was accepted as a war minister, while
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pacific. On December 1  Lewis came down to the Legislature, and an-
nounced that he would insist that the émigrés should receive no encour-
agement beyond the frontier. It was the first act of hostility and defi-
ance, and it showed that the king was parting with his Feuillant friends.
But Delessart spoilt the effect by keeping back the note to the emperor
for ten days, and communicating it then with precautions.
Leopold II was one of the shrewdest and most cautious of men. He
knew how to wait, and how to give way. He had no wish that his brother-
in-law should again be powerful, and he was not sorry that France should
be disabled by civil dissension. But he could not abandon  his sister
without dishonour; and he was afraid of the contagion of French prin-
ciples in Belgium, which he had reconciled and pacified with difficulty.
Moreover, a common action in French affairs, action which might even-
tually be warlike, was a means of closing the long enmity with Prussia,
and obtaining a substitute for the family alliance with France, which
had become futile. Therefore he was prepared, if they had escaped, to
risk war for their restoration, and induced the Prussian agent to sign an
undertaking which went beyond his instructions.
When the disastrous news reached him from Varennes, Leopold
appealed to the Powers, drew up an alliance with Prussia, and joined in
the declaration of Pilnitz, by which France was threatened with the com-
bined action of all Europe unless the king was restored to a position
worthy of kings. The threat implied no danger, because it was made
conditional on the unanimity of the Powers. There was one Power that
was sure not to consent. England was waiting an opportunity to profit
by French troubles. It had already been seriously proposed by Bouillé,
with the approval of Lewis, to purchase aid from George III. by the
surrender of all the colonies of France. Therefore Leopold thought that
he risked nothing by a demonstration which the émigrés made the most
of to alarm and irritate the French people. But when the king freely
accepted the Constitution, the manifesto of Pilnitz fell to the ground. If
he was content with his position, it could not be the duty of the Powers
to waste blood and treasure in attempting to alter it. The best thing was
that things should settle down in France. Then there would be no excite-
ment spreading to Belgium, and no reason why other princes should be
less easily satisfied than Lewis himself. “The king,” said Kaunitz, “the
king, good man, has helped us out of our difficulty himself.” Still more,
when he obtained a revival of popularity which seemed a marvel after
the events of June, when he freely vetoed acts which he disapproved,166/John Acton
and appeared to be acting in full agreement with a powerful and still
dominant party, the imperial government hoped that the crisis was over.
And this was the state of things in October and November.
The émigrés, conscious of their repulse at Pilnitz, made it their busi-
ness to undeceive the emperor, and to bring him back to the scheme of
intervention. The Spanish Bourbons were with them, and had recalled
their ambassador, and fitted out a fleet in the Mediterranean. Gustavus
of Sweden was eager to invade France with a Swedish army to be con-
veyed in Russian ships, and paid for in Mexican piastres, and with Bouillé
by his side. Catherine II gave every encouragement to the German Pow-
ers to embroil themselves with France, and to leave her to deal uncon-
trolled with Poland and Turkey. The first to emigrate had been the Comte
d’Artois and his friends, who had conspired against Necker and the new
Constitution. They fled, because their lives were in danger. Others fol-
lowed, after the rising of the peasants and the spoliation of August. As
things grew more acute, and the settlement of feudal claims was carried
out with unsparing hostility, the movement spread to the inferior no-
blesse. After the breach with the clergy and the secularisation of Church
property, the prelates went into exile, and were followed by their friends.
In the winter of 1790-1791 they began to organise themselves on the
Rhine, and to negotiate with some of the smaller Powers, especially
Sardinia, for an invasion. The later arrivals were not welcomed, for
they were men who had accepted constitutional government. The pur-
pose of the true émigrés was the restoration of the old order, of the
ancient principles and institutions, not without reform, but without sub-
version. That was the bond between them, and the basis on which they
sought the aid of absolute princes. They denied that the king himself,
writhing in the grip of democracy, had the right to alter the fundamental
laws. Some of the best and ablest and most honourable men had joined
their ranks, and they were instructed and inflamed by the greatest writer
in the world, who had been the best of Liberals and the purest of revo-
lutionary statesmen, Edmund Burke. It was not as a reactionist, but as a
Whig who had drunk success to Washington, who had dressed in blue
and buff, who had rejoiced over the British surrender at Saratoga, who
had drawn up the address to the Colonists, which is the best State paper
in the language, that he told them that it was lawful to invade their own
country, and to shed the blood of their countrymen.
The émigrés of every grade of opinion were united in dislike of the
queen and in depreciation of the king, and they wished to supersede himLectures on the French Revolution/167
by declaring his brother Regent. They hoped to save them both; but they
thought more of principles than of persons, and were not to be diverted
from their projects by consideration of what might happen at Paris.
When the emperor spoke of the danger his sister and her husband were
running, Castelnau replied, “What does it matter, provided the royal
authority is preserved in the person of d’Artois?” They not only refused
obedience to Lewis, but they assiduously compromised him, and pro-
claimed that he meant the contrary of what he said, making a reconcili-
ation between him and his people impossible. Even his brothers defied
him when in this extremity, he entreated them to return. It was the émigré
policy to magnify the significance of what was done at Pilnitz; and as
they have convinced posterity that it was the announcement of an in-
tended attack, it was easy to convince their contemporaries at home.
The language of menace was there, and France believed itself in danger.
How little the Princes concerned meant to give effect to it remained a
secret.
The French democracy might have found its advantage in the disap-
pearance of so many nobles; but as they were working, with apparent
effect, to embroil the country with its neighbours, attempts were made
to compel their return, first by a threefold taxation, then by confisca-
tion, and at last, November 9, by threatening with death those who did
not return. The non-juring clergy were associated with the émigrés in
the public mind as enemies and conspirators who were the more danger-
ous because they remained at home. The First Assembly had provoked
the hostility on the frontier; the Second provoked hostilities at home.
The First had left nonjuring priests with a pension, and the use of parish
churches where successors had not been appointed. The Legislative
Assembly decreed, November 29, that in all cases where it seemed good
to the authorities, they might be deprived of their pensions and sent
away. The great insurrection of the West was caused by this policy. It
was religious rather than political, and was appeased by the return of
the priests.
The head of the war party in the Assembly was Brissot, who was
reputed to know foreign countries, and who promised certain success,
as no really formidable Power was ready to take the field. Meantime he
endeavoured to isolate Austria, and Ségur was sent to Berlin, Talleyrand
to London, to surround France with her natural allies. Brissot’s text was
the weakness and division of other countries; the first man who divined
the prodigious resources and invincible energy of France was the168/John Acton
declamatory Provençal Isnard. He spoke on November 29, and this was
his prophetic argument: the French people exhibited the highest quali-
ties in war when they were treated as slaves by despotic masters; there
was no fear that they had degenerated in becoming free men; only let
them fight for principle, not for State policy, and the force that was in
them would transform the world. Hérault de Séchelles divulged the po-
litical motive of the war party. He said a foreign conflict would be desir-
able for internal reasons. It would lead to measures of precaution stron-
ger than peace time would admit, and changes otherwise impossible
would then be justified by the plea of public safety. It is the first shadow
cast by the coming reign of terror. But neither Girondin violence nor
intrigue was the cause that plunged France into the war that was to be
the most dreadful of all wars. The true cause was the determination of
Marie Antoinette not to submit to the new Constitution. At first she
wished that France should be intimidated by a congress of the united
Powers. She warned her friends abroad not to be taken in by the mock-
ery of her understanding with the Feuillant statesmen; and when Leopold
treated the accepted Constitution seriously, as a release from his en-
gagements, she accused him of betraying her. On September 8, just be-
fore accepting, Lewis, in confidence, wrote that he meant to tolerate no
authority in France besides his own, and that he desired to recover it by
foreign aid.
The idea of an armed Congress persisted until the end of November.
But during the week from the 3rd to the 10th of December the king and
queen wrote to the Powers, desiring them not to regard their official
acts, beseeching them to resist the demands they made in public and to
make war, and assuring them that France would be easily subdued and
cowed. They hoped, by this treason, to recover their undivided power.
All these letters were inspired, were almost dictated, by Fersen.
As Leopold began to see more clearly what it was his sister meant,
he modified his pacific policy. On the 25th of October he speaks of
increasing the royal authority by a counter-revolution in France. On the
17th of November he invites Prussia to help him with 20,000 men. On
the 10th of December he denounces the annexation by France of the
German domains in Alsace. In conformity with this gradual change,
Kaunitz became more rigid, and he made known that any assault on the
Elector of Treves, for the protection he gave to the warlike émigrés,
would be resisted by the imperial forces. Each step was as short as
possible. The transition from peace to war, from pointless remonstranceLectures on the French Revolution/169
to vigorous defiance, was slow and gradual. It began late in October,
when the real meaning of the acceptance of the Constitution became
known, but down to the month of January the change was not decisive,
and the tone was still ambiguous. On the 3rd of January a letter from the
queen at length carried the emperor over. On the way this appeal had
converted Mercy, and Mercy, on January 7, wrote a letter which com-
pelled Kaunitz to give way. Kaunitz had grown grey in the idea of the
French alliance and of rivalry with Prussia. He laughed at Mr. Burke
and the theory of contagion. He desired to perpetuate a state of things
which paralyzed France, by the rivalry between the king and the democ-
racy. To restore the king’s power at home was, to increase it abroad.
Kaunitz was willing that it should be kept in check by the legislature;
but a moment came when he perceived that the progress of the opposi-
tion, of the Jacobins as men indiscriminately called them, more properly
of the Girondins, had transferred the centre of gravity. What had been
cast down in the Monarch rose again in the Second Assembly, and the
power of the nation, the nation united with its representatives, began to
appear.
Kaunitz, though he had no eye for such things, took alarm at last,
and resolved that the way to depress France was to assist the king of
France. On January 5, after the queen’s letter of December 16 had been
received, he declared that Austria would support the elector of Treves,
and would repel force by force, if he was attacked for the harbouring of
émigrés. At the same moment Leopold resolved on an offensive alliance
with Prussia. He explained his change of policy by the letters which
showed him the true mind of the queen. On January 16 Kaunitz still
believed that the other Powers would refuse to co-operate. But Prussia
was willing to accept the new alliance, if Austria abandoned the new
Polish Constitution of May 3. Leopold paid the stipulated price. On
February 7 he gave up the Poles, that he might be strong against France.
Already, January 25, Kaunitz had taken the deciding step, passing over
from the defensive to attack He speaks no more of the king’s liberty of
action. He demands restitution of the papal territory at Avignon, an-
nexed in consequence of the Pope’s action against the ecclesiastical laws.
He requires that the German princes shall have their Alsatian domains
given back to them, and that there shall be no trespass on the imperial
dominions. And in general terms he requires the restoration of monar-
chy. Again he wrote, in the same warlike and defiant spirit, on February
17, when the Prussian signature had been received, and when he ex-170/John Acton
pected English aid for the preservation of Belgium. Meantime Simolin,
the Russian minister who had been helpful in procuring the fatal pass-
port, arrived at Vienna with a last appeal from the queen. At that time
she did not feel that their lives were in jeopardy, but their power. To the
faithful Fersen she wrote that she hoped the enemy would strike home,
so that the French, in their terror, might pray the king to intercede.
Kaunitz, having despatched his ultimatum on the inter- national
grounds of quarrel, declined to interfere in internal affairs. But Simolin
saw Leopold on the 25th, and then the emperor admitted what his chan-
cellor denied, that the cause was the common cause of all crowned heads.
With those significant words he quits the stage. Five days later he was
dead.
Each step forward taken by Austria aggravated the warlike feeling
in the French legislature. But Delessart, through whom the government
communicated with foreign powers, mitigated everything, and avoided
provocation. Even the note of the 17th, which was delivered at Paris on
the 27th, produced no immediate commotion. But Narbonne thought the
time had come to carry into effect his policy of war, for the majority was
now with him. He threatened to resign unless Bertrand retired, who was
the king’s nominee among the six ministers; and he only withdrew his
threat at the instance of Lafayette and the other generals who were to be
in command. Lewis, indignant at this intrigue, dismissed not Bertrand,
but Narbonne. The Girondins, in reply, impeached Delessart, who was
sent to prison, March 10, and perished there in September. The Feuillant
minister resigned. Robespierre, who divined the calculations of the Court,
and feared that war might strengthen the arm that bore the banner, re-
sisted the warlike temper, and carried the Jacobins with him. On this
issue Girondins and Jacobins separated into distinct parties. The
Girondins inclined to an inevitable Republic, because they distrusted
the king; but they accepted the Constitution, and did not reject a king at
low pressure, such as had been invented by the Whigs. They were per-
suaded that, in case of war, Lewis would intrigue with the enemy, would
be detected, and would be at their mercy. “It is well that we should be
betrayed,” said Brissot, “because then we shall destroy the traitors.”
And Vergniaud, whose dignity and elevation of language have made
him a classic, pointed to the Tuileries and said, “Terror has too often
issued from that palace in the name of a despot. Let it enter, to-day, in
the name of the law.” They suspected, and suspected truly, that the men-
acing note from Vienna was inspired at Paris. They formed a new min-Lectures on the French Revolution/171
istry, with Dumouriez at the Foreign Office. Dumouriez gave Austria a
fixed term to renounce its policy of coercing France by a concert of
Powers; and as Kaunitz stood his ground, and upheld his former state-
ments of policy, on April 20 Lewis declared war against his wife’s
nephew, Francis, king of Hungary. Marie Antoinette triumphed, through
her influence on her own family. Formally it was not a war for her
deliverance, but a war declared by France, which might be turned to her
advantage. To be of use to her, it must be unsuccessful; and in order to
ensure defeat, she betrayed to the Court of Vienna the plan of operations
adopted in Council the day before.XIV: DUMOURIEZ
As the war was more often a cause of political events than a conse-
quence, it will be convenient to follow up the progress of military affairs
to the fall of Dumouriez, postponing the catastrophe of monarchy to
next week.
On the 17th of February 1792 Pitt informed the House of Commons
that the situation of Europe had never afforded such assurance of con-
tinued peace. He did not yet recognise the peril that lay in the new French
Constitution. Under that Constitution, no government could be deemed
legitimate unless it aimed at liberty, and derived its powers from the
national will. All else is usurpation; and against usurped authority, in-
surrection is a duty. The Rights of Man were meant for general applica-
tion, and were no more specifically French than the multiplication table.
They were not founded on national character and history, but on Rea-
son, which is the same for all men. The Revolution was essentially uni-
versal and aggressive; and although these consequences of its original
principle were assiduously repressed by the First Assembly, they were
proclaimed by the Second, and roused the threatened Powers to inter-
vene. Apart from this inflaming cause the motives of the international
conflict were indecisive. The emperor urged the affair of Avignon, the
injury to German potentates who had possessions in Alsace, the com-
plicity of France in the Belgian troubles, and the need of European con-
cert while the French denied the foundations of European polity.
Dumouriez offered to withdraw the French troops from the frontier,
if Austria would send no more reinforcements but at that moment the
queen sent word of an intended attack on Liége. The offer seemed per-
fidious, and envenomed the quarrel. Marie Antoinette despatched
Goguelat, the man who was not at his post on the flight to Varennes, to
implore intervention. She also gave Mercy her notions as to an Austrian
manifesto; and in this letter, dated April 30, there is no sign of alarm,
and no suggestion yet that France might be cowed by the use of exorbi-
tant menaces. Dumouriez, who desired war with Austria, endeavoured
to detach Prussia from the alliance. He invited the king to arbitrate in
the Alsatian dispute, and promised deference to his award. He proposed
that the prerogative should be enlarged, the princes indemnified, the
émigrés permitted to return. Frederic William was unmoved by these
advances. He relied on the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to com-
pensate both allies, and he expected to succeed, because his army wasLectures on the French Revolution/173
the most illustrious of all armies in Europe. He wished to restore the
émigrés who would support him against Austria, and the émigrés looked
to him to set up the order of society that had fallen. “Better to lose a
province,” they said, “than to live under a constitution.”
The allied army was commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, the
most admired and popular prince of his time. His own celebrity disabled
him. Many years ago Marshal Macmahon said to an officer, since in
high command at Berlin, that an army is best when it is composed of
soldiers who have never smelt gunpowder, of experienced non-commis-
sioned officers, and of generals with their reputation to make. Brunswick
had made his reputation under the great king, and he feared to compro-
mise it. Want of enterprise made him unfit for his position, although
nobody doubted his capacity. In France, they thought of him for the
command of their armies, and even for a still higher post. In spite of the
disasters I am about to describe, the Prussians believed in him, and he
was again their leader when they met Napoleon. The army which he led
across the Rhine fell short of the stipulated number by 35,000 men.
Francis, the new emperor, did not fulfil his engagements, and entered on
the expedition with divided counsels.
Kaunitz, who was eighty-two years of age, and knew the affairs of
Europe better than any other man, condemned the policy of his new
master. He represented that they did not know what they were going to
fight for; that Lewis had never explained what changes in the Constitu-
tion would satisfy him; that nothing could be expected from disaffec-
tion, and nothing could be done for a system which was extinct On
August 2 he resigned office, and made way for men who speculated on
the dismemberment of France, and expected to see a shrunken monar-
chy in the north and a confederate republic in the south.
The entire force brought together for the invasion amounted to about
80,000 men, of which half were Prussians. When they were assembled
on the Rhine, it became necessary to explain to the French people why
they were coming, and what they meant to do. Headquarters were at
Frankfort, when a confidential emissary from Lewis XVI, Mallet du
Pan, appeared on the scene. Mallet du Pan was neither a brilliant writer
like Burke and De Maistre and Gentz, nor an original and constructive
thinker like Sieyès; but he was the most sagacious of all the politicians
who watched the course of the Revolution. As a Genevese republican he
approached the study of French affairs with no prejudice towards mon-
archy, aristocracy, or Catholicism. A Liberal at first, like Mounier and174/John Acton
Malouet, he became as hostile as they; and his testimony, which had
been enlightened and wise, became morose and monotonous when his
cause was lost, until the Austrian statesmen with whom he corresponded
grew tired of his narrowing ideas. He settled in England, and there he
died. As he was not a man likely to propose a foolish thing, he was
heard with attention. He proposed that the allies should declare that they
were warring on Jacobinism, not on liberty, and would make no terms
until the king regained his rightful power. If he was injured, they would
inflict a terrible vengeance.
Whilst Mallet’s text was being manipulated by European diplomacy
at Frankfort, Marie Antoinette, acting through Fersen, disturbed their
counsels. The queen understood how to control her pen, and to repress
the language of emotion. But after June 20 she could not doubt that
another and a more violent outrage was preparing, and that the republi-
cans aimed at the death of the king. The terms in which she uttered her
belief outweighed the advice of the sober Genevese. “Save us,” she wrote,
“if it is yet time. But there is not a moment to lose.” And she required a
declaration of intention so terrific that it would crush the audacity of
Paris. Montmorin and Mercy were convinced that she was right. Malouet
alone among royalist politicians expected that the measure she proposed
would do more harm than good. Fersen, to whom her supplications were
addressed, employed an émigré named Limon to draw up a manifesto
equal to the occasion, and Limon, bearing credentials from Mercy, sub-
mitted his composition to the allied sovereigns. He announced that the
Republicans would be exterminated, and Paris destroyed. Already Burke
had written: “If ever a foreign prince enters into France, he must enter it
as into a country of assassins. The mode of civilised war will not be
practised; nor are the French, who act on the present system, entitled to
expect it.” Mallet du Pan himself had declared that there ought to be no
pernicious mercy, and that humanity would be a crime. In reality, the
difference between his tone and the fanatic who superseded him was not
a wide one.
The manifesto, which proceeded from the queen, which had the sanc-
tion of Fersen, of Mercy, of Bouillé, was accepted at once by the em-
peror. The Prussians introduced some alterations, and Brunswick signed
it on July 25. His mind misgave him at the time, and he regretted after-
wards that he had not died before he set his hand to it. Mercy, when it
was too late, wished to put another declaration in its place. The Prus-
sian ministers would not suffer the text to be published at Berlin. TheyLectures on the French Revolution/175
allowed the author to fall into poverty and obscurity. He had acted in the
spirit of the émigrés.
On July 27 the Princes issued a declaration of their own, to the
effect that not Paris only should suffer the extremity of martial law, but
every town to which the king might be taken if he was removed from the
capital. Breteuil, although he complained that the invaders exhibited an
intolerable clemency, disapproved the second proclamation. But Limon
demanded the destruction of Varennes, and the émigrés expected that
seventies should be inflicted on the population as they went along. The
idea of employing menaces so awful as to inspire terror at a distance of
300 miles was fatal to those who suggested it; but the danger was imme-
diate, and the consequences of inaction were certain, for the destined
assailants of the Tuileries were on the march from Toulon and Brest. It
was not so certain that the king would be unable to defend himself. The
manifesto was a desperate resource in a losing cause, and it is not clear
that wiser and more moderate words would have done better. The text
was not published at Paris until August 3. The allies were too far away
for their threats to be treated seriously, and they are not answerable for
consequences which were already prepared and expected. But their
manifesto strengthened the hands of Danton, assured the triumph of the
violent sections, and suggested the use to which terror may be put in
revolutions. It contributed to the fall of the monarchy, and still more to
the slaughter of the royalists three weeks later. The weapon forged by
men unable to employ it was adopted by their enemies, and served the
cause it was intended to destroy.
The Declaration united the French people against its authors. The
Republicans whom it threatened and denounced became the appointed
leaders of the national defence, and the cause of the Republic became
identified with the safety of the nation. In order to withstand the inva-
sion, and to preserve Paris from the fate of Jerusalem, the army gave
itself to the dominant faction. The royalist element vanished from its
ranks. Lafayette made one last attempt to uphold the Constitution, but
his men repulsed him. He went over to imperial territory, and was de-
tained in prison as the guilty author of the Revolution. Dumouriez suc-
ceeded to his command, and adhered to the new government. Out of
9000 officers in the king’s service, 6000 had resigned, and, for the most
part, had emigrated. Their places were filled by new men. In 1791,
100,000 volunteers had been enrolled, and enjoyed the privilege of elect-
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ferred it to the line, where discipline was sterner and elected command-
ers were unknown. The men who now rose from the ranks proved better
professional soldiers than the fine gentlemen whom they replaced. Tal-
ent could not fail to make its way. Those volunteer officers of 1791 and
1792 included most of the men whom the long war raised to eminence.
Seventeen of the twenty-six marshals of Napoleon were among them.
On the 19th of August, four months after war had been declared,
the allies entered France by the line of the Moselle. There was one French
army to their left at Metz, and another to their right along Vauban’s
chain of fortresses, with an undefended interval between. To widen the
gap they laid siege to Longwy, the nearest fortified place, and took it,
after a feeble resistance, on August 24. When the news spread there was
a moment of alarm, and the Council of Defence proposed to retire from
the capital. Danton declared that he would burn Paris to the ground
rather than abandon it to the enemy. Lavergne, who made so poor a
defence at Longwy, was afterwards condemned to death. He was dis-
heartened by disaster, but his wife cried out that she would perish with
him, and the judges granted her prayer. She strove to give him comfort
and courage along the way, and they were guillotined together.
From Longwy the Prussians advanced upon Verdun, which surren-
dered September 2, after one day’s bombardment, and there was not a
rampart between them and the capital. A few miles beyond Verdun the
roads to the west traversed the Argonne, a low wooded range of hills
pierced in five places by narrow defiles, easy to defend. Then came the
open country of Champagne, and the valley of the Maine, leading, with-
out a natural or artificial obstacle, to Paris.
On the 7th of September Pitt wrote that he expected Brunswick
soon to reach his goal. There was no enemy in his front, while on his
flank Dumouriez clung to his frontier strongholds, persuaded that he
would arrest the invasion if he threatened the Austrians at Brussels,
where they were weakened by recent insurrection and civil war. The
French government rejected his audacious project, and ordered him to
move on Châlons, and cover the heart of France. At Sedan, Dumouriez
could hear heavy firing at a distance, and knew that Verdun was at-
tacked, and could not hold out. He quickly changed his plan, postponing
Belgium, but not for long, and fell back on the passes of the forest that
he was about to make so famous. “They are the Thermopylae of France,”
he said, “but I mean to do better than Leonidas.”
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organised a new administration at Verdun, gave time for the French to
strengthen their position. Before moving forward, he pointed out on the
map the place where he intended to halt on the 16th, and men heard for
the first time the historic name, Valmy. On the 14th Clerfayt, with the
Austrians, forced one of the passes, and turned the French left. At night-
fall, Dumouriez evacuated his Thermopylae more expeditiously than
became a rival Leonidas, and established himself across the great road
to Châlons, opposite the southern defile of the Argonne, which extends
between Clermont and St. Ménehould, where Drouet rode in pursuit of
the king. His infantry encountered Prussian troopers and ran away. Ten
thousand men, he wrote, were put to flight by fifteen hundred hussars.
Napoleon said, at St. Helena, that he believed himself to be bolder
than any general that ever lived, but he would never have dared to hold
the position that Dumouriez took up. He was outnumbered, three to one.
He had been outmanceuvred, and driven from his fastness by the most
enterprising of the allied generals; and his recruits refused to face the
enemy. He never for a moment lost confidence in himself, for the time
wasted at Verdun had given him the measure of his opponents. He sum-
moned Kellermann, with the army of Metz, and Beurnonville, with 10,000
men, from Lille, and they arrived, just in time, on the 19th. Beurnonville,
when his telescope showed him a regular army in order of battle, took
alarm and fell back, thinking it must be Brunswick. It proved to be
Dumouriez; and on the morning of September 20 he was at the head of
53,000 men, with the allies gathering in his front. The Prussians had
come through the woods by the pass he had abandoned, and as they
turned to face him, they stood with their backs to the great Catalaunian
plain, which was traversed by the high road to Paris. They had been for
a month in France, and had met with no resistance. Lafayette had de-
serted. The military breakdown was so apparent that the colonel of in-
fantry, as he marched out of Longwy, threw himself into the river, and
the governor of Verdun blew out his brains.
Clerfayt’s success on the 14th and the rout of the following day
raised the hopes of the Germans, and they wrote on the 19th that they
were turning the enemy, and were sure of destroying him, if he was rash
enough to wait their attack. From his prison at Luxemburg Lafayette
urged them onward, and hinted that Dumouriez might be induced to
unite with them for the rescue of the king.
Therefore, on the morning of September 20, when the mist rose
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joy in the Prussian camp, and the battalions that had been trained at
Potsdam, under the eye of the great king, to the admiration of Europe,
received for the first time the republican fire. They were 34,000.
Kellermann opposed them with 36,000 men, and 40 guns against 58. It
soon appeared that things were not going as the invaders had expected.
The French soldiers were not frightened by the cannonade. Beurnonville
rode up to one of his regiments and told them to lie down, to make way
for shot. They refused to obey whilst he exposed himself on horseback.
After time had been allowed for artillery to produce its effect on repub-
lican nerve,the Prussian infantry made ready to attack. Gouvion St Cyr,
the only general of his time whom Napoleon acknowledged as his equal,
believed that the French would not have stood at close quarters. But the
word to advance was never given.
The secret of war, said Wellington, is to find out what is going on on
the other side of the hill. When Brunswick rode over the field some days
later, a staff officer asked him why he had not moved forward, He an-
swered, “Because I did not know what was behind the hill.” There was
Dumouriez’s reserve of 16,000 men. He had sent to the front as many as
were needed to fill Kellermann’s line, and left to his colleague the part
for which he was fitted. For his conduct that day Kellermann was named
a marshal of the Empire and duke of Valmy; but the whole world was
aware that the event was due to the brain of the man in the background.
When the French had lost 300 men without wavering, the Prussians
ceased firing, and broke off the engagement. Their loss was only 184.
Yet this third-rate and mediocre action is counted, with Waterloo and
Gettysburg, among the decisive battles of history; and Goethe was not
the only man there who knew that the scene before him was the begin-
ning of a new epoch for mankind. With 36,000 men and 40 guns the
French had arrested the advance of Europe, not by skilful tactics or the
touch of steel, but by the moral effect of their solidity when they met the
best of existing armies. The nation discovered that the Continent was at
its mercy, and the war begun for the salvation of monarchy became a
war for the expansion of the Republic. It was founded at Paris, and
consolidated at Valmy. Yet no military event was less decisive. The French
stood their ground because nobody attacked them, and they were not
attacked because they stood their ground. The Prussians suffered a stra-
tegic, though not a tactical defeat. By retiring to their encampment they
renounced the purposes for which they went to war, the province they
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advantage of numbers, and without superior numbers there could be no
dash for Paris.
The object of the invasion was unattainable by force, but something
might be got by negotiation, if it was undertaken before force had defi-
nitely failed. They were losing heavily, by disease and want, while French
recruits were pouring in. Therefore Dumouriez wished for time. The
king’s secretary had been captured, and he sent him with overtures,
representing that the intended advance upon Paris was hopeless, and
that Prussia had more interests in common with France than with Aus-
tria. Frederic William at once surrendered the original demands. He
made no stipulations now regarding the future government of France or
the treatment of the émigrés. He only demanded that Lewis should be
restored, in such manner as might seem good to France, and that the
propaganda of revolution should be put an end to. That propaganda was
one of the weapons by which the French checked and embarrassed the
champions of European absolutism, and it was obvious that it would
receive encouragement from their success at Valmy. And it was a point
of honour to speak for the imprisoned monarch. But it had become a
vain thing. Dumouriez produced a newspaper with the decree of the new
Assembly abolishing monarchy. It was hard to say what the allies were
now doing on French soil. “Only do something for the king,” said
Brunswick, “and we will go.” The Austrians would be satisfied if he
was only a stadtholder. Kellermann promised that peace might be ob-
tained if he was sent back to the Tuileries. It was all too late. The Prince,
in whose behalf the allies invaded France, was now a hostage in the
power of their enemies; all that they could obtain was a pledge not to
carry the revolution into foreign countries. Their position grew more
dangerous every day, and Dumouriez grew stronger.
At the end of September Frederic William abandoned Lewis to his
fate. He had contributed to his dethronement by entering France, and he
contributed to his execution by leaving it. He did not feel that he had
deserved so prodigious a humiliation. If the Austrians had joined as they
promised with 100,000 men, the march upon the capital would have
been conceivable with energetic commanders. And the king could justly
say that he had favoured spirited schemes, and had been baffled by the
faltering commander-in-chief. He attempted, by throwing out hints of
neutrality, to escape without further loss. Dumouriez calculated that
every attack would weld the allies more closely together, and refrained
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province, and retreated to the Rhine, pursued by a few random shots,
while Dumouriez hastened to Paris, to be hailed as the saviour of his
country.
The invasion of 1792 roused a crouching lion; and the French, after
their easy and victorious defence, went over to the attack. Whilst the
invaders were standing still, too weak to advance and too proud to with-
draw, the conquest of Europe began. The king of Sardinia, as the father-
in-law of the Comte d’Artois, had thrown himself into the counter-revo-
lutionary policy, and the scheme for attacking Lyons. Of all European
monarchs, since the murder of Gustavus, he was the most hostile. An
army under Montesquieu occupied Savoy and Nice without resistance,
and the people readily adopted the new system. A week later Custine
seized the left bank of the Rhine, where diminutive secular and ecclesi-
astical territories, without cohesion, were an easy prey. The Declaration
of Rights, said Gouverneur Morris, proved quite as effectual as the
trumpets of Joshua. Mentz fell, October 21, and Custine occupied Frank-
fort and replenished his military chest. This excursion into the middle of
the Empire was not authorised by State policy. The idea was already
taking shape that the safety of France required the defensible and his-
toric, or, as they unscientifically called it, the natural frontier of the
Rhine, and that the grand conflict with Austria should be transferred to
Italy. Germany was a nation of armed men, and was best let alone. In
Italy, the Austrians would have only their own resources for war. Their
most vulnerable point was the outlying principality of Belgium, so dis-
tant from Vienna and so near to Paris.
Dumouriez was now at liberty to deliver the stroke by which he had
hoped to stop the invasion, as Scipio drove Hannibal from Italy by land-
ing in Africa. By carrying the war in that direction he would occupy the
Imperialists, and would not excite the resentment of Prussia. The coun-
try had not long been pacified, and it presented the unusual feature that
Conservatives and Liberals alike were patriotic and rebellious. As a
place where disaffection would assist war, it was there that the process
of European revolution would properly begin. On October 19 Dumouriez
assumed the command of 70,000 men, in the region he had held before
his flank march to the Argonne. One of his lieutenants was the Peruvian
adventurer Miranda, whose mission it was to apply the movement in
Europe to the rescue of Spanish America. The other was known as Prince
Egalité, senior, whose wonderful future was already foreseen both by
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During the operations in Champagne the Austrians had begun the
siege of Lille, and at the turning of the tide they withdrew across the
frontier, and took up a strong position at Jemmapes, in front of Mons,
with 13,000 men. Clerfayt, again, was at their head; and when, on No-
vember 6, he saw the French army approaching, nearly 40,000 strong,
like Nelson in the hour of death he appeared in all his stars and gold
lace, that his men, seeing him, might take heart. He was defeated, and
the next evening, at the theatre of Mons, Dumouriez was acclaimed by
the Flemish patriots. A week later he was at Brussels, and before the
end of the month he was master of Belgium. Holland was undefended,
and he proposed to conquer it; but Antwerp was already in the power of
the French, and his government feared that England would come to the
defence of the Dutch. They directed him to march upon Cologne and
complete the conquest of the Rhine.
By a decree of November 19 the Convention proffered sympathy
and succour to every people that struck a blow for freedom; but the
cloven hoof of annexation soon appeared, and it was avowed that the
war would be carried on, that the financial needs of France might be
supplied, at the expense of the populations which the French arms deliv-
ered. These things offended the political, if not the moral sense of
Dumouriez. He became alienated from the Convention; and as England
went to war on the death of the king, there was no consideration of
policy protecting Holland. The invasion was undertaken, and immedi-
ately failed. The Austrians, under the duke of Coburg, who on that day
founded the great fortunes of his house, came back in force, and gave
battle at Neerwinden, close to the fields of Landen and of Ramillies.
Here, March 18, Clerfayt crushed Dumouriez’s left wing, and recov-
ered the Belgic provinces as suddenly as he had lost them four months
earlier.
Dumouriez had already resolved to treat with the Imperialists for
common action against the Regicides. Five days after his defeat he in-
formed Coburg that, with his support, he would lead his army against
Paris, disperse the Convention, and establish a constitutional monarchy
without the émigrés. He promised that the better part of his force would
follow him. The volunteers were Jacobinical; but the regulars were jeal-
ous of the volunteers, and would obey their general. As he felt his way,
hostile officers watched him, and reported what was going on in the
camp of the new Wallenstein. Twice the Jacobins attempted to avert the
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their head and overpower the Girondin majority, and they employed
men to assassinate him. At last they sent the minister of war, accompa-
nied by four deputies, to arrest him. There was to have been a fifth, but
he did not arrive in time, and his absence saved France. For Dumouriez
seized the envoys of the Convention, and handed them over to Coburg,
to be hostages for the life of the queen. The deputy who failed to appear
was Carnot. After that, Dumouriez was deserted by his men, and fled to
the Austrian camp. He survived for thirty years. He became one of the
shrewdest observers of Napoleon’s career, and was the confidential cor-
respondent of Wellington on the art they understood so well. The future
“king of the French,” who went over with him, remained true to his
chief during the strange vicissitudes of their lives; and at the Restora-
tion he asked that he should be made a marshal. “How could you think,”
was the proud comment of Dumouriez, “that they have forgotten the
Argonne?”
On the 20th of June in the following year Louis Philippe drove into
town from Twickenham to learn the news from the Low Countries. His
sons still know the spot where he found his old commander gesticulating
on the pavement at Hammersmith, and learned from him how the great
war, which began with their victory at Valmy, had ended under Napo-
leon at Waterloo.XV: THE CATASTROPHE OF MONARCHY
The calculations of the Girondins were justified by the event Four months
after the declaration of war the throne had fallen, and the king was in
prison. Next to Dumouriez the principal members of the new ministry
were the Genevese Clavière, one of Mirabeau’s advisers, and the pro-
moter of the assignats, Servan, a meritorious officer, better known to us
as a meritorious military historian; and Roland, whose wife shared, on a
lower scale, the social influence and intellectual celebrity of Madame de
Staël.
Dumouriez, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is one of the great fig-
ures of the Revolution. He was excessively clever rather than great,
agreeable, and abounding in resource, not only cool in danger, as a
commander should be, but steadfast and cheerful when hope seemed
lost, and ready to meet the veterans of Frederic with undisciplined vol-
unteers, and officers who were the remnant of the royal army. Without
principle or conviction or even scruple, he had none of the inhumanity
of dogmatic revolutionists. To the king, whom he despised, he said, “I
shall often displease you, but I shall never deceive you.” He was not an
accomplice of the conspiracy to compromise him and to ruin him by
war, and would have saved him if the merit and the reward had been his
own. He did not begin well, in the arts either of war or peace. He em-
ployed all his diplomacy, all his secret service money, in the endeavour
to make Prussia neutral. Nothing availed against the indignation of the
Prussians at French policy, and their contempt for French arms. The
officers received orders to make ready for a march to Paris, and were
privately told that it would be a mere parade. The first encounter with
Austrians on Belgian soil confirmed this persuasion, for the French turned
and fled, and murdered one of their generals.
Dumouriez’s credit was shaken, and the Girondin leaders, who could
not rely on him to make the coming campaign turn towards the execu-
tion of their schemes, revived the question of the clergy. On May 27
Vergniaud carried a decree placing non-jurors at the mercy of local au-
thorities, and threatening them with arbitrary expulsion as public en-
emies in time of national peril. If the king sanctioned, he would be iso-
lated and humiliated. If the king vetoed, they would have the means of
raising Paris against him, without waiting for the vicissitudes of war or
the co-operation of Dumouriez. Madame Roland wrote a letter to the
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the safety of the priests themselves that they should be sent out of the
way of danger. Roland, proud of the composition, sent it to the papers.
The Girondin ministry was at once dismissed. Dumouriez remained,
attempted to form an administration without the Girondin colleagues,
but could not overcome the king’s resistance to the act of banishment.
On June 15 he resigned office, and took a command on the frontier. The
majority in the Assembly was still faithful to the Constitution of 1791,
and opposed to further change; but the rejection of their decree against
the royalist clergy alienated them at the critical moment. Lewis had lost
ground with his friends; he had angered the Girondins; and he had lost
the services of the last man who was strong enough to save him.
On June 1 a high official in the administration of the department
was at Maubeuge, on a visit to Lafayette. His name was Roederer, and
we shall meet him again. He rose high under Napoleon, and is one of
those to whom we owe our knowledge of the Emperor’s character, as
well as of the events I am about to relate. His inter- view with the gen-
eral was interrupted by a message from Paris. Lafayette was called
away; and Roederer, from the next room, heard the joyful exclamations
of the officers. The news was the fall of the Girondin ministry; and
Lafayette, to strengthen the king’s hands, wrote to the Assembly remon-
strating against the illiberal and unconstitutional tendencies of the hour.
His letter was read on the 18th. A new ministry had been forming, con-
sisting of Feuillants and men friendly to Lafayette, one of whom, Ter-
rier de Montciel, enjoyed the confidence of the king. On the opposition
side were the Girondins angry and alarmed at their fall from power, the
more uncompromising Jacobins, Pétion at the head of the Commune,
and behind Pétion, the real master of Paris, Danton, surrounded by a
group of his partisans, Panis and Sergent in the police, Desmoulins and
Fréron in the press, leaders of the populace, such as Santerre and
Legendre, and above them all, the Alsatian soldier, Westermann.
With Danton and his following we reach the lowest stage of what
can still be called the conflict of opinion, and come to bare cupidity and
vengeance, to brutal instinct and hideous passion. All these elements
were very near the surface in former phases of the Revolution. At this
point they are about to prevail, and the man of action puts himself for-
ward in the place of contending theorists. Robespierre and Brissot were
politicians who did not shrink from crime, but it was in the service of
some form of the democratic system. Even Marat, the most ghastly of
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rocity was revolting and grotesque, even Marat was obedient to a logic
of his own. He adopted simply the state of nature and the primitive
contract, in which thousands of his contemporaries believed. The poor
had agreed to renounce the rights of savage life and the prerogative of
force, in return for the benefits of civilisation; but finding the compact
broken on the other side, finding that the upper classes governed in their
own interest, and left them to misery and ignorance, they resumed the
conditions of barbaric existence before society, and were free to take
what they required, and to inflict what punishment they chose upon men
who had made a profit of their sufferings. Danton was only a strong
man, who wished for a strong government in the interest of the people,
and in his own. In point of doctrine, he cared for little but the relief of
the poor by taxing the rich. He had no sympathy with the party that was
gathering in the background, whose aim it was not only to reduce in-
equalities, but to institute actual equality and the social level. There was
room beyond for more extreme developments of the logic of democracy;
but the greatest change in the modern world was wrought by Danton,
for it was he who overthrew the Monarchy and made the Republic.
When Lewis dismissed his ministers, Danton ex- claimed that the
time had come to strike terror, and on June 20 he fulfilled his threat. It
was the anniversary of the Tennis Court. A monster demonstration was
organised, to plant a tree of liberty or to present a petition in reality to
overawe the Assembly and the king. There was an expectation that the
king would perish in the tumult, but nothing definite was settled, and no
assassin was designated. It was enough that he should give way, aban-
don his priests, and receive his ministers from the populace. That was
all the Girondins required, and they would assent to no more. The king
would have to choose between them and their temporary confederates,
the Cordeliers. If he gave way, he would be spared; if he resisted, he
would be slain. It was not to be apprehended that he would resist and
would yet come out alive. The king understood the alternative before
him, made his choice, and prepared to die. After putting his house in
order, he wrote, on the 19th, that he had done with this world.
Lewis XVI had not ability to devise a policy or vigour to pursue it,
but he had the power of grasping a principle. He felt at last that the
ground beneath his feet was firm. He would drift no longer, sought no
counsel, and admitted no disturbing inquiries. If he fell, he would fall in
the cause of religion and for the rights of conscience. The proper name
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self; and was about to end as he had begun, in the character of a liberal
and reforming king. When the morning came, there was a moment of
hesitation. The pacific rioters asked what would happen if the guards
fired upon them. Santerre, who was at their head, replied, “March on,
and don’t be afraid; Pétion will be there.” They presented their petition,
defiled before the Assembly, and made their way to the palace. It was
not to be thought of that, after they had been admitted by the represen-
tatives of the nation, an inferior power should deny them access. One
barrier after another yielded, and they poured into the room where the
king awaited them, in the recess of a window, with four or five guards in
front of him. They shielded him well, for although there were men in the
crowd who struck at him with sword and pike, he was untouched. Their
cry was that he should restore Roland and revoke his veto, for this was
the point in common between the Girondins and their violent associates.
Legendre read an insulting address, in which he called the king a traitor.
The scene lasted more than two hours. Vergniaud and Isnard appeared
after some time, and their presence was a protection. At last Pétion
came in, borne aloft on the shoulders of grenadiers. He assured the mob
that the king would execute the will of the people, when the country had
shown that it agreed with the capital; he told them that they had done
their duty, and then, with lenient arts, turned them out.
That trying humiliation marks the loftiest moment in the reign of
Lewis XVI. He had stood there, with the red cap of liberty on his pow-
dered head, not only fearless, but cheerful and serene. He had been in
the power of his enemies and had patiently defied them. He made no
surrender and no concession while his life was threatened. The Girondins
were not recalled, and the movement failed. For the moment the effect
was injurious to the revolutionary party, and useful to the king. It was
clear that menace and outrage would not move him, and that more was
wanted than the half-hearted measures of the Gironde.
The outrage of June 20 was a contumelious reply to Lafayette’s
letter of the 16th, and the time had come for more than the writing of
letters. His letter had been well received, and the Assembly had ordered
it to be printed. The Girondins, by pretending that it could not be au-
thentic, had prevented a vote on the question of sending it to the depart-
ments. He could count on the Feuillant majority, on the ministry com-
posed of his partisans, on his popularity with the National Guard. As he
was at the head of an army, his advice to the king to adopt a policy of
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more, that he could never maintain his ground against the Prussians
unless there was a change in the state of things in the capital. On the
morning of June 28, immediately after his letter, he appeared in the
Assembly, and denounced the sowers of disorder who were disorganising
the State. Having obtained a vote of approval, by 339 to 234, he ap-
pealed to the National Guard to stand by him against his Jacobins. He
summoned a meeting of his friends, but the influence of the Court caused
it to fail, and he was compelled to return to his camp, having accom-
plished nothing. He imagined one chance more. He now put forward his
colleague, General Luckner, who was incompetent but, not being a poli-
tician, was not distrusted, and they were jointly to rescue the king, and
bring him to a city of refuge.
The revolutionists could now lay their plans without fear of the
army. They summoned fédérés from the departments for the anniver-
sary of July 14, and it was arranged that sturdy men should be sent from
Brest and Marseilles to be at their orders when they struck the final
blow. Paris could not be relied on. The failure there had been complete.
On June 21, and on the 25th, the Cordeliers attempted to renew, with
better effect, the attack which had been baffled by a divided purpose on
the 20th. But their men would not move. The minister, Montciel, gave
orders that the departments should not send fédérés to Paris, and he
succeeded in stopping all but a couple of thousand. Nothing could be
done until the contingents from the seaports arrived. The crisis was
postponed, and some weeks of July were spent in parliamentary war-
fare. Here the Girondins had the lead; but the Feuillants were the major-
ity in the Assembly, while the Jacobins were supreme in Paris. The
Girondins were driven into a policy both tortuous and weak. The Re-
public would give power to one of their enemies as the Monarchy gave
it to the other. All they could do was to increase hostile pressure on the
king, in the hope of bringing him to terms with them. They oscillated
between open attack and secret negotiation and offers of defence.
Lewis was inclined to accept a scheme for his deliverance which
was arranged by his ministers in conjunction with the generals. He was
to have been taken to Compiégne, within reach of the army. But the
army meant Lafayette, and Lafayette would only consent to restore the
king as the hereditary chief of a commonwealth, who should reign, but
should not govern. The queen refused to reign under such conditions, or
to be saved by such hands. The security for her was in power, not in
limitations to power. The sacred thing was the ancient Crown, not the188/John Acton
new Constitution. Lally Tollendal came over from England, conferred
with Malouet and Clermont Tonnerre, and exhorted her to consent Mor-
ris, whose ready pen had put the American Constitution into final shape
five years before, aided them in drawing up an amended scheme of gov-
ernment to be proclaimed when they should be free. But the strong will
and stronger passion of the queen prevailed. When all was accurately
combined, and the Swiss troops were on the march to the rendezvous,
the king revoked his orders, and on July 10 the Feuillant ministry re-
signed, and the Girondins saw power once more within their grasp. They
had vehemently denounced the king as the cause of all the troubles of
the State, and on July 6 the assault had been interrupted for a moment
by a scene of emotion, when the bishop of Lyons obtained a manifesta-
tion of unanimous feeling in the presence of the enemy.
On July 11 the Assembly passed a vote declaring the country in
danger, and on the 22nd it was proclaimed, to the sound of cannon. It
was a call to arms, and placed dictatorial power in the hands of govern-
ment Different plans were proposed to keep that power distinct from the
executive, and the idea which afterwards developed into the Committee
of Public Safety now began to be familiar. On July 14 the anniversary
of the Bastille and of the Federation of 1790 was celebrated on the
Champ de Mars; the king went up to the altar, where he swore fidelity to
the Constitution, with a heavy heart; and the people saw him in public
for the last time until they saw him on the scaffold. It was near the end
of July when the Girondins saw that the king would not take them back,
and that the risk of a Jacobin insurrection, as much against them as
against the throne, was fast approaching. Their last card was a regency,
to be directed by them in the name of the Dauphin. Vergniaud suggested
that the king should summon four conspicuous members of the Con-
stituent Assembly to his Council, without office, to make up for the
obscurity of his new ministers. At that moment Brunswick’s declaration
became known, some of the forty-eight sections in which the people of
Paris deliberated demanded the dethronement of the king, and the
Marseillais, arriving on the 30th, five or six hundred strong, made it
possible to accomplish it.
These events, coinciding almost to a day, conveyed power from the
Assembly to the municipality, and from the Girondins to the Jacobins,
who had the municipality in their hands, and held the machinery that
worked the sections. In a letter written to be laid before the king,
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allies who were in arms for his sake, and whose success would be so
favourable to his authority. That was the argument to which no royalist
could reply. The country was in danger, and the cause of the danger was
the king. The Constitution had broken down on June 20. The king could
not devote himself to the maintenance of a system which exposed him to
such treatment, and enabled his adversaries to dispose of all forces in a
way that left him at the mercy of the most insolent and the most infa-
mous of the rabble. He had not the instincts of a despot, and would
easily have been made content with reasonable amendments. But the
limit of the changes he sought was unknown, unsettled, unexplained,
and he was identified simply with the reversal of the Constitution he
was bound by oath to carry out
The queen, a more important person than her husband, was more
openly committed to reaction. The failure of the great experiment drove
her back to absolutism. As she repudiated the émigrés in 1791, so she
now repudiated the constitutionalists, and chose rather to perish than to
owe her salvation to their detested aid. She looked for deliverance only
to the foreigners slowly converging on the Moselle. Her agents had ex-
cluded a saving allusion to constitutional liberty in the manifesto of the
Powers; and she had dictated the threats of vengeance on the inhabitants
of Paris.
The king himself had called in the invaders. His envoy, concealed in
the uniform of a Prussian major, rode by the side of Brunswick. His
brothers were entering France with the heavy baggage of the enemies,
and Breteuil, the agent whom he trusted more than his brothers, was
preparing to govern, and did in September govern, the provinces they
occupied, under the shelter of their bayonets. For him the blow was
about to fall not for his safety, but for his plenary authority. The pur-
pose of the allied sovereigns, and of the émigrés who prompted them,
stood confessed. They were fighting for unconditional restoration, and
both as invaders and as absolutists the king was their accomplice. The
country could not make war with confidence, if the military power was
in the hands of traitors. The king could protect them from the horrors
with which they were threatened on his account, not as the head of the
executive, but as a hostage. He was a danger in his palace; he would be
a security in prison. All this was obvious at the time, and the effect it
had was to disable and disarm the friends of the constitutional king, so
that no resistance was offered when the attack came, although it was the
act of a very small part of the population. The Girondins no longer190/John Acton
displayed a distinct policy, and scarcely differed from their former asso-
ciates, of June, except by their wish to suspend the king, and not to
dethrone him. The final question, as to monarchy, regency, or republic,
was to be left to the Convention that was to follow. Pétion was per-
suaded that he would soon be the Regent of France. He received a large
sum of money from the Court; and it was in reliance on him, and on
some less conspicuous men, that the king and queen remained obsti-
nately in Paris. At the last moment Liancourt offered them a haven in
Normandy; but Liancourt was a Liberal of the Constituante, and there-
fore unforgiven. Marie Antoinette preferred to trust to Pétion and
Santerre.
Early in August the most revolutionary section of Paris decided that
the king should be deposed. The Assembly rescinded the vote. Then the
people of that section and some others made known that they would
execute their own decree, unless the Assembly itself made it unneces-
sary and accomplished legally what would otherwise be done by the act
of the sovereign people, superseding all powers and standing above law.
Time was to be allowed until August 9. If the king was still on the
throne upon the evening of that day, the people of Paris would sound the
tocsin against him.
On August 8 the Assembly came to a vote on the conduct of
Lafayette, in abandoning his army in time of war to threaten his enemies
at home. He was justified by 406 votes to 224. It was the last appear-
ance of the Liberal party. Four hundred deputies, a majority of the en-
tire body, kept out of the way in the moment of danger, and allowed the
Girondin and republican remnant to proceed without them. The absolu-
tion of Lafayette proclaimed the resolve not to dethrone the king. The
Gironde had no constitutional remedy for its anxieties. The next step
would be taken by the democracy of Paris, and their victory would be a
grave danger to the Gironde and a triumph for the extreme revolution-
ary faction. Up to this time they had struggled for mastery; they would
now have to struggle for existence. They accepted what was inevitable.
After the flight of the Feuillants, the Gironde, now supreme in the legis-
lature, capitulated to the revolution which they dreaded, and appeared
without initiative or policy.
On August 9 the Jacobin leaders settled their plan of action. Their
partisans in each section were to elect three commissaries to act with the
Commune for the public good, and to strengthen, and, if necessary, even-
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sent them, and they assembled in the course of the night at the Hôtel de
Ville, apart from the legal body. In the political science of the day, the
constituency suspended the constituted authorities and resumed all del-
egated powers. The revolutionary town-councillors, who now came to
the front, are the authors of the atrocities that afflicted France during
the next two years. They were creatures of Danton. And as we now
enter the company of malefactors and the Chamber of Horrors, we must
bear this in mind, that our own laws punish the slightest step towards
absolute government with the same supreme penalty as murder; so that
morally the difference between the two extremes is not serious. The
agents are ferocious ruffians, and the leaders are no better; but they are
at the same time influenced by republican convictions, as respectable as
those of the émigrés. The function of this supplementary Commune was
not to lead the insurrection or direct the attack, but to disable the de-
fence; for the commander of the National Guard received his orders
from the Hôtel de Ville, and he was a loyal soldier.
The forces of the Revolution were not overwhelming. The men from
Marseilles and Brest were intent on fighting, and so were some from the
departments. But when the tocsin rang from the churches soon after
midnight, the Paris combatants assembled slowly, and the event might
be doubtful. Ammunition was supplied to the insurgent forces from the
Hôtel de Ville, but not to the National Guard. It is extremely dangerous,
said Pétion, to oppose one public force to another. At the Tuileries there
were less than a thousand Swiss mercenaries, who were sure to do their
duty; one or two hundred gentlemen, come to defend the king; and sev-
eral thousand National Guards of uncertain fidelity and valour. Pétion
showed himself at the palace, and at the Assembly, and then was seen no
more. By a happy inspiration he induced Santerre to place him under
arrest, with a guard of four hundred men to protect him from the dan-
gers of responsibility. He himself tells the story, and is mean enough to
boast of his ingenuity. But if the mayor was a traitor and a coward, the
commanding general, Mandat, knew his duty, and was resolved to do it.
He prepared for the defence of the palace, and there was great probabil-
ity that his men would fight. If they did, they were strong enough to
repulse attack. Therefore, early in the morning of August 10, Mandat
was summoned by his lawful superiors to the Hôtel de Ville. He ap-
peared before them, made his report, and was then taken to the revolu-
tionary committee sitting separately. He declared that he had orders to
repel force by force, and that it would be done. They required. him to192/John Acton
sign an order removing half of the National Guard from the place they
were to defend. Mandat refused to save his life by an act of treachery,
and by Danton’s order he was shot dead. He was in flagrant insurrection
against the people themselves and abetting constituted authorities in re-
sist- ance to their master. By this first act of bloodshed the defence of
the palace was deprived of half its forces. The National Guards were
without a commander, and, left to themselves, it was uncertain how
many would fire on the people of Paris.
Having disposed of the general commanding, the new Commune
appointed Santerre to succeed him, and then took the place of the former
Commune. There was no obstacle now to the concentration and ad-
vance of the insurgents, and they appeared in the space between the
Louvre and the Tuileries, which was crowded with private houses. It
was between seven and eight in the morning. All night long the royal
family expected to be attacked, and the king did nothing. Some thou-
sands of Swiss were within reach, at Courbevoie, and were not brought
up in time. At last, surrounded by his family, the king made a forlorn
attempt to rouse his guards to combat. It was an occasion memorable
for all time, for it was the last stand of the monarchy of Clovis. His
wife, his children, his sister were there, their lives depending on the
spirit which, by a word, by a glance, he might infuse into the brave men
before him. The king had nothing to say, and the soldiers laughed in his
face. When the queen came back, tears of rage were bursting from her
eyes. ‘He has been deplorable,” she said, “and all is lost” Others soon
came to the same conclusion. Roederer went amongst the men, and found
them unwilling to fight in such a cause. He was invested with authority
as a high official; and although the ministers were present, it was he
who gave the law. The disappearance of Mandat and the hesitation of
the artillery convinced him that there was no hope for the defenders.
There was a looker-on who lived to erect a throne in the place of the
one that fell that day, and to be the next sovereign who reigned at the
Tuileries. In 1813 Napoleon told Roederer that he had watched the scene
from a window on the Carrousel, and assured him that he had made a
fatal mistake. Many of the National Guard were staunch, and the royal
forces were superior to those with which he himself conquered in
Vendémiaire. He thought that the defence ought to have been victorious.
I do not suppose he seriously resented the blunder to which he owed so
much. Roederer was a clever man, and there is some reason to doubt
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flict. The queen was eager to fight, and spoke brave words to every one.
Afterwards, when she heard the cannonade from her refuge in the
reporter’s box, she said to d’Hervilly: “Well, do you think now that we
were wrong to remain in Paris?” He answered, “God grant, madam,
that you may not repent of it!” Roederer had detected what was passing
in her mind. Defeat would be terrible, for nothing could save the royal
family. But victory would also be a perilous thing for the revolution, for
it would restore the monarchy in its power, and the old nobles collected
in the palace would gain too much by it They were indeed but a residue:
7000 had been expected to appear at the supreme moment; there were
scarcely 120. Charette, the future hero of Vendée, was among them,
unconscious yet of his extraordinary gifts for war.
Roederer, vigorously backed by his colleagues of the department,
informed the king of what he had seen and heard, assured him that the
Tuileries could not be defended with the forces present, and that there
was no safety except in the Assembly, the only authority that was re-
garded. It was but two days since the deputies, by an immense majority,
had approved the act of Lafayette. He thought they might be trusted to
protect the king. As there was nothing left to fight for, he affirmed that
those who remained behind would be in no danger. He would not allow
the garrison to retire, and he left the Swiss, without orders, to their fate.
Marie Antoinette resisted vehemently, and Lewis was not easy to con-
vince. At last he said that there was nothing to be done, and gave orders
to set out. But the queen in a fury turned upon him, and exclaimed:
“Now I know you for what you are!” Lewis told his valet to wait his
return; but as they crossed the garden, where the men were sweeping the
gravel, he remarked: “The leaves are falling early this year.” Roederer
heard, and understood.
A newspaper had said that the throne would not last to the fall of the
leaf; and it was by those trivial but significant words that the fallen
monarch acknowledged the pathetic solemnity of the moment, and indi-
cated that the footsteps which took him away from his palace would
never be retraced. A deputation met him at the door of the Assembly,
and he entered, saying that he came there to avert a great crime. The
Feuillants were absent. The Girondins predominated, and the president,
Vergniaud, received him with stately sentences. From his retreat in the
reporter’s box he placidly watched the proceedings. Verguiaud also moved
that he be suspended, as he had been before, and that a Convention
should be convoked, to pronounce on the future government of France.194/John Acton
It was decided that the elections should be held without a property quali-
fication. Roland and the other Girondin ministers returned to their former
posts, and Danton was appointed Minister of Justice by 222 votes. For
Danton was the victor. While Pétion kept out of the way, it was he who
issued commands from the Hôtel de Ville, and when Santerre faltered, it
was Danton’s friend Westermann who brought up his men to the tryst at
the Carrousel. After the king was gone they made their way into the
Tuileries, holding parley with the defenders. If there had been anybody
left to give orders, bloodshed might have been averted. But the tension
was extreme; the Swiss refused to surrender their arms; a shot was
fired, and then they lost patience and fell upon the intruders. In ten
minutes they cleared the palace and the courtyard. But the king heard
the fusillade, and sent orders to cease firing. The bearer of the order was
d’Hervilly; but he had the heart of a soldier; and finding the position by
no means desperate, he did not at once produce it. When he did, it was
too late. The insurgents had penetrated by the long gallery of the Lou-
vre, near the river, and then there was no escape for the Swiss. They
were killed in the palace, and in the gardens, and their graves are under
the tall chestnuts. Of the women, some were taken to prison, and some
to their homes. The conquerors slaked their thirst in the king’s wine, and
then flooded the cellars, lest some fugitive aristocrat should be lurking
underground. Their victims were between 700 and 800 men, and about
140 of the assailants had fallen.
The royalists did not at first perceive that the monarchy was at an
end. They imagined that the king was again in the same condition as
after Varennes, only occupying the Luxembourg instead of the Tuileries,
and that he would be again restored, as the year before. The majority of
the Legislature was loyal, and it was hoped that France would resent the
action of the capital. But Paris, represented by the intruding municipal-
ity, held its prey. The allowance promised by the Assembly was sup-
pressed, and the Temple was substituted for the Luxembourg which was
deemed unsafe because of the subterranean galleries. A sum of £20,000
was voted for expenses, until the Convention in September disposed of
the king.
With no severer effort than the signing of an order, Lewis might
have called up other regiments of Swiss, who would have made the
stronghold of monarchy impregnable. And it would have been in his
power, before sunset that day, to march out of Paris at the head of a
victorious army, and at once to proclaim reforms which enlightenedLectures on the French Revolution/195
statesmen had drawn up. His queen was active and resolute; but she had
learnt, in adversity, to think more of the claims of authority and the
historic right of kings. She shared Burke’s passionate hatred for men
whose royalism was conditional. At every step downward they were the
authors of their own disaster. The French Republic was not a spontane-
ous evolution of social elements. The issue between constitutional mon-
archy, the richest and most flexible of political forms, and the Republic
one and indivisible (that is, not federal), which is the most rigorous and
sterile, was decided by the crimes of men, and by errors more inevitably
fatal than crime. There is another world for the expiation of guilt; but
the wages of folly are payable here below.XVI: THE EXECUTION OF THE KING
The constitutional experiment, first tried on the Continent under Lewis
XVI, failed mainly through distrust of the executive and a mechanical
misconstruction of the division of power. Government had been inca-
pable, the finances were disordered, the army was disorganised; the
monarchy had brought on an invasion which it was now the mission of
the Republic to repel. The instinct of freedom made way for the instinct
of force, the Liberal movement was definitely reversed, and the change
which followed the shock of the First European Coalition was more
significant, the angle more acute, than the mere transition from royal to
republican forms. Unity of power was the evident need of the moment,
and as it could not be bestowed upon a king who was in league with the
enemy, it had to be sought in a democracy which should have concentra-
tion and vigour for its dominant note. Therefore supremacy was assured
to that political party which was most alert in laying its grasp on all the
resources of the State, and most resolute in crushing resistance. More
than public interests were at stake. Great armies were approaching,
guided by vindictive émigrés, and they had announced the horrors they
were prepared to inflict on the population of Paris.
Beyond the rest of France the Parisians were interested in the cre-
ation of a power equal to the danger, and were ready to be saved even by
a dictatorship. The need was supplied by the members of the new mu-
nicipality who expelled the old on the night of August 9. They were
instituted by Danton. They appointed Marat their organ of publicity.
Robespierre was elected a member of the body on August 11. It was the
stronghold of the Revolution. Strictly, they were an illegal assembly,
and their authority was usurped ; but they were masters of Paris, and
had dethroned the king. The Legislative, having accepted their action,
was forced to obey their commandments, and to rescind its decrees at
their pleasure. By convokirig the constituencies to elect a Convention, it
had annulled itself. It was no more than a dying assembly whose days
were exactly numbered, and whose credit and influence were at an end.
Between a king who was deposed and an assembly that abdicated,
the Commune alone exhibited the energy and force that were to save the
country. Being illegitimate, they could quell opposition only by vio-
lence; and they made it clear what violence they meant to use when they
gave an office to Marat. This man had been a writer on science, and
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is remarkable for the absence of any allusion to his public career. But he
considered that the rich have no right to enjoyments of which the masses
are deprived, and that the guilt of selfishness and oppression could only
be expiated by death. A year before he had proposed that obnoxious
deputies should be killed by torture, and their quarters nailed to the
walls as a hint to their successors. He now desired to reconcile mercy
with safety, and declared himself satisfied if the Assembly was deci-
mated. For royalists, and men who had belonged to privileged orders, he
had no such clemency. If, he said, the able-bodied men become soldiers
and are sent to guard the frontier, who is to protect us from traitors at
home? Either thousands of fighting men must be kept away from the
army in the field, or the internal enemy must be put out of the way. On
August 19 Marat began to employ this argument, and a company of
recruits protested against being sent to the front whilst their families
were at the mercy of the royalists. The cry became popular that France
would be condemned to fight her enemies with one arm, if she had to
guard the traitors with the other. And this was the plea provided to
excuse the crimes that were about to follow. It was the plea, but not the
motive. If the intended destruction of royalists could be represented as
an act of war, as a necessity of national defence, moderate men would
be unable to prevent it without incurring reproach as unpatriotic citi-
zens.
When the Jacobins prepared the massacre in the prisons, their pur-
pose was to fill France with terror and to secure their majority in the
Convention. That is the controlling idea that governed the events of the
next few weeks. After the decree which assigned the Luxemburg palace
as a residence to the king, the Commune claimed him; and he was deliv-
ered up to them, and confined in the Temple, the ancient fortress in
which the Valois kept their treasure. They proceeded to suppress the
newspapers that were against them, disfranchised the voters who had
signed opposing or reactionary petitions, and closed the barriers. They
threw their enemies into prison, erected a new tribunal for the punish-
ment of crimes against the Revolution, and supplied it with a new and
most efficient instrument which executed its victims painlessly, expedi-
tiously, and on terms conforming to the precept of equality. From the
moment of his appearance at the Hôtel de Ville, the day after the fight
was over, Robespierre became the ruling spirit and the organiser, and it
was felt at once that, behind the declamations and imprecations of Marat,
there was a singularly methodical, consistent, patient, and systematic198/John Acton
mind at work, directing the action of the Commune.
The fall of Longwy was known at Paris on August 26. On that day
the Minister of Justice, Danton, revised the list of prisoners; domiciliary
visits were carried out, all over the city, to search for arms, and for
suspected persons. Nearly 3000 were arrested by the 28th, and a thing
still more ominous was that many prisoners were released. Nobody
doubted, nobody seriously denied, the significance of these measures.
The legislature, seeing that this was not the mere frenzy of passion, but
a deliberate and settled plan, dissolved the Commune, August 30, and
ordered that it should be renewed by a fresh election. They also restored
the governing body of the department, as a check on the municipality.
They had the law and constitution on their side, and their act was an act
of sovereignty. It was the critical and deciding moment in the struggle
between the Girondins and the Hôtel de Ville. On the following day,
August 31, the Assembly revoked the decree. Tallien read an address,
drawn up by Robespierre, declaring that the Commune, just instituted
by the people of Paris, with a fresh and definite mandate, could not
submit to an assembly which had lost its powers, which had allowed the
initiative to pass away from it. The Assembly was entirely helpless, and
was too much com- promised by its complicity since the 10th of August
to resist its master. Robespierre, at the Commune, threatened the
Girondins with imprisonment, and, to complete their discomfiture,
Brissot’s papers were examined, and Roland, Minister of the Interior,
was subjected to the same indignity.
In the last days of August, whilst every house was being searched
for fugitives, the primary elections were held. The Jacobins were much
opposed to the principle of indirect election, but they did not succeed in
abolishing it. They instituted universal suffrage for the first stage, and
they gave to the primary assemblies a veto on the choice of the second.
For the rest, they relied on intimidation. The 800 electors met at the
bishop’s palace on September 2. But here there was no stranger’s gal-
lery, and it was requisite that the nominees of the people should act in
the presence of the public that nominated them to do its work. Robespierre
proposed that the electoral body should hold its sittings at the Jacobin
Club, in the full enjoyment of publicity. On the following day they met
at the same place, and proceeded to the Jacobins; Their way led them
over the bridge, where a spectacle awaited them which was carefully
calculated to assist their deliberations. They found themselves in the
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prison.
For this is what had happened. On the 2nd of September Verdun
had fallen. This was not yet known at Paris; but it was reported that the
Prussians had appeared before the fortress, and that it could not hold
out. Verdun was the last barrier on the road to Paris, and the first scene
of the war in Belgium made it doubtful whether the new levies would
stand their ground against battalions that had been drilled by Frederic.
Alarm guns were fired, the tocsin sounded, the black flag proclaimed
that the country was in danger, and the men of Paris were summoned by
beat of drum to be enrolled for the army of national defence.
Danton, who knew English, and read English books, seems to have
remembered a passage in Spenser, when he declared that France must
be saved at Paris, and told his terrified hearers to be bold, to be bold,
and again to be bold. Then he went off to see to the enrolments, and left
the agents of the Commune to accomplish the work appointed for the
day. Twenty-four prisoners at the Maine were removed to the Abbaye,
which was the old Benedictine monastery of St. Germain, in hackney
coaches; twenty-two of them were priests. Lewis XVI. had fallen be-
cause he refused to proscribe the refractory clergy who were accused of
spreading discontent Beyond all men they were identified with the lost
cause, and it had been decided that they should be banished. They were
imprisoned in large numbers, as a first step towards their expulsion.
That group, escorted by Marseillais from the Maine to the Abbaye,
were the first victims. The people, who did not love them, let them pass
through the streets without injury; but when they reached their destina-
tion, the escorting Marseillais began to plunge their swords into the
carriages, and all but three were killed. Two made their way into a room
where a commission was sitting, and, by taking seats among the rest,
escaped. Sicard, the teacher of the deaf and dumb, was recognised and
saved: and it is through him that we know the deeds that were done that
day. They were directed by Maillard who proceeded from the abbey to
the Carmelites, a prison filled with ecclesiastics, where he sent for the
Register, and had them murdered orderly and without tumult There was
a large garden, and sixteen of the prisoners climbed over the wall and
got away; fourteen were acquitted; 120 were put to death, and their
bones are collected in the chapel, and show the sabre cuts by which they
died.
During the absence of Maillard, which lasted three hours, certain
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proposed to go on with the work of extermination which he had left
unfinished. The gaolers were obliged to deliver up a few prisoners, to
save time. When Maillard returned, he established a sort of tribunal for
the trial of prisoners, while the murderers, in all something under 200,
waited outside and slaughtered those that were given up to them. In the
case of the clergy, and of the Swiss survivors of the 4th of August, little
formality was observed. At the Abbaye, and at La Force, there were
many political prisoners, and of these a certain number were elaborately
absolved. Several prisons were left unvisited ; but at Bicêtre and the
Saltpêtrière, where only the most ignoble culprits were confined, fright-
ful massacres took place.
As this was utterly pointless and unmeaning, it has given currency
to the theory that all the horrors of that September were the irrational
and spontaneous act of some hundreds of gaolbirds, whose eyes were
stained with the vision of blood, and who ran riot in their impunity. So
that criminal Paris, not revolutionary Paris, was to blame. In reality, the
massacres were organised by the Commune, paid for by the Commune,
and directed by its emissaries. We know how much the various agents
received, and what was the cost of the whole, from the 2nd of Septem-
ber to the 5th. At first, all was deliberate and methodical, and the women
were spared. Several were released at the last moment; some were dis-
missed by the tribunal before which they appeared. The exception is the
Princess de Lamballe, who was the friend of the queen. But as Madame
de Tourzel was spared, the cause of her death remains unexplained. Her
life had not been entirely free from reproach; and it has been supposed
that she was in possession of secrets injurious to the duke of Orleans.
But the problem is not to know why murderers were guilty of mur-
der, but how they allowed many of their captives to be saved. One man
made friends with a Marseillais by talking in his native patois. When
asked what he was, he replied, “A hearty royalist!” Thereupon Maillard
raised his hat and said, “We are here to judge actions, not opinions,”
and the man was received with acclamation outside by the thirsty ex-
ecutioners. Bertrand, brother of the royalist minister, had the same re-
ception. Two men interrupted their work to see him home. They waited
outside whilst he saw his family, and then went away, thanking him for
the sight of so much happiness, and refusing a reward. Another prisoner
was taken to his house in a cab, with half a dozen dripping patriots
crowded on the roof, and hanging on behind. They would accept noth-
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the foster-brother of the queen. He had been on guard at the Tuileries,
and was by her side on the funereal march across the gardens from
palace to prison. As he well knew what she was leaving, and to what she
was going, he was so overcome that Princess Elizabeth whispered to
him to control his feelings and be a man. Yet he was one of those who
lived to tell the tale of his appearance before the dread tribunal of
Maillard. When he was acquitted, the expectant cutthroats were wild
with enthusiasm. They cheered him; they gave him the fraternal acco-
lade; they uncovered as he passed along the line; and a voice cried,
“Take care where he walks! Don’t you see he has got white stockings
on?”
One acquittal is remembered beyond all the rest In every school and
in every nursery of France the story continues to be told how Sombreuil,
the governor of the Invalides, was acquitted by the judges, but would
have been butchered by the mob outside if his daughter had not drunk to
the nation in a glass filled with the warm blood of the last victim. They
were taken home in triumph. Sombreuil perished in the Reign of Terror.
His daughter married, and died at Avignon in 1823, at the height of the
royalist reaction. The fame of that heroic moment in her life filled the
land, and her heart was brought to Paris, to be laid in the consecrated
ground where she had worshipped as a child, and it rests under the same
gilded canopy that covers the remains of Napoleon. Many people be-
lieve that this is one of the legends of royalism which should be strung
with the mock pearls of history. No contemporary mentions it, and it
does not appear before 1801. Mlle. de Sombreuil obtained a pension
from the Convention, but this was not included in the statement of her
claims. An Englishman, who witnessed the release of Sombreuil, only
relates that father and daughter were carried away swooning from the
strain of emotion. I would not dwell on so well-worn an anecdote if I
believed that it was false. The difficulty of disbelief is that the son of the
heroine wrote a letter affirming it, in which he states that his mother was
never afterwards able to touch a glass of red wine. The point to bear in
mind is that these atrocious criminals rejoiced as much in a man to save
as in a man to kill. They were servants of a cause, acting under author-
ity.
Robespierre, among the chiefs, seems to have aimed mainly at the
destruction of the priests. Others proposed that the prisoners should be
confined underground, and that water should be let in until they were
drowned. Marat advised that the prisons should be bumt, with their202/John Acton
inmates. “The 2nd of September,” said Collot d’Herbois, “ is the first
article of the creed of Liberty. Without it there would be no National
Convention.” “France,” said Danton, in a memorable conversation, “is
not republican. We can only establish a Republic by the intimidation of
its enemies.” They had crushed the Legislature, they had given warning
to the Germans that they would not save the king by advancing on the
capital when it was in the hands of men capable of such deeds, and they
had secured a Jacobin triumph at the Paris election. Marat prepared an
address exhorting the departments to imitate their example, and it was
sent out under cover from the Ministry of Justice. Danton himself sent
out the same orders. Only one copy seems to have been preserved, and it
might have been difficult to determine the responsibility of Danton, if he
had not avowed to Louis Philippe that he was the author of the massa-
cres of September.
The example of Paris was not widely followed, but the State prison-
ers at Orleans were brought to Versailles, and there put to death. The
whole number killed was between thirteen and fourteen hundred. We
have touched low-water mark in the Revolution, and there is nothing
worse than this to come. We are in the company of men fit for Tyburn.
I need spend no words in impressing on you the fact that these republi-
cans began at once with atrocities as great as those of which the abso-
lute monarchy was justly accused, and for which it justly perished. What
we have to fix in our thoughts is this, that the great crimes of the Revo-
lution, and crimes as great as those in the history of other countries, are
still defended and justified in almost every group of politicians and his-
torians, so that, in principle, the present is not altogether better than the
past.
The massacre was successful at Paris, but not in the rest of France.
Under its influence none but Jacobins were elected in the capital. Presi-
dent and vice-president of the Electoral Assembly were Robespierre and
Collot d’Herbois, with Marat for secretary. Robespierre was the first
deputy returned, Danton was second, Collot third, Manuel fourth,
Billaud-Varennes fifth, Camille Desmoulins sixth, and Marat seventh,
with a majority over Priestley, who was chosen in two departments, but
refused the seat The twentieth and last of the deputies for Paris was the
duke of Orleans.
While the people of Paris sanctioned and approved the murders, it
was not the same in the country. In many places the proceedings began
with mass, and concluded with a Te Deum. Seventeen bishops were sentLectures on the French Revolution/203
to the Convention, and thirty-one priests. Tom Paine, though he could
not speak French, was elected in four places. Two-thirds were new mem-
bers, who had not sat in the previous assemblies. Four-fifths of the pri-
mary electors abstained.
The Convention began its sittings, September 20, in the Riding
School, where the Legislative had met; in the month of May 1793 it
adjourned to the Tuileries. There were about fifty or sixty Jacobins. The
majority, without being Girondins, were prepared generally to follow, if
the Girondins led. Pétion was at once elected president, and all the six
secretaries were on the same side. The victory of the Gironde was com-
plete. It had the game in its hands. The party had little cohesion and, in
spite of the whispered counsels of Sieyès, no sort of tactics. Excepting
Buzot, and perhaps Vergniaud, they scarcely deserve the interest they
have excited in later literature, for they had no principles. Embarrassed
by the helpless condition of the Législative, they made no resistance to
the massacres. When Roland, Condorcet, Gorsas, spoke of them in public,
they described them as a dreadful necessity, an act of rude but inevitable
justice. Roland, Minister of the Interior, had some of the promoters to
dine with him while the bloodshed was going on, and he proposed to
draw a decent veil over what had passed. Such men were unfit to com-
pete with Robespierre in ruth- less villainy, but they were equally unfit
to denounce and to expose him. That was the policy which they at-
tempted, and by which they perished.
The movement towards a permanent Republic was not pronounced,
beyond the barrier of Paris. The constituencies made no demand for it,
except the Jura. Two others declared against monarchy. Thirty-four de-
partments gave no instructions; thirty-six gave general or unlimited pow-
ers. Three, including Paris, required that constitutional decrees should
be submitted to popular ratification. The first act of the Convention was
to adopt that new principle. By a unanimous vote, on the motion of
Danton, they decided that the Constitution must be accepted by the na-
tion in its primary assemblies. But some weeks later, October 16, when
Manuel proposed to consult the people on the question of a Republic,
the Convention refused. The abolition of monarchy was carried, Sep-
tember 21, without any discussion ; for the history of kings, said Bishop
Grégoire, is the martyrology of nations. On the 22nd the Republic was
proclaimed, under the first impression of the news from Valmy, brought
by the future king of the French. The repulse of the invasion provoked
by the late government coincided with the establishment of the new.204/John Acton
The Girondins, who were in possession, began with a series of per-
sonal attacks on the opposite leaders. They said, what everybody knew,
that Marat was an infamous scoundrel, that Danton had not made his
accounts clear when he retired from office on entering the Convention,
that Robespierre was a common assassin. Some suspicion remained
hanging about Danton, but the assailants used their materials with so
little skill that they were worsted in the encounter with Robespierre. The
Jacobins expelled them from their Club, and Louvet’s motion against
Robes- pierre was rejected on November 5. Thus they were weakened
already when, on the following day, the question of the trial of the king
came on. It was not only the first important stage in the strife of the
parties, but it was the decisive one. The question whether Lewis should
live or die was no other than the question whether Jacobin or Girondin
should survive and govern.
A mighty change occurred in the position of France and in the spirit
of the nation, between the events we have just contemplated and the
tragedy to which we are coming. In September the German armies were
in France, and at first met with no resistance. The peril was evidently
extreme, and the only security was the life of the king. Since then the
Prussians and Austrians had been ignominiously expelled; Belgium had
been conquered; Savoy had been overrun; the Alps and the Rhine as far
as Mentz were the frontiers of the Republic. From the German Ocean to
the Mediterranean not an army or a fortress had been able to resist the
revolutionary arms. The reasonable alarm of September had made way
for an exorbitant confidence. There was no fear of all the soldiery of
Europe. The French were ready to fight the world, and they calculated
that they ran no graver risk than the loss of the sugar islands. It suited
their new temper to slay their king, as it had been their policy to pre-
serve him as a hostage. On the 19th of November they offered aid and
friendship to every people that determined to be free. This decree, really
the beginning of the great war, was caused by remonstrances from Mentz
where the French party feared to be abandoned. But it was aimed against
England, striking at the weakest point, and reducing its warlike power
by encouraging Irish disaffection.
On the 12th of August Rebecqui had proposed that the king should
be tried by the Convention that was to meet, and that there should be an
appeal to the people. On October 1 the question was brought before the
Convention, and a Commission of twenty-four was appointed to exam-
ine the evidence. They reported on the 6th of November; and from thatLectures on the French Revolution/205
moment the matter did not rest. On the following day, Mailhe, in the
name of the jurists, reported that there was no legal obstacle, from the
inviolability acknowledged by the Constitution. Mousson replied that
since Lewis was deposed, he had no further responsibility. A very young
member sprang suddenly into notoriety, on the 13th, by arguing that
there was no question of justice and its forms: a king deserved death not
for what he did, but for what he was. The speaker’s name was St. Just.
On November 20, before the debate had gone either way, Roland ap-
peared, with news of an important discovery. The king had an iron safe
in his palace, which the locksmith had betrayed. Roland had found that
it contained 625 documents. A committee of twelve was directed to ex-
amine them, and they found the proofs of a great scheme of corruption,
and of the venality of Mirabeau. On December 3 it was resolved that the
king should be tried by the Convention; the order of proceedings was
determined on the 6th, and on the 10th the indictment was brought in.
On the next day Lewis appeared before his judges, and was interrogated
by the President. He said, in his replies, that he knew nothing of an iron
safe, and had never given money to Mirabeau, or to any deputy. When
he got back to prison the unhappy man exclaimed, “They asked ques-
tions for which I was so little prepared that I denied my own hand.” Ten
days were allowed to prepare the defence. He was assisted by
Malesherbes, by the famous jurist Tronchet, and by Desèze, a younger
man, who made the speech. It was unconvincing, for the advocates per-
ceived, no better than their client, where the force and danger of the
accusation lay.
Everybody believed that Lewis had brought the invader into the
country, but it was not proved in evidence. If the proofs since published
had been known at the time, the defence must have been confined to the
plea that the king was inviolable; and the answer would have been that
he is covered by the responsibility of ministers, but responsible for what
he does behind their back. At the last moment several Girondins pro-
posed that sentence should be pronounced by the nation, in primary
assemblies  an idea put forward by Faure on November 29. This was
contrary to the spirit of representative democracy, which consults the
electors as to men, and not as to measures properly the result of debate.
It was consistent with the direct action of Democracy, which was the
theory of Jacobinism. But the Jacobins would not have it. By compel-
ling the vote on the capital question, they would ruin their adversaries.
If the Girondins voted for death, they would follow the train of the party206/John Acton
that resolutely insisted on it. If they voted against, they could be ac-
cused of royalism. When the question “Guilty or not guilty?” was put,
there was no hesitation; 683 voted guilty, one man, Lanjuinais, answer-
ing that he was a legislator, not a judge. The motion, to leave the penalty
to the people, which was made in the interest of the Girondins, not of the
king, failed by 423 to 281, and ruined the party that contrived it. The
voting on the penalty began on the evening of January 17, and as each
man gave his voice from the tribune, it lasted far into the following day.
Vergniaud declared the result; he said that there was a majority of five
for death. Both parties were dissatisfied, and suspected fraud. A scru-
tiny was held, and it then appeared that those who had voted simply for
the capital penalty were 361, and that those who had voted otherwise
were 360. Majority, 1. But when the final vote was taken on the ques-
tion of delay, there was a majority of 70 for immediate execution.
That the decision was the result of fear has been stated, even by
Brissot and Carnot. The duke of Orleans had written to the President
that he could not vote at the trial of his kinsman. The letter was returned
to him. He promised his son that he would not vote for death, and when
they met again exclaimed, “I am not worthy to be your father!” At din-
ner, on the fatal day, Vergniaud declared that he would defend the king’s
life, even if he stood alone. A few hours later he voted for death. Yet
Vergniaud was soon to prove that he was not a man whom intimidation
influenced. The truth is, that nobody had a doubt as to guilt. Punish-
ment was a question rather of policy than of justice.
The army was inclined to the side of mercy. Custine had offered,
November 23, to save Lewis, if Prussia would acknowledge the Repub-
lic. The offer was made in vain. Dumouriez came to Paris in January,
and found that there was nothing to be done. He said afterwards, “It is
true he was a perfidious scoundrel, but it was folly to cut his head off”
The Spanish Bourbons made every effort to save the head of the house.
They offered neutrality and mediation, and they empowered their agent
to spend hundreds of thousands of pounds in opportune bribery. They
promised, if Lewis was delivered up to them, that they would prevent
him from ever interfering in French affairs, and would give hostages for
his good behaviour. They entreated George III to act with them in a
cause which was that of monarchy and of humanity. Lansdowne,
Sheridan, and Fox urged the government to interpose. Grenville made
known that peace would be preserved if France gave up her conquests,
but he said not a word for the king. Information was brought to Pitt,Lectures on the French Revolution/207
from a source that could be trusted, that Danton would save him for
£40,000. When he made up his mind to give the money, Danton replied
that it was too late. Pitt explained to the French diplomatist Maret, af-
terwards Prime Minister, his motive for hesitation. The execution of the
king of France would raise such a storm in England that the Whigs
would be submerged.
Lewis was resigned to his fate, but he expected that he would be
spared, and he spoke of retiring to the Sierra Morena, or of seeking a
retreat for his old age among the faithful republicans of Switzerland.
When his advocates came to tell him that there was no hope, he refused
to believe them. “You are mistaken,” he said; “they would never dare.”
He quickly recovered his composure, and declined to ask permission to
see his family. “ I can wait,” he said; “in a few days they will not refuse
me.” A priest who applied for leave to attend him was sent to prison. As
a foreigner was less likely to be molested, the king asked for the abbé
Edgeworth, of Firmount, who had passed his life in France, but might
be considered an Irishman. Garat, the Minister of the Interior, went to
fetch him. On their way he said, “He was weak when in power; but you
will see how great he is, now that he is in chains.”
On the following day Lewis was taken through a vast parade of
military and cannon to the scaffold in the Place de la Concorde, a little
nearer to the Champs Elysées than the place where the obelisk of Luxor
stands. He was nearly an hour on the way. The Spanish envoy had not
made terms with the agents who were attracted by the report of his
unlimited credit, and he spent his doubloons in a frantic attempt at res-
cue as the prisoner passed, at a foot pace, along the Boulevard. An
equivocal adventurer, the Baron de Batz, who helped to organise the
rising of Vendémiaire, which only failed because it encountered
Bonaparte, had undertaken to break the line, with four or five hundred
men. They were to make a rush from a side street. But every street was
patrolled and every point was guarded as the coach went by carrying the
prisoner. De Batz was true to the rendezvous, and stood up, waving a
sword and crying, “Follow me and save the king!” It was without effect;
he vanished in the crowd; one companion was taken and guillotined, but
the police were able to report that no incident had occurred on the way.
Not the royalists but the king served the royal cause on that 21st of
January. Unequal to his duties on the throne, he found, in prison and on
the scaffold, a part worthy of the better qualities of his race, justifying
the words of Louis Blanc, “None but the dead come back.” To absolve208/John Acton
him is impossible, for we know, better than his persecutors, how he
intrigued to recover uncontrolled authority by bringing havoc and dev-
astation upon the people over whom he reigned. The crowning tragedy
is not that which Paris witnessed, when Santerre raised his sword, com-
manding the drums to beat, which had been silenced by the first word of
the dying speech; it is that Lewis XVI met his, fate with inward compla-
cency, unconscious of guilt, blind to the opportunities he had wasted
and the misery he had caused, and died a penitent Christian but an unre-
pentant king.XVII: THE FALL OF THE GIRONDE
The Constitution of 1791 had failed because it carried the division of
powers and the reaction against monarchical centralisation so far as to
paralyse the executive. Until the day when a new system should be
organised, a series of revolutionary measures were adopted, and by these
the Convention governed to the end. Immediately after the death of Lewis
XVI they began to send out representatives with arbitrary powers to the
departments. The revolutionary tribunal was appointed in March to judge
political cases without appeal; and the Secret Committee of Public Safety
in April, on the defeat and defection of Dumouriez. All this time, the
Girondins had the majority. The issue of the king’s trial had been disas-
trous to them, because it proved their weakness, not in numbers, but in
character and counsel. Roland at once resigned, confessing the defeat.
But they stood four months before their fall. During that memorable
struggle, the question was whether France should be ruled by violence
and blood, or by men who knew the passion for freedom. The Girondins
at once raised the real issue by demanding inquiry into the massacres of
September. It was a valid but a perilous weapon. There could be no
doubt as to what those who had committed a thousand murders to ob-
tain power would be capable of doing in their own defence.
The Girondins calculated badly. By leaving crime unpunished they
could have divided their adversaries. Almost to the last moment Danton
wished to avoid the conflict. Again and again they rejected his offers.
Open war, said Vergniaud, is better than a hollow truce. Their rejection
of the hand that bore the crimson stain is the cause of their ruin, but also
of their renown. They were always impolitic, disunited, and undecided;
but they rose, at times, to the level of honest men. Their second line of
attack was not better chosen. Party politics were new, and the science of
understanding the other side was not developed; and the Girondins were
persuaded that the Montagnards were at heart royalists, aiming at the
erection of an Orleanist throne. Marat received money from the Palais
Royal; and Sieyès to the last regarded him as a masked agent of monar-
chy. Danton himself assured the young Duc de Chartres that the Repub-
lic would not last, and advised him to hold himself in readiness to reap,
some day, what the Jacobins were sowing.
The aim of the Jacobins was a dictatorship, which was quite a new
substitute for monarchy, and the Orleans spectre was no more than an
illusion on which the Gironde spent much of its strength. In retaliation,210/John Acton
they were accused of Federalism, and this also was a false suspicion.
Federal ideas, the characteristic of America, had the sanction of the
greatest names in the political literature of France Montesquieu and
Rousseau, Necker and Mirabeau. The only evident Federalist in the
Con- vention is Barère. A scheme of federation was discussed at the
Jacobins on September 10, and did not come to a vote. But the idea was
never adopted by the Girondin party, or by any one of its members, with
the exception of Buzot. They favoured things just as bad in Jacobin
eyes. They inclined to decentralisation, to local liberties, to restraint on
the overwhelming activity of Paris, to government by representatives of
the sovereign people, not by the sovereign itself. All this was absolutely
opposed to the concentration of all powers, which was the prevailing
purpose since the alarm of invasion and treason, and was easily con-
founded with the theory of provincial rights and divided authority, which
was dreaded as the superlative danger of the time. That which, under
the title of Federalism, was laid to their charge, must be counted to their
credit; for it meant that, in a limited sense, they were constitutional, and
that there were degrees of power and oppression, which even a Girondin
would resist
The Jacobins had this superiority over their fluctuating opponents,
that they fell back on a system which was simple, which was intelli-
gible, and which the most famous book of the previous generation had
made known to everybody. For them there was no uncertainty, no grop-
ing, and no compromise. They intended that the mass of the people
should at all times assert and enforce their will, over-riding all tempo-
rary powers and superseding all appointed agents. As they had to fight
the world with a divided population, they required that all power should
be concentrated in the hands of those who acted in conformity with the
popular will, and that those who resisted at home, should be treated as
enemies. They must put down opposition as ruthlessly as they repelled
invasion. The better Jacobin would not have denied liberty, but he would
have defined it differently. For him it consisted not in the limitation, but
the composition of the governing power. He would not weaken the state
by making its action uncertain, slow, capricious, dependent on alternate
majorities and rival forces; but he would find security in power exer-
cised only by the whole body of the nation, united in the enjoyment of
the gifts the Revolution had bestowed on the peasant. That was the most
numerous class, the class whose interests were the same, which was
identified with the movement against privilege, which would inevitablyLectures on the French Revolution/211
be true to the new institutions. They were a minority in the Convention,
but a minority representing the unity and security of the Republic, and
supported by the majority outside. They drew to themselves not the best
or the most brilliant men, but those who devoted themselves to the use
of power, not to the manipulation of ideas. Many good ad- ministrators
belonged to the party, among whom Carnot is only the most celebrated.
Napoleon, who understood talent and said that no men were so vigorous
and efficient as those who had gone through the Revolution, gave office
to 127 regicides, most of whom were Montagnards.
The Girondins, vacillating and divided, would never have made the
Republic triumph over the whole of Europe and the half of France.
They were immediately confronted by a general war and a formidable
insurrection. They were not afraid of war. The great military powers
were Austria and Prussia, and they had been driven to the Rhine by
armies of thirty or forty thousand men. After that, the armies of Spain
and England did not seem formidable. This calculation proved to be
correct. The audacity of the French appeared in their declaration of war
against the three chief maritime powers at once  England, Spain, and
Holland. It was not until 1797, not for four years, that the superiority of
the British fleet was established. They had long hoped that war with
England could be avoided, and carried on negotiations through a suc-
cession of secret agents. There was a notion that the English govern-
ment was revolutionary in character as it was in origin, that the execu-
tion of the king was done in pursuance of English examples, that a
Protestant country must admire men who followed new ideas. Brissot,
like Napoleon in 1815, built his hopes on the opposition. Mr. Fox could
not condemn the institution of a Republic; and a party that had ap-
plauded American victories over their own countrymen might be ex-
pected to feel some sympathy with a country which was partly imitating
England and partly America.
War with continental absolutism was the proper price of revolution;
but the changes since 1 789 were changes in the direction of a Whig
alliance. When the Convention were informed that George III. would
not have a regicide minister in the country, they did not debate the mat-
ter, but passed it over to a committee. They acted not only from a sense
of national dignity, but in the belief that the event was not very terrible.
The Girondins thought that the war would not be popular in England,
that the Whigs, the revolutionary societies, and the Irish, would bring it
to an early termination. Marat, who knew this country affirmed that it212/John Acton
was an illusion. But there was no opposition to the successive declara-
tions of war with England Holland, and the Spanish and Neapolitan
Bourbons which took place in February and March. Eight hundred mil-
lion of asszgnats were voted at once, to be secured on the confiscated
property of the émigrés. France, at that moment, had only 150,000 sol-
diers in the field. On February 24, a decree called out 300,000 men, and
obliged each department to raise its due proportion. The French army
that was to accomplish such marvels in the next twenty years, begins on
that day. But the first consequence was an extraordinary diminution in
the military power of the State. The Revolution had done much for the
country people, and had imposed no burdens upon them. The compul-
sory levy was the first. In most places, with sufficient pressure, the
required men were supplied. Some districts offered more than their proper
number.
On March 10, the Conscription was opened in the remote parishes
of Poitou. The country had been agitated for some time. The peasants,
for there were no large towns in that region, had resented the overthrow
of the nobility, of the clergy, and of the throne. The expulsion of their
priests caused constant discontent. And now the demand that they should
go out, under officers whom they distrusted, and die for a government
which persecuted them, caused an outbreak. They refused to draw their
numbers, and on the following day they gathered in large crowds and
fell upon the two sorts of men they detested the government officials,
and the newly established clergy. Before the middle of March about
three hundred priests and republican officials were murdered, and the
war of La Vendée began. And it was there, and not in Paris, that liberty
made its last stand in revolutionary France.
But we must see first what passed in the Convention under the shadow
of the impending struggle. A committee had been appointed, October 1,
to draw up a constitution for the Republic. Danton was upon it, but he
was much away, with the army in Belgium. Tom Paine brought illumi-
nation from America, and Barère, generally without ideas of his own,
made others’ plausible. The majority were Girondins, and with them
Sieyès was closely associated. On February 15, Condorcet produced
the report. It was the main attempt of the Girondins to consolidate their
power, and for three months it occupied the leisure of the Convention.
The length of the debate proved the weak- ness of the party. Robespierre
and his friends opposed the work of their enemies, and talked it out.
They devoted their arguments to the preamble, the new formula of theLectures on the French Revolution/213
Rights of Man, and succeeded so well that no part of the Constitution
ever came to a vote. The most interesting portion of the debate turned
upon the principle of religious liberty, which the draft affirmed, and
which was opposed by Vergniaud. Whilst this ineffectual discussion
proceeded, the fight was waged decisively else- where, and the Jacobins
delivered a counterstroke of superior force.
Dumouriez’s reverses had begun, and there was new urgency in the
demand for concentration. Danton came to an understanding with
Robespierre, and they decided on establishing the revolutionary tribu-
nal. It was to consist of judges appointed by the Convention to try pris-
oners whom the Convention sent before it, and to judge without appeal.
Danton said that it was a necessary measure, in order to avert popular
violence and vengeance. He recommended it in the name of humanity.
When the Convention heard Danton speak of humanity there was a shud-
der, and in the midst of a dead silence Lanjuinais uttered the word “Sep-
tember.” Danton replied that there would have been no massacres if the
new tribunal had been instituted at the time. The Convention resolved
that there should be trial by jury, and that no deputies should be tried
without their permission. The object of Robespierre was not obtained.
He had meant that the revolutionary tribunal should judge without a
jury, and should have jurisdiction over the deputies. The Girondins were
still too strong for him. Danton next addressed himself to them. They
agreed that there should be a strong committee to supervise and control
the government. On March 25 they carried a list of twenty-five, com-
posed largely of their own friends, and, by thus subjecting the Assembly
at large to a committee, they once more recovered supreme power. Im-
mediately after, the defection of Dumouriezwas reported at Paris, and
the Convention rightly believed that they had narrowly escaped a great
danger. For Dumouriez had intended to unite all the forces he could
collect in the Dutch and Belgian Netherlands, and to march into France
at their head, to establish a government of his own. He had been in close
communication with Danton, and the opportunity of attacking Danton
was too good to be lost. On April 1 Lasource accused him of complicity
in the treason. The truce between them was at an end, and the conse-
quences were soon apparent. The committee of twenty-five was too bulky,
and was made up from different parties. A proposal was made to reduce
the number, and on April 6 a new committee of nine, the real Committee
of Public Safety, was elected, and no Girondins were included in it. On
the same day the first execution took place of a prisoner sentenced by214/John Acton
the new tribunal. The two chief instruments of the revolutionary gov-
ernment were brought into action at the same time. But they did not
enable the Jacobins to reach their enemies in the Assembly, for the depu-
ties were inviolable. Everybody else was at the mercy of the public
accuser.
The Girondins, having failed in their attack on Danton, now turned
against Marat, and by 220 to 132 votes sent him before the revolution-
ary tribunal to be tried for sedition. On the 24th he was acquitted. Mean-
time his friends petitioned against the Girondins, and demanded that
twenty-two of them should be expelled. The petition was rejected, after
a debate in which Vergniaud refused to have the fate of his party decided
by primary assemblies, on the ground that it would lead to civil war.
Vendée was in flames, and the danger of explosion was felt in many
parts of France.
Down to the month of May, the Girondins had failed in their attacks
on individual deputies, but their position in the Assembly was unshaken.
By their divisions, and by means of occasional majorities, especially by
the uncertain and intermittent help of Danton, Robespierre had carried
important measures—the Revolutionary Tribuna the Committee of Public
Safety, the employment of commissaries from the Convention to en-
force the levies in each department. By a series of acceptable decrees in
favour of the indigent, he had established himself and his friends as the
authors of a new order of society, against the representatives of the
middle class. The people of Paris responded by creating an insurrec-
tionary committee to accomplish, by lawful pressure or otherwise, the
purpose of the deputation which had demanded the exclusion of the
twenty-two. On May 21 a commission of twelve was appointed to vin-
dicate the supremacy of the Convention against the municipality. The
Girondins obtained the majority. Their candidates received from 104 to
325 votes. No Jacobin had more than 98. It was their last parliamentary
victory. There was no legal way of destroying them. The work had to be
left to agitators like Marat, and the committee of insurrection. When
this came to be understood, the end was very near. The committee of
twelve, the organ of the Convention and of the moderate part of it, ar-
rested several of the most violent agitators. On May 26, Robespierre
summoned the people of Paris against the traitorous deputies. Next day
they appeared, made their way into the Convention, and stated their
demands. The men were released, and the commission of twelve was
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tamely to a demonstration which was not overwhelming, renewed the
commission, by 279 votes to 239.
A more decisive action was now resolved upon, and the Jacobins
prepared what they called a moral insurrection. They desired to avoid
bloodshed, for the tenure by which the Revolutionary Tribunal existed
was that it prevented the shedding of blood otherwise than by legal forms.
The Girondins, after expulsion, could be left to the enjoyment of all the
securities of a trial by jury. Meanwhile, the Girondin scheme of Consti-
tution was dropped, an five new members were appointed to draw up a
new one and on May 30, for the first time, a president was take from the
deputies of the Mountain. On May 31 the insurrectionary masses in-
vaded the Assembly. There was no actual violence, and no resistance.
The Giroudins did nothing to defend their cause, and their commission
of twelve was again dissolved. The deputies remained uninjured; but
Roland fled, and his wife was sent to prison. Two days later, June 2, the
victory of moral force was completed. The Tuileries were surrounded
with cannon, the deputies were not permitted to go out, and some of the
Girondins agreed to resign their seats in order to prevent an outbreak. It
was called a voluntary ostracism.
In the extreme weakness of the party Lanjuinais alone spoke and
acted with courage and decision. Legendre went up to the Tribune while
he was speaking, and threatened to kill him. As Legendre was a butcher,
Lanjuinais replied, “First decree that I am a bullock.” When Chabot,
who had been a Capuchin, reviled the fallen statesmen, Lanjuinais ex-
claimed, “The ancients crowned their victims with flowers, and the priest
did not insult them.” This brave man lived through it all, lived to wit-
ness the destruction of his enemies, to be the elect of many departments,
and to preside over the Chamber that decreed the downfall of Napoleon.
At the last moment, an obscure supporter of the Girondins saw Danton,
and called on him to interfere to save the Convention from violence.
Danton answered that he could do nothing, for they had no confidence
in him. It is a redeeming testimony. On the evening of June 2 the more
conspicuous Girondins, without being sent to prison, were placed under
arrest. In the capital, the victory of the Jacobins was complete. They
had conquered by the aid of the insurrectionary committee, to which no
man was admitted who did not swear approval of the September mur-
ders.
Rout and extermination ensued upon the fall of the Gironde. They
had been scrupulous not to defend them- selves by force, and preferred216/John Acton
the Republic to their party. While some remained as hostages in the
power of the foe, others went away to see what France would think of
the mutilation of its parliament. Their strength was in the departments,
and in several departments the people were arming. In the west there
was no hope for them, for they had made the laws against which La
Vendée rebelled. They turned to the north. In Normandy the royalists
were forming an army, under the famous intriguer, Puisaye. Between
such a man and Buzot no understanding could subsist. There was no
time for them to quarrel, for the movement broke down at once. The
people of Normandy were quite indifferent. But there was one among
them who had spirit, and energy, and courage, and passion enough to
change the face of France. This extraordinary person was the daughter
of M. d’Armont, and she passed into the immortality of history as Char-
lotte Corday. She was twenty-four. Her father was a royalist, but she
had read Raynal, and had the classical enthusiasm which was bred by
Plutarch in those as well as in other days. She had refused the health of
Lewis XVI, because, she said, he was a good man, but a bad king. She
preferred to live with a kinswoman, away from her own family, and her
mind was made up never to marry. Her bringing up had been profoundly
religious, but that influence seems to have been weakened in her new
home. There is no trace of it during the five days on which a fierce light
beats. In her room they found her Bible lying open at the story of Judith.
From the 31st of May she had learnt to regard Marat as the author of
the proscription of the Girondins, some of whom had appeared at Caen
in a patriotic halo. When the troops were paraded, on July 7, those who
volunteered for the march against Paris were so few that the hope of
deeds to be done by armed men utterly vanished. It occurred to Char-
lotte that there may be something stronger than the hands and the hearts
of armed men. The Girondins were in the power of assassins, of men
against whom there was no protection in France but the dagger. To take
a life was the one way of saving many lives. Not a doubt ever touched
her that it is right to kill a murderer, an actual and intending murderer,
on condition of accepting the penalty. She told no one of the resolution
in her mind, and said nothing that was pathetic, and nothing that was
boastful. She only replied to Pétion’s clumsy pleasantries: “Citizen, you
speak like that because you do not understand me. One day, you will
know.” Under a harmless pretext she went to Paris, and saw one of the
Girondin deputies. In return for some civility, she advised him to leave
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seized, but he told her that he could not desert the post of duty. Once
more, she cried, “Believe me, fly before to-morrow night!” He did not
understand, and he was one of the famous company that mounted the
scaffold with Vergniaud. Next morning, Saturday July 13, Charlotte
purchased her dagger, and called on Marat. Although he was in the bath
where he spent most of his time, she made her way in, and explained her
importunity by telling him about the conspirators she had seen in
Normandy. Marat took down their names, and assured her that in a few
days he would have them guillotined. At that signal she drove her knife
into his heart. When the idiotic accuser-general intimated that so sure a
thrust could only have been acquired by practice, she exclaimed, “The
monster! He takes me for a murderess.” All that she felt was that she
had taken one life to preserve thousands. She was knocked down and
carried through a furious crowd to prison. At first she was astonished to
be still alive. She had expected to be torn in pieces, and had hoped that
the respectable inhabitants, when they saw her head displayed on a pike,
would remember it was for them that her young life was given. Of all
murderers, and of all victims, Charlotte Corday was the most composed.
When the executioner came for the toilette, she borrowed his shears to
cut off a lock of her hair. As the cart moved slowly through the raging
streets, he said to her, “You must find the way long.” “No,” she an-
swered, “I am not afraid of being late.” They say that Vergniaud pro-
nounced this epitaph: “She has killed us, but she has taught us all how
to die.”
After the failure in Normandy, of which this is the surviving epi-
sode, Buzot and his companions escaped by sea to the Gironde. Having
been outlawed, on July 28, they were liable to suffer death without a
trial, and had to hide in out-houses and caverns. Nearly all were taken.
Barbaroux, who had brought the Marseillais, shot himself at the mo-
ment of capture, but had life enough to be carried to the scaffold. Buzot
and Pétion outlived their downfall for a year. Towards the end of the
Reign of Terror, snarling dogs attracted notice to a remote spot in the
south-west. There the two Girondins were found, and recognised, though
their faces had been eaten away. Before he went out to die, Buzot placed
in safety the letters of Madame Roland. Seventy years later they came
to light at a sale, and the suspected secret of her life told in her Memoirs,
but suppressed by the early editors, was revealed to the world. She had
been executed on November 10, 1793' four days after the Duke of Or-
leans, and the cheerful dignity of her last moments has reconciled many218/John Acton
who were disgusted with her declamatory emphasis, her passion, and
her inhumanity. Her husband was safe in his place of concealment near
Rouen; but when he heard, he ran himself through with a sword-cane.
The main group had died a few days earlier. Of 180 Girondin deputies,
140 were imprisoned or dispersed, and 24 of these managed to escape;
73 were arrested at Paris, October 3, but were not brought to trial; 21,
among whom were many celebrities, went before the revolutionary tri-
bunal, October 24, and a week later they were put to death. Their trial
was irregular, even if their fate was not undeserved. With Vergniaud,
Brissot, and their companions the practice began of sending numbers to
the guillotine at once. There were 98 in the five months that followed.
During the agony of his party, Condorcet found shelter in a lodging-
house at Paris. There, under the Reign of Terror, he wrote the little book
on Human Progress, which contains his legacy to mankind. He derived
the leading idea from his friend Turgot, and transmitted it to Comte.
There may be, perhaps, a score or two dozen decisive and characteristic
views that govern the world, and that every man should master in order
to understand his age, and this is one of them. When the book was
finished, the author’s part was played, and he had nothing more to live
for. As his retreat was known to one, at least, of the Montagnards, he
feared to compromise those who had taken him in at the risk of their life.
Condorcet assumed a disguise, and crept out of the house with a Horace
in one pocket and a dose of poison in the other. When it was dark, he
came to a friend’s door in the country. What passed there has never been
known, but the fugitive philosopher did not remain. A few miles outside
Paris he was arrested on suspicion and lodged in the gaol. In the morn-
ing they found him lying dead. Cabanis, who afterwards supplied Na-
poleon in like manner, had given him the means of escape.
This was the miserable end of the Girondin party. They were easily
beaten and mercilessly destroyed, and no man stirred to save them. At
their fall liberty perished; but it had become a feeble remnant in their
hands, and a spark almost extinguished. Although they were not only
weak but bad, no nation ever suffered a greater mis- fortune than that
which befell France in their defeat and destruction. They had been the
last obstacle to the Reign of Terror, and to the despotism which then by
successive steps centred in Robespierre.XVIII: THE REIGN OF TERROR
The liberal and constitutional wave with which the Revolution began
ended with the Girondins; and the cause of freedom against authority, of
right against force was lost. At the moment of their fall, Europe was in
arms against France by land and sea; the royalists were victorious in the
west; the insurrection of the south was spreading, and Précy held Lyons
with 40,000 men. The majority, who were masters in the Convention,
had before them the one main purpose of increasing and concentrating
power, that the country might be saved from dangers which, during
those months of summer, threatened to destroy it. That one supreme and
urgent purpose governed resolutions and inspired measures for the rest
of the year, and resulted in the method of government which we call the
Reign of Terror. The first act of the triumphant Mountain was to make
a Constitution. They had criticized and opposed the Girondin draft, in
April and May, and only the new declaration of the Rights of Man had
been allowed to pass. All this was now re-opened. The Committee of
Public Safety, strengthened by the accession of five Jacobins, undertook
to prepare a scheme adapted to the present conditions, and embodying
the principles which had prevailed. Taking Condorcet’s project as their
basis, and modifying it in the direction which the Jacobin orators had
pointed to in debate, they achieved their task in a few days, and they laid
their proposals before the Convention on June 10. The reporter was
Hérault de Séchelles; but the most constant speaker in the ensuing de-
bate was Robespierre. After a rapid discussion, but with some serious
amendments, the Republican Constitution of 1793 was adopted, on June
24. Of all the fruits of the Revolution this is the most characteristic, and
it is superior to its reputation.
The Girondins, by their penman Condorcet, had omitted the name
of God, and had assured liberty of conscience only as liberty of opinion.
They elected the executive and the legislative alike by direct vote of the
entire people, and gave the appointment of functionaries to those whom
they were to govern. Primary assemblies were to choose the Council of
Ministers, and were to have the right of initiating laws. The plan re-
stricted the power of the State in the interest of decentralisation. The
Committee, while retaining much of the scheme, guarded against the
excess of centrifugal forces. They elected the legislature by direct uni-
versal suffrage, disfranchised domestic servants, and made the ballot
optional, and therefore illusory. They resolved that the supreme execu-220/John Acton
tive council of twenty-four should be nominated by the legislature from
a list of candidates, one chosen by indirect voting in each department,
and should appoint and control all ministers and executive officers; the
legislature to issue decrees with force of law in all necessary matters;
but to make actual laws only under popular sanction, given or implied.
In this way they combined direct democracy with representative democ-
racy. They restricted the suffrage, abolished the popular initiative, lim-
ited the popular sanction, withdrew the executive patronage from the
constituency, and destroyed secret voting. Having thus provided for the
composition of power, they proceeded in the interest of personal liberty.
The Press was to be free, there was to be entire religious toleration, and
the right of association. Education was to become universal, and there
was to be a poor law; in case of oppression, insurrection was declared a
duty as well as a right, and usurpation was punishable with death. All
laws were temporary, and subject to constant revision. Robespierre, who
had betrayed socialist inclinations in April, revoked his earlier language,
and now insisted on the security of property, proportionate and not pro-
gressive taxation, and the refusal of exemptions to the poor. In April, an
unknown deputy from the Colonies had demanded that the Divinity be
recognised in the preamble, and in June, after the elimination of the
Girondins, the idea was adopted. At the same time, inverting the order
of things, equality was made the first of the Rights of Man, and Happi-
ness, instead of Liberty, was declared the supreme end of civil society.
In point of spiritual quality, nothing was gained by the invocation of the
Supreme Being.
Hérault proposed that a Grand Jury should be elected by the entire
nation to hear complaints against the government or its agents, and to
decide which cases should be sent for trial. The plan belonged to Sieyès,
and was supported by Robespierre. When it was rejected, he suggested
that each deputy should be judged by his constituency, and if censured,
should be ineligible elsewhere. This was contrary to the principle that a
deputy belongs to the whole nation, and ought to be elected by the na-
tion, but for the practical difficulty which compels the division into sepa-
rate constituencies. The end was, that the deputies remained inviolable,
and subject to no check, although the oldest member, a man so old that
he might very well have remembered Lewis XIV, spoke earnestly in
favour of the Grand Jury.
The Constitution wisely rescinded the standing offer of support to
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sion. When the passage was read declaring that there could be no peace
with an invader, a voice cried, “Have you made a contract with vic-
tory?” “No,” replied Bazire ; “we have made a contract with death.” A
criticism immediately appeared, which was anonymous, but in which
the hand of Condorcet was easily recognised. He complained that judges
were preferred to juries, that functionaries were not appointed by uni-
versal suffrage, that there was no fixed term of revision, that the popu-
lar sanction of laws was reduced to a mere form. Condorcet believed
that nearly all inequality of fortune, such as causes suffering, is the
effect of imperfect laws, and that the end of the social art is to reduce it.
There were others who objected that the Constitution did not benefit the
poor. In regard to property, as in other things, it was marked by a pro-
nounced Conservatism. It was adopted by a national vote of 1,801,918
to 11,610 and, with solemn rites, was inaugurated on August 10. No
term was fixed for it to come into operation. The friends of Danton
spoke of an early dissolution, but the Convention refused to be dis-
solved, and the Constitution was never executed. Although other acts of
the legislature at that time are still good law, French jurists do not ap-
peal to the great constitutional law of June 24 and August 10, 1793. In
the course of the autumn, October 10 and December 4, it was formally
suspended, and was never afterwards restored. France was governed,
not by this instrument, but by a series of defining enactments, which
created extraordinary powers, and suppressed opposition.
After the integrity of the Assembly, the next thing to perish was the
liberty of the Press. The journalists could not claim the sanctity which
had been violated in the representatives, and gave way. Marat remained,
and exercised an influence in Paris which his activity on June 2 in-
creased. He had his own following, in the masses, and his own basis of
power, and he was not a follower of either Danton or Robespierre. By
his share in the fall of the Girondins he became their equal. When he
died, the vacant place, in the Press and in the street, was at once occu-
pied by a lesser rival, Hébert. In a little time, Hébert acquired enormous
power. Marat’s newspaper had seldom paid its way; but Hébert used to
print 600,000 copies of the Père Duchesne. Through his ally Chaumette,
he controlled the municipality of Paris, and all that depended from it.
Through Bouchotte and Vincent, he managed the War Office, with its
vast patronage and command of money, and distributed his journal in
every camp. To a man of order and precision like Robespierre, the per-
sonage was odious, for he was anarchical and corrupt, and was the222/John Acton
urgent patron of incapable generals; but Robespierre could not do with-
out his support in the Press, and was obliged to conciliate him. Between
Hébert and Danton there was open war, and Danton had not the best of
it. He had been weakened by the overthrow of the Girondins whom he
wished to save, and was forced to abandon. In the Convention, he was
still the strongest figure, and at times could carry all before him. But
when he lost his seat on the governing Committee, and was without
official information, he was no match at last for Robespierre. All through
the summer he was evidently waning, whilst the Confederates, Chaumette,
Hébert, and Vincent, became almost invincible.
On the 10th of July the Committee of Public Safety, after acting as
a Committee of Legislation, was recomposed as an executive body. There
had been fourteen members, there were now nine. Barère had the high-
est vote, 192; St. Just had only 126; and Danton was not elected. The
influence of Robespierre was supreme; he himself became a member, on
a vacancy, July 27. The fortunes of France were then at their lowest.
The Vendeans were unconquered, Lyons was not taken, and the Austri-
ans and English had broken through the line of fortresses, and were
making slowly for Paris. A few months saw all this changed, and those
are the earlier months of the predominance of Robespierre, with his
three powerful instruments, the Committee of Public Safety, the Revo-
lutionary Tribunal, and the Jacobin Club, which made him master of the
Convention. On July 27, the day before he was elected to the Commit-
tee, an important change occurred. For the first time, an order was sent
from the Tuileries to the army on the frontier, in a quarter of an hour.
This was the beginning of the semaphore telegraph, and science was
laying hold of the Revolution. On August 1, the metrical system was
introduced, and the republican calendar followed; but we shall speak of
it in another connection.
In the middle of August, Prieur, an engineer officer, was elected to
the Committee, to conduct the business of war; but Prieur protested that
he was the wrong man, and advised them to take Carnot. Therefore,
August 5, very much against the wish of Robespierre, the organiser of
victory joined the government. The Hébertists had proposed that the
entire population should be forced into the army, more particularly the
richer class. Danton modified the proposal into something reasonable,
and on August 23, Carnot drew up the decree which was called the
levée en masse. It turned France into a nominal nation of soldiers. Prac-
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ordered the men of the second class, from twenty-five to thirty, to be
ready. It is to Danton and Carnot that France owed the army which was
to overrun the Continent; and by the end of the year the best soldiers in
the world, Hoche, Moreau, Masséna, Bonaparte, were being raised to
command.
On August g, an event occurred in the civil order which influenced
the future of mankind as widely as the creation of the French army.
While the Committee of Public Safety was busy with the Constitution,
the Committee of Legislation was employed in drawing up a Code of
Civil Law, which was the basis of the Code Napoleon. Cambacérès,
who, with the same colleagues, afterwards completed the work, pre-
sented it in its first form on that day. Lastly, August 24, Cambon, the
financial adviser of the Republic, achieved the conversion and unifica-
tion of the Public Debt.
These were the great measures, undertaken and accomplished by
the men who accepted the leadership of Robespierre, in the first weeks
of his government We come to those by which he consolidated his power.
At the beginning of September, the Committee was increased by the
admission of Billaud-Varennes, and of Collot d’Herbois, of whom one
afterwards overthrew Danton, and the other, Robespierre. The appoint-
ment of Collot was a concession to Hébert. The same party were per-
suaded that the hands of government were weak, and ought to be strength-
ened against its enemies. Danton himself said that every day one aristo-
crat, one villain, ought to pay for his crimes with his head. Two mea-
sures were at once devised which were well calculated to achieve that
object September 5, the Revolutionary Tribunal was remodelled, and
instead of one Revolutionary Tribunal, there were four. And on Septem-
ber 17 the Law of Suspects was passed, enabling local authorities to
arrest whom they pleased, and to detain him in prison even when acquit-
ted. In Paris, where there had been 1877 prisoners on September 13,
there were 2975 on October 20. On September 25, the mismanagement
of the Vendean War, where even the Mentz garrison had been defeated,
led to a sharp debate in the Convention. It was carried away by the
attack of the Dantonists; but Robespierre snatched a victory, and ob-
tained a unanimous vote of confidence. From that date to the 26th of
July 1794, we count the days of his established reign, and the Conven-
tion makes way for the Committee of Public Safety, which becomes a
Provisional government.
The party of violence insisted on the death of those whom they re-224/John Acton
garded as hostages, the Girondins, for the rising in the south, the queen
for the rising in the west. An attempt to save the life of Marie Antoinette
had been made by the government, with the sanction of Danton. Maret
was sent to negotiate the neutrality of minor Italian States by offering to
release her. Austria, not wishing the Italians to be neutral, seized Maret
and his companion Sémonville, in the passes of the Grisons, and sent
them to a dungeon at Mantua. The queen was sent to the Conciergerie,
which was the last stage before the Tribunal; and as her nephew, the
emperor, did not relent, in October she was put on her trial, and ex-
ecuted. The death of the queen is revolting, because it was a move in a
game, a concession by which Robespierre paid his debts to men at that
time more violent than himself, and averted their attack. We have al-
ready seen that the advice she gave in decisive moments was disastrous,
that she had no belief in the rights of nations, that she plotted war and
destruction against her own people. There was cause enough for hatred.
But if we ask ourselves who there is that comes forth unscathed from
the trials that befell kings and queens in those or even in other times, and
remember how often she pleaded and served the national cause against
royalist and émigré, even against the great Irishman2 whose portrait of
her at Versailles, translated by Dutens, was shown to her by the Duch-
ess of Fitzjames, we must admit that she deserved a better fate than
most of those with whom we can compare her.
That month of October, 1793, with its new and un- precedented
development of butchery, was a season of triumph to the party of Hébert.
The policy of wholesale arrest, rapid judgment, and speedy execution
was avowedly theirs; and to them Robespierre seemed a lethargic, unde-
cided person who only moved under pressure. He was at last moving as
they wished; but the merit was theirs, and theirs the reward. One of
them, Vincent, was of so bloodthirsty a disposition that he found com-
fort in gnawing the heart of a calf as if it was that of a royalist. But the
party was not made up of ferocious men only. They had two enemies,
the aristocrat and the priest; and they had two passions, the abolition of
an upper class and the abolition of religion. Others had attacked the
clergy, and others again had attacked religion. The originality of these
men is that they sought a substitute for it, and wished to give men some-
thing to believe in that was not God. They were more eager to impose
the new belief than to destroy the old. Indeed, they were persuaded that
the old was hurrying towards extinction, and was inwardly rejected by
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the glowing patriarch of irreligious belief. He regarded the Revolution
as essentially hostile to Christian faith, and conceived that its inmost
principle was that which he now propounded. The clergy had been popu-
lar, for a day, in 1789; but the National Assembly refused to declare that
the country was Catholic. In June 1792 the Jacobin Club rejected a
proposal to abolish the State-Church, and to erect Franklin and Rousseau
in the niches occupied by Saints, and in December a member speaking
against divine worship met with no support. On May 30, 1793, during
the crisis of the Gironde, the procession of Corpus Christi moved unmo-
lested through the streets of Paris; and on August 25, Robespierre pre-
siding, the Convention expressly repudiated a petition to suppress preach-
ing in the name of Almighty God.
On September 20, Romme brought the new calendar before the
Assembly, at a moment when, he said, equality reigned in heaven as
well as on earth. It was adopted on November 24, with the sonorous
nomenclature devised by Fabre d’Eglantine. It signified the substitution
of Science for Christianity. Winemonth and fruitmonth were not more
unchristian than Julius and Augustus, or than Venus and Saturn; but the
practical result was the abolition of Sundays and festivals, and the su-
premacy of reason over history, of the astronomer over the priest The
calendar was so completely a weapon of offence, that nobody cared
about the absurdity of names which were inapplicable to other latitudes,
and unintelligible at Isle de France or Pondicherry. While the Conven-
tion wavered, moving sometimes in one direction and then retracing its
steps, the Commune advanced resolutely, for Chaumette was encour-
aged by the advantage acquired by his friends in September and Octo-
ber. He thought the time now come to close the churches, and to institute
new forms of secularised worship. Supported by a German more enthu-
siastic than himself, Anacharsis Cloots, he persuaded the bishop of Paris
that his Church was doomed like that of the Nonjurors, that the faithful
had no faith in it, that the country had given it up. Chaumette was able
to add that the Commune wanted to get rid of him. Gobel yielded. On
November 7, he appeared, with some of his clergy, at the bar of the
Convention, and resigned to the people what he had received from the
people. Other priests and bishops followed, and it appeared that some
were men who had gone about with masks on their faces, and were glad
to renounce beliefs which they did not share. Sieyès declared what ev-
ery- body knew, that he neither believed the doctrines nor practised the
rites of his Church; and he surrendered a considerable income. Some226/John Acton
have doubted whether Gobel was equally disinterested. They say that he
offered his submission to the Pope in return for a modest sum, and it is
affirmed that he received compensation through Cloots and Chaumette,
to whom his solemn surrender was worth a good deal. The force of his
example lost some- what, when the bishop of Blois, Grégoire, as violent
an enemy of kings as could be found anywhere, stood in the tribune, and
refused to abandon his ecclesiastical post He remained in the Conven-
tion to the end, clad in the coloured robes of a French prelate.
Three days after the ceremony of renunciation, Chaumette opened
the Cathedral of Notre Dame to the religion of Reason. The Convention
stood aloof, in cold disdain. But an actress, who played the leading part,
and was variously described as the Goddess of Reason or the Goddess
of Liberty, and who possibly did not know herself which she was, came
down from her throne in the church, proceeded to the Assembly, and
was admitted to a seat beside the President, who gave her what was
known as a friendly accolade amid loud applause. After that invasion,
the hesitating deputies yielded, and about half of them attended the god-
dess back to her place under the Gothic towers. Chaumette decidedly
triumphed. He had already forbidden religious service outside the build-
ings. He had now turned out the clergy whom the State had appointed,
and had filled their place with a Parisian actress. He had overcome the
evident reluctance of the Assembly, and made the deputies partake in
his ceremonial. He proceeded, November 23, to close the churches, and
the Commune resolved that whoever opened a church should incur the
penalties of a suspect It was the zenith of Hébertism.
Two men unexpectedly united against Chaumette and appeared as
champions of Christendom. They were Danton and Robespierre.
Robespierre had been quite willing that there should be men more ex-
treme than he, whose aid he could cheaply purchase with a few cartloads
of victims. But he did not intend to suppress religion in favour of a
worship in which there was no God. It was opposed to his policy, and it
was against his conviction; for, like his master, Rousseau, he was a
theistic believer, and even intolerant in his belief. This was not a link
between him and Danton who had no such spiritualist convictions, and
who, so far as he was a man of theory, belonged to a different school of
eighteenth-century thought. But Danton had been throughout assailed
by the Hébertist party, and was disgusted with their violence. The death
of the Girondins appalled him, for he could see no good reason which
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Republic, no enthusiasm, and no belief. From that time in October, his
thoughts were turned towards moderation. He identified Hébert, not
Robespierre, with the unceasing bloodshed, and he was willing to act
with the latter, his real rival, against the raging exterminators. From the
end of September he was absent in his own house at Arcis. At his return
he and Robespierre denounced the irreligious masquerades, and spoke
for the clergy, who had as good a right to toleration as their opponents.
When Robespierre declared that the Convention never intended to
proscribe the Catholic worship, he was sincere, and was taking the first
step that led to the feast of the Supreme Being. Danton acted from policy
only, in opposition to men who were his own enemies. Chaumette and
Hébert succumbed. The Commune proclaimed that the churches were
not to be closed; and early in December the worship of Reason, having
lasted twenty-six days, came to an end. The wound was keenly felt Fire
and poison, said Chaumette, were the weapons with which the priests
attack the nation. For such traitors, there must be no mercy. It is a
question of life and death. Let us throw up between us the barrier of
eternity. The Mass was no longer said in public. It continued in private
chapels throughout the winter until the end of February. In April, one
head of accusation against Chaumette was his interference with mid-
night service at Christmas.
Robespierre had repressed Hébertism with the aid of Danton. The
visible sign of their understanding was the appearance in December of
the Vieux Cordelier. In this famous journal Camille Desmoulins pleaded
the cause of mercy with a fervour which, at first, resembled sincerity,
and pilloried Hébert as a creature that got drunk on the drippings of the
guillotine. Robespierre saw the earlier numbers in proof; but by Christ-
mas he had enough of the bargain. The Convention, having shown some
inclination towards clemency on December 20, withdrew from it on the
26th, and Desmoulins, in the last of his six numbers, loudly retracted
his former argument The alliance was dissolved. It had served the pur-
pose of Robespierre, by defeating Hébert, and discrediting Danton. In
January, the Vieux Cordelier ceased to appear.
Robespierre now stood between the two hostile parties  Danton,
Desmoulins, and their friends, on the side of a regular government;
Hébert, Chaumette, and Collot, returned from a terrible proconsulate,
wishing to govern by seventies. The energy of Collot gave new life to
his party, whilst Danton displayed no resource. Just then, Robespierre
was taken ill, and from February 19 to March 13 he was confined to his228/John Acton
room. Robespierre was a calculator and a tactician, methodical in his
ways, definite and measured in his ends. He was less remark- able for
determination and courage; and thus two men of uncommon energy now
took the lead. They were Billaud-Varennes and St Just. When St. Just
was with the army, his companion Baudot relates that they astonished
the soldiers by their intrepidity under fire. He adds that they had no
merit, for they knew that they bore charmed lives, and that cannon balls
could not touch them. That was the ardent and fanatical spirit that St.
Just brought back with him. During his leader’s illness he acquired the
initiative, and proclaimed the doctrine that all factions constitute a divi-
sion of power, that they weaken the state, and are therefore treasonable
combinations.
On March 4, Hébert called the people to arms against the govern-
ment of Moderates. The attempt failed, and Robespierre, by a large
expenditure of money, had Paris on his side. At one moment he even
thought of making terms with this dangerous rival; and there is a story
that he lost heart, and meditated flight to America. In this particular
crisis money played a part, and Hébert was financed by foreign bank-
ers, to finish the tyranny of Robespierre. On March 13 he was arrested,
Chaumette on the 18th; and on the 17th, Hérault de Séchelles, Danton’s
friend, on coming to the Committee of Public Safety, was told by
Robespierre to retire, as they were deliberating on his arrest. On the
19th the Dantonists caused the arrest of Héron, the police agent of
Robespierre, who instantly had him released. March 24, Hébert was
sent to the scaffold. On the way he lamented to Ronsin that the Republic
was about to perish. “The Republic,” said the other, “is immortal.” Hith-
erto the guillotine had been used to destroy the vanquished parties, and
persons notoriously hostile. It was an easy inference, that it might serve
against personal rivals, who were the best of Republicans and Jacobins.
The victims in the month of March were 127.
Danton did nothing to arrest the slaughter. His inaction ruined him,
and deprived him of that portion of sympathy which is due to a man who
suffers for his good intentions. Billaud and St Just demanded that he
should be arrested, and carried it, at a night sitting of the Committee.
Only one refused to sign. Danton had been repeatedly and amply warned.
Thibaudeau, Rousselin, had told him what was impending. Panis, at the
last moment, came to him at the opera, and offered him a place of ref-
uge. Westermann proposed to him to rouse the armed people. Tallien
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the Convention. A warning reached him from the very grave of Marat.
Albertine came to him and told him that her brother had always spoken
with scorn of Robespierre as a man of words. She exclaimed, “Go to the
tribune while Tallien
presides, carry the Assembly, and crush the Committees. There is
no other road to safety for a man like you!” “What?” he replied; “I am
to kill Robespierre and Billaud?” “If you do not, they will kill you.” He
said to one of his advisers, “The tribunal would absolve me.” To an-
other, “Better to be guillotined than to guillotine.” And to a third, “They
will never dare!” In a last interview, Robespierre accused him of having
encouraged the opposition of Desmoulins, and of having regretted the
Girondins. “Yes,” said Danton, “it is time to stop the shedding of blood.”
“Then,” returned the other, “you are a conspirator, and you own it”
Danton, knowing that he was lost, burst into tears. All Europe would
cast him out; and, as he had said, he was not a man who could carry his
country in the soles of his shoes. One formidable imputation was to call
him a bondsman of Mr. Pitt; for Pitt had said that if there were negotia-
tions, the best man to treat with would be Danton. He was arrested, with
Camille Desmoulins and other friends, on the night of March 31. Legendre
moved next day that he be heard before the Convention, and if they had
heard him, he would still have been master there. Robespierre felt all the
peril of the moment, and the Right supported him in denying the privi-
lege. Danton defended himself with such force that the judges lost their
heads, and the tones of the remembered voice were heard outside, and
agitated the crowd. The Committee of Public Safety refused the wit-
nesses called for the defence, and cut short the proceedings. The law
was broken that Danton and his associates might be condemned.
There was not in France a more thorough patriot than Danton; and
all men could see that he had been put to death out of personal spite, and
jealousy, and fear. There was no way, thenceforth, for the victor to main-
tain his power, but the quickening of the guillotine. Reserving compas-
sion for less ignoble culprits, we must acknowledge that the defence of
Danton is in the four months of increasing terror that succeeded the 5th
of April 1794, when Robespierre took his stand at the corner of the
Tuileries to watch the last moments of his partner in crime.
The sudden decline of Danton, and his ruin by the hands of men
evidently inferior to him in capacity and vigour, is so strange an event
that it has been explained by a story which is worth telling, though it is
not authenticated enough to influence the narrative. In June 1793, just230/John Acton
after the fall of the Girondins, Danton was married. His bride insisted
that their union should be blessed by a priest who had not taken the
oaths. Danton agreed, found the priest, and went to confession. He be-
came unfitted for his part in the Revolution, dropped out of the Commit-
tees, and retired, discouraged and disgusted, into the country. When he
came back, after the execution of the queen, of Madame Roland, and
the Girondins, he took the side of the proscribed clergy, and encouraged
the movement in favour of clemency. In this way he lost his popularity
and influence, and refused to adopt the means of recovering power. He
neglected even to take measures for his personal safety, like a man who
was sick of his life. At that time, seven of the priests of Paris, whose
names are given, took it by turns to follow the carts from the prison to
the guillotine, disguised as one of the howling mob, for the comfort and
consolation of the dying. And the abbé de Keravenant, who had married
Danton, thus followed him to the scaffold, was recognised by him, and
absolved him at the last moment.XIX: ROBESPIERRE
We reach the end of the Reign of Terror, on the 9th of Thermidor, the
most auspicious date in modem history. In April Robespierre was abso-
lute. He had sent Hébert to death because he promoted disorder,
Chaumette because he suppressed religion, Danton because he had sought
to restrain bloodshed. His policy was to keep order and authority by
regulated terror, and to relax persecution. The governing power was
concentrated in the Committee of Public Safety by abolishing the office
of minister, instead of which there were twelve Boards of Administra-
tion reporting to the Committee. That there might be no rival power, the
municipality was remodelled and placed in the hands of men attached to
Robespierre. The dualism remained between representation in the As-
sembly and the more direct action of the sovereign people in the Town
Hall. When the tocsin rings, said a member of the Commune, the Con-
vention ceases to exist. In other words, when the principal chooses to
interfere, he supersedes his agent The two notions of government are
contradictory, and the bodies that incorporated them were naturally hos-
tile. But their antagonism was suspended while Robespierre stood be-
tween.
The reformed Commune at once closed all clubs that were not
Jacobin. All parties had been crushed: Royalists, Feuillants, Girondins,
Cordeliers. What remained of them in the scattered prisons of France
was now to be forwarded to Paris, and there gradually disposed of.
But though there no longer existed an opposing party, there was still
a class of men that had not been reduced or reconciled. This consisted
chiefly of deputies who had been sent out to suppress the rising of the
provinces in 1793. These Commissaries of the Convention had enjoyed
the exercise of enormous authority; they had the uncontrolled power of
life and death, and they had gathered spoil without scruple, from the
living and the dead. On that account they were objects of suspicion to
the austere personage at the head of the State; and they were known to
be the most unscrupulous and the most determined of men.
Robespierre, who was nervously apprehensive, saw very early where
the danger lay, and he knew which of these enemies there was most
cause to dread. He never made up his mind how to meet the peril; he
threatened before he struck; and the others combined and overthrew
him. He had helped to unite them by introducing a conflict of ideas at a
time when, apparently, and on the surface, there was none. Everybody232/John Acton
was a Republican and a Jacobin, but Robespierre now insisted on the
belief in God. He perished by the monstrous imposture of associating
divine sanction with the crimes of his sanguinary reign. The scheme was
not suggested by expediency, for he had been always true to the idea. In
early life he had met Rousseau at Ermenonville, and he had adopted the
indeterminate religion of the “vicaire Savoyard.” In March 1792 he pro-
posed a resolution, that the belief in Providence and a future life is a
necessary condition of Jacobinism. In November, he argued that the
decline of religious conviction left only a residue of ideas favourable to
liberty and public virtue, and that the essential principles of politics
might be found in the sublime teaching of Christ. He objected to
disendowment, because it is necessary to keep up reverence for an au-
thority superior to man. Therefore, on December 5, he induced the Club
to break in pieces the bust of Helvétius.
Although Rousseau, the great master, had been a Genevese Calvin-
ist, nobody thought of preserving Christianity in a Protestant form. The
Huguenot ministers themselves did nothing for it, and Robespierre had
a peculiar dislike of them. Immediately after the execution of Danton
and before the trial of Chaumette, the restoration of religion was fore-
shadowed by Couthon. A week later it was resolved that the remains of
Rousseau, the father of the new church, should be transferred to the
Pantheon.
On May 7, Robespierre brought forward his famous motion that
the Convention acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being. His
argument, stripped of parliamentary trappings, was this. The secret of
the life of a Republic is public and private virtue, that is, integrity, the
consciousness of duty, the spirit of self-sacrifice, sub- mission to the
discipline of authority. These are the natural conditions of pure democ-
racy; but in an advanced stage of civilisation they are difficult to main-
tain without the restraint of belief in God, in eternal life, in government
by Providence. Society will be divided by passion and interest, unless it
is reconciled and controlled by that which is the universal foundation of
religions. By this appeal to a higher power Robespierre hoped to
strengthen the State at home and abroad. In the latter purpose he suc-
ceeded ; and the solemn renunciation of atheism impressed the world. It
was very distinctly a step in the Conservative direction, for it promised
religious liberty. There was to be no favour to churches, but also no
persecution. Practically, the advantage was for the Christian part of the
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Revolution appeared to be turning backwards, and to seek its friends
among those who had acquired their habits of life and thought under the
fallen order. The change was undoubted; and it was a change imposed
by the will of one man, un- supported by any current of opinion.
A month later, June 8, the Feast of the Supreme Being was held
with all the solemnity of which Paris was capable. Robespierre walked
in procession from the Tuileries to the Champ de Mars, at the head of
the Convention. As the others fell back, he marched alone with his hair
powdered, a large nosegay in his hands, wearing the sky-blue coat and
nankeens by which he is remembered, for they reappeared in the crisis
of Thermidor. He had attained the loftiest summit of prosperity and
greatness that was ever given to man. Not a monarch in Europe could
compare with him in power. All that had stood in his way during the last
five years had been swept to destruction; all that survived of the Revo-
lution followed obedient at his heels. At the last election of a President
in the Convention there had been 117 votes; but 485 had voted for
Robespierre, that he might parade at their head that day. It was there, in
that supreme and intoxicating moment, that a gulf opened before him,
and he became aware of the extremity of his peril. For he could hear the
hostile deputies in the front rank behind him, muttering curses and sneer-
ing at the enthusiasm with which he was received. Those fierce procon-
suls who, at Lyons, Nevers, Nantes, Toulon, had crushed all that they
were now forced to venerate by their master, vowed vengeance for their
humiliation. They said that this was to be a starting-point for divine
right, and the excuse for a new persecution. They felt that they were
forging a weapon against themselves, and committing an act of suicide.
The decree of the month before would have involved no such dire conse-
quences; but the elaborate and aggressive ceremonial was felt as a dec-
laration of war.
Experienced observers at once predicted that Robespierre would
not last long. He lost no time in devising a precaution equal to the dan-
ger. He prepared what is known as the law of the 22nd of Prairial, which
was presented by Couthon, and carried without a division on June 10,
two days after the procession. It is the most tyrannical of all the acts of
the Revolution, and is not surpassed by anything in the records of abso-
lute monarchy. For the decree of Prairial suppressed the formalities of
law in political trials. It was said by Couthon, that delays may be useful
where only private interests are at stake, but there must be none where
the interest of the entire public is to be vindicated. The public enemy has234/John Acton
only to be identified. The State despatches him to save itself. Therefore
the Committee was empowered to send whom it chose before the tribu-
nal, and if the jury was satisfied, no time was to be lost with witnesses,
written depositions, or arguments. Nobody whom Robespierre selected
for execution would be allowed to delay judgment by defence; and that
there might be no exception or immunity from arbitrary arrest and im-
mediate sentence, all previous decrees in matter of procedure were re-
voked. That article contained the whole point, for it deprived the Con-
vention of jurisdiction for the protection of its own members. Robespierre
had only to send a deputy’s name to the public accuser, and he would be
in his grave next day. The point had been so well concealed that nobody
perceived it. Afterwards, the deputies, warned by the great jurist Mer-
lin, saw what they had done, and on June 11, they stipulated that no
member should be arrested without leave of the Convention. Couthon
and Robespierre were not present. On the 12th, by threatening that the
Committees would resign, they caused the decree of the previous day to
be rescinded, but they assured the Assembly that it was superfluous,
and their design had been misunderstood. They maintained their text,
and gained their object; but the success was on the other side. The scheme
had been exposed, and the Convention had resisted, for the first time.
The opposing deputies had received warning, and showed that they un-
derstood. From that moment they were on the watch, and their enemy
shrank from employing against them a clause the validity of which he
had denied. He gave them time to combine. Over the rest of the nation he
exerted his new power without control. The victims increased rapidly in
number. Down to the middle of June, in fourteen months, the executions
had been about 1200. In seven weeks, after the law of Prairial, they
were 1376; that is, an average of 32 in a week rose to an average of 196.
But the guillotine was removed to a distant part of the city, where a deep
trench was dug to carry away such quantities of blood.
During this time the Tribunal was not acting against men actually
in public life, and we are not compelled to study its judgments, as if they
were making history. Whilst inoffensive people were suffering obscurely,
the enemies of the tyrant were plotting to save themselves from the dread-
ful fate they saw so near them. Nothing bound them together but fear
and a common hatred for the obtrusive dogmatist at the head of affairs;
and it was not evident to each that they were acting in the same cause.
But there was a man among them, still somewhat in the background, but
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1815 and Robespierre in 1794.
Fouché, formerly an Oratorian, had been one of the most unscrupu-
lous deputies on missions, and had given the example of seizing the
treasure of churches. For he said there were no laws, and they had gone
back to the state of nature. After the execution of Hébert he was recalled
from Lyons; and Robespierre, whose sister he had asked in marriage,
defended him at the Jacobins on April 10. Being an unfrocked ecclesias-
tic, he was elected president of the Club on June 6, as a protest against
the clerical tendencies of Robespierre. On the 11th, immediately after
the procession, and the law of Prairial, Fouché attacked him in a speech
in which he said that it is to do homage to the Supreme Being to plunge
a sword into the heart of a man who oppresses liberty. This was the first
opening of hostilities, and it seems to have been premature. Fouché was
not sup- ported by the club at the time, and some weeks later, when
Robespierre called him the head of the conspiracy against him, he was
expelled. He was a doomed man, carrying his life in his hand, and he
adopted more subtle means of combat. July 19, five days after his ex-
pulsion, Collot was elected President of the Convention. He and Fouché
were united in sacred bands of friendship, for they had put 1682 persons
to death at Lyons. About the same day others joined the plotters, and on
July 20, Barère, the orator of the Committee, who watched the turning
of the tide, made an ambiguous declaration portending a breach. No
plan of operations had been agreed upon, and there was yet time for
Robespierre, now fully awake to the approaching danger, to strike an
irresistible blow.
During the last few weeks the position of the country had undergone
a change. On the 1st of June, Villaret Joyeuse had given battle to the
English off Ushant. It was the beginning of that long series of fights at
sea, in which the French were so often successful in single combat, and
so often defeated in general actions. They lost the day, but not the object
for which they fought, as the supplies of American grain were brought
safely into port. That substantial success and the opportune legend of
the Vengeur saved the government from reproach. At the end of the
month St. Just brought news of the French victory over the Austrians at
Fleurus, the scene of so many battles. It was due to Jourdan and his
officers, and would have been lost if they had obeyed St. Just; but he
arrived in time to tell his own story. Many years were to pass before an
enemy’s guns were again heard on the Belgian frontier. St. Just en-
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while the people were rejoicing over victory. It appeared, afterwards,
that the battle of Fleurus, the greatest which the French had won since
the reign of Lewis XIV, rendered no service to the government under
whom it was fought. The soil of France was safe for twenty years, and
with the terror of invasion, the need for terror at home passed away. It
had been borne while the danger lasted; and with the danger, it came to
an end.
The Committee of Public Safety resented the law of Prairial; and
when asked to authorise the proscription of deputies refused. Robespierre
did nothing to conciliate the members, and had not the majority. And he
threatened and insulted Carnot. As the powers were then constituted he
was helpless against his adversaries. The Commune and the Jacobins
were true to him; but the Convention was on its guard, and the two
Committees were divided. Lists of proscription had been discovered,
and those who knew that their names were upon them made no surren-
der.
Two days after the speech which showed that Barère was wavering,
when Collot had been chosen President, and Fouché was at work under-
ground, a joint sitting of both Committees was called at night. St. Just
proposed that there should be a dictator. Robespierre was ready to ac-
cept, but there were only five votes in favour three out of eleven on one
Committee, two out of twelve on the other. The Jacobins sent a deputa-
tion to require that the Convention should strengthen the executive; it
was dismissed with words by Barère. One resource remained. It might
still be possible, disregarding the false move of Prairial, to obtain the
authority of the Convention for the arrest, that is, for the trial and ex-
ecution of some of its members. They had delivered up Danton and
Desmoulins, Hérault and Chaumette. They would perhaps abandon
Cambon or Fouché, Bourdon or Tallien, four months later.
The Committees had refused Robespierre, and were in open revolt
against his will. His opponents there would oppose him in the Assem-
bly. But the mass of the deputies, belonging not to the Mountain but to
the Plain, were always on his side. They had no immediate cause for
fear, and they had something to hope for. Seventy of their number had
been under arrest ever since October, as being implicated in the fall of
the Girondins. Robespierre had constantly refused to let them be sent to
trial, and they owed him their lives. They were still in prison, still in his
power. To save them, their friends in the Assembly were bound to refuse
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a few more ruffians as they had delivered over the others in the spring.
That was the basis of his calculation. The Mountain would be divided;
the honest men of the Plain would give him the majority, and would
purge the earth of another batch of miscreants. On his last night at home
he said to the friends with whom he lived, “We have nothing to fear, the
Plain is with us.”
Whilst Robespierre, repulsed by the committees which had so long
obeyed him, sat down to compose the speech on which his victory and
his existence depended, his enemies were maturing their plans. Fouché
informed his sister at Nantes of what was in preparation. On the 21st of
July he is expecting that they will triumph immediately. On the 23rd he
writes: “Only a few days more, and honest men will have their turn.
Perhaps this very day the traitors will be unmasked.” It is unlike so
sagacious a man to have written these outspoken letters, for they were
intercepted and sent to Paris for the information of Robespierre. But it
shows how accurately Fouché timed his calculation, that when they ar-
rived Robespierre was dead.
The importance of the neutral men of the Plain was as obvious to
one side as to the other, and the Con- federates attempted to negotiate
with them. Their overtures were rejected; and when they were renewed,
they were rejected a second time. The Plain were disabled by consider-
ation for their friends, hostages in the grasp of Robespierre, and by the
prospect of advantage for religion from his recent policy. They loaded
him with adulation, and said that when he marched in the procession,
with his blue coat and nosegay, he reminded them of Orpheus. They
even thought it desirable that he should live to clear off a few more of
the most detestable men in France, the very men who were making ad-
vances to them. They believed that time was on their side. Tallien, Collot,
Fouché were baffled, and the rigid obstinacy of the Plain produced a
moment of extreme and certain danger.
Whilst they hesitated, Tallien received a note in a remembered hand-
writing. That bit of paper saved unnumbered lives, and changed the
fortune of France, for it contained these words: “Coward! I am to be
tried to-morrow.” At Bordeaux, Tallien had found a lady in prison, whose
name was Madame de Fontenay, and who was the daughter of the Madrid
banker Cabarrus. She was twenty-one, and people who saw her for the
first time could not repress an exclamation of surprise at her extraordi-
nary beauty. After her release, she divorced her husband, and married
Tallien. In later years she became the Princesse de Chimay; but, for238/John Acton
writing that note, she received the profane but unforgotten name of Notre
Dame de Thermidor.
On the night of July 26, Tallien and his friends had a third Confer-
ence with Boissy d’Anglas and Durand de Maillane, and at last they
gave way. But they made their terms. They gave their votes against
Robespierre on condition that the Reign of Terror ended with him. There
was no condition which the others would not have accepted in their
extremity, and it is by that compact that the government of France, when
it came into the hands of these men of blood, ceased to be sanguinary. It
was high time, for, in the morning, Robespierre had delivered the accus-
ing speech which he had been long preparing, and of which Daunou told
Michelet that it was the only very fine speech he ever made. He spoke of
heaven, and of immortality, and of public virtue; he spoke of himself; he
denounced his enemies, naming scarcely any but Cambon and Fouché.
He did not conclude with any indictment, or with any demand that the
Assembly would give up its guilty members. His aim was to conciliate
the Plain, and to obtain votes from the Mountain, by causing alarm but
not despair. The next stroke was reserved for the morrow, when the
Convention, by voting the distribution of his oration, should have com-
mitted itself too far to recede. The Convention at once voted that 250,000
copies of the speech should be printed, and that it should be sent to
every parish in France. That was the form in which acceptance, entire
and unreserved acceptance, was expressed. Robespierre thus obtained
all that he demanded for the day. The Assembly would be unable to
refuse the sacrifice of its black sheep, when he reappeared with their
names.
Then it was seen that, in naming Cambon, the orator had made a
mistake. For Cambon, having had the self-command to wait until the
Convention had passed its approving vote, rose to reply. He repelled the
attack which Robespierre had made upon him, and turned the entire
current of opinion by saying, “What paralyses the Republic is the man
who has just spoken.”
There is no record of a finer act of fortitude in all parliamentary
history. The example proved contagious. The Assembly recalled its vote,
and referred the speech to the Committee. Robespierre sank upon his
seat and murmured, “I am a lost man.” He saw that the Plain could no
longer be trusted. His attack was foiled. If the Convention refused the
first step, they would not take the second, which he was to ask for next
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meeting. He told them that it was his dying testament. The combination
of evil men was too strong for him. He had thrown away his buckler,
and was ready for the hemlock. Collot sat on the step below the president’s
chair, close to him. He said, “Why did you desert the Committee? Why
did you make your views known in public without informing us?”
Robespierre bit his nails in silence. For he had not consulted the Com-
mittee because it had refused the extension of powers, and his action
that day had been to appeal to the Convention against them. The Club,
divided at first, went over to him, gave him an ovation, and expelled
Collot and Billaud-Varennes with violence and contumely. Robespierre,
encouraged by his success, exhorted the Jacobins to purify the Conven-
tion by expelling bad men, as they had expelled the Girondins. It was his
first appeal to the popular forces. Coffinhal, who was a man of energy,
implored him to strike at once. He went home to bed, after midnight,
taking no further measures of precaution, and persuaded that he would
recover the majority at the next sitting.
Collot and Billaud, both members of the supreme governing body,
went to their place of meeting, after the stormy scene at the Club, and
found St. Just writing intently. They fell upon him, and demanded to
know whether he was preparing accusations against them. He answered
that that was exactly the thing he was doing. When he had promised to
submit his report to the Committee of Public Safety before he went to
the Assembly, they let him go. In the morning, he sent word that he was
too much hurt by their treatment of him to keep his promise. Barère
meanwhile undertook to have a report ready against St. Just.
Before the Assembly began business on the morning of Sunday the
9th of Thermidor, Tallien was in the lobby cementing the alliance which
secured the majority; and Bourdon came up and shook hands with
Durand, saying, “Oh! the good men of the Right.” When the sitting
opened, St. Just at once mounted the tribune and began to read. Tallien,
seeing him from outside, exclaimed, “ Now is the moment, come and
see. It is Robespierre’s last day!” The report of St. Just was an attack on
the committee. Tallien broke in, declaring that the absent men must be
informed and summoned, before he could proceed. St. Just was not a
ready speaker, and when he was defied and interrupted, he became si-
lent. Robespierre endeavoured to bring him aid and encouragement; but
Tallien would not be stopped. Billaud followed in the name of the gov-
ernment; Barère and Vadier continued, while Robespierre and St. Just
insisted vainly on being heard. The interrupters were turbulent, aggres-240/John Acton
sive, out of order, being desperate men fighting for life. Collot d’Herbois,
the President, did not rebuke them, and having surrendered his place to
a colleague whom he could trust, descended to take part in the fray. If
the Convention was suffered once more to hear the dreaded voice of
Robespierre, nobody could be sure that he would not recover his
ascendency. These tactics succeeded. Both parties to the overnight con-
vention were true to it, and Robespierre was not allowed to make his
speech. The galleries had been filled from five in the morning. Barère
moved to divide the command of Hanriot, the general of the Commune,
on whose sword the triumvirs relied; and the Convention outlawed him
and his second in command as the excitement increased. This was early
in the afternoon; and it was on learning this that the Commune called
out its forces, and Paris began to rise.
All this time Robespierre had not been personally attacked. Decrees
were only demanded, and passed, against his inferior agents. The struggle
had lasted for hours; he thought that his adversaries faltered, and made
a violent effort to reach the tribune. It had become known in the Assem-
bly that his friends were arming, and they began to cry, “Down with the
tyrant!” The President rang his bell and refused to let him speak. At last
his voice failed him. A Montagnard exclaimed, “He is choking with the
blood of Danton.” Robespierre replied, “What! It is Danton you would
avenge?” And he said it in a way that signified “Then why did you not
defend him?” When he understood what the Mountain meant, and that a
motive long repressed had recovered force, he appealed to the Plain, to
the honest men who had been so long silent, and so long submissive.
They had voted both ways the day before, but he knew nothing of the
memorable compact that was to arrest the guillotine. But the Plain, who
were not prepared with articulate arguments for their change of front,
were content with the unanswerable cry, “Down with the tyrant!” That
was evidently decisive; and when that declaration had been evoked by
his direct appeal the end came speedily. An unknown deputy moved that
Robespierre be arrested, nobody spoke against it; and his brother and
several friends were taken into custodywith him. None made
anyresistance or protest. The conflict, they knew, would be outside. The
Commune of Paris, the Jacobin Club, the revolutionary tribunal were of
their party; and how many of the armed multitude, nobody could tell.
All was not lost until that was known. At five o’clock the Convention,
weary with a heavy day’s work, adjourned for dinner.
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troops collected slowly, and Hanriot was arrested. He was released, and
brought back in triumph to the Hôtel de Ville, where the arrested depu-
ties soon assembled. They had been sent to different prisons, but all the
gaolers but one refused to admit them. Robespierre insisted on being
imprisoned, but the turnkey at the Luxembourg was unmoved, and turned
him out. He dreaded to be forced into a position of illegality and revolt,
because it would enable his enemies to outlaw him. Once outlawed,
there was nothing left but an insurrection, of which the issue was uncer-
tain. There was less risk in going before the revolutionary tribunal, where
every official was his creature and nominee, and had no hope of mercy
from his adversaries, when he ceased to protect. The gaoler who shut
the prison door in his face sealed his fate; and it is supposed, but I do not
know, that he had his instructions from Voulland, on the other side, in
order that the prisoner might be driven into contumacy, against his will.
Expelled from gaol, Robespierre still refused to be free, and went to the
police office, where he was technically under arrest.
St. Just, who had seen war, and had made men wonder at his cool-
ness under heavy fire, did not calculate with so much nicety, and re-
paired, with the younger Robespierre, to the municipality, where a force
of some thousands of men were assembled. They sent to summon their
leader, but the leader declined to come. He felt safer under arrest; but he
advised his friends at the Commune to ring the tocsin, close the barriers,
stop the Press, seize the post, and arrest the deputies. The position of the
man of peace encouraging his comrades to break the law, and explain-
ing how to do it, was too absurd to be borne. Coffinhal, who was a
much bigger man, came and carried him away by friendly compulsion.
About ten o’clock the arrested deputies were united. Couthon, who
was a cripple, had gone home. The others sent for him, and Robespierre
signed a letter by which he was informed that the insurrection was in
full activity. This message, and the advice which he forwarded from his
shelter with the police prove that he had made up his mind to fight, and
did not die a martyr to legality. But if Robespierre was ready, at the last
extremity, to fight, he did not know how to do it. The favourable mo-
ment was allowed to slip by; not a gun was fired, and the Convention,
after several hours of inaction and danger, began to recover power. By
Voulland’s advice the prisoners out of prison were outlawed, and Barras
was put at the head of the faithful forces. Twelve deputies were ap-
pointed to proclaim the decrees all over Paris. Mounted on police charg-
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made known in every street that Robespierre was now an outlaw under
sentence of death. This was at last effective, and Barras was able to
report that the people were coming over to the legal authority. An inge-
nious story was spread about that Robespierre had a seal with the lilies
of France. The western and wealthier half of Paris was for the Conven-
tion, but parts of the poorer quarters, north and east, went with the
Commune. They made no fight. Legendre proceeded to the Jacobin Club,
locked the door, and put the key in his pocket, while the members qui-
etly dispersed. About one in the morning, Bourdon, at the head of the
men from the district which had been the stronghold of Chaumette made
his way along the river to the Place de Grève. The insurgents drawn up
before the Hôtel de Ville made no resistance, and the leaders who were
gathered within knew that all was over.
The collapse was instantaneous. A little earlier, a messenger sent
out by Gaudin, afterwards Duke of Gaeta and Napoleon’s trusted fi-
nance minister, reported that he had found Robespierre triumphing and
receiving congra- tulations. Even in those last moments he shrank from
action. A warlike proclamation was drawn up, signed by his friends,
and laid before him. He refused to sign unless it was in the name of the
French people. “Then,” said Couthon, “there is nothing to be done but
to die.” Robespierre, doubtful and hesitating, wrote the first two letters
of his name. The rest is a splash of blood. When Bourdon, with a pistol
in each hand, and the blade of his sword between his teeth, mounted the
stairs of the Hôtel de Ville at the head of his troops, Lebas drew two
pistols, handed one to Robespierre, and killed himself with the other.
What followed is one of the most disputed facts of history. I believe that
Robespierre shot himself in the head, only shattering the jaw. Many
excellent critics think that the wound was inflicted by a gendarme who
followed Bourdon. His brother took off his shoes and tried to escape by
the cornice outside, but fell on to the pavement. Hanriot, the general, hid
himself in a sewer, from which he was dragged next morning in a filthy
condition. The energetic Coffinhal alone got away, and remained some
time in concealment. The rest were captured without trouble.
Robespierre was carried to the Tuileries and laid on a table where,
for some hours, people came and stared at him. Surgeons attended to his
wound, and he bore his sufferings with tranquillity. From the moment
when the shot was fired he never spoke; but at the Conciergerie he asked,
by signs, for writing materials. They were denied him, and he went to
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been a mysterious suspicion that the tale has been but half told, and that
there is something deeper than the base and hollow criminal on the sur-
face. Napoleon liked him, and believed that he meant well. Cambacérès,
the arch-chancellor of the Empire, who governed France when the Em-
peror took the field, said to him one day, “It is a cause that was decided
but was never argued.”
Some of those who felled the tyrant, such as Cambon and Barère,
long after repented of their part in his fall. In the north of Europe, espe-
cially in Denmark, he had warm admirers. European society believed
that he had affinity with it. It took him to be a man of authority, integ-
rity, and order, an enemy of corruption and of war, who fell because he
attempted to bar the progress of unbelief, which was the strongest cur-
rent of the age. His private life was inoffensive and decent. He had been
the equal of emperors and kings; an army of 700,000 men obeyed his
word; he controlled millions of secret service money, and could have
obtained what he liked for pardons, and he lived on a deputy’s allow-
ance of eighteen francs a day, leaving a fortune of less than twenty
guineas in depreciated assignats. Admiring enemies assert that by legal
confiscation, the division of properties, and the progressive taxation of
wealth, he would have raised the revenue to twenty-two millions ster-
ling, none of which would have been taken from the great body of small
cultivators who would thus have been for ever bound to the Revolution.
There is no doubt that he held fast to the doctrine of equality, which
means government by the poor and payment by the rich. Also, he de-
sired power, if it was only for self-preservation; and he held it by blood-
shed, as Lewis XIV had done, and Peter the Great, and Frederic. Indif-
ference to the destruction of human life, even the delight at the sight of
blood, was common all round him, and had appeared before the Revolu-
tion began. The transformation of society as he imagined, if it cost a few
thousand heads in a twelvemonth, was less deadly than a single day of
Napoleon fighting for no worthier motive than ambition. His private
note-book has been printed, but it does not show what he thought of the
future. That is the problem which the guillotine left unsolved on the
evening of June 28, 1794. Only this is certain, that he remains the most
hateful character in the forefront of history since Machiavelli reduced to
a code the wickedness of public men.XX: LA VENDÉE
The remorseless tyranny which came to an end in Thermidor was not
the product of home causes. It was prepared by the defeat and defection
of Dumouriez; it was developed by the loss of the frontier fortresses in
the following July; and it fell when the tide of battle rolled away after
the victory of Fleurus. We have, therefore, to consider the series of war-
like transactions that reacted so terribly on the government of France.
At first, and especially in the summer of 1793, the real danger was not
foreign, but civil war. During four years the Revolution always had
force on its side. The only active opposition had come from emigrant
nobles who were a minority, acting for a class. Not a battalion had
joined Brunswick when he occupied a French province; and the mass of
the country people had been raised, under the new order, to a better
condition than they had ever known. For the hard kernel of the revolu-
tionary scheme, taken from agrarian Rome, was that those who till the
land shall own the land; that they should enjoy the certainty of gathering
the fruits of their toil for themselves; that every family should possess
as much as it could cultivate. But the shock which now made the Re-
public tremble was an insurrection of peasants, men of the favoured
class; and the democracy which was strong enough to meet the monar-
chies of Europe, saw its armies put to flight by a rabble of field labourers
and woodmen, led by obscure commanders, of whom many had never
served in war.
One of Washington’s officers was a Frenchman who came out be-
fore Lafayette, and was known as Colonel Armand. His real name was
the Marquis de La Rouerie. His stormy life had been rich in adventure
and tribulation. He had appeared on the boards of the opera; he had
gone about in company with a monkey; he had fought a duel, and be-
lieving that he had killed his man had swallowed poison; he had been an
inmate of the monastery of La Trappe, after a temporary disappoint-
ment in love; and he had been sent to the Bastille with other discontented
Bretons. On his voyage out his ship blew up in sight of land, and he
swam ashore. But this man who came out of the sea was found to be full
of audacity and resource. He rose to be a brigadier in the Continental
army; and when he came home, he became the organiser of the royalist
insurrection in the west Authorised by the Princes, whom he visited at
Coblenz, he prepared a secret association in Brittany, which was to co-
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While La Rouerie was adjusting his instruments and bringing the
complicated agency to perfection, the invaders came and went, and the
signal for action, when they were masters of Châlons, was never given.
When volunteers were called out to resist them, men with black cock-
ades went about interrupting the enrolment, and declaring that no man
should take arms, except to deliver the king. Their mysterious leader,
Cottereau, the first to bear the historic name of Jean Chouan, was La
Rouerie’s right hand. When the prospect of combination with the Pow-
ers was dissolved by Dumouriez, the character of the conspiracy changed,
and men began to think that they could fight the Convention single-
handed, while its armies were busy on the Rhine and Meuse. Brittany
had 200 miles of coast, and as the Channel Islands were in sight, aid
could come from British cruisers.
La Rouerie, who was a prodigy of inventiveness, and drew his lines
with so firm a hand that the Chouannerie, which broke out after his
death, lasted ten years and only went to pieces against Napoleon,
organised a rising, almost from Seine to Loire, for the spring of 1793.
Indeed it is not enough to say that they went down before the genius of
Napoleon. The “Petite Chouannerie,” as the rising of 1815 was called,
contributed heavily to his downfall; for he was compelled to send 20,000
men against it, whose presence might have turned the fortune of the day
at Waterloo.
But in January 1793 La Rouerie fell ill, the news of the king’s death
made him delirious, and on the 30th he died. That the explosion might
yet take place at the appointed hour, they concealed his death, and bur-
ied him in a wood, at midnight, filling the grave with quicklime. The
secret was betrayed, the remains were discovered, the accomplices fled,
and those who were taken died faithful to their trust.
The Breton rising had failed for the time, and royalists north of the
Loire had not recovered from the blow when La Vendée rose. The corpse
in the thicket was found February 26; the papers were seized March 3;
and it was March 12, at the moment when Brittany was paralysed, that
the conscription gave the signal of civil war. The two things are quite
separate. In one place there was a plot which came to nothing at the
time; in the other, there was an outbreak which had not been prepared.
La Vendée was not set in motion by the wires laid north of the Loire. It
broke out spontaneously, under sudden provocation. But the Breton plot
had ramified in that direction also, and there was much expectant watch-
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gar men had carried the whispered parole, armed with a passport in
these terms “ Trust the bearer, and give him aid, for the sake of Armand”;
and certain remote and unknown country gentlemen were affiliated, whose
names soon after filled the world with their renown. D’Elbée, the future
commander-in-chief, was one of them; and he always regarded the tu-
multuous outbreak of March, the result of no ripened design, as a fatal
error. That is the reason why the gentry hung back at first, and were
driven forward by the peasants. It seemed madness to fight the Conven-
tion without previous organisation for purposes of war, and without the
support of the far larger population of Brittany, which had the com-
mand of the coast, and was in touch with the great maritime Power.
Politics and religion had roused much discontent; but the first real act of
rebellion was prompted by the new principle of compulsory service,
proclaimed on February 23.
The region which was to be the scene of so much glory and so much
sorrow lies chiefly between the left bank of the Loire and the sea, about
100 miles across, from Saumur to the Atlantic, and 50 or 60 from Nantes
towards Poitiers. Into the country farther south, the Vendeans, who were
weak in cavalry and had no trained gunners, never penetrated. The main
struggle raged in a broken, wooded, and almost inaccessible district
called the Bocage, where there were few towns and no good roads. That
was the stronghold of the grand army, which included all that was best
in Vendean virtue. Along the coast there was a region of fens, peopled
by a coarser class of men, who had little intercourse with their inland
comrades, and seldom acted with them. Their leader, Charette, the most
active and daring of partisans, fought more for the rapture of fighting
than for the sake of a cause. He kept open communication by sea, nego-
tiated with England, and assured the Bourbons that, if one of them ap-
peared, he would place him at the head of 200,000 men. He regarded the
other commanders as subservient to the clergy, and saw as little of them
as he could.
The inhabitants of La Vendée, about 800,000, were well-to-do, and
had suffered less from degenerate feudalism than the east of France.
They lived on better terms with the landlords, and had less cause to
welcome the Revolution. Therefore, too, they clung to the non-juring
clergy. At heart, they were royalist, aristocratic and clerical, uniting
anti-revolutionary motives that acted separately elsewhere. That is the
cause of their rising; but the secret of their power is in the military
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disturbances that broke out in several places on the day of enrolment,
were conducted by men of the people. Cathelineau, one of the earliest,
was a carrier, sacristan in his village, who had never seen a shot fired
when he went out with a few hundred neighbours and took Cholet By
his side there was a gamekeeper, who had been a soldier, and came from
the eastern frontier. As his name was Christopher, the Germans cor-
rupted it into Stoffel, and he made it famous in the form of Stoffiet.
While the conflict was carried on by small bands there was no better
man to lead them. He and Charette held out longest, and had not been
conquered when the clergy, for whom they fought, betrayed them.
The popular and democratic interval was short. After the first few
days the nobles were at the head of affairs. They deemed the cause
desperate. Not one of them had promoted the rising, scarcely one re-
fused to join in it. The one we know best is Lescure, because his wife’s
memoirs have been universally read. Lescure formed the bond between
gentry and clergy, for the cause was religious as much as political. He
would have been the third generalissimo, but he was disabled by a wound,
and put forward his cousin, Henri de la Rochejaquelein, in preference to
Stoffiet. We shall presently see that a grave suspicion darkens his fame.
Like Lescure, d’Elbée was a man of policy and management; but he was
no enthusiast. He desired a reasonable restoration, not a reaction; and
he said just before his death that when the pacification came it would be
well to keep fanatics in order.
Far above all these men in capacity for war, and on a level with the
best in character, was the Marquis de Bonchamps. He understood the
art of manoeuvring large masses of men; and as his followers would
have to meet large masses, when the strife became deadly, he sought to
train them for it. He made them into that which they did not want to be,
and for which they were ill-fitted. It is due to his immediate command
that the war could be carried on upon a large scale; and that men who
had begun with a rush and a night attack, dispersing when the foe stood
his ground, afterwards defeated the veterans of the Rhine under the best
generals of republican France. Bonchamps always urged the need of
sending a force to rouse Brittany; but the day when the army crossed the
Loire was the day of his death.
La Vendée was far from the route of invading armies, and the dis-
trict threatened by the Germans. There were no fears for hearth and
home, no terrors in a European war for those who kept out of it. If they
must fight, they chose to fight in a cause which they loved. They hated248/John Acton
the Revolution, not enough to take arms against it, but enough to refuse
to defend it. They were compelled to choose. Either they must resist
oppression, or they must serve it, and must die for a Government which
was at war with their friends, with the European Conservatives, who
gave aid to the fugitive nobles, and protection to the persecuted priests.
Their resistance was not a matter of policy. There was no principle in it
that could be long maintained. The conscription only forced a decision.
There were underlying causes for aversion and vengeance, although the
actual outbreak was unpremeditated. The angry peasants stood alone
for a moment; then was seen the stronger argument, the greater force
behind. Clergy and gentry put forward the claim of conscience, and then
the men who had been in the royalist plot with La Rouerie, began to
weave a new web. That plot had been authorised by the princes, on the
émigré lines, and aimed at the restoration of the old order. That was not,
originally, the spirit of La Vendée. It was never identified with absolute
monarchy. At first, the army was known as the Christian army. Then, it
became the Catholic and royal army. The altar was nearer to their hearts
than the throne. As a sign of it, the clergy occupied the higher place in
the councils. Some of the leaders had been Liberals of ‘89. Others sur-
rendered royalism and accepted the Republic as soon as religious lib-
erty was assured. Therefore, throughout the conflict, and in spite of
some intolerant dements, and of some outbursts of reckless fury, La
Vendée had the better cause. One Vendean, surrounded and summoned
to give up his arms, cried “First give me back my God.”
Bernier, the most conspicuous of the ecclesiastical leaders, was an
intriguer; but he was no fanatical adherent of obsolete institutions. The
restoration of religion was, to him, the just and sufficient object of the
insurrection. A time came when he was very careful to dissociate La
Vendée from Brittany, as the champions, respectively, of a religious and
a dynastic cause. He saw his opportunity under the Consulate, came out
of his hiding-place, and promoted a settlement. He became the agent
and auxiliary of Bonaparte, in establishing the Concordat, which is as
far removed from intolerance as from legitimacy. As bishop of Orleans
he again appeared in the Loire country, not far from the scene of his
exploits; but he was odious to many of the old associates, who felt that
he had employed their royalism for other ends, without being a royalist.
The country gentlemen of La Vendée had either not emigrated, or
had returned to their homes, after seeing what the emigration came to.
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tion. With all the combative spirit which made their brief career so bril-
liant, few of them displayed violent or extreme opinions. La Vendée was
made illustrious mainly by men who dreaded neither the essentials of
the Revolution nor its abiding consequences, but who strove to rescue
their country from the hands of persecutors and assassins. The rank and
file were neither so far-sighted nor so moderate. At times they exhibited
much the same ferocity as the fighting men of Paris, and in spite of their
devotion, they had the cruel and vindictive disposition which in France
has been often associated with religion. It was seen from the outset among
the wild followers of Charette; and even the enthusiasts of Anjou and of
Upper Poitou degenerated and became bloodthirsty. They all hated the
towns, where there were municipal authorities who arrested priests, and
levied requisitions and men.
The insurrection began by a series of isolated attacks on all the
small towns, which were seats of government; and in two months of the
spring of 1793 the republicans had been swept away, and the whole
country of La Vendée belonged to the Vendeans. They were without
order or discipline or training of any sort, and were averse to the sight of
officers overtopping them on horseback. Without artillery of their own,
they captured 500 cannon. By the end of April they were estimated at
near 100,000, a proportion of fighting men to population that has only
been equalled in the War of Secession. When the signal was given, the
tocsin rang in 600 parishes. In spite of momentary reverses, they carried
everything before them, until, on the 9th of June, they took Saumur, a
fortress which gave them the command of the Loire. There they stood
on the farthest limit of their native province, with 40,000 soldiers, and a
large park of artillery. To advance beyond that point, they would require
an organisation stronger than the bonds of neighbourhood and the acci-
dental influence of local men. They established a governing body, largely
composed of clergy; and they elected a commander-in-chief. The choice
fell on Cathelineau, because he was a simple peasant, and was trusted
by the priests who were still dominant. As they were all equal there
arose a demand for a bishop who should hold sway over them. Non-
juring bishops were scarce in France; but Lescure contrived to supply
the need of the moment. Here, in the midst of so much that was tragic,
and of so much that was of good report, we come to the bewildering and
grotesque adventure of the bishop of Agra.
At Dol, near St. Malo, there was a young priest who took the oath
to the Constitution, but afterwards dropped the cassock, appeared at250/John Acton
Poitiers as a man of pleasure, and was engaged to be married. He volun-
teered in the republican cavalry, and took the field against the royalists,
mounted and equipped by admiring friends. On May 5, he was taken
prisoner, and as his card of admission to the Jacobins was found upon
him, he thought himself in danger. He informed his captors that he was
on their side; that he was a priest in orders, whom it would be sacrilege
to injure; at last, that he was not only a priest, but a bishop, whom, in
the general dispersion, the Pope had chosen as his vicar apostolic to the
suffering Church of France. His name was Guyot, and he called himself
Folleville. Such a captive was worth more than a regiment of horse.
Lescure carried the republican trooper to his country house for a few
days; and on May 16 Guyot reappeared in the robes proper to a bishop,
with the mitre, ring, and crozier that belonged to his exalted dignity.
It was a great day in camp under the white flag; and the enemy,
watching through his telescope, beheld with amazement the kneeling
ranks of Vendean infantry, and a gigantic prelate who strode through
them and distributed blessings. He addressed them when they went into
action, promising victory to those who fought, and heaven to those who
fell, in so good a cause; and he went under fire with a crucifix in his
hand, and ministered to the wounded. They put him at the head of the
council, and required every priest to obey him, under pain of arrest.
Bernier, who had been at school with Guyot, was not deceived. He de-
nounced him at Rome, through Maury, who was living there in the en-
joyment of well-earned honours. The fraud was at once exposed. Pius
VI. declared that the bishop of Agra did not exist; and that he knew
nothing of the man so called, except that he was an impostor and a
rogue.
From the moment when Bernier wrote, Guyot was in his power; but
it was October before he translated the papal Latin to the generals. They
resolved to take no notice, but the detected pretender ceased to say Mass.
La Rochejaquelein intended to put him on board ship and get rid of him
at the first seaport. They never reached the sea. To the last, at Granville,
Guyot was seen in the midst of danger, and his girdle was among the
spoils of the field. Though the officers watched him, the men never found
him out. He served them faithfully during his six months of precarious
importance, and he perished with them. He might have obtained hope of
life by betraying the mendacity of his accomplices, and the imbecility of
his dupes. He preferred to die without exposing them.
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time that they should have a policy and a plan. They had four alterna-
tives. They might besiege Nantes and open communications with En-
glish cruisers. They might join with the royalists of the centre. They
might raise an insurrection in Brittany, or they might strike for Paris.
The great road to the capital opened before them; there were the prison-
ers in the Temple to rescue, and the monarch to restore. Dim reports of
their exploits reached the queen, and roused hopes of deliverance. In a
smuggled note, the Princess Elizabeth inquired whether the men of the
west had reached Orleans; in another, she asked, not unreasonably, what
had become of the British fleet It is said that Stofflet gave that heroic
counsel. Napoleon believed that if they had followed it, nothing could
have prevented the white flag from waving on the towers of Notre Dame.
But there was no military organisation; the troops received no pay, and
went home when they pleased. The generals were hopelessly divided,
and Charette would not leave his own territory. Bonchamps, who al-
ways led his men, and was hit in every action, was away, disabled by a
wound. His advice was known. He thought that their only hope was to
send a small corps to rouse the Bretons. With the united forces of Brit-
tany and Vendée they would then march for Paris. They adopted a com-
promise, and decided to besiege Nantes, an open town, the headquarters
of commerce with the West Indies, and of the African slave trade. If
Nantes fell it would be likely to rouse Brittany; and it was an expedition
in which Charette would take a part. This was the disastrous advice of
Cathelineau. They went down from Saumur to Nantes, by the right bank
of the Loire, and on the night of June 28, their fire-signals summoned
Charette for the morrow. Charette did not fail. But he was beyond the
river, unable to make his way across, and he resented the arrangement
which was to give the pillage of the wealthy city to the pious soldiers of
Anjou and Poitou, whilst he looked on from a distance.
During the long deliberations at Saumur, and the slow march down
the river, Nantes had thrown up earth- works, and had fortified the hearts
of its inhabitants. The attack failed. Cathelineau penetrated to the mar-
ket place, and they still show the window from which a cobbler shot
down the hero of Anjou. The Vendeans retreated to their stronghold, and
their cause was without a future. D’Elbée was chosen to succeed, on the
death of Cathelineau. He admitted the superior claims of Bonchamps,
but he disliked his policy of carrying the war to the north. The others
preferred d’Elbée because they had less to fear from his ascendancy and
strength of will. They were not only divided by jealousy, but by enmity.252/John Acton
Charette kept away from the decisive field, and rejoiced when the grand
army passed the Loire, and left their whole country to him. Charette and
Stoffiet caused Marigny, the commander of the artillery, to be executed.
Lescure once exclaimed that, if he had not been helpless from a wound,
he would have cut down the Prince de Talmond. Stoffiet sent a chal-
lenge to Bonchamps; and both Stofflet and Charette were ultimately
betrayed by their comrades. Success depended on the fidelity of d’Elbée,
Bonchamps, and Lescure to each other, through all divergences of char-
acter and policy. For two months they continued to hold the Republic at
bay. They never reached Poitiers, and they were heavily defeated at
Luçon; but they made themselves a frontier line of towns, to the south-
west, by taking Thouars, Parthenay, Fontenay, and Niort. There was a
road from north to south by Beaupréau, Châtillon, and Bressuire; and
another from east to west, through Doué, Vihiers, Coron, Mortagne. All
these are names of famous battles. At Cholet, which is in the middle of
La Vendée, where the two roads cross, the first success and the final
rout took place.
The advantage which the Vendeans possessed was that there was no
good army to oppose them, and there were no good officers. It was the
early policy of Robespierre to repress military talent, which may be
dangerous in a republic, and to employ noisy patriots. He was not duped
by them; but he trusted them as safe men; and if they did their work
coarsely and cruelly, imitating the practice that succeeded so well at
Paris, it was no harm. That was a surer way of destroying royalists en
masse than the manoeuvres of a tactician, who was very likely to be
humane, and almost sure to be ambitious and suspicious of civilians.
Therefore a succes- sion of incompetent men were sent out, and the star
of d’Elbée ascended higher and higher. There had been time for commu-
nication with Pitt, who was believed to be intriguing everywhere, and
the dread of an English landing in the west became strong in the Com-
mittees of government at Paris.
At the end of July, a serious disaster befell the French armies. Mentz
surrendered to the Prussians, and Valenciennes immediately after to the
Austrians. Their garrisons, unable to serve against the enemy abroad,
were available against the enemy at home. The soldiers from Mayence
were sent to Nantes. They were 8000, and they brought Kléber with
them. It was the doom of La Vendée. By the middle of September the
best soldiers and the best generals the French government possessed
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the 23rd, they fought five battles, of which the most celebrated is named
after the village of Torfou. And with this astonishing result, that the
royalists were victorious in every one of them, and captured more than
100 cannon. On one of these fields, Kléber and Marceau saw each other
for the first time. But it seemed that Bonchamps was able to defeat even
Kléber and Marceau, as he had defeated Westermann and Rossiguol.
Then a strange thing happened. Some men, in disguise, were brought
into the Vendean lines. They proved to be from the Mayence garrison;
and they said that they would prefer serving under the royalist generals
who had beaten them, rather than under their own unsuccessful chiefs.
They undertook, for a large sum of money, to return with their com-
rades. Bonchamps and Charette took the proposals seriously, and wished
to accept them. But the money could only be procured by melting down
the Church plate, and the clergy made objection. Some have thought
that this was a fatal miscalculation. The other causes of their ruin are
obvious and are decisive. They ought to have been supported by the
Bretons, and the Bretons were not ready. They ought to have been united,
and they were bitterly divided and insub- ordinate. They ought to have
created an impregnable fastness on the high ground above the Loire; but
they had no defensive tactics, and when they occupied a town, would
not wait for the attack, but retired, to have the unqualified delight of
expelling the enemy. Above all, they ought to have been backed by En-
gland. D’Elbée’s first letter was intercepted, and four months passed
before the English government stirred. The émigrés and their princes,
had no love for these peasants and stay-at-home gentry and clergy, who
took so long to declare themselves, and whose primary or ultimate mo-
tive was not royalism. Puisaye showed Napier a letter in which Lewis
XVIII directed that he should be put secretly to death.
England ought to have been active on the coast very early, during
the light winds of summer. But the English wanted a safe landing-place,
and there was none to give them. With more enterprise, while Charette
held the island of Noirmoutier, Pitt might have become the arbiter of
France. When he gave definite promises and advice, it was October, and
the day of hope had passed.
In the middle of October Kléber, largely reinforced, advanced with
25,000 men, and Bonchamps made up his mind that the time had come
to retreat into Brittany. He posted a detachment to secure the passage of
the Loire at St. Laurent, and fell back with his whole force to Cholet,
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ber 16, he fought his last fight. D’Elbée was shot through the body. He
was carried in safety to Noirmoutier, and still lingered when the Repub-
licans recovered the island in January. His last conversation with his
conqueror, before he suffered death, is of the highest value for this his-
tory. Lescure had already received a bullet through the head, and at
Cholet, Bonchamps was wounded mortally. But there had been a mo-
ment in the day during which fortune wavered, and the lost cause owed
its ruin to the absence of Charette. Stoffiet and La Rochejaquelein led
the retreat from Cholet to the Loire. It was a day’s march, and there was
no pursuit. Bonchamps was still living when they came to the river, and
still able to give one last order. Four thousand five hundred prisoners
had been brought from Cholet; they were shut up in the church at St.
Laurent, and the officers agreed that they must be put to death. At first,
the Convention had not allowed the men whom the royalists released to
serve again. But these amenities of civilised war had long been abol-
ished; and the prisoners were sure to be employed against the captors
who spared them. Bonchamps gave these men their lives, and on the
same day he died. When, at the same moment, d’Elbée, Lescure and
Bonchamps had disappeared, La Rochejaquelein assumed the command.
Kléber, whom he repulsed at Laval, described him as a very able of-
ficer; but he led the army into the country beyond the Loire without a
definite purpose. The Prince de Talmond, who was a La Tremoille, prom-
ised that when they came near the domains of his family, the expected
Bretons would come in. More important was the appearance of two
peasants carrying a stick. For the peasants were émigrés disguised, and
their stick contained letters from Whitehall, in which Pitt undertook to
help them if they succeeded in occupying a seaport; and he recommended
Granville, which stands on a promontory not far from French Saint
Michael’s Mount The messengers declined to confirm the encourage-
ment they brought; but La Rochejaquelein, heavily hampered with thou-
sands of women and children who had lost their homes, made his way
across to the sea, and attacked the fortifications of the place. He as-
saulted in vain; and although Jersey listened to the cannonade, no ships
came. The last hope had now gone; and the remnant of the great army,
cursing the English, turned back towards their own country. Some thou-
sands of Bretons had joined, and Stoffiet still drove the republicans
before him. With La Rochejaquelein and Sapinaud he crossed the Loire
in a small boat. The army found the river impassable, and wandered
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taken by the enemy, and ceased to exist. Lescure had followed the col-
umn in his carriage, until he heard of the execution of the queen. With
his last breath, he said: “I fought to save her: I would live to avenge her.
There must be no quarter now.
In this implacable spirit Carrier was acting at Nantes. But I care not
to tell the vengeance of the victorious republicans upon the brave men
who had made them tremble. The same atrocities were being committed
in the south. Lyons had overthrown the Jacobins, had put the worst of
them to death, and had stood a siege under the republican flag. Girondins
and royalists, who were enemies at Nantes, fought here side by side; and
the place was so well armed that it held out to October 9. On the 29th of
August, the royalists of Toulon called in a joint British and Spanish
garrison, and gave up the fleet and the arsenal to Lord Hood. The re-
publicans laid siege to the town in October. The harbour of Toulon is
deep and spacious; but there was, and still is, a fort which commands
the entrance. Whoever held l’Aiguillette was master of every ship in the
docks and of every gun  in the arsenal. On December 18, at midnight,
during a violent storm, the French attacked and carried the fort. Toulon
was no longer tenable. Hastily, but imperfectly, the English destroyed
the French ships they could not at once take away, leaving the materials
for the Egyptian expedition, and as fast as possible evacuated the harbour,
under the fire of the captured fort. The fortunes of Bonaparte began
with that exploit, and the first event of his career was the spectacle of a
British fleet flying before him by the glare of an immense conflagration.
The year 1793 thus ended triumphantly, and the Convention was master
of all France, except the marshes down by the ocean, where Charette
defied every foe, and succeeded in imposing his own terms on the Re-
public. But the danger had come that disturbed the slumber of
Robespierre, and the man was found who was to make the Revolution a
stepping-stone to the power of the sword.XXI: THE EUROPEAN WAR
The French Revolution was an attempt to establish in the public law of
Europe maxims which had triumphed by the aid of France in America.
By the principles of the Declaration of Independence a government which
obstructs liberty forfeits the claim to obedience, and the men who de-
vote their families to ruin and themselves to death in order to destroy it
do no more than their duty. The American Revolution was not provoked
by tyranny or intolerable wrong, for the Colonies were better off than
the nations of Europe. They rose in arms against a constructive danger,
an evil that might have been borne but for its possible effects. The pre-
cept which condemned George III was fatal to Lewis XVI, and the case
for the French Revolution was stronger than the case for the American
Revolution. But it involved international consequences. It condemned
the governments of other countries. If the revolutionary government was
legitimate, the conservative governments were not. They necessarily
threatened each other. By the law of its existence, France encouraged
insurrection against its neighbours, and the existing balance of power
would have to be redressed in obedience to a higher law.
The successful convulsion in France led to a convulsion in Europe;
and the Convention which, in the first illusions of victory, promised
brotherhood to populations striking for freedom, was impolitic, but was
not illogical. In truth the Jacobins only transplanted for the use of op-
pressed Europeans a precedent created by the Monarchy in favour of
Americans who were not oppressed. Nobody imagined that the new sys-
tem of international relations could be carried into effect without resis-
tance or sacrifice, but the enthusiasts of liberty, true or false, might well
account it worth all that it must cost, even if the price was to be twenty
years of war. This new dogma is the real cause of the breach with En-
gland, which did such harm to France. Intelligent Jacobins, like Danton
and Carnot, saw the danger of abandoning policy for the sake of prin-
ciple. They strove to interpret the menacing declaration, until it became
innocuous, and they put forward the natural frontier in its stead. But it
was the very essence of the revolutionary spirit, and could not be de-
nied.
England had remained aloof from Pilnitz and the expedition under
Brunswick, but began to be unfriendly after the 10th of August. Lord
Gower did not at once cease to be ambassador, and drew his salary to
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when the king went to prison, and no solicitude was shown to make the
step less offensive. Chauvelin was not acknowledged. He was not ad-
mitted to present his new credentials, and his requests for audience were
received with coldness. Pitt and Grenville were not conciliatory. They
were so dignified that they were haughty, and when they were haughty
they were insolent. The conquest of Belgium, the opening of the Scheldt
for navigation, and the trial of the king, roused a bitter feeling in En-
gland, and ministers, in the course of December, felt that they would be
safe if they went along with it. The opening of the Scheldt was not
resisted by the Dutch, and gave England no valid plea But France was
threatening Holland, and if out of English hatred to the Republic, to
republican principles of foreign policy, to the annexation of the Nether-
lands, war was really inevitable, it was important to get possession at
once of the Dutch resources by sea and land.
The idea of conciliating England by renouncing con- quest, and the
idea of defying England by the immediate invasion of the United Prov-
inces, balanced each other for a time. By renunciation, the moderate or
Girondin party would have triumphed. The Jacobins, who drew all the
consequences of theories, and who were eager to restore the finances
with the spoils of the opulent Dutchmen, carried their purpose when
they voted the death of the king. That event added what was wanting to
make the excitement and exasperation of England boil over. Down to
the month of January the government continued ready to treat on condi-
tion that France restored her conquests, and several emissaries had been
received. The most trustworthy of these was Maret, afterwards Duke of
Bassano. On the 28th of January Talleyrand, who was living in retire-
ment at Leatherhead, informed ministers that’ Maret was again on the
way to herald the approach of Dumouriez himself, whose presence in
London, on a friendly mission, would have been tantamount to the aban-
donment of the Dutch project. But Maret came too late, and Dumouriez
on his journey to the coast was overtaken by instructions that Amsterdam,
not London, was his destination.
The news from Paris reached London on the evening of the 23rd, and
the audience at the theatre insisted that the performance should be stopped.
There was to be a drawing-room next day. The drawing-room was coun-
termanded. A Council was summoned, and there a momentous decision
was registered. Grenville had refused to recognise the official character
of the French envoy, Chauvelin. He had informed him that he was sub-
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to leave the country. Upon that Dumouriez was recalled. On the 29th
Chauvelin arrived at Paris, and told his story. And it was then, February
1, that the Convention declared war against England. With less violent
counsels in London, and with patience to listen to Dumouriez, the out-
break of the war might have been postponed. But nothing that England
was able to offer could have made up to France for the sacrifice of the
fleet and the treasure of Holland.
Our ministers may have been wanting in many qualities of negotia-
tors, and the dismissal of Chauvelin laid on them a responsibility that
was easy to avoid. They could not for long have averted hostilities. It is
possible that Fox might have succeeded, for Fox was able to understand
the world of new ideas which underlay the policy of France; but the
country was in no temper to follow the Whigs. They accused Pitt un-
justly when they said that he went to war from the motive of ambition.
He was guiltless of that capital charge. But he did less than he might
have done to prevent it, perceiving too clearly the benefit that would
accrue. And he is open to the grave reproach that he went over to the
absolute Powers and associated England with them at the moment of the
Second Partition, and applied to France the principles on which they
acted against Poland. When the Prince of Coburg held his first confer-
ence with his allies in Belgium, he declared that Austria renounced all
ideas of conquest. The English at once protested. They made known
that they desired to annex as much territory as possible, in order to
make the enemy less formidable. Our envoy was Lord Auckland, a man
of moderate opinions, who had always advised his government to come
to terms with the Republic. He exhorted Coburg not to rest until he had
secured a satisfactory line of frontier, as England was going to appro-
priate Dunkirk and the Colonies, and meant to keep them. George III, on
April 27, uttered the same sentiments. France, he said, must be greatly
circumscribed before we can talk of any means of treating with that
dangerous and faithless nation. In February Grenville definitely pro-
posed dismemberment, offering the frontier fortresses and the whole of
Alsace and Lorraine to Austria. It was the English who impressed on
the operations, that were to follow, the character of a selfish and sordid
rapacity.
The island kingdom alone had nothing to fear, for she had the rest of
the maritime Powers on her side, and the preponderance of the naval
forces was decisive. The French began the war with 76 line-of-battle
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difference was not so great, for the English guns threw 89,000 lbs. and
the French 74,000. But England had the Spanish fleet, of 56 ships-of-
the-line, and the Dutch with 49 the Spaniards well built, but badly
manned; the Dutch constructed for shallow waters, but with superior
crews. To these must be added Portugal, which followed England, and
Naples, whose king was a Bourbon, brother to the king of Spain. There-
fore, in weight of metal, which is the first thing, next to brains, we were
at least 2 to 1; and in the number of ships 3 to 1, or about 230 to 76.
That is the reason why the insular statesmen went to war, if not with
greater enterprise and energy, yet with more determination and spirit,
than their exposed and vulnerable allies upon the Continent The differ-
ence between them is that between men who are out of reach and are 2 to
1, and men whose territories are accessible to an enemy greatly superior
to themselves in numbers. Therefore it was Pitt who from his post of
vantage pushed the others forward, and, when they vacillated, encour-
aged them with money and the promise of spoil. The alliance with the
maritime states was important for his policy, but it accomplished noth-
ing in the actual struggle. The Dutch and the Spaniards were never
brought into line; and the English, though they owed their safety at first
to their system of alliances, owed their victories to themselves. And
those victories became more numerous and splendid when, after two
years of inefficacious friendship with us, the Spaniard and the Dutch-
man joined our enemies. England was drawn into the war, which it main-
tained with unflagging resolution, by the prospect of sordid gain. It
brought increase of rents to the class that governed, and advantage to
the trader from the conquest of dependencies and dominions over the
sea.
The year 1793 brought us no profit from the sea. We occupied Toulon
on the invitation of the inhabitants, and there we had in our possession
half of the naval resources of France. But before the end of the year we
were driven away. The French dominions in India fell at once into our
hands, and in March and April 1794 we captured the Windward Islands
in the West Indies, Martinique, Santa Lucia, and at last Guadeloupe.
But a Jacobin lawyer came over from France and reconquered
Guadeloupe, and the French held it with invincible tenacity till 1810.
They lost Hayti, but it never became English, and drifted into the power
of the negroes, who there rose to the highest point they have attained in
history. In the summer of the same year, 1794, Corsica became a British
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nean. We were not able to retain it. Our admirals did nothing for La
Vendée. So little was known about it that on December 19 there was a
question of sending an officer to serve under Bonchamps, who at that
time had been dead two months.
In all this chequered and inglorious history there is one day to be
remembered. On April 11, 1794, 130 merchantmen, laden with food-
supplies, sailed from Chesapeake Bay for the ports of France. Lord
Howe went out to intercept them; and on May 16 the French fleet left
Brest to protect them. Howe divided his force. He sent Montagu to watch
for the merchantmen, and led the remainder of his squadron against
Villaret Joyeuse. After a brush on May 28, they met, in equal force, on
the 1st of June, 400 miles from land. The French admiral had an un-
frocked Huguenot divine on board, who had been to sea in his youth,
and, was now infusing the revolutionary ardour into the fleet, as St. Just
did with the army. The fight lasted three hours and then ceased. Villaret
waited until evening, but Lord Howe had several ships disabled, and
would neither renew the battle nor pursue the enemy. The French had
lost seven ships out of twenty-six. The most famous of these is the Vengeur
du Peuple. It engaged the Brunswick, and the rigging of one ship be-
came so entangled with the anchors of the other that they were locked
together, and drifted away from the line. They were so close that the
French could not fire their lower deck guns, having no space to ram the
charge. The English were provided for this very emergency with flex-
ible rammers of rope and went on firing into the portholes of the enemy,
while the French captain, calling up his men from below, had the advan-
tage on the upper deck. At last the rolling of the sea forced the uncon-
quered enemies to part. The Brunswick had lost 158 out of a crew of
600, and 23 of her guns out of 74 were dismounted. She withdrew out of
action disabled, and went home to refit. The Vengeur remained on the
ground, with all her masts gone. Presently it was seen that she had been
hit below the water-line. The guns were thrown overboard, but after
some hours the Vengeur made signals that she was sinking. English
boats came and rescued about 400 men out of 723. Those of the survi-
vors who were not wounded were seen standing by the broken mast, and
cried “Vive la république,” as the ship went down. That is the history,
not the legend, of the loss of the Vengeur, and no exaggeration and no
contradiction can mar the dramatic grandeur of the scene.
The battle of the 1st of June is the one event by land or sea that was
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dancy then acquired was never lost Our failures in the West Indies, at
Cape Verde Islands, in the Mediterranean, and on the coasts of France,
and even the defection of our maritime allies, did not impair it And later
on, when all were against us, admirals more original and more enter-
prising than Howe increased our superiority. The success was less bril-
liant and entire than that which Nelson gained against a much greater
force at Trafalgar, when France lost every ship. Montagu did not inter-
cept the French merchantmen, and did not help to crush the French men-
of-war. Villaret Joyeuse and the energetic minister from Languedoc lost
the day, but they gained the substantial advantage. Under cover of their
cannon, the ships on which the country depended for its supplies came
into port. Although during those two years the French fought against
great odds at sea, their loss was less than they had expected, and did not
weaken their government at home. They had reason to hope that when-
ever their armies were brought to close quarters with Spain and the
Netherlands, the fortune of war at sea would follow the event on land.
The war with which we have now to deal passed through three dis-
tinct phases. During the year 1793, the French maintained themselves
with difficulty, having to contend with a dangerous insurrection. In 1794
the tide turned in their favour; and 1795 was an epoch of preponderance
and triumph. The Republic inherited from the Monarchy a regular army
of 220,000 men, seriously. damaged and demoralised by the emigration
of officers. To these were added, first, the volunteers of 1791, who soon
made good soldiers, and supplied the bulk of the military talent that rose
to fame down to 1815, and the like of which was never seen, either in the
American Civil War, or among the Germans in 1870. The second batch
of volunteers, those who responded to the Brunswick proclamation and
the summons of September, when the country was in danger, were not
equal to the first. The two together supplied 309,000 men. At the begin-
ning of the general war, in March 1793, the Conscription was instituted,
which provoked the rising in Vendée, and was interrupted by troubles in
other departments. Instead of 300,000 men, it yielded 164,000. In the
summer of 1793, when the fortresses were falling, there was, first, the
levy en masse, and then, August 23, the system of requisition, by which
the levy was organised and made to produce 425,000 men. Altogether,
in a year and a half, France put 1,100,000 men into line; and at the
critical moment, at the end of the second year, more than 700,000 were
present under arms. That is the force which Carnot had to wield. He
was a man of energy, of integrity, and of professional skill as an engi-262/John Acton
neer, but he was not a man of commanding abilities. Lord Castlereagh
rather flippantly called him a foolish mathematician. Once, having quar-
relled with his former comrade Fouché, and having been condemned to
banishment, he had this conversation with him: “Where am I to go,
traitor?” “Wherever you like, idiot.” As an austere republican he was
out of favour during the empire; but his defence of Antwerp is a bright
spot in the decline of Napoleon. He became Minister of the Interior on
the return from Elba, and his advice might have changed the history of
the world. For he wished the emperor to fall upon the English before
they could concentrate, and then to fight the Prussians at his leisure.
One night, during a rubber of whist, the tears that ran down his cheek
betrayed the news from Waterloo.
Carnot owed his success to two things arbitrary control over pro-
motion, and the cheapness of French lives. He could sacrifice as many
men as he required to carry a point. An Austrian on the Sambre, 1,000
miles from home, was hard to replace. Any number of Frenchmen were
within easy reach. Colonel Mack observed that whenever a combatant
fell, France lost a man, but Austria lost a soldier. La Vendée had shown
what could be done by men without organisation or the power of
manceuvring, by constant activity, exposure, and courage. Carnot taught
his men to win by a rush many times repeated, and not to count their
dead. The inferior commanders were quickly weeded out, sometimes
with help from the executioner, and the ablest men were brought to the
front. The chief army of all, the army of Sambre et Meuse, was com-
manded by Kléber, Moreau, Reynier, Marceau, and Ney. Better still, on
the Rhine were Hoche, Desaix, and St Cyr. Best of all, in the Apennines,
the French were led by Bonaparte and Masséna
All these armaments had scarcely begun when the victory of
Neerwinden and the flight of Dumouriez brought the Austrians up to the
Belgian frontier. Carnot was not discovered, the better men had not
risen to command, the levy en masse had not been thought of. The French
could do nothing in the field while the Prince of Coburg, supported by
the Dutch, and by an Anglo-Hanoverian army under the Duke of York,
sat down before the fortresses. By the end of July Condé and Valenciennes
had fallen, and the road to Paris was open to the victors. They might
have reached the capital in overwhelming force by the middle of August
But the English coveted, not Paris but Dunkirk, and the Duke of York
withdrew with 37,000 men and laid siege to it. Coburg turned aside in
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the fortified towns, one after another, according to Grenville’s prescrip-
tion, and then to join hands with the Prussians whom it was urgent to
have with him when penetrating to the interior. The Prussians mean-
while had taken Mentz, the garrison, like that of Valenciennes, making a
defence too short for their fame. But the Prussians remembered the in-
vasion of the year before, and they were in no hurry. The allies, with
conflicting interests and divided counsels, gave the enemy time. Some
years later, when Napoleon had defeated the Piedmontese, and was wait-
ing for them to send back the treaty he had dictated at Cherasco, duly
signed, he grew excessively impatient at their delay. The Piedmontese
officers were surprised at what seemed a want of self- restraint, and let
him see it. His answer was, “I may often lose a battle, but I shall never
lose a minute.”
The French put to good account the time their enemies allowed them.
Carnot took office on August 14, and on the 23rd he caused the Conven-
tion to decree what is pleasantly called the levy en masse, but was the
system of requisition, making every able-bodied man a soldier. The new
spirit of administration was soon felt in the army. The forces besieging
Le Quesnoy and Dunkirk were so far apart that the French came be-
tween and attacked them successively. The Dunkirk garrison opened the
sluices and flooded the country, separating the English from the cover-
ing force of Hanoverians, and leaving the Duke of York no means of
retreat except by a single causeway. On September 8 the French de-
feated the Hanoverians at Hondschooten and relieved Dunkirk. The
English got away in great haste, abandoning their siege guns; but as
they ought not to have got away at all, the French cut off the head of
their victorious commander. Jourdan, his successor, turned upon the
Prince of Coburg, and, by the new and expensive tactics, defeated him
at Wattignies on October 16. Carnot, who did not yet trust his generals,
arrived in time to win the day by overruling Jourdan and his staff And
every French child knows how he led the charge through the grapeshot,
on foot, with his hat at the end of his sword. From that day to the peace
of Bâle he held the army in his grasp. He had stopped the invasion. No
one in the allied camp spoke any more of the shortest road to Paris; but
they still held the places they had conquered. Two months later, Hoche,
who had distinguished himself at Dunkirk, took the command in the
Vosges, and stormed the lines of Weissenburg at the scene of the first
action in the war of 1870. By the end of December the Prussians were
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that time, too, La Vendée, and Lyons, and Toulon had fallen. The cam-
paign of 1794 was to be devoted to foreign war.
During that autumn and winter, Carnot, somewhat unmindful of
what went on near him and heedless of the signatures he gave, was
organising the enormous force the requisition provided, and laying the
plans that were to give him so great a name in the history of his country.
He divided the troops into thirteen armies. They call them fourteen, I
believe, because there were cadres for an army of reserve. Two were
required for the Spanish war, for the Pyrenees are impassable by artil-
lery except at the two ends, where narrow valleys lead from France to
Spain near San Sebastian, and by a strip of more open country near the
Mediterranean. What passed there did not influence events; but it is well
to know that the Spaniards under Ricardos gained important advan-
tages in 1794, and fought better than they ever did in the field during
their struggle with Napoleon. A third army was placed on the Italian
frontier, a fourth on the Rhine, and a fifth against the allies in Flanders.
Carnot increased the number because he had no men who had proved
their fitness for the direction of very large forces. He meant that his
armies should be everywhere sufficient, but in Belgium they were to he
overwhelming. That was the point of danger, and there a great body of
Austrians, Dutch, English, and Hanoverians had been collected. The
Emperor himself appeared among them in May; and his brother, the
Archduke Charles, was the best officer in the allied camp.
At the end of April Coburg took Landrecies, the fourth of the line of
fortresses that had fallen. On May 18 the French were victorious at
Tourcoing, where the English suffered severely, and the Duke of York
sought safety in precipitate flight There was even talk of a court mar-
tial. The day was lost in consequence of the absence of the Archduke,
who suffered from fits like Julius Caesar, and is said to have been lying
unconscious many miles away. For a month longer the allies held their
ground and repeatedly repressed Jourdan in his attempts to cross the
Sambre. At last, Charleroi surrendered to the French, and on the follow-
ing day, June 26, they won the great battle of Fleurus. Mons fell on July
1, and on the 5th the allies resolved to evacuate Belgium. The four for-
tresses were recovered in August; and Coburg retired by Liége into
Germany, York by Antwerp into Holland. In October Jourdan pursued
the Austrians, and drove them across the Rhine. The battle of Fleurus
established the ascendancy of the French in Europe as the 1st of June
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retained it for twenty years. Yet the defeat of Fleurus, after such varying
fortunes and so much alternate success does not explain the sudden
discouragement and collapse of the allies. One of the great powers was
about to abandon the alliance. Prussia had agreed in the spring to accept
an English subsidy. For £300,000 down, and £150,000 a month, a force
of fifty to sixty thousand Prussians was to be employed in a manner to
be agreed upon with England, that meant in Belgium. Before
Malmesbury’s signature was dry, the whole situation altered.
The Committee of Public Safety had created a diversion in the rear
of the foe. Kozsiusko, with the help of French money and advice, had
raised an insurrection in Poland, and the hands of the Prussians were
tied. The Polish question touched them nearer than the French, and all
their thoughts were turned in the opposite direction. The Austrians be-
gan to apprehend that Prussia would desert them on the Rhine, and
would gain an advantage over them in Poland, while they were busy
with their best army in Flanders. Pitt increased his offers. Lord Spencer
was sent to Vienna to arrange for a further subsidy. But the Prussians
began to withdraw. Marshal Moellendorf informed the French in Sep-
tember that the Austrians were about to attack Treves. He promised that
he would do no more than he could help for his allies. On the 20th,
Hohenlohe, who was not in the secret, having fought Hoche at
Kaiserslautern and defeated him, the commander-in-chief sent explana-
tions and apologies. In October, Pitt stopped the supplies, and the
Prussians disappeared from the war.
The winter of 1794–95 was severe, and even the sea froze in Hol-
land. In January, Pichegru marched over the solid Rhine, and neither
Dutch nor English offered any considerable resistance. The Prince of
Orange fled to England; the Duke of York retreated to Bremen, and
there embarked; and on the 28th the French were welcomed by the de-
mocracy of Amsterdam. A body of cavalry rode up to the fleet on the
ice, and received its surrender. There was no cause left for it to defend.
Holland was to be the salvation of French credit It gave France trade, a
fleet, a position from which to enter Germany on the undefended side.
The tables were turned against Pitt and his policy. His Prussian ally
made peace in April, giving up to France all Germany as far as the
Rhine, and undertaking to occupy Hanover, if George III, as elector,
refused to be neutral. Spain almost immediately followed. Manuel Godoy,
lately a guardsman, but Prime Minister and Duke of Alcudia since No-
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there were hopes of saving the life of Lewis by the promise of neutrality.
When those hopes came to an end, he consented. The joint occupation
of Toulon had not been amicable; and when George III was made King
of Corsica, it was an injury to Spain as a Mediterranean Power. The
animosity against regicide France faded away; the war was not popular,
and the Duke of Alcudia became, amid general rejoicing, Prince of the
Peace.
We saw how the first invasion, in 1792, brought the worst men to
power. In 1793, the Reign of Terror coincided exactly with the season of
public danger. Robespierre became the head of the government on the
very day when the bad news came from the fortresses, and he fell imme-
diately after the occupation of Brussels, July 11, 1794, exposed the
effects of Fleurus. We cannot dissociate these events, or disprove the
contention that the Reign of Terror was the salvation of France. It is
certain that the conscription of March 1793, under Girondin auspices,
scarcely yielded half the required amount, whilst the levies of the fol-
lowing August, decreed and carried out by the Mountain, inundated the
country with soldiers, who were prepared by the slaughter going on at
home to face the slaughter at the front. This, then, was the result which
Conservative Europe obtained by its attack on the Republic. The French
had subjugated Savoy, the Rhineland, Belgium, Holland, whilst Prussia
and Spain had been made to sue for peace. England had deprived France
of her colonies, but had lost repute as a military Power. Austria alone,
with her dependent neighbours, maintained the unequal struggle on the
Continent under worse conditions, and with no hope but in the help of
Russia.XXII: AFTER THE TERROR
It remains for us to pursue the course of French politics from the fall of
the Terrorists to the Constitution of the year III, and the close of the
Convention in October 1795. The State drifted after the storm, and was
long without a regular government or a guiding body of opinion. The
first feeling was relief at an immense deliverance. Prisons were opened
and thousands of private citizens were released. The new sensation dis-
played itself extravagantly, in the search for pleasures unknown during
the stern and sombre reign. Madame Tallien set the fashion as queen of
Paris society. Men rejected the modern garment which characterised the
hateful years, and put on tights. They buried the chin in folded neckcloths,
and wore tall hats in protest against the exposed neck and the red night-
cap of the enemy. Powder was resumed; but the pigtail was cut off
straight, in commemoration of friends lost by the fall of the axe. Young
men, representing the new spirit, wore a kind of uniform, with the badge
of mourning on the arm, and a knobstick in their hands adapted to the
Jacobin skull. They became known afterwards as the Jeunesse Dorée.
The press made much of them, and they served as a body to the leaders
of the reaction, hustling opponents, and denoting the infinite change in
the conditions of public life.
These were externals. What went on underneath was the gradual
recovery of the respectable elements of society, and the passage of power
from the unworthy hands of the men who destroyed Robespierre. These,
the Thermidorians, were faithful to the contract with the Plain, by which
they obtained their victory. Some had been friends of Danton, who, at
one moment of the previous winter, had approved a policy of modera-
tion in the use of the guillotine. Tallien had domestic as well as public
reasons for clemency. But the bulk of the genuine Montagnards were
unaltered. They had deserted Robespierre when it became unsafe to de-
fend him; but they had not renounced his system, and held that it was
needful as their security against the furious enmity they had incurred
when they were the ruling faction.
The majority in the Convention, where all powers were now con-
centrated, were unable to govern. The irresistible resources of the Reign
of Terror were gone, and nothing occupied their place. There was no
working Constitution, no settled authority, no party enjoying ascendancy
and respect, no public men free from the guilt of blood. Many months
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constituted an effective government with a real policy and the means of
pursuing it. The chiefs of the Commune and of the revolutionary tribu-
nal, near one hundred in number, had followed Robespierre to the scaf-
fold.
The Committees of government had lost their most energetic mem-
bers, and were disabled by the new plan of rapid renewal. Power fluctu-
ated between varying combinations of deputies, all of them transient
and quickly discredited. The main division was between vengeance and
amnesty. And the character of the following months was a gradual drift
in the direction of vengeance, as the imprisoned or proscribed minority
returned to their seats. But the Mountain included the men, who by
organising, and equipping, and controlling the armies had made France
the first of European Powers, and they could not at once be displaced.
Barère proposed that existing institutions should be preserved, and that
Fouquier should continue his office. On August 19, Louchet, the man
who led the assault against Robespierre, insisted that it was needful to
keep up the Terror with all the rigour that had been prescribed by the
sagacious and profound Marat. A month later, September 21, the Con-
vention solemnised the apotheosis of Marat, whose remains were de-
posited in the Pantheon, while those of Mirabeau were cast out. Three
weeks later, the master of Robespierre, Rousseau, was brought, with
equal ceremony, to be laid by his side. The worst of the remaining of-
fenders, Barère, Collot d’Herbois, and Billaud-Varennes, were deprived
of their seats on the Committee of Public Safety. But in spite of the
denunciations of Lecointre and of Legendre, the Convention refused to
proceed against them.
All through September and a great part of October the Mountain
held its ground, and prevented the reform of the government. Billaud,
gaining courage, declared that the lion might slumber, but would rend
his enemies on awaking. By the lion, he meant himself and his friends of
Thermidor. The governing Committees were reconstructed on the prin-
ciple of frequent change; the law of Prairial, which gave the right of
arbitrary arrest and unconditional gaol delivery, was abrogated; and
commissaries were sent out to teach the Provinces the example of Paris.
Beyond these measures, the action of the State stood still. The fall
of the men who reigned by terror produced, at first, no great political
result The process of change was set in motion by certain citizens of
Nantes. Carrier had sent a batch of 132 of his prisoners to feed the Paris
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remainder were still in prison in Thermidor; and they now petitioned to
be put on their trial. The trial took place; and the evidence given was
such as made a reaction inevitable. On September 14, the Nantais were
acquitted. Then the necessary consequence followed. If the victims of
Carrier were innocent, what was Carrier himself? His atrocities had
been exposed, and, on November 12, the Convention resolved, by 498
to 2, that he should appear before the tribunal. For Carrier was a deputy,
inviolable under common law.
The trial was prolonged, for it was the trial not of a man, but of a
system, of a whole class of men still in the enjoyment of immunity.
Everything that could be brought to light gave strength to the
Thermidorians against their enemies, and gave them the command of
public opinion. On December 16 Carrier was guillotined. He had de-
fended himself with spirit The strength of his case was that his prosecu-
tors were nearly as guilty as himself; and that they would all, succes-
sively, be struck down by the enemies of the Republic. He did his best to
drag down the party with him. His associates, acquitted by the revolu-
tionary tribunal on the plea that their delinquencies were not political,
were then sent before the ordinary courts. On the day on which the
convention resolved that the butcher of Nantes must stand his trial, they
closed the Jacobin Club, and now the reaction was setting in.
On December 1, after hearing a report by Carnot, the assembly
offered an amnesty to the insurgents on the Loire, and on the 8th those
Girondins were recalled who had been placed under arrest. This mea-
sure was decisive. With the willing aid of the Plain they were masters of
the Convention, for they were seventy-three in number, and, unlike the
Plain, they were not hampered and disabled by their own iniquities.
They were not accomplices of the Reign of Terror, for they had spent it
in confinement. They had nothing to fear from a vigorous application of
deserved penalties, and they had a terrible score to clear off. There were
still sixteen deputies who had been proscribed with Buzot and the rest..
They were now amnestied, and three months later, March 8, they were
admitted to their seats. There they sat face to face with the men who had
outlawed them, who had devoted them to death by an act the injustice of
which was now proclaimed.
The cry for vengeance was becoming irresistible as the policy of the
last year was reversed. In the course of that process La Vendée had its
turn. On the 17th of February, at La Jaunaye, the French Republic came
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liberty for religion, compensation in money, relief from conscription,
and a territorial guard of 2000 men, to be paid by the government, and
commanded by himself. The same conditions were accepted soon after
by Stofflet, and by the Breton leader, Cormatin. In that hour of triumph
Charette rode into Nantes with the white badge of Royalism displayed;
and he was received with honour by the authorities, and acclaimed by
the crowd. Immediately after the treaty of La Jaunaye which granted the
free practice of religion in the west, it was extended to the whole of
France. The churches were given back some months later; there is one
parish, in an eastern department, where it is said that the church was
never closed, and the service never interrupted.
In March the Girondins were strong enough to turn upon their foes.
The extent of the reaction was tested by the expulsion of Marat from his
brief rest in the Pantheon, and the destruction of his busts all over the
town, by the young men stimulated by Fréron. In March, the great of-
fenders who had been so hard to reach, Collot d’Herbois, Billaud, and
Barère, were thrown into prison. Carnot defended them, on the ground
that they were hardly worse than himself. The Convention resolved that
they should be sent to Cayenne. Barère escaped on the way. Fouquier-
Tinville came next, and his trial did as much, harm to his party in the
spring as that of Carrier in the preceding autumn. He pleaded that he
was but an instrument in the hands of the Committee of Public Safety,
and that as the three members of it, whom he had obeyed, were only
transported, no more could be done to himself. The tribunal was not
bound by the punishments decreed by the Assembly, and in May Fouquier
was executed.
The Montagnards resolved ‘that they would not perish without a
struggle. On April i they assailed the Con- vention, and were repulsed.
A number of the worst were thrown into prison. A more formidable
attack was made on May 20. For hours the Convention was in the power
of the mob, and a deputy was killed in attempting to protect the presi-
dent. Members who belonged to the Mountain carried a series of de-
crees hich gratified the populace. Late at night the Assembly was res-
cued. The tumultuous votes were declared non-existent, and those who
had moved them were sent before a military commission. They had not
prompted the sedition, and it was urged that they acted as they did in
order to appease it, and to save the lives of their opponents. Romme,
author of the republican Calendar, was the most remark- able of these
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sentence. One of them had been visited by his wife, and she left the
means of suicide in his hands. As they left the court, each of them stabbed
himself; and passed the knife in silence to his neighbour. Before the
guards were aware of anything, three were dead, and the others were
dragged, covered with blood, to the place of execution. It was the iyth of
June, and the Girondins were supreme. Sixty-two deputies had been
decreed in the course of the reaction, and the domination of the Jacobin
mob, that is, govern- ment by equality instead of liberty, was at an end.
The middle class had recovered power, and it was very doubtful whether
these new masters of France were willing again to risk the experiment of
a republic. That experi- ment had proved a dreadful failure, and it was
more easy and obvious to seek relief in the refuge of monarchy than on
the quicksands of fluttering majorities.
The royalists were wreaking vengeance on their enemies in the south,
by what was afterwards known as the White Terror; and they showed
themselves in force at Paris. For a time, every measure helped them that
was taken against the Montagnards, and people used publicly to say
that 8 and 9 are 17, that is, that the revolution of 1789 would end by the
accession of Lewis XVII. Between Girondin and royalist there was the
blood of the king, and the regicides knew what they must expect from a
restoration. The party remained irreconcilable, and opposed the idea.
Their struggle now was not with the Mountain, which had been laid
low, but with their old adversaries the reforming adherents of Monar-
chy. But there were some leading men who, from conviction or, which
would be more significant, from policy began to compound with the
exiled princes. Tallien and Cambacérès of the Mountain, Isnard and
Lanjuinais of the Gironde, Boissy d’Anglas of the Plain, the successful
general Pichegru, and the best negotiator in France Barthélemy, were all
known, or suspected, to be making terms with the Count of Provence at
Verona. It was commonly reported that the Committee was wavering,
and that the Constitution would turn towards monarchy. Breton and
Vendean were ready to rise once more, Pitt was preparing vast arma-
ments to help them; above all, there was a young pretender who had
never made an enemy, whose early sufferings claimed sympathy from
royalist and republican, and who shared no responsibility for émigré
and invader, whom, for the best of reasons, he had never seen.
Meantime the Republic had improved its position in the world. Its
conquests included the Alps and the Rhine, Belgium, and Holland, and
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confederacy of kings was broken up. Tuscany had been the first to treat.
Prussia had followed, bringing with it the neutrality of Northern Ger-
many. Then Holland came, and Spain had opened negotiations. But with
Spain there was a difficulty. There could be no treaty with a government
which detained in prison the head of the House of Bourbon. As soon as
he was delivered up, Spain was ready to sign and to ratify. Thus in the
spring of 1795, the thoughts of men came to be riveted on the room in
the Temple where the king was slowly and surely dying. The gaoler had
asked the Committee what their intention was. “ Do you mean to banish
him?” “No.” “To kill him?” “No.” “Then,” with an oath “what is it you
want?” “To get rid of him.” On May 3, it was reported to the govern-
ment that the young captive was ill. Next day, that he was very ill. But
he was an obstacle to the Spanish treaty which was absolutely neces-
sary, and twice the government made no sign. On the 5th, it was believed
that he was in danger, and then a physician was sent to him. The choice
was a good one, for the man was capable, and had attended the royal
family. His opinion was that nothing could save the prisoner, except
country air. One day he added  “He is lost, but perhaps there are some
who will not be sorry.” Three days later Lewis XVII was living, but the
doctor was dead, and a legend grew up on his grave. It was said that he
was poisoned because he had discovered the dread secret that the boy in
the Temple was not the king. Even Louis Blanc believed that the king
had been secretly released, and that a dying patient from the hospital
had been substituted for him. The belief has been kept alive to this day.
The most popular living dramatist’ has a play now running at Paris, in
which the king is rescued in a washerwoman’s linen basket, which draws
crowds. The truth is that he died on June 8, 1795. The Republic had
gained its purpose. Peace was signed with Spain; and the friends of
monarchy on the Constitutional Committee at once declared that they
would not vote for it.
At the very moment when the Constitution was presented to the
Assembly by Boissy d’Anglas, a fleet of transports under convoy ap-
peared off the western coast. Pitt had allowed La Vendée to go down in
defeat and slaughter, but at last he made up his mind to help, and it was
done on a magnificent scale. Two expeditions were fitted out, and fur-
nished with material of war. Each of them carried three or four thousand
émigrés, armed and clad by England. One was commanded by d’Hervilly,
whom we have already seen, for it was he who took the order to cease
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saved in September in the tragic way you have heard. At the head of
them all was the Count de Puisaye, the most politic and influential of the
émigrés, a man who had been in touch with the Girondins in Normandy,
who had obtained the ear of ministers at Whitehall, and who had been
washed in so many waters that the genuine, exclusive, narrow-minded
managers of Vendean legitimacy neither understood nor believed him.
They brought a vast treasure in the shape of forged assignats; and in
confused memory of the services rendered by the titular of Agra, they
brought a real bishop who had sanctioned the forgery.
The first division sailed from Cowes on June 10. On the 23rd Lord
Bridport engaged the French fleet and drove it into port. Four days later
the émigrés landed at Carnac, among the early monuments of the Celtic
race. It was a low promontory, defended at the neck by a fort named
after the Duke de Penthièvre, and it could be swept, in places, by the
guns of the fleet. Thousands of Chouans joined; but La Vendée was
suspicious and stood aloof. They had expected the fleet to come to them,
but it had gone to Brittany, and there was jealousy between the two
provinces, between the partisans of Lewis XVIII and those of his brother
the Count d’Artois, between the priests and the politicians. The clergy
restrained Charette and Stoffiet from uniting with Puisaye and his ques-
tionable allies, whom they accused of seeking the crown of France for
the Duke of York; and they promised that, if they waited a little, the
Count d’Artois would appear among them. They effectively ruined their
prospects of success; but Pitt himself had contributed his share. Puisaye
declined to bring English soldiers into his country, and his scruples were
admitted. But, in order to swell his forces, the frugal minister armed
between 1000 and 2000 French prisoners, who were republicans, but
who declared themselves ready to join, and were as glad to escape from
captivity as the government was to get rid of them. The royalist officers
protested against this alloy, but their objections did not prevail, and
when they came to their own country these men deserted. They pointed
out a place where the republicans could pass under the fort at low water,
and enter it on the undefended side. At night, in the midst of a furious
tempest, the passage was attempted. Hoche’s troops waded through the
stormy waters of Quiberon bay, and the tricolor was soon displayed
upon the walls.
The royalists were driven to the extremity of the peninsula. Some,
but not many, escaped in English boats, and it was thought that our fleet
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the fame and the influence of England. Sombreuil defended himself un-
til a republican officer called on him to capitulate. He consented, for
there was no hope; but no terms were made, and it was in truth an
unconditional surrender. Tallien, who was in the camp, hurried to Paris
to intercede for the prisoners. Before going to the Convention, he went
to his home. There his wife told him that she had just seen Lanjuinais,
that Sieyés had brought back from Holland, where he had negotiated
peace, proofs of Tallien’s treasonable correspondence with the Bour-
bons, and that his life was in danger. He went at once to the Convention,
and called for the summary punishment of the captured émigrés.
Hoche was a magnanimous enemy, both by character and policy,
and he had a deep respect for Sombreuil. He secretly offered to let him
escape. The prisoner refused to be saved without his comrades; and they
were shot down together near Auray, on a spot which is still known as
the field of sacrifice. They were six or seven hundred. The firing party
awakened the echoes of Vendée, for Charette instantly put his prisoners
to death; and the Chouans afterwards contrived to cut down every man
of the four battalions charged with the execution.
The battle of Quiberon took place on July 21, and when all that
ensued was over on August 25, another expedition sailed from Ports-
mouth with the Count d’Artois on board. He landed on an island off La
Vendée, and Charette, with fifteen thousand men, marched down to the
coast to receive him, among the haggard veterans of the royal cause.
There, on October 10, a message came from the Prince informing the
hero that he was about to sail away, and to wait in safety for better
times. Five days earlier the question had been fought out and decided at
Paris, and a man had been revealed who was to raise deeper and more
momentous issues than the obsolete controversy between monarchy and
republic. That controversy had been pursued in the constitutional de-
bates under the fatal influence of the events on the coast of Brittany. The
royalists had displayed their colours, sailing under the British flag, and
the British alliance had not availed them. And they had displayed a
strange political imbecility, contrasting with their spirit and intelligence
in war.
The constitutional committee had been elected on April 23 under
different auspices, when the Convention was making terms with Charette
and Cormatin, as well as with the foreign Powers. Sieyès, of necessity,
was the first man chosen; but he was on the governing committee, and
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the three ablest men in the assembly did not serve.
Eleven moderate but not very eminent men were elected, and the
draft was made chiefly by Daunou, and advocated by Thibaudeau.
Daunou was an ancient oratorian, a studious and thoughtful if not a
strong man, who became keeper of the archives, and lived down to 1840
with a somewhat usurped reputation for learning. Thibaudeau now be-
gan to exhibit great intelligence, and his writings are among our best
authorities for these later years of the Republic and for the earlier years
of the Empire. The general character of their scheme is that it is influ-
enced more by experience than by theory, and strives to attach power to
property. They reported on June 23; the debate began on July 4; and on
the 20th Sieyès intervened. His advice turned mainly on the idea of a
constitutional jury, an elective body of about one hundred, to watch
over the Constitution, and to be guardians of the law against the makers
of the law. It was to receive the plaints of minorities and of individuals
against the legislature, and to preserve the spirit of the organic institu-
tions against the omnipotence of the national representatives. This memo-
rable attempt to develop in Europe something analogous to that prop-
erty of the Supreme Court which was not yet matured in America, was
rejected on August 5, almost unanimously.
The Constitution was adopted by the Convention on August 17. It
included a declaration of duties, founded on confusion, but defended on
the ground that a declaration of rights alone destroys the stability of the
State. And in matters touching religion it innovated on what had been
done hitherto, for it separated Church and State, leaving all religions to
their own resources. The division of powers was carried farther, for the
legislative was divided into two, and the executive into five. Universal
suffrage was restricted; the poorest were excluded; and after nine years
there was to be an educational test. The law did not last so long. The
electoral body, one in two hundred of the whole constituency, was to be
limited to owners of property. The directors were to be chosen by the
legislature. Practically, there was much more regard for liberty, and less
for equality, than in the former constitutions. The change in public Opin-
ion was shown by the vote on two Houses which only one deputy op-
posed.
At the last moment, that there might be no danger from royalism in
the departments, it was resolved that two-thirds of the legislature must
be taken from the Convention. They thus prolonged their own power,
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the same time they showed their want of confidence in the republican
feeling of the country, and both exasperated the royalists and gave them
courage to act for themselves On September 23 the country accepted the
scheme, by a languid vote, but with a large majority.
The new Constitution afforded securities for order and for liberty
such as France had never enjoyed. The Revolution had begun with a
Liberalism which was a passion more than a philosophy, and the first
Assembly endeavoured to realise it by diminishing authority, weakening
the executive, and decentralising power. In the hour of peril under the
Girondins the policy failed, and the Jacobins governed on the principle
that power, coming from the people, ought to be concentrated in the
fewest possible hands and made absolutely irresistible. Equality became
the substitute of liberty, and the danger arose that the most welcome
form of equality would be the equal distribution of property. The Jacobin
statesmen, the thinkers of the party, undertook to abolish poverty with-
out falling into Socialism. They had the Church property, which served
as the basis of the public credit. They had the royal domain, the confis-
cated estates of emigrants and malignants, the common lands, the forest
lands. And in time of war there was the pillage of opulent neighbours.
By these operations the income of the peasantry was doubled, and it
was deemed possible to relieve the masses from taxation, until, by the
immense transfer of property, there should be no poor in the Republic.
These schemes were at an end, and the Constitution of the year III closes
the revolutionary period.
The royalists and conservatives of the capital would have acqui-
esced in the defeat of their hopes but for the additional article which
threatened to perpetuate power in the hands of existing deputies, which
had been carried by a far smaller vote than that which was given in
favour of the organic law itself. The alarm and the indignation were
extreme, and the royalists, on counting their forces, saw that they had a
good chance against the declining assembly. Nearly thirty thousand men
were collected, and the command was given to an experienced officer. It
had been proposed by some to confer it on the Count Colbert de
Maulevrier, the former employer of Stoffiet. This was refused on the
ground that they were not absolutists or émigrés, but Liberals, and par-
tisans of constitutional monarchy, and of no other.
The army of the Convention was scarcely six thousand, and a large
body of Jacobin roughs were among them. The command was bestowed
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disgusted with his materials, and felt more sympathy with the enemy.
He endeavoured to negotiate, and was deposed, and succeeded by Barras,
the victor in the bloodless battle of Thermidor.
Bonaparte, out of employment, was lounging in Paris, and as he
came out of the theatre he found himself among the men who were hold-
ing the parley. He hurried to headquarters, where the effect of his defin-
ing words upon the scared authorities was such that he was at once
appointed second in command. Therefore, when morning dawned, on
October 5, the Louvre and the Tuileries had become a fortress, and the
gardens were a fortified camp. A young officer who became the most
brilliant figure on the battlefield of Europe Murat  brought up cannon
from the country. The bridge, and the quay, and every street that opened
on the palace, were so commanded by batteries that they could be swept
by grape-shot. Officers had been sent out for provisions, for barrels of
gunpowder, for all that belongs to hospital and ambulance. Lest retreat
should be cut off, a strong detachment held the road to St. Cloud; and
arms were liberally supplied to the Convention and the friendly quarter
of St Antoine. The insurgents, led by dexterous intriguers, but without a
great soldier at their head, could not approach the river; and those who
came down from the opulent centre of the city missed their opportunity.
After a sharp conflict in the Rue St. Honoré, they fled, pursued by noth-
ing more murderous than blank cartridge; and Paris felt, for the first
time, the grasp of the master. The man who defeated them, and by de-
feating them kept the throne vacant, was Bonaparte, through whose
genius the Revolution was to subjugate the Continent.APPENDIX: THE LITERATURE OF THE
REVOLUTION
Before embarking on the stormy sea before us, we ought to be provided
with chart and compass. Therefore I begin by speaking about the histo-
ries of the Revolution, so that you may at once have some idea what to
choose and what to reject, that you may know where we stand, how we
have come to penetrate so far and no farther, what branches there are
that already bear ripe fruit and where it is still ripening on the tree of
knowledge. I desire to rescue you from the writers of each particular
school and each particular age, and from perpetual dependence on the
ready-made and conventional narratives that satisfy the outer world.
With the growing experience of mankind, the larger curiosity and
the increased resource, each generation adds to our insight. Lesser events
can be understood by those who behold them, great events require time
in proportion to their greatness.
Lamartine once said that the Revolution has mysteries but no enig-
mas. It is humiliating to be obliged to confess that those words are no
nearer truth now than when they were written. People have not yet ceased
to dispute about the real origin and nature of the event. It was the defi-
cit; it was the famine; it was the Austrian Committee; it was the Dia-
mond Necklace, and the humiliating memories of the Seven Years’ War;
it was the pride of nobles or the intolerance of priests; it was philoso-
phy; it was freemasonry; it was Mr. Pitt; it was the incurable levity and
violence of the national character; it was the issue of that struggle be-
tween classes that constitutes the unity of the history of France.
Amongst these interpretations we shall have to pick our way; but
there are many questions of detail on which I shall be forced to tell you
that I have no deciding evidence.
***
After the contemporary memoirs, the first historian who wrote with
authority was Droz. He was at work for thirty years, having begun in
1811, when Paris was still full of floating information, and he knew
much that otherwise did not come out until long after his death. He had
consulted Lally Tollendal, and he was allowed to use the memoirs of
Malouet, which were in manuscript, and which are unsurpassed for
wisdom and good faith in the literature of the National Assembly. Droz
was a man of sense and experience, with a true if not a powerful mind;
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could be in the days when it was written. It is a history of Lewis XVI
during the time when it was possible to bring the Revolution under con-
trol; and the author shows, with an absolute sureness of judgment, that
the turning-point was the rejection of the first project of Constitution, in
September 1789. For him, the Revolution is contained in the first four
months. He meant to write a political treatise on the natural history of
revolutions, and the art of so managing just demands that unjust and
dangerous demands shall acquire no force. It became a history of re-
jected opportunities, and an indictment of the wisdom of the minister
and of the goodness of the king, by a constitutional royalist of the En-
glish school. His service to history is that he shows how disorder and
crime grew out of unreadiness, want of energy, want of clear thought
and definite design. Droz admits that there is a flaw in the philosophy of
his title-page. The position lost in the summer of 1789 was never recov-
ered. But during the year 1790 Mirabeau was at work on schemes to
restore the monarchy, and it is not plain that they could never have
succeeded. Therefore Droz added a volume on the parliamentary career
of Mirabeau, and called it an appendix, so as to remain true to his origi-
nal theory of the fatal limit. We know the great orator better than he
could be known in 1842, and the value of Droz’s excellent work is con-
fined to the second volume. It will stand undiminished even if we reject
the idea which inspired it, and prefer to think that the cause might have
been won, even when it came to actual fighting, on the 10th of August.
Droz’s book belongs to the small number of writings before us which
are superior to their fame, and it was followed by one that enjoyed to the
utmost the opposite fate.
For our next event is an explosion. Lamartine, the poet, was one of
those legitimists who believed that 1830 had killed monarchy, who con-
sidered the Orleans dynasty a sham, and set themselves at once to look
ahead of it towards the inevitable Republic. Talleyrand warned him to
hold himself ready for something more substantial than the exchange of
a nephew for an uncle on a baseless throne. With the intuition of genius
he saw sooner than most men, more accurately than any man, the signs
of what was to come. In six years, he said, we shall be masters. He was
mistaken only by a few weeks. He laid his plans that, when the time
came, he should be the accepted leader. To chasten and idealise the Revo-
lution, and to prepare a Republic that should not be a terror to mankind,
but should submit easily to the fascination of a melodious and sympa-
thetic eloquence, he wrote the History of the Girondins. The success280/John Acton
was the most instantaneous and splendid ever obtained by a historical
work. People could read nothing else; and Alexandre Dumas paid him
the shrewd compliment of saying that he had lifted history to the level of
romance. Lamartine gained his purpose. He contributed to institute a
Republic that was pacific and humane, responsive to the charm of phrase,
and obedient to the master hand that wrote the glories of the Gironde.
He always believed that, without his book, the Reign of Terror would
have been renewed.
From early in the century to the other day there was a succession of
authors in France who knew how to write as scarcely any but Mr. Ruskin
or Mr. Swinburne have ever written in England. They doubled the opu-
lence and the significance of language, and made prose more sonorous
and more penetrating than anything but the highest poetry. There were
not more than half a dozen, beginning with Chateaubriand, and, I fear,
ending with Saint Victor. Lamartine became the historian in this
Corinthian school of style, and his purple patches outdo everything in
effectiveness. But it would appear that in French rhetoric there are pit-
falls which tamer pens avoid Rousseau compared the Roman Senate to
two hundred kings, because his sensitive ear did not allow him to say
three hundred trois cents rois. Chateaubriand, describing in a private
letter his journey to the Alps, speaks of the moon along the mountain
tops, and adds: “It is all right; I have looked up the Almanac, and find
that there was a moon. Paul Louis Courier says that Plutarch would
have made Pompey conquer at Pharsalus if it would have read better,
and he thinks that he was quite right. Courier’s exacting taste would
have found contentment in Lamartine. He knows very well that Marie
Antoinette was fifteen when she married the Dauphin in 1770; yet he
affirms that she was the child the Empress held up in her arms when the
Magyar magnates swore to die for their queen, Maria Theresa. The
scene occurred in 1741, fourteen years before she was born. Histories
of literature give the catalogue of his amazing blunders.
In his declining years he reverted to this book, and wrote an apol-
ogy, in which he answered his accusers, and confessed to some passages
which he exhorted them to tear out. There was good ground for recanta-
tion. Writing to dazzle the democracy by means of a bright halo, with
himself in the midst of it, he was sometimes weak in exposing crimes
that had a popular motive. His republicanism was of the sort that allows
no safeguard for minorities, no rights to men but those which their country
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rejected the Regency which was the legal government, and compelled
the Duchess of Orleans to fly. When a report reached him that she had
been seized, and he was asked to order her release, he refused, saying,
“If the people ask for her, she must be given up to them.”
In his own defence he showed that he had consulted the widow of
Danton, and had found a witness of the last banquet of the Girondins. In
his book he dramatised the scene, and displayed the various bearing of
the fallen statesmen during their last night on earth. Granier de Cassagnac
pronounced the whole thing a fabrication. It was told by Nodier who
was a professional inventor, and by Thiers who gave no authority, and
none could be found. But there was a priest who sat outside the door,
waiting to offer the last consolations of religion to the men about to die.
Fifty years later he was still living, and Lamartine found him and took
down his recollections. An old Girondin, whom Charlotte Corday had
requested to defend her, and who died a senator of the Second Empire,
Pontécoulant, assured his friends that Lamartine had given the true colour,
had reproduced the times as he remembered them. In the same way
General Dumas approved of Thiers’s 10th of August He was an old
soldier of the American war, a statesman of the Revolution, a trusted
servant of Napoleon, whose military history he wrote, and he left mem-
oirs which we value. But I suspect that these lingering veterans were
easily pleased with clever writers who brought back the scenes of their
early life. There may be truth in Lamartine’s colouring, but on the whole
his Girondins live as literature not as history. And his four volumes on
the National Assembly are a piece of book-making that requires no com-
ment.
Before the thunder of the Girondins had rolled away, they were fol-
lowed by two books of more enduring value on the same side. Louis
Blanc was a socialist politician, who helped, after 1840, to cement that
union of socialists and republicans which overthrew the monarchy, and
went to pieces on the barricades of June 1848. Driven into exile, he
settled in London, and spent several years at work in the British Mu-
seum. It was not all a misfortune, as this is what he found there: it will
give you an encouraging idea of the resources that await us on our path.
When Croker gave up his house at the Admiralty on the accession of the
Whigs, he sold his revolutionary library of more than 10,000 pieces to
the Museum. But the collector’s fever is an ailment not to be laid by
change of government or loss of income. Six years later Croker had
made another collection as large as the first, which also was bought by282/John Acton
the Trustees. Before he died, this incurable collector had brought to-
gether as much as the two previous lots, and the whole was at last de-
posited in the same place. There, in one room, we have about five hun-
dred shelves crowded, on an average, with more than one hundred and
twenty pamphlets, all of them belonging to the epoch that concerns us.
Allowing for duplicates, this amounts to forty or fifty thousand Revolu-
tion tracts; and I believe that there is nothing equal to it at Paris. Half of
them were already there, in time to be consulted both by Louis Blanc
and Tocqueville. Croker’s collection of manuscript papers on the same
period was sold for £50 at his death, and went to what was once the
famous library of Middle Hill.
Louis Blanc was thus able to continue in England the work he had
begun at home, and he completed it in twelve volumes. It contains much
subsidiary detail and many literary references, and this makes it a use-
ful book to consult. The ponderous mass of material, and the power of
the pen, do not compensate for the weary obtrusion of the author’s doc-
trine and design.
An eminent personage once said to me that the parliament of his
country was intent on suppressing educational freedom. When I asked
what made them illiberal, he answered, “It is because they are liberal.”
Louis Blanc partook of that mixture. He is the ex- pounder of Revolu-
tion in its compulsory and illiberal aspect. He desires government to be
so constituted that it may do everything for the people, not so restricted
that it can do no injury to minorities. The masses have more to suffer
from abuse of wealth than from abuse of power, and need protection by
the State, not against it. Power, in the proper hands, acting for the whole,
must not be restrained in the interest of a part. Therefore Louis Blanc is
the admirer and advocate of Robespierre; and the tone of his pleading
appears at the September massacres, when he bids us remember St.
Bartholomew.
Michelet undertook to vindicate the Revolution at the same time as
Louis Blanc, without his frigid passion, his ostentatious research, his
attention to particulars, but with deeper insight and a stronger pinion.
His position at the archives gave him an advantage over every rival; and
when he lost his place, he settled in the west of France and made a study
of La Vendée. He is regardless of proof, and rejects as rubbish mere
facts that contribute nothing to his argument or his picture. Because
Arras was a clerical town, he calls Robespierre a priest. Because there
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For him the function of history is judgment, not narrative. If we submit
ourselves to the event, if we think more of the accomplished deed than
of the suggested problem, we become servile accomplices of success
and force. History is resurrection. The historian is called to revise trials
and to reverse sentences, as the people, who are the subject of all his-
tory, awoke to the knowledge of their wrongs and of their power, and
rose up to avenge the past. History is also restitution. Authorities
tyrannised and nations suffered; but the Revolution is the advent of jus-
tice, and the central fact in the experience of mankind. Michelet pro-
claims that at his touch the hollow idols were shattered and exposed, the
carrion kings appeared, un- sheeted and unmasked. He says that he has
had to swallow too much anger and too much woe, too many vipers and
too many kings; and he writes sometimes as if such diet disagreed with
him. His imagination is filled with the cruel sufferings of man, and he
hails with a profound enthusiasm the moment when the victim that could
not die, in a furious act of retribution, avenged the martyrdom of a
thousand years. The acquisition of rights, the academic theory, touches
him less than the punishment of wrong. There is no forgiveness for those
who resist the people rising in the consciousness of its might. What is
good proceeds from the mass, and what is bad from individuals. Man-
kind, ignorant in regard to nature, is a righteous judge of the affairs of
man. The light which comes to the learned from reflection comes to the
un- learned more surely by natural inspiration; and power is due to the
mass by reason of instinct, not by reason of numbers. They are right by
dispensation of heaven, and there is no pity for their victims, if you
remember the days of old. Michelet had no patience with those who
sought the pure essence of the Revolution in religion. He contrasts the
agonies with which the Church aggravated the punishment of death with
the swift mercy of the guillotine, and prefers to fall into Danton’s hands
rather than into those of Lewis IX or Torquemada.
With all this, by the real sincerity of his feeling for the multitude, by
the thoroughness of his view and his intensely expressive language, he
is the most illuminating of the democratic historians. We often read of
men whose lives have been changed because a particular book has fallen
into their hands, or, one might say, because they have fallen into the
hands of a particular book. It is not always a happy accident; and one
feels that things would have gone otherwise with them if they had exam-
ined Sir John Lubbock’s List of Best Books, or what I would rather call
the St. Helena library, containing none but works adequate and adapted284/John Acton
to use by the ablest man in the full maturity of his mind. Of such books,
that are strong enough, in some eminent quality, to work a change and
form an epoch in a reader’s life, there are two, perhaps, on our revolu-
tionary shelf. One is Taine, and the other Michelet.
The fourth work of the revolutionary party, that was written almost
simultaneously with these, is that of Villiaumé. Lamartine esteemed
Vergniaud. Louis Blanc esteemed Robespierre, Michelet, Danton.
Villiaumé went a step farther, and admired Marat. He had lived much in
the surviving families of revolutionary heroes, and received, he says,
the last breath of an expiring tradition. He had also gathered from
Chateaubriand what he remembered; and Thierry, who was blind, caused
his book to be read to him twice over.
The account of Marat in the 28th volume of Buchez was partly
written by Villiaumé, and was approved by Albertine Marat. The great
bibliographical curiosity in the literature of the Revolution is Marat’s
newspaper. It was printed often in hiding-places and under difficulties,
and is so hard to find that, a few years ago, the Paris library did not
possess a complete set. A bookseller once told me that he had sold it to
an English statesman for £240. Marat’s own copy, corrected in his hand-
writing, and enriched with other matter, was preserved by his sister. In
1835 she made it over to Villiaumé, who, having finished his book, sold
it in 1859 for £80 to the collector Solar. Prince Napoleon afterwards
owned it; and at last it made its way to an ancient Scottish castle, where
I had the good fortune to find it.
***
Whilst the revolutionary historians, aided by public events, were
predominating in France, the conservatives competed obscurely, and at
first without success. Genoude was for many years editor of the leading
royalist journal, and in that capacity initiated a remarkable phase of
political thought. When the Bourbons were cast out under the imputa-
tion of incurable absolutism, the legiti- mists found themselves identi-
fied with a grudging liberality and a restricted suffrage, and stood at a
hopeless disadvantage. In the Gazette de France Genoude at once adopted
the opposite policy, and overtrumped the liberal Orleanists. He argued
that a throne which was not occupied by right of inheritance, as a man
holds his estate, could only be made legitimate by the expressed will of
France. Therefore he insisted on an appeal to the nation, on the sover-
eignty of the people, on the widest extension of the franchise. When his
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who induced him to adopt the new practice of universal suffrage, which
was unknown to the Revolution. Having lost his wife, he took orders.
All this, he said one day, will presently come to an end, not through the
act of a soldier or an orator, but of a Cardinal. And he drank to the
memory of Richelieu.
The notion of a legitimate throne, restored by democracy, which
was borrowed from Bolingbroke, and which nearly prevailed in 1873,
gives some relief and originality to his work on the Revolution. You are
not likely to meet with it. When Talleyrand’s Memoirs appeared, most
people learnt for the first time that he went at night to offer his services
to the king, to get the better of the Assembly. The editor placed the event
in the middle of July. Nobody seemed to know that the story was already
told by Genoude, and that he fixed the midnight bid for power at its
proper date, a month earlier.
The history of Amédée Gabourd is a far better book, and perhaps
the best of its kind. Gabourd had previously written a history of France,
and his many volumes on the nineteenth century, with no pretension in
point of research, are convenient for the lower range of countries and
events. He writes with the care, the intelligence, the knowledge of the
work of other men, which distinguish Charles Knight’s Popular History
of England. I have known very deep students indeed who were in the
habit of constantly using him. He says, with reason, that no writer has
sought truth and justice with more perfect good faith, or has been more
careful to keep aloof from party spirit and accepted judgments. As he
was a constitutionalist, the revolution of February was the ruin of a
system which he expected to last for ever, and to govern the last age of
the world. But Gabourd remained true to his principles. He wrote: “I
shall love the people, and honour the king; and I shall have the same
judgment on the tyranny from above and the tyranny from below. I am
not one of those who set a chasm between liberty and religion, as if God
would accept no worship but that of servile hearts. I shall not oppose the
results of the event which I describe, or deny the merit of what had been
won at the price of so much suffering.”
***
The Doctrinaires were of all men in the best position to understand
the Revolution and to judge it rightly. They had no weakness for the
ancient monarchy, none for the republic; and they accepted the results
rather than the motives. They rejoiced in the reign of reason, but they
required the monarchy duly limited, and the church as established by286/John Acton
the Concordat, in order to resume the chain of history and the reposing
influence of custom. They were the most intellectual group of statesmen
in the country; but, like the Peelites, they were leaders without follow-
ers, and it was said of them that they were only four, but pretended to be
five, to strike terror by their number. Guizot, the greatest writer among
them, composed, in his old age, a history of France for his grandchil-
dren. It was left incomplete, but his discourses on the Revolution, the
topic he had thought about all his life, were edited by his family. These
tales of a grandfather are not properly his work, and, like the kindred
and coequal lectures of Niebuhr, give approximately the views of a man
so great that it is a grief not to possess them in authentic form.
Instead of Guizot, our Doctrinaire historian is Barante. He had the
distinction and the dignity of his friends, their book learning, and their
experience of public affairs; and his work on the dukes of Burgundy
was praised, in the infancy of those studies, beyond its merit. In early
life he had assisted Madame de la Rochejaquelein to bring out her Mem-
oirs. His short biography of Saint Priest, Minister of the Interior in the
first revolutionary year, is a singularly just and weighty narrative. After
1848 he published nine volumes on the Convention and the Directory.
Like the rest of his party, Barante had always acknowledged the origi-
nal spirit of the Revolution as the root of French institutions. But the
movement of 1848, directed as it was against the Doctrinaires, against
their monarchy and their ministry, had much developed the conservative
element which was always strong within them.
In those days Montalembert succeeded Droz at the Academy, and
took the opportunity to attack, as he said, not 1793 but 1789. He said
that Guizot, the most eloquent of the immortals, had not found a word to
urge in reply. On this level, and in opposition to the revival of Jacobin
ideas and the rehabilitation of Jacobin character, Barante composed his
work. It was a great occasion, as the tide had been running strongly the
other way; but the book, coming from such a man, is a disappointment.
In the trial of the king adverse points are slurred over, as if a historian
could hold a brief. A more powerful writer of conservative history ap-
peared about the same time in Heinrich von Sybel.
***
About the middle of the fifties, when Sybel’s earlier volumes were
coming out, the deeper studies began in France with Tocqueville. He
was the first to establish, if not to discover, that the Revolution was not
simply a break, a reversal, a surprise, but in part a development ofLectures on the French Revolution/287
tendencies at work in the old monarchy. He brought it into closer con-
nection with French history, and believed that it had become inevitable,
when Lewis XVI ascended the throne, that the success and also the
failure of the movement came from causes that were at work before.
The desire for political freedom was sincere but adulterated. It was
crossed and baffled by other aims. The secondary and subordinate lib-
erties embarrassed the approach to the supreme goal of self-govern-
ment. For Tocqueville was a Liberal of the purest breed a Liberal and
nothing else, deeply suspicious of democracy and its kindred, equality,
centralisation and utilitarianism. Of all writers he is the most widely
acceptable, and the hardest to find fault with. He is always wise, always
right, and as just as Aristides. His intellect is without a flaw, but it is
limited and constrained. He knows political literature and history less
well than political life; his originality is not creative, and he does not
stimulate with gleams of new light or unfathomed suggestiveness.
Two years later, in 1858, a work began to appear which was less
new and less polished than Tocqueville’s, but is still more instructive for
every student of politics. Duvergier de Hauranne had long experience of
public life. He remembered the day when he saw Cuvier mount the tri-
bune in a black velvet suit and speak as few orators have spoken, and
carry the electoral law which was the Reform Bill of 1817. Having
quarrelled with the Doctrinaires, he led the attack which overthrew
Guizot, and was one of three on whom Thiers was relying to save the
throne, when the king went away in a cab and carried the dynasty with
him. He devoted the evening of his life to a history of parliamentary
government in France, which extends in ten volumes to 1830, and con-
tains more profound ideas, more political science, than any other work
I know in the compass of literature. He analyses every constitutional
discussion, aided by much confidential knowledge, and the fullest ac-
quaintance with pamphlets and leading articles. He is not so much at
home in books; but he does not allow a shade of intelligent thought or a
valid argument to escape him. During the Restoration, the great contro-
versy of all ages, the conflict between reason and custom was fought
out on the higher level. The question at that time was not which of the
two should prevail, but how they should be reconciled, and whether
rational thought and national life could be made to harmonise. The in-
troductory volume covers the Revolution, and traces the progress and
variation of views of government in France, from the appearance of
Sieyès to the elevation of Napoleon.288/John Acton
Laboulaye was a man of like calibre and measure ments, whom
Waddington, when he was minister, called the true successor of
Tocqueville. Like him he had saturated himself with American ideas,
and like him he was persuaded that the revolutionary legacy of concen-
trated power was the chief obstacle to free institutions. He wrote, in
three small volumes, a history of the United States, which is a most
intelligent abstract of what he had Jearnt in Bancroft and Ilildreth. He
wrote with the utmost lucidity and definiteness, and never darkened coun-
sel with Prevaricating eloquence, so that there is no man from whom it
is so easy and so agreeable to learn. His lectures on the early days of the
Revolution were published from time to time in a review, and, I believe,
have not been collected. Laboulaye was a scholar as well as a states-
man, and always knew his subject well, and as a guide to the times we
can have none more helpful than his unfinished course.
***
The event of the English competition is the appearance of Carlyle.
After fifty years we are still dependent on him for Cromwell, and in Past
and Present he gave what was the most remarkable piece of historical
thinking in the language. But the mystery of investigation had not been
revealed to him when he began his most famous book. He was scared
from the Museum by an offender who sneezed in the Reading Room. As
the French pamphlets were not yet catalogued, he asked permission to
examine them and to make his selection at the shelves on which they
stood. He complained that, having applied to a respectable official, he
had been refused. Panizzi, furious at being described as a respectable
official, declared that he could not allow the library to be pulled about
by an unknown man of letters. In the end, the usual modest resources of
a private collection satisfied his requirements. But the vivid gleam, the
mixture of the sublime with the grotesque, make other opponents forget
the impatient verdicts and the poverty of settled fact in the volumes that
delivered our fathers from thraldom to Burke. They remain one of those
disappointing storm-clouds that give out more thunder than lightning.
***
The proof of advancing knowledge is the improvement in compen-
diums and school books. There are three which must be mentioned. In
the middle of the century Lavallée wrote a history of France for his
students at the Military College. Quoting Napoleon’s remark, that the
history of France must be in four volumes or in a hundred, he pro-
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best of its kind. Being at St. Cyr, once the famous girls’ school, for
which Racine composed his later tragedies, he devoted many years to
the elucidation of Madame de Maintenon, and the recovery of her inter-
polated letters. His Revolution is contained in 230 pages of his fourth
volume. There is an abridgment of the like moderate dimensions by
Carnot. He was the father of the President, and the son of the organiser
of victory, who, in 1815, gave the memorable advice to Napoleon that,
if he made a rush at the English, he would find them scattered and un-
prepared. He was a militant republican, editor of the Memoirs of his
father, of Grégoire, and of Barère, and M. Aulard praises his book, with
the sympathy of a co-religionist, as the best existing narrative. Other
good republicans prefer what Henri Martin wrote in continuation of his
history of France. I should have no difficulty in declaring that the sev-
enth volume of the French history by Dareste is superior to them all; and
however far we carry the process of selection and exclusion, I would
never surrender it.
We have seen that there are many able works on either side, and two
or three that are excellent. And there are a few sagacious and impartial
men who keep the narrow path between them: Tocqueville for the ori-
gin, Droz and Laboulaye for the decisive period of 1789, Duvergier de
Hauranne for all the political thinking, Dareste for the great outline of
public events, in peace and war. They amount to no more than five
volumes, and are less than the single Thiers or Michelet, and not half as
long as Louis Blanc. We can easily read them through; and we shall find
that they have made all things clear to us, that we can trust them, and
that we have nothing to unlearn. But if we confine ourselves to the com-
pany of men who steer a judicious middle course, with whom we find
that we can agree, our wisdom will turn sour, and we shall never behold
parties in their strength. No man feels the grandeur of the Revolution till
he reads Michelet, or the horror of it without reading Taine. But I have
kept the best for the end, and will speak of Taine, and two or three more
who rival Taine, next week.
***
After much partial and contentious writing, sagacious men attained
a reasonable judgment on the good and evil, the truth and error, of the
Revolution. The view established by constitutional royalists, like
Duvergier de Hauranne, and by men equidistant from royalist or re-
publican exclusiveness, such as Tocqueville and Laboulaye, was very
largely shared by intelligent democrats, more particularly by Lanfrey,290/John Acton
and by Quinet in his two volumes on the genius of the Revolution. At
that time, under the Second Empire, there was nothing that could be
called an adequate history. The archives were practically unexplored,
and men had no idea of the amount of labour serious exploration im-
plies. The first writer who produced original matter from the papers of
the Paris Commune was Mortimer Ternaux, whose eight volumes on
the Reign of Terror came out between 1862 and 1880. What he revealed
was so decisive that it obliged Sybel to rewrite what he had written on
the scenes of September
When I describe the real study of the Revolution as beginning with
Tocqueville and Ternaux, I mean the study of it in the genuine and offi-
cial sources. Memoirs, of course, abounded. There are more than a hun-
dred. But memoirs do not supply the certainty of history. Certainty comes
with the means of control, and there is no controlling or testing memoirs
without the contemporary document Down to the middle of the century,
private letters and official documents were rare. Then, in the early sum-
mer of 1851, two important collections appeared within a few weeks of
each other.
First came the Memoirs of Mallet du Pan, a liberal, independent,
and discerning observer, whom, apart from the gift of style, Taine com-
pares to Burke, and who, like Burke, went over to the other side.
This was followed by Mirabeau’s Secret Correspondence with the
Court. His prevarication and double-dealing as a popular leader in the
pay of the king had long been known. At least twenty persons were in
the secret. One man, leaving Paris hurriedly, left one paper, the most
important of all, lying about in his room. Unmistakable allusions were
found among the contents of the Iron Chest. One of the ministers told
the story in his Memoirs, and a letter belonging to the series was printed
in 1827. La Marck, just before his death, showed the papers to Montigny,
who gave an account of them in his work on Mirabeau, and Droz more-
over knew the main facts from Malouet when he wrote in 1842. For us
the interest of the publication lies not in the exposure of what was al-
ready known, but in the details of his tortuous and ingenious policy
during his last year of life, and of his schemes to save the king and the
constitution. For the revolutionary party, the posthumous avowal of so
much treachery was like the story of the monk who, dying with the fame
of a saint, rose under the shroud during the funeral service, and con-
fessed before his brethren that he had lived and died an unrepentant
hypocrite.Lectures on the French Revolution/291
Still, no private papers could make up for the silence of the public
archives; and the true secrets of government, diplomacy and war, re-
mained almost intact until 1865. The manner in which they came to be
exhumed is the most curious transaction in the progress of revolution-
ary history. It was a consequence of the passion for autographs and the
collector’s craze. Seventy thousand autographs were sold by auction in
Paris in the twenty-eight years from 1822 to 1850. From the days of the
Restoration no letters were more eagerly sought and prized than those
of the queen. Royalist society regarded her as an august, heroic, and
innocent victim, and attributed the ruin of the monarchy to the neglect
of her high-minded counsels. It became a lucrative occupation to steal
letters that bore her signature, in order to sell them to wealthy purchas-
ers. Prices rose steadily. A letter of the year 1784, which fetched fifty-
two francs in 1850, was sold for one hundred and seven in 1857, and for
one hundred and fifty in 1861. In 1844 one was bought for two hundred
francs, and another for three hundred and thirty. A letter to the Princess
de Lamballe, which fetched seven hundred francs in 1860, went up to
seven hundred and sixty in 1865, when suspicion was beginning to stir.
In all, forty-one letters from the queen to Mine. de Lamballe have been
in the market, and not one of them was genuine. When it became worth
while to steal, it was still more profitable to forge, for then there was no
limit to the supply.
In her lifetime the queen was aware that hostile émigrés imitated her
hand. Three such letters were published in 1801 in a worthless book
called Madame de Lamballe’s Memoirs. Such forgeries came into the
market from the year 1822. The art was carried to the point that it defied
detection, and the credulity of the public was insatiable. In Germany a
man imitated Schiller’s writing so perfectly that Schiller’s daughter
bought his letters as fast as they could be produced. At Paris the nefari-
ous trade became active about 1839.
On March 15, 1861, a facsimilist, Betbeder, issued a challenge,
undertaking to execute autographs that it would be impossible to detect,
by paper, ink, handwriting, or text. The trial came off in the presence of
experts, and in April 1864 they pronounced that his imitations could not
be distinguished from originals. In those days there was a famous math-
ematician whose name was Chasles. He was interested in the history of
geometry, and also in the glory of France, and a clever genealogist saw
his opportunity. He produced letters from which it appeared that some
of Newton’s discoveries had been anticipated by Frenchmen who had292/John Acton
been robbed of their due fame. M. Chasles bought them, with a patriotic
disregard for money; and he continued to buy, from time to time, all that
the impostor, Vram Lucas, offered him. He laid his documents before
the Institute, and the Institute declared them genuine. There were auto-
graph letters from Alexander to Aristotle, from Caesar to Vercingetorix,
from Lazarus to St. Peter, from Mary Magdalen to Lazarus. The
fabricator’s imagination ran riot, and he produced a fragment in the
handwriting of Pythagoras, showing that Pythagoras wrote in bad French.
At last other learned men, who did not love Chasles, tried to make him
understand that he had been befooled. When the iniquity came to light,
and the culprit was sent to prison, he had flourished for seven years, had
made several thousand pounds, and had found a market for 27,000 un-
blushing forgeries.
About the time when this mysterious manufacture was thriving,
Count Hunolstein bought one hundred and forty- eight letters from Marie
Antoinette, of a Paris dealer, for £3400, and he published them in June
1864. Napoleon III. and the Empress Eugénie, whose policy it was to
conciliate legitimists whom the Italian Revolution offended, exhibited a
cultivated interest in the memory of the unhappy queen; and it happened
that a high official of their Court, M. Feuillet de Conches, was zealous
in the same cause. He began his purchases as early as 1830, and had
obtained much from the Thermidorean, Courtois, who had had
Robespierre’s papers in his hands. Wachsmuth, who went to Paris in
1840 to prepare his historical work, reported in German reviews on the
value of Feuillet’s collection; and in 1843 he was described as the first
of French autographophiles the term is not of my coining. It was known
that he meditated a publication on the royal family. He travelled all over
Europe, and was admitted to make transcripts and facsimiles in many
places that were jealously guarded against intruders. His first volume
appeared two months later than Hunolstein’s, and his second in Septem-
ber. During that summer and autumn royalism was the fashion, and
enjoyed a season of triumph. Twenty-four letters were common to both
collections; and as they did not literally agree, troublesome people be-
gan to ask questions.
The one man able to answer them was Arneth, then deputy keeper
of the archives at Vienna, who was em- ployed laying down the great
history of Maria Theresa that has made him famous. For the letters
written by Marie Antoinette to her mother and her family had been reli-
giously preserved, and were in his custody. Before the end of the yearLectures on the French Revolution/293
Arneth produced the very words of the letters, as the Empress received
them; and then it was discovered that they were quite different from
those which had been printed at Paris.
An angry controversy ensued, and in the end it became certain that
most of Hunolstein’s edition, and part of Feuillet’s, was fabricated by
an impostor. It was whispered that the supposed originals sold by
Charavay, the dealer, to Hunolstein came to him from Feuillet de Conches.
Sainte Beuve, who had been taken in at first, and had applauded, there-
upon indignantly broke off his acquaintance, and published the letter in
which he did it. Feuillet became more wary. His four later volumes are
filled with matter of the utmost value; and his large collection of the
illegible autographs of Napoleon were sold for £1250 and are now at
The Durdans.
It is in this way that the roguery of a very dexterous thief resulted in
the opening of the imperial archives, in which the authentic records of
the Revolution are deposited. For the emperors, Joseph and Leopold,
were the queen’s brothers; her sister was regent in the Low Countries,
the family ambassador was in her confidence, and the events that brought
on the great war, and the war itself, under Clerfayt, Coburg, and the
Archduke Charles, can be known there and there only. Once opened,
Arneth never afterwards allowed the door to be closed on students. He
published many documents himself, he encouraged his countrymen to
examine his treasures, and he welcomed, and continues to welcome, the
scholars of Berlin. Thirty or forty volumes of Austrian documents, which
were brought to light by the act of the felonious Frenchman, constitute
our best authority for the inner and outer history of the Revolution, and
of the time that preceded it.
The French Foreign Office is less communicative. The papers of
their two ablest diplomatists, Barthélemy and Talleyrand, have been
made public, besides those of Fersen, Maury, Vaudreuil, and many
émigrés; and the letters of several deputies to their constituents are now
coming out.
Next to the Austrian, the most valuable of the diplomatists are the
Americans, the Venetians, and the Swede, for he was the husband of
Necker’s illustrious daughter. This change in the centre of gravity which
went on between 1865 and 1885 or 1890, besides directing renewed
attention to international affairs, considerably reduced the value of the
memoirs on which the current view of our history was founded. For
memoirs are written afterwards for the world, and are clever, apolo-294/John Acton
getic, designing and deceitful. Letters are written at the moment, and are
confidential, and therefore they enable us to test the truth of the mem-
oirs. In the first place, we find that many of them are not authentic, or
are not by the reputed author. What purports to be the memoirs of Prince
Hardenberg is the composition of two well-informed men of letters,
Beauchamp and d’Allouville. Beauchamp also wrote the book known
as the Memoirs of Foucki. Those of Robespierre are by Reybaud, and
those of Barras by Rousselin. Roche wrote the memoirs of Levasseur de
la Sarthe, and Lafitte those of Fleury. Cléry, the king’s confidential va-
let, left a diary which met with such success that somebody composed
his pretended memoirs. Six volumes attributed to Sanson, the execu-
tioner, are of course spurious.
When Weber’s Memoirs were republished in the long collection of
Baudoin, Weber protested and brought an action. The defendant denied
his claim, and produced evidence to prove that the three first chapters
are by Lally Tollendal. It does not always follow that the book is worth-
less because the title-page assigns it to a man who is not the author. The
real author very often is not to be trusted. Malouet is one of those men,
very rare in history, whose reputation rises the more we know him; and
Dumont of Geneva was a sage observer, the confidant, and often the
prompter, of Mirabeau. Both are misleading, for they wrote long after,
and their memory is constantly at fault. Dumouriez wrote to excuse his
defection, and Talleyrand to cast a decent veil over actions which were
injurious to him at the Restoration. The Necker family are exasperating,
because they are generally wrong in their dates. Madame Campan wished
to recover her position, which the fall of the Empire had ruined. There-
fore some who had seen her manuscript have affirmed that the sup-
pressed passages were adverse to the queen; for the same reason that, in
the Fersen correspondence, certain expressions are omitted and replaced
by suspicious asterisks. Ferrières has always been acknowledged as one
of the most trustworthy witnesses. It is he who relates that, at the first
meeting after the oath, the deputies were excluded from the tennis-court
in order that the Count d’Artois might play a match. We now find, from
the letters of a deputy recently published, that the story of this piece of
insolence is a fable. The clergy had made known that they were coming,
and it was thought unworthy of such an occasion to receive a procession
of ecclesiastics in a tennis-court; so the deputies adjourned to a
neighbouring church.
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cavalier, tells us that his own colleague from Auvergne was nearly killed
in a duel, and kept his bed for three months. Biauzat, the fellow-towns-
man of the wounded man, writes home that he was absent from the
Assembly only ten days. The point of the matter is that the adversary
whose hand inflicted the wound was Montlosier himself.
The narrative which Madame Roland drew up in prison, as an ap-
peal to posterity, is not a discreet book, but it does not reveal the secret
of her life. It came out in 1863, when three or four letters were put up
for sale at auction, and when, shortly after, a miniature, with something
written on it, was found amid the refuse of a greengrocer’s shop. They
were the letters of Madame Roland, which Buzot had sent to a place of
safety before he went out and shot himself; and the miniature was her
portrait, which he had worn in his flight.
Bertrand, the Minister of Marine, relates that the queen sent to the
emperor to learn what he would do for their deliverance, and he pub-
lishes the text of the reply which came back. For a hundred years that
document has been accepted as the authentic statement of Leopold’s
intentions. It was the document which the messenger brought back, but
not the reply which the emperor gave. That reply, very different from
the one that has misled every historian, was discovered by Arneth, and
was published two years ago by Professor Lenz, who lectures on the
Revolution to the fortunate students of Berlin. Sybel inserted it in his
review, and rewrote Lenz’s article, which upset an essential part of his
own structure.
The Marquis de Bouillé wrote his recollections in 1797, to clear
himself from responsibility for the catastrophe of Varennes. The corre-
spondence, preserved among Fersen’s papers, shows that the statements
in his Memoirs are untrue. He says that he wished the king to depart
openly, as Mirabeau had advised; that he recommended the route by
Rheims, which the king rejected; and that he opposed the line of military
posts, which led to disaster. The letters prove that he advised secret
departure, the route of Varennes, and the cavalry escort.
***
The general characteristic of the period I am describing has been
the breakdown of the Memoirs, and our emancipation from the author-
ity of the writers who depended on them. That phase is represented by
the three historians, Sybel, Taine, and Sorel. They distanced their pre-
decessors, because they were able to consult much personal, and much
diplomatic, correspondence. They fell short of those who were to come,296/John Acton
because they were wanting in official information.
Sybel was Ranke’s pupil, and he had learnt in the study of the Middle
Ages, which he disliked, to root out the legend and the fable and the lie,
and to bring history within the limits of evidence, in early life he ex-
ploded the story of Peter the Hermit and his influence on the Crusades,
and in the same capacity it was he who exposed the fabrication of the
queen’s letters. Indeed he was so sturdy a critic that he scorned to read
the fictitious Hardenberg, although the work contains good material. He
more than shared the unspiritual temper of the school, and fearing alike
the materialistic and the religious basis of history, he insisted on confin-
ing it to affairs of state. Having a better eye for institutions than his
master, and an intellect adapted to affairs, he was one of the first to turn
from the study of texts to modern times and burning questions. In erudi-
tion and remote research he fully equalled those who were scholars and
critics, and nothing else; but his tastes called him to a different career.
He said of himself that he was three parts a politician, so that only the
miserable remnant composed the professor. Sybel approached the Revo-
lution through Burke, with essays on his French and Irish policy. He
stood firmly to the doctrine that men are governed by descent, that the
historic nation prevails invincibly over the actual nation, that we cannot
cast off our pedigree. Therefore the growth of things in Prussia seemed
to him to be almost normal, and acceptable in contrast with the condi-
tion of a people which attempted to constitute itself according to its own
ideas. Political theory as well as national antagonism allowed him no
sympathy with the French, and no wonder he is generally under-esti-
mated in France. He stands aloof from the meridian of Paris, and medi-
tates high up in Central Europe on the conflagration of 1789, and the
trouble it gave to the world in general. The distribution of power in
France moves him less than the distribution of power in Europe, and he
thinks forms of government less important than expansion of frontier.
He describes the fall of Robespierre as an episode in the partition of
Poland. His endeavour is to assign to the Revolution its place in interna-
tional history.
Once it was said, in disparagement of Niebuhr and other historians,
that when you ask a German for a black coat he offers you a white
sheep, and leaves you to effect the transformation yourself Sybel be-
longs to a later age, and can write well, but heavily, and without much
light or air. His introduction, published in 1853, several years before the
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suggested that he might have read the earlier article by Tocqueville,
which John Mill translated for the Westminster Review. But Sybel as-
sured me that he had not seen it. He had obtained access to important
papers, and when he became a great public personage, everything was
laid open before him. In diplomatic matters he is very far ahead of all
other writers, except Sorel. Having been an opposition leader, and what
in Prussia is called a Liberal, he went over to Bismarck, and wrote the
history of the new German Empire under his inspiration, until the Em-
peror excluded him from the archives, of which, for many active years,
he had been the head. His five volumes, not counting various essays
written in amplification or defence, stand, in the succession of histories,
by dint of constant revision, at a date near the year 1880. For a time
they occupied the first place. In successive editions errors were weeded
out as fast as they could be found; and yet, even in the fourth, Mounier,
who, as everybody knows, was elected for Dauphiné, is called the deputy
from Provence. Inasmuch as he loves neither Thiers nor Sieyès, Sybel
declares it absurd to compare, as Thiers has done, the Constitution of
1799 to the British Constitution. In the page alluded to, one of the most
thoughtful in the Consulate and Empire, Thiers is so far from putting
the work of Sieyès on the British level, that his one purpose is to display
the superiority of a government which is the product of much experi-
ment and incessant adaptation to the artificial outcome of political logic.
Sybel’s view is that the Revolution went wrong quite naturally, that
the new order was no better than the old, because it proceeded from the
old, rose from an exhausted soil, and was worked by men nurtured in
the corruption of the old régime. He uses the Revolution to exhibit the
superiority of conservative and enlightened Germany. And as there is
little to say in favour of Prussia, which crowned an inglorious war by an
inglorious peace, he produced his effect by piling up to the utmost the
mass of French folly and iniquity. And with all its defects, it is a most
instructive work. A countryman, who had listened to Daniel Webster’s
Bunker Hill oration, described it by saying that every word weighed a
pound. Almost the same thing might be said of Sybel’s history, not for
force of language or depth of thought, but by reason of the immense
care with which every passage was considered and all the evidence
weighed. The author lived to see himself overtaken and surpassed, for
internal history by Taine, and for foreign affairs by Sorel.
Taine was trained in the systems of Hegel and Comte, and his fun-
damental dogma was the denial of free will and the absolute dominion298/John Acton
of physical causes over the life of mankind. A violent effort to shape the
future by intention and design, and not by causes that are in the past,
seemed to him the height of folly. The idea of starting fresh, from the
morrow of creation, of emancipating the individual from the mass, the
living from the dead, was a defiance of the laws of nature. Man is civilised
and trained by his surroundings, his ancestry, his nationality, and must
be adapted to them. The natural man, whom the Revolution discovered
and brought to the surface, is, according to Taine, a vicious and destruc-
tive brute, not to be tolerated unless caught young, and perseveringly
disciplined and controlled.
Taine is not a historian, but a pathologist, and his work, the most
scientific we possess, and in part the most exhaustive, is not history. By
his energy in extracting formulas and accumulating knowledge, by the
crushing force with which he masses it to sustain conclusions, he is the
strongest Frenchman of his time, and his indictment is the weightiest
that was ever drawn up. For he is no defender of the Monarchy or of the
Empire, and his cruel judgments are not dictated by party. His book is
one of the ablest that this generation has produced. It is no substitute for
history. The consummate demonstrator, concentrated on the anatomy of
French brains, renounces much that we need to be told, and is incompe-
tent as to the literature and the general affairs of Europe. Where Taine
failed Sorel has magnificently succeeded, and he has occupied the va-
cant place both at the Academy and in his undisputed primacy among
writers on the Revolution. He is secretary to the Senate, and is not an
abstract philosopher, but a politician, curious about things that get into
newspapers and attract the public gaze. Instead of investigating the hu-
man interior, he is on the look-out across the Alps and beyond the Rhine,
writing, as it were, from the point of view of the Foreign Office. He is at
his best when his pawns are diplomatists. In the process of home poli-
tics, and the development of political ideas, he does not surpass those
who went before him. Coming after Sybel, he is somewhat ahead of him
in documentary resource. He is more friendly to the principles of the
Revolution, without being an apologist, and is more cheerful, more san-
guine, and pleasanter to read. A year ago I said that, Sybel and Taine
being dead, Sorel is our highest living authority. To-day I can no longer
use those words.
On Ranke’s ninetieth birthday, Mommsen paid him this compliment:
“You are probably the last of the universal historians. Undoubtedly you
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parage general histories; but it is with a general history that I am going
to conclude what I have to say on the literature of the Revolution. In the
eighth volume of the General History, now appearing in France, Aulard
gives the political outline of the Revolution. It may be called the charac-
teristic product of the year 1889. When the anniversary came round, for
the hundredth time, and found the Republic securely established, and
wielding a power never dreamed of by the founders, men began to study
its history in a new spirit. Vast pains and vast sums were expended in
collecting, arranging, printing, the most authentic and exact informa-
tion; and there was less violence and partiality, more moderation and
sincerity, as became the unresisted victor. In this new school the central
figure was M. Aulard. He occupies the chair of revolutionary history at
Paris; he is the head of the society for promoting it; the editor of the
review, La Révolution, now in its thirty-first volume; and he has pub-
lished the voluminous acts of the Jacobin Club and of the Committee of
Public Safety. Nobody has ever known the printed material better than
he, and nobody knows the unpublished material so well. The cloven
hoof of party preference appears in a few places. He says that the people
wrought vengeance after the manner of their kings; and he denies the
complicity of Danton in the crimes of September. As Danton himself
admitted his guilt to no less a witness than the future king of the French,
this is a defiance of a main rule of criticism that a man shall be con-
demned out of his own mouth. Aulard’s narrative is not complete, and
lacks detail; but it is intelligent and instructive beyond all others, and
shows the standard that has been reached by a century of study.
Where then do we now stand, and what is the elevation that enables
us to look down on men who, the other day, were high authorities? We
are at the end, or near the end, of the supply of Memoirs; few are known
to exist in manuscript. Apart from Spain, we are advanced in respect of
diplomatic and international correspondence; and there is abundant pri-
vate correspondence, from Fersen downwards. But we are only a little
way in the movement for the production of the very acts of the govern-
ment of revolutionary France.
To give you an idea of what that means. Thirty years ago the Cahiers,
or Instructions, of 1789 were published in six large volumes. The edi-
tors lamented that they had not found everything, and that a dozen cahiers
were missing in four provinces. The new editor, in his two volumes of
introduction, knows of 120 instructions that were overlooked by his
predecessors in those four regions alone; and he says that there were300/John Acton
50,000 in the whole of France. One collection is coming out on the
Elections for Paris, another on the Paris Electors, that is, the body en-
trusted with the choice of deputies, who thereupon took over the munici-
pal government of the city and made themselves permanent. Then there
is the series of the acts of the Commune, of the several governing com-
mittees, of the Jacobins, of the war department, and seven volumes on
Vendée alone.
In a few years all these publications will be completed, and all will
be known that ever can be known. Perhaps some one will then compose
a history as far beyond the latest that we possess as Sorel, Aulard,
Rambaud, Flammermont are in advance of Taine and Sybel, or Taine
and Sybel of Michelet and Louis Blanc; or of the best that we have in
English, the three chapters in the second volume of Buckle, or the two
chapters in the fifth volume of Lecky. In that golden age our historians
will be sincere, and our history certain. The worst will be known, and
then sentence need not be deferred. With the fulness of knowledge the
pleader’s occupation is gone, and the apologist is deprived of his bread.
Mendacity depended on concealment of evidence. When that is at an
end, fable departs with it, and the margin of legitimate divergence is
narrowed.
Don’t let us utter too much evil of party writers, for we owe them
much. If not honest, they are helpful, as the advocates aid the judge; and
they would not have done so well from the mere inspiration of disinter-
ested veracity. We might wait long if we watched for the man who knows
the whole truth and has the courage to speak it, who is careful of other
interests besides his own, and labours to satisfy opponents, who can be
liberal towards those who have erred, who have sinned, who have failed,
and deal evenly with friend and foe assuming that it would be possible
for an honest historian to have a friend.Lectures on the French Revolution/301
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